

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



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PHILO JUDÆUS;

OR,

THE JEWISH-ALEXANDRIAN PHILOSOPHY

IN ITS

DEVELOPMENT AND COMPLETION.

BY

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Σπούδασον οὖν, ὃ ψυχὴ, θεοῦ οἶκος γενέσθαι.

PHILO, DE SOMNIIS, I. 23.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.



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P R E F A C E.

THE work which is here offered to the public is not intended to be a complete introduction to the study of Philo. The literature of the subject is only incidentally referred to ; and of the many topics which might attract the student to the writings of the Alexandrian only one has received systematic treatment. My studies originated in the desire to learn at first hand what Philo thought, and why he thought it ; and in order to guard, as far as possible, against every bias, I have considered it best, both in my own investigations, and in giving the results to the public, to avoid all side issues, and make the discussion purely historical. But while one could only gain by setting aside, for the time, the bearing of Philo's teaching upon Christian dogma, it was impossible to understand it without tracing the previous streams of thought, which met and mingled in the hospitable eclecticism of his philosophy. I have, therefore, prefixed to the book on Philo a sketch of those lines of Greek speculation which had the most influence upon him, and some account of that development of Hebrew thought of which he is the most distinguished representative. The latter subjects are not new to the English reader ; but I could hardly assume that they were familiar at least to

beginners, and, perhaps, even the more advanced may find in them a refreshment to their memory which will not be wholly without suggestion. A treatise on Philo's own philosophy needs no apology ; for not only is English literature deficient in this respect, but I have been led to entertain views which differ on fundamental points from those which are most current, and have arrived, rightly or wrongly, at a much higher estimate of Philo's speculative power than at one time I was tempted to form from the strange and incoherent jumble which has been ascribed to him by some eminent expositors. Not that his system is without gaps and flaws and inconsistencies ; but I hope I have succeeded in showing, to those at least who will take the trouble of transporting themselves into foreign climes of thought, that it was, in its grand and determining features, something better than a mere tissue of absurdity and contradiction, and that it was possible for a strong, comprehensive, and highly trained mind to accept it as the best attainable solution of the problem of existence. Still it has not been my intention to criticize Philo's philosophy, but simply to ascertain and expound it, leaving it to make its own impression on those who are sufficiently interested in it to undergo the labour of understanding it.

Sufficient acknowledgment has, I trust, been made to my predecessors in the notes. I have, of course, consulted the most eminent authorities ; but the work is throughout drawn straight from the original sources, and especially Philo himself has been a far more constant companion than his critics. In connection with the Wisdom of Solomon, I should have been glad to refer to an excellent paper by Mr. Claude

G. Montefiore, but my own chapter on the same subject was printed before it came, through the kindness of the author, into my possession. Professor Mahaffy's valuable work on "Greek life and thought from the age of Alexander to the Roman conquest," was also published too late to be of service.

In citing passages from Philo, I have sometimes, to prevent confusion and make the limits of the citation clearer to the eye, adopted smaller type; and in regard to these passages I must ask the reader to bear a distinction in mind. Where quotation marks are used I give a literal translation, adhering with as absolute fidelity as I can to the Greek; but where these marks are absent I present only the substance, often keeping closely to the original, but omitting portions which are not necessary to the subject in hand. In such cases I hope I have succeeded in preserving what is essential to Philo's meaning, and excluding everything foreign to it. My desire has been throughout to make Philo speak for himself.

I have habitually used the Tauchnitz edition of 1851-3, in eight volumes, resorting, when necessary, to Mangey's standard work. References are given to the name of the treatise, and the section in Tauchnitz, followed in brackets by the volume and page in Mangey. In the case of the Fragments printed by Mangey, the reference is only to the volume and page. References to the treatises published by Mai and Aucher include the numbers exhibited from these editors in the upper margin of Tauchnitz, except in the *De Providentia* and the *Quæstiones et Solutiones*, where only the treatise and section are given. References to Tischendorf and Professor Harris are indicated by the names of the editors.

Perhaps I ought to state that the Introduction was published, substantially, in 1877, in the form of a College address. Much of my time during the ten years which have since elapsed has been given to the work. And now I send forth these volumes in the hope that they may communicate to a few of those who are interested in the history of thought, some share of the pleasure which I have had in their preparation, and that, whatever defects the readers may find in Philo, their purest ideals will not be injured by contact with his noble seriousness, his catholic sympathy, and his truth of moral and spiritual judgment.

JAMES DRUMMOND.

HAMPSTEAD,

January 11th, 1888.

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Prospectus of the THEOLOGICAL TRANSLATION FUND.

As it is important that the best results of recent theological investigations on the Continent, conducted without reference to doctrinal considerations, and with the sole purpose of arriving at truth, should be placed within the reach of English readers, it is proposed to collect, by Subscriptions and Donations, a Fund which shall be employed for the promotion of this object. A good deal has been already effected in the way of translating foreign theological literature, a series of works from the pens of Hengstenberg, Haevernick, Delitzsch, Keil, and others of the same school, having of late years been published in English; but—as the names of the authors just mentioned will at once suggest to those who are conversant with the subject—the tendency of these works is for the most part conservative. It is a theological literature of a more independent character, less biassed by dogmatical prepossessions, a literature which is represented by such works as those of Ewald, Hupfeld, F. C. Baur, Zeller, Rothe, Keim, Schrader, Hausrath, Nöldeke, Pfeiderer, &c., in Germany, and by those of Kuenen, Scholten, and others, in Holland, that it is desirable to render accessible to English readers who are not familiar with the languages of the Continent. The demand for works of this description is not as yet so widely extended among either the clergy or the laity of Great Britain as to render it practicable for publishers to bring them out in any considerable numbers at their own risk. And for this reason the publication of treatises of this description can only be secured by obtaining the co-operation of the friends of free and unbiassed theological inquiry.

It is hoped that at least such a number of Subscribers of *One Guinea Annually* may be obtained as may render it practicable for the Publishers, as soon as the scheme is fairly set on foot, to

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PHILO JUDAEUS.

INTRODUCTION.

PHILO, AND THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE JEWISH-ALEXANDRIAN PHILOSOPHY.

THE writings of Philo Judaeus are full of interest not only on account of their intrinsic merits, but on account of their historical position. The former fail to make their due impression upon the modern reader, who is repelled by a method of exegesis which no longer appeals to him, and finds nothing but a tedious delusion in passages which may have delighted the writer's contemporaries by the brilliance and subtlety of the suggestions which he extracted from the Scriptures. Philo's apparent want of system is offensive to one who opens his works in order to discover his philosophical creed. Nowhere is any great philosophical question fully discussed, and brought to a clear conclusion; a multitude of passages have to be compared, and pieced together, and arranged, before anything resembling a philosophical system emerges into view. We shall be more patient with this seeming defect if we remember the object with which his treatises were written. He did not intend to step into the arena as the champion of a new philosophy, but rather to present an *apologia* for the teaching of Moses by showing that, even where it appeared questionable or trifling, it was full of the highest philosophical truth. His philosophy, therefore, only comes in by the way, and is guided by the requirements of his biblical interpretation. Precisely for this

reason he occupies a unique historical position, and has attained an eminence which, perhaps, on purely Hellenic ground he could hardly have reached. He became a model for the early Christian theologians, and especially for those of Alexandria. His general method of exegesis, many of its details, the determining principles of his religious philosophy, passed into the Christian Church; and although that philosophy was there wrought into fresh shapes by an original force, and combined with elements which were quite unknown to Philo, yet a careful study of his works fills with light the mental atmosphere in which the first Christian thinkers lived, and enables us to enter with much clearer insight into the position which they occupied.

The doctrine of the Logos, or the Word, is the one which excites our most immediate interest; for such a doctrine had existed for centuries, and we wish to know whence it arose, and what stage it had reached before it received a wholly new significance in Christianity. We may fairly say that it formed the central and determining factor of Philo's philosophy. For this very reason we are unable to understand it except in connection with the entire system; and the reader who desires to grasp Philo's real meaning must bear patiently with discussions which seem rather remote from the living thought of to-day, and must be content if he picks up here and there some lustrous gem, and derives from the whole study that sense of mental enjoyment with which a traveller returns from some strange land. Moreover, since the doctrine of the Logos was not original with Philo, but at most brought by him into new combinations, it is necessary to review its previous history. This history flowed in two streams which met and mingled in Alexandria, and, in order that the eclectic position of Philo may be clearly understood, it is our first duty to give a preliminary sketch of the principles and method by which the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy was distinguished, and of the surroundings and character of the man to whose writings we are chiefly indebted for our knowledge of a tendency of thought

so strange to our modern view, and yet so influential at the time when Christianity appeared.

We describe not only the most prominent feature of the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy, one which is obvious to the most casual reader of Philo, but one which really determines the character of all the rest, when we say that it is the mingled product of Hebrew and Greek ideas. It is an attempt to express the great religious conceptions of Moses and the Prophets in the language of the philosophical schools, and to bring into rational harmony the dogmas of a supernatural revelation and the results of speculative thought.

The preparation for this blending of eastern and western tendencies was made when Alexander chose in Egypt the site for a city which was destined to perpetuate his name. Though his vast empire fell to pieces after the untimely death of the conqueror, his foresight was in this instance amply justified. Alexandria grew into the spacious and magnificent capital of the Ptolemies, and, notwithstanding a change of masters, was for well-nigh a thousand years one of the chief centres of intellectual and commercial activity. Alexander himself translated a number of Jews to the newly erected city, and bestowed upon them full civic privileges, making them equal with the Macedonians. The same liberal policy was pursued by his successors. The first Ptolemy, having taken advantage of the Sabbath, seized upon Jerusalem, and removed a multitude of captives into Egypt. Knowing, however, the fidelity with which the Jews respected their engagements, he employed a portion of them in garrison duty; and on those who settled in Alexandria he conferred the full rights of citizenship. Encouraged by this generous treatment, numbers of Jews migrated from time to time into Egypt for their own purposes. Hence it happened that in Philo's time his countrymen formed a very important element in the population. He says that of five districts into which Alexandria was divided, two were known as the Jewish

quarters, being so named from the majority of their inhabitants, while many Jews were to be found also scattered up and down the remaining three. The whole Jewish population of Egypt he estimates at no less than a million.* The privileges so freely accorded to them by the Greek sovereigns, were continued to them on the conquest of Egypt by the Romans. Augustus allowed them to regulate their own affairs through the medium of a council of elders,† and for a considerable time they were even presided over by their own chief magistrate, named Ethnarch,‡ or, more distinctively, Alabarch. They did not, however, enjoy an unchequered prosperity. The contempt with which they looked down upon the miserable superstitions of Egypt, and the peculiar customs which served as a barrier between them and their neighbours, excited the animosity of the people among whom they lived, and they were subject from time to time, as so often in later ages and in other lands, to brutal outbursts of popular passion and violence, and occasionally to the more formal outrages of persecution directed by the government.§

We must now glance at the other element which most nearly concerns us in the population of Alexandria. The Ptolemies aspired to the honour of being patrons of learning, and their city became a rendezvous for adherents of the various forms of Greek philosophy. In the finest quarter of the city, running along the Great Harbour and fronting the celebrated Pharos lighthouse, stood not only the palace and the theatre, but the Museum. This was an institution founded by either the first or the second Ptolemy for the encouragement of learning. Its lecture-theatre and dining-hall stood hospitably open, regardless of sect or nationality, to all whose qualifications were sufficiently high. Intimately connected with it was

* In Flaccum, 6 and 8 (II. 523 and 525); Josephus, Bell. Jud., II. 18, § 7; Contra Ap. II. 4; Antiq. XII, 1, § 1.

† Philo, In Flac., 10 (II. 527). ‡ Strabo, apud Joseph., Ant. XIV, 7, § 2.

§ Joseph., Contra Ap. I, 21; II, 3 and 5; Bell. Jud. II, 18, §§ 7 and 8; Philo, In Flaccum, and Legatio ad Caium, *passim*.

the famous Library, which at one time contained among its treasures the private library collected by Aristotle, and offered to the student a choice, at the lowest estimate, of 400,000 volumes. To these solid advantages, so attractive to the genuine student, we must add the charm of popular favour. Philo tells us that almost every day the lecture-halls and theatres were crowded, and discourses about virtue were delivered. The audience seems to have comprised various classes of society, but, we must confess, was not such as to encourage men of real earnestness. For, according to Philo's account, instead of paying attention to what was said, they allowed their minds to wander elsewhere. Some thought of their ships and their commerce, others of their rents and their husbandry, others of civic honours, some of the profits of their trade, others of vengeance on their enemies, and some of their pleasures, so that they were present only in body, and differed nothing from images and statues. Some, it is true, paid attention, but came to be amused rather than benefited, and remembered nothing that was said. In a third set the words that were spoken found an echo : but these turned out to be sophists, and not philosophers, powerful in saying, but powerless in doing, what was best. With difficulty could one be found with fixed attention and retentive memory, honouring deeds rather than words.* This fashionable and worldly audience, however, was well enough suited to the degenerate condition of Greek philosophy, and would probably quite satisfy such a teacher as Philo describes, a man with pompous and haughty bearing, pulling up his eyebrows, and asking a handsome fee from those who wished to be his pupils, but turning away from those whom he perceived to be poor, though they thirsted for instruction.† The simplicity, depth, and originality of Greek genius were nearly extinct. It seemed as though the creative impulse had sunk down in exhaustion, and culture, criticism, and imitation supplied, as

* De Congressu eruditionis gratia, 13 (I. 528-9).

† Congr. erud. grat., 23 (I. 537).

best they could, the deficiency of natural force. The fostering influences of Alexandria were not really favourable to original developments. We have seen the kind of audience which the philosophers had to address, and we can easily suppose that in time their ideal would rise no higher than the rhetorical delivery of moral platitudes. The close dependence, too, of learning upon a court which was fond of mingling in superficial inquiries, but had no appreciation of the deeper questions of life and thought, depressed rather than encouraged the investigation of truth for its own sake; and the Museum, with its motley group of students of various nations and creeds, instead of being the calm abode of men serenely devoted to the highest pursuits, was too often a scene of jealousy and cabals.* The attempt, moreover, to bring different forms of thought into friendly union, however admirable in principle, and conducive to wider and more charitable views, is not without its dangers to some of the higher attributes of the mind. He who constructs his belief only by criticizing, and thinning off, and piecing together the various systems of greater men, can hardly have a sturdy faith of his own, and what he gains in comprehensiveness and breadth, he loses in directness and force. The study of comparative philosophy at Alexandria and elsewhere, bringing before the mind the most contradictory theories, each maintained with all the power of the human intellect, resulted in Scepticism; and this, when rest could not be really found in a permanent suspense of judgment, was succeeded by Eclecticism. But the endeavour to pick out, by the test of consciousness, whatever was true and good in the ancient systems, left a deep-seated want unsatisfied. The nice discernment and æsthetic admiration of the true and good did not constitute belief in them, and the kindling soul of faith was still absent. Greek philosophy began to look towards Oriental mysticism or positive revelation

* See Dähne, *Geschichtliche Darstellung der jüdisch-alexandrinischen Religions-Philosophie*, Halle, 1834, I. p. 9 sq.

to satisfy its yearnings. The religious spirit of the East, on its side, could not resist the fascination of Greek intellect and learning, and, committing itself to philosophical methods, endeavoured to find in the reason a justification for its creed. This mutual attraction of East and West, of religion and philosophy, produced in Egypt, where circumstances favoured their union, the Jewish-Alexandrian and Neo-Platonic schools.*

Of the former of these schools Philo was the most distinguished representative. Fortunately a large number of his writings have survived the ravages of time, and enable us to trace the lines of his thought, and gain an insight into the spirit by which he was animated; but of his outward life we know comparatively little, and probably the retirement of a student offered but few salient points to attract the pen of a biographer. He was a resident, and probably a native, of Alexandria,† and belonged to one of the most distinguished families of that city.‡ His brother Alexander was Alabarch,§ and not only by virtue of this office, but by his birth and property was the foremost man in the Jewish community.|| Philo himself, however, was not attracted by the excitements or the honours of political life, or by the social influence which wealth can command. From early life he was of a studious and contemplative disposition; and instead of crawling, as he expresses it, about glory or wealth or bodily comforts, he seemed to be carried aloft in a kind of inspiration, and to follow the sun and moon, and the whole heaven and universe. But in his later years he was forced from the retirement which he loved, and was plunged, he says, into a great sea of political cares, from which only occasionally could he raise his head, looking around him with the eyes of his soul now dimmed

* For an interesting sketch of the state of science and literature under the Ptolemies, see Professor Mahaffy's "Alexander's Empire," London, 1887, pp. 142 sqq.

† "Our Alexandria," Leg. ad Caium, 22 (II. 567). ‡ Eusebius, Hist. Ec. II. 4.

§ Josephus, Ant. XVIII, 8, § 1.

|| Josephus, Ant. XX, 5, § 2.

by the mist of portentous affairs, or resuming his favourite pursuits in some brief and unexpected lull.*

Of the more important of these political troubles he himself has given us an elaborate account. Flaccus had been appointed by Tiberius to the government of Alexandria and the adjoining country, and, so long as Tiberius lived, had displayed the qualities of a firm and sagacious administrator. After the accession of Caligula his character gradually changed, and became enervated by grief and fear. He had reason to apprehend the hostility of the new emperor, and turned a ready ear to the crafty suggestion that he must rely upon the support of Alexandria, and, in order to gain that support, must curry favour with the populace, and abandon the Jews to the malice of their enemies. The Jews soon experienced the effects of this counsel in his altered demeanour, and in the partiality of his conduct as a magistrate. While Flaccus was in this unfriendly mood, his jealousy was excited by the unexpected arrival of Agrippa, who had been honoured with the title of king, and seemed to insult his lower official rank by the display of regal magnificence. Publicly he dissembled his antipathy, but he secretly encouraged the mob to show their contempt for the royal visitor by every species of jibe and mockery. A poor naked idiot was dragged into the Gymnasium, and, having been robed in a mat, crowned with a flattened piece of papyrus, and presented with a papyrus sceptre, was made to do duty for the Syrian king, and, attended by some lads, armed with sticks, to represent his bodyguard, received the salutations of the rabble. Though the temper of the people, abandoned to their own caprices, was fast growing dangerous, Flaccus never interfered with this unseemly spectacle; and in the morning the crowd poured into the theatre, and the cry was made to erect images in the Jewish houses of prayer. The mob soon proceeded to every excess of violence. A few days later they assaulted the

* De Specialibus Legibus, III. 1 (II. 299-300).

Jewish quarters, sacked the houses, and broke open the workshops and carried off the tools, thus depriving the artisans even of their means of gaining subsistence. The terrified fugitives were now huddled together, and confined in a narrow space, till women and children began to die of want. Some stole away to beg for food. Others ventured to the market-place to buy necessities, but were seized and put to death, and their lifeless bodies were dragged away and trodden to pieces by the savage multitude. Wherever a Jew appeared he was assailed with sticks and stones. Whole families were burned, no pity being shown to either age or sex; and many perished by tortures, if possible, still more horrible. To crown all, thirty-eight members of the Council of Elders were arrested in their houses, bound, and dragged to the market-place, where they were so brutally scourged that some died at the time, and the lives of others were despaired of. The mad career of Flaccus was stopped by the unexpected arrival of Bassus, who was sent by the emperor to arrest him. His base method of attracting popular support availed him nothing. He was recalled to Italy, deprived of his property, banished, and finally executed.

How Philo was personally affected by these scenes of violence, we are not informed; but his deep interest in them is evinced not only by the narrative which has supplied the materials for the foregoing account, but by the fact that not long afterwards he undertook, though advanced in years, to carry the complaints of the Jewish community to Rome. The recall of Flaccus did not put an end to the troubles. Encouraged by the known enmity of Caligula towards the Jews, the mob of Alexandria renewed all the former atrocities. But what sank most deeply into the heart of a Jew was the attack upon the synagogues, many of which were to be found in every quarter of the city. Some of these were pillaged, others were burned to the ground, to the peril of the neighbouring dwellings. Where the Jews were so numerous as to

check this extremity of violence, the houses of prayer were defiled by images of the emperor; and in the largest and most celebrated—of which it is said in the Talmud that he who had not seen it had never seen the glory of Israel*—a bronze statue was erected, placed (such was the indecent hurry) in a very old, rusty, and dilapidated four-horse chariot, brought for the purpose from the Gymnasium. Thus the Alexandrians raised Caligula to the dignity which they lavished on asps and crocodiles. The Jews, in their perplexity, and despairing of any other remedy, resolved to despatch an embassy to lay the question of their privileges before the emperor himself. Of this embassy, consisting of five members,† Philo was appointed the head. The voyage took place in the winter,‡ probably at the end of the year 39 or the beginning of 40 of our era. This date is determined by references in Philo's account of the embassy. He stated in an address to the emperor that the Jews had offered sacrifices "in hope of the German victory."§ As the pretended campaign against Germany was conducted in the summer of 39 A.D., the embassy must have been at least as late as the ensuing winter. Again, while the ambassadors were in Italy, Caligula issued his order to Petronius to erect his image in the temple at Jerusalem.|| The reply of Petronius was written at harvest time,¶ and therefore, as Caligula was murdered in January, 41 A.D., the order to erect the statue must have been given at least as far back as the early months in the year 40; and thus the date of the embassy is exactly fixed.

The ambassadors, who knew that the emperor's mind was poisoned against them by the representations of their enemies,

* *Succa* 51 b., and elsewhere, quoted in Dr. Bernhard Ritter's "*Philo und die Halacha. Eine vergleichende Studie unter steter Berücksichtigung des Josephus.*" Leipzig, 1879, p. 6, Anm. 4.

† *Leg. ad Caium*, 46 (II. 600). Josephus makes the number "three"—*Ant.* XVIII, 8, § 1—but of course Philo knew best.

‡ *Leg. ad Cai.*, 29 (573).

§ *Ib.*, 45 (598).

|| *Ib.*, 29 (573).

¶ *Ib.*, 33 (583).

determined to present him with a memorial, containing a summary statement of their grievances and their wishes. They were agreeably surprised by the cordiality of their first reception. The emperor met them as he was coming out of his mother's garden on the banks of the Tiber, waved his right hand in token of good-will, and sent his officer who attended to the affairs of embassies to assure them that he would himself hear them when he had a favourable opportunity. The by-standers offered their congratulations; but the apprehensions of Philo, who was older and more experienced, were not allayed by this appearance of friendliness. In due time the capricious and insolent tyrant displayed his true character; and when Philo and his colleagues were formally summoned before him, his looks and gestures showed that they were meeting an accuser rather than a judge. They found him, not in magisterial state, but inspecting some gardens and country-houses; and he ran from place to place and gave his orders while they endeavoured to lay their cause before him. The spectators hissed and groaned and jeered. Caligula solemnly asked why they abstained from swine's flesh; and this piece of imperial witticism was received with roars of laughter. Even blows were inflicted; and at last, tired out and even despairing of their lives, they were dismissed.* Such was Philo's experience of political life.

The time when Philo lived may be approximately ascertained from circumstances connected with this embassy. In referring to the apprehensions which he felt after the apparent kindness with which he and his fellow-deputies were at first received, he says that he was supposed to be more prudent on account of his *age* and education.† At the opening of his narrative he describes himself as old and grey-headed at the time of writing.‡ Now, this narrative was written some time after the events which it relates; for in it Claudius is referred to with the imperial title.¶ Yet it is not probable that he

* Ib., 44 sqq. (597).

† 28 (572).

‡ 1 (545).

¶ 30 (576).

would allow any very long time to elapse without committing his experiences to writing; and we seem quite within the limits of safe conjecture if, with Gfrörer,* we say that the treatise was written not later than the tenth year of Claudius, or 50 A.D. Again, we learn from Pirqué Aboth† that a man was considered old at sixty, and grey at seventy. Hence we may fairly draw the conclusion that Philo was about sixty at the time of the embassy, and therefore was born about the year 20 B.C.‡

Happily the time of his greatest literary activity can be determined with some approach to certainty. We need not here follow the evidence, but content ourselves with the statement that the great majority of his works must have been written before the year 38 of our era.§

It thus appears that Philo's teaching was on the whole contemporary with that of Christ. It was too early to be influenced by Christian ideas; and although it is possible that his works may have been known to some of the writers of the New Testament, and there are occasionally startling coincidences of thought and expression, yet there is nothing to prove conscious borrowing, and it is probable that the resemblances are due to the general condition of religious culture among the Jews. We must regard him not as one who by his original force gave a decided bent to the development of Christian doctrine, but as one who marks the height to which the tide of religious speculation had risen, as one who represents a school of thought which was generated by the necessities of the time,

* Philo und die alexandr. Theosophie, &c. Stuttg., 1831, I. p. 40. † V. 21.

‡ Delaunay places his birth as far back as 30 B.C.—See his *Philon d'Alexandrie. Ecrits historiques*, &c. Paris, 1867, pp. 12-14. Mangey took the same view. See his *Præfatio*, p. ii.

§ See Gfrörer, p. 41 sqq., who gives, in the second chapter of his work, I. pp. 7 sqq., a classified list of Philo's writings. There is a similar list in Delaunay, pp. 61 sqq., and an admirable one by Schürer in his article on Philo in the last edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (also in his *Gesch. des Jüd. Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi. Zweiter Theil.* Leipzig, 1886, pp. 836 sqq.), to which I may be content to refer my readers.

and the principles of which were working in many minds far beyond the limits of Alexandria. It is Philo's distinguishing merit that he gave clear and full expression to the philosophical tendencies of his age, and has made it evident how among the Hellenistic Jews the ground was prepared for the advent of Christianity, and indicated numerous elements of doctrine and of feeling which the new religion, by its original and formative genius, was enabled to fashion to its own purposes and fill with a triumphant life. Again and again, as we read him, we wish that he and Paul could have known one another; and yet we doubt whether he could ever, with Paul, have broken loose from the bondage of the past, and committed himself trustfully to a new and more glorious future.

This leads us to notice Philo's position in the world of religious belief. We should entirely mistake that position if we supposed that he consciously broke with the traditions of the past. He considered himself a devout orthodox Jew, and earnestly defended the religion of Moses not only against idolatrous superstition or atheistic philosophy, but against the free-thinking tendencies among his own people. He gives an amusing instance of his intolerant attachment to even the most trivial portions of the ancient records. He once heard "an atheistic and impious man" scoffing at the change in the names of Abraham and Sarah, and urging that the addition of a single letter was no great gift from the Ruler of the universe. The mocker soon suffered a suitable punishment; for on some trifling pretext he was hanged!*

This anecdote will prepare us for the remark that Philo's whole system was avowedly based upon the Scriptures. They were the "oracles," the "sacred" or "divine word," whose inspiration extended to the most minute particulars. Under the influence of the Spirit the voluntary faculties of the prophet were suspended, and he became the passive instrument of a higher power.† Philo distinguishes, indeed, different

* De Mutatione Nominum, 8 (I. 587). † Quis rerum div. heres, 53 (I. 511).

kinds of inspiration,* but this distinction does not affect its divine authority. "The prophets are interpreters of God, who uses their organs for declaring whatsoever He will." They speak nothing of their own, but only what another suggests; and their own reflection resigns the citadel of the soul to the divine Spirit dwelling within them.† Yet this wonderful inspiration is not regarded as the result of special and arbitrary miracle. Communion between God and man is among the permanent possibilities of our race; and Philo goes so far as to say that every good and wise man has the gift of prophecy, while it is impossible for the wicked man to become an interpreter of God.‡ It is true that he is referring here primarily to the good men in the Scriptures; but he seems to regard them as representatives of a universal law. He did not look upon himself as a stranger to this blessed influence, but sometimes "a more solemn word" spoke from his own soul, and he ventured to write down what it said to him.§ In one passage he fully records his experience. He has been speaking of the presence of God, "along with the graces, his virgin daughters," and maintaining the necessity of this presence for any perfect work. He then proceeds:—"I am not ashamed to relate the way in which I am myself affected, which I know I have experienced countless times. Intending sometimes to come to my usual occupation of writing the doctrines of philosophy, and having seen exactly what I ought to compose, I have found my mind fruitless and barren, and left off without accomplishing anything, reproaching my mind with its self-conceit, and amazed at the power of HIM WHO IS, by whom it has turned out that the wombs of the soul are opened and closed. But sometimes, having come empty, I suddenly became full, ideas being invisibly showered upon me and planted from above, so that by a divine possession I was filled with enthusiasm, and

* Vita Mosis, III. 23 (II. 163-4).

† Monarchia, I. 9 (II. 222); Special. Leg. IV. 8 (II. 343).

‡ Quis rer. div. heres, 52 (I. 510).

§ Cherubim, 9 (I. 143).

was absolutely ignorant of the place, of those present, of myself, of what was said, of what was written; for I had a stream of interpretation,* an enjoyment of light, a most keensighted vision, a most distinct view of the subjects treated,† such as would be given through the eyes from the clearest exhibition [of an object].”‡ Elsewhere he refers to the suggestions of the spirit which was accustomed to commune with him unseen.§ It was evidently from this kind of experience that Philo formed his notion of inspiration; but he ascribed to the biblical writers a fulness of this divine enthusiasm, and consequent infallibility of utterance, which he claimed for no others.

At the head of the prophets stood Moses, whose like had not arisen, whom the Lord knew face to face.|| He was in the highest sense the interpreter of God, and combined in his own person, in their most exalted degree, the functions of king, legislator, high-priest, and prophet.¶ In a word, he was “a man in all respects greatest and most perfect.”** In accordance with this view Philo believed that the Law of Moses was unchangeable and eternal. The laws of others had been shaken or destroyed by the vicissitudes of time; but his alone remained firm and immovable, stamped as it were with the seals of nature herself, and amid all the changes of the Jewish people had not been disturbed in even the smallest enactment, and there was hope that his commandments would remain immortal through all time, as long as the sun and the moon and the whole heaven and universe should last.†† It was impossible to place any second prophet on so high a level. Other writers of the Old Testament are occasionally cited as

* I follow Markland's conjecture.

† I venture to change *ἐνέργειαν* into *ἐνάργειαν*, which seems to suit the sense much better. So I wrote before seeing Mangey's note: “Scribe omnino *ἐνάργειαν*.”

‡ Migrat. Abrah., 7 (I. 441).

§ De Somniis, II. 38 (I. 692).

|| Quis rer. div. her., 52 (I. 511).

¶ Vita Mosis, III. 23 (II. 163); and II. 1 (II. 134-5).

** Vita Mosis, I. 1 (II. 80).

†† Vita Mosis, II. 3 (II. 136).

inspired authorities; but they appear to occupy a subordinate position, and are not so much original channels of a new revelation as companions and disciples of Moses.*

The authority which we might suppose would attach only to the Hebrew Scriptures Philo extended to the Greek translation. He accepts the story which ascribes to the translators of the Pentateuch a miraculous concurrence in the choice of words. He speaks of the translators themselves as "hierophants and prophets," and maintains that the Hebrew and the Greek Scriptures are such that they must be admired and revered "as sisters, or rather as one and the same both in the facts and in the words."† He fully acts upon this belief, and, basing all his arguments on the LXX., accords to the Greek text as profound a veneration and faith as if it had been written by the finger of God himself.

Philo, however, was unable to confine his sympathies within the limits of an exclusive Judaism. Indeed, he could not admit that Judaism was exclusive, and he expresses his surprise that some ventured to charge with inhumanity the nation which had shown such excess of fellowship and good-will towards all men everywhere as to offer its prayers and celebrate its feasts on behalf of the common race of men.‡ This enlarged view had its practical result in the extended range of his studies. While believing that all wisdom was to be found in the Pentateuch, he did not in reality derive the whole of his knowledge from that source, or shape his conduct solely by its rules. He freely resorted to Greek places both of culture and of

* The prophet Jeremiah is hardly an exception, though he is specially cited as οὐ μόνον μύστης, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἱεροφάντης ἱκανός: Cherub., 14 (I. 148). Dr. Bernhard Ritter infers from this passage that, owing to Jeremiah's connection with Egypt, his memory was still cherished among the Egyptian Jews: Philo u. die Halacha, p. 4, Anm. 2.

† Vita Mosis, II. 5-7 (II. 138-140).

‡ Tischendorf, Philonea, p. 53. See also the striking saying, τοῦ νομίμου ἀνδρός, εὐθὺς ὅντος κοσμοπολίτου, on the ground that the law was in harmony with the nature of the cosmos: De mundi opificio, 1 (I. 1).

amusement. We have already noticed his account of the philosophical lectures. He did not disdain to go often to the theatre, where he seems to have studied the varied emotions of the audience as much as the skill of the performers;* and if we are to judge from his description of the conduct of the bulls in the bull-fight, he must have witnessed even that brutal sport.† But much more congenial to his temperament were the graver pursuits opened to him by the great masters of Greek thought. In his youth he passed through the so-called “encyclical” course of education, comprising grammar (which included in its higher grade the reading of history and the poets), arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music, and rhetoric. This course served as propædæutic to philosophy, with its three subdivisions of physics, ethics, and logic.‡ But while attaching a high value to this preparatory study, he felt the great uncertainty of merely speculative inquiries. He was acquainted with the various schools, and attributed the wide diversity of opinions which he there observed to the inherent difficulty of the problems which philosophy undertook to solve.§ He therefore embraced the divine philosophy of Moses as the clue by which to decide among the divergent systems; and no scepticism on the part of those who maintained that there was no Cause apart from phenomena could shake his faith in the supreme God, who indeed fills every portion of space with his power, but transcends the universe, or, as Philo expresses it, comprehends all things, but is not comprehended.|| In the noblest of the philosophers, however, he recognized elements of divine truth; and, perhaps to a much larger extent than he himself was aware of, he borrowed the methods of the schools, and poured his own

* De Ebrietate, 43 (I. 384).

† Mutat. Nom., 29 (I. 602).

‡ Cherubim, 30 (I. 157-8); Agricultura, 3 and 4 (I. 302-3); Congr. erud. grat., 3, 4, 14, 25, 26 (I. 520-2, 529-30, 539-41); Somn. I. 35 (I. 652).

§ Quis rer. div. heres, 50 (I. 508).

|| De Migratione Abrahami, 32 (I. 464), and generally his whole treatment of such questions.

religious belief into the moulds provided by Hellenic thought. Pledged to no sect, he culled whatever fruits attracted him; and Pythagorean, Platonic, Peripatetic, and Stoical doctrines all exercised their influence in the formation of his opinions.

These two positions, maintained by Philo without any sense of contradiction between them, were in reality incompatible. Moses did not teach the Platonic doctrine of ideas, nor could the deep utterances of a spiritual philosophy be found in the literal meaning of the stories in Genesis. Philo accordingly summoned to his aid, as the solvent of all difficulties, the system of allegorical interpretation. We should wholly misapprehend the nature of this system, if we supposed that it consisted either in a mere whimsical search for hidden meanings, or in an intentional falsification of the plain sense of Scripture in order to commend it to philosophic minds. However grotesque many of its results must appear to us, and however grossly its whole method departs from the canons of scientific exegesis, Philo employed it with all seriousness, and believed that he was faithfully drawing out the original meaning of the writers whom he expounded. A little consideration will show us that some such mode of interpreting sacred books marks an inevitable stage in the progress of religious belief. When it is held as a fundamental and incontrovertible truth that certain ancient writings are in all respects divine, the inference immediately follows that whatever seems undivine in them must be so in appearance only; and men will, with equal honesty and humility, contend that the difficulties arise solely from fallible and unspiritual interpretations long before they can admit that the whole position, which has been so universally accepted as the basis of religion, is itself erroneous. Plato and the Stoics endeavoured to save the credit of the myths by allegorical interpretation.* The Koran and the Veda have not been exempt from the application of a similar

* Examples from the writings of the Stoics will be given farther on.

method.* And nearer home we may find a parallel in the non-natural interpretations of articles of belief, and in the strained explanations by which certain passages of Scripture are forced into agreement with the facts of science. Philo's difficulties were naturally not of a scientific, but of a religious and speculative character. He had attained to a philosophical conception of God, and of his relation to the world, with which numerous statements in the Pentateuch could not, if accepted in their literal sense, be possibly reconciled. Everything anthropomorphic had to be transmuted into some spiritual or philosophical truth. Adam and Eve, for instance, could not have really hidden themselves from God, because God has interpenetrated the universe, and left nothing empty of himself; and therefore the account refers only to the false conception of the wicked man.† “It is silly to suppose that the universe was made in six days, or in time at all,” because time is the interval of days and nights, and dependent on the motion of the sun, and is consequently posterior to the universe; and therefore the Mosaic expression was used to denote the orderly arrangement of creation, for number is a property of arrangement, and of numbers six is the most perfect and productive.‡ Whatever, superficially regarded, appeared to be trivial and foolish must for that very reason be the veil of some profound thought. To suppose that God really planted fruit-trees in Paradise, when no one was allowed to live there, and when it would be impious to fancy that he required them for himself, is “great and incurable silliness.” The reference must, therefore, be to the paradise of virtues, with their appropriate actions, implanted by God in the soul.§ The objections of cavillers were set aside by a similar process. There were those who sneered at the story of the tower of

* Ewald, *Gesch. d. Volk. Isr.*, IV. p. 335, Anm. 1.

† *Legum Allegoriæ*, III. 2 (I. 88).

‡ *Ibid.*, I. 2 (I. 44); *De Mundi Opificio*, 3 (I. 3).

§ *De Plantatione Noe*, 8, 9 (I. 334-5).

Babel, and thought it parallel to Homer's tale about Pelion, Ossa, and Olympus. Such persons were to be refuted by having recourse to the true interpretation, which traced between the lines the universal nature and course of wickedness.* Even those who wished respectfully to adhere to the literal meaning of a humane precept are rebuked, and taught to recognize in the pledged garment† the gift of speech, by which, as by raiment, man is protected, covered, and adorned.‡

When once men had committed themselves to this mode of interpretation, it was natural that it should be pushed far beyond the passages which, from their difficulty, seemed to demand its application. Accordingly Philo tells us that "almost everything, or most things in the legislation [that is, I presume, in the Pentateuch] are related allegorically."§ Still, whenever nothing objectionable occurs, the literal meaning is allowed to stand, although side by side with it the familiar symbolism is introduced; and Philo emphatically protests against the opinion that the ceremonial law might be neglected on account of its spiritual significance.|| The high development which allegorical explanation must have reached when it was necessary to introduce such a caution might lead us to suppose that it had long been familiar to the Egyptian Jews. It seems, accordingly, in Philo's time to have been characteristic of a school of expositors,¶ to have attained to the regularity of a system, as we may judge from the retention of the same symbolical meaning for the same person or event, and to have been governed by a settled code of laws or canons.**

* De Confusione Linguarum, 1 sqq. (I. 404 sqq.).

† Exodus xxii. 26, 27.

‡ Somn., I. 16 sqq. (I. 634 sqq.).

§ De Josepho, 6 (II. 46).

|| Migrat. Abrah., 16 (I. 450-1).

¶ "With us the allegorizers," Somn., II. 20 (I. 677).

** Somn., I. 13, 17 (I. 631, 636); II. 2 (p. 660); De Abrahamo, 15 (II. 11). These laws have been carefully set forth and illustrated by Dr. Carl Siegfried, in his *Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des Alten Testaments*, &c. Jena, 1875, pp. 160 sqq. In the course of this work the connection between Philo's exegesis and that of the Rabbinical schools is investigated. Ritter, in his *Philo und die Halacha*, supplements these inquiries by tracing the relation of Philo's expo-

These rules, however, were not such as to preclude differences of opinion, and Philo more than once intimates his dissent from the exposition of other teachers, and ventures to put forward an interpretation of his own.*

An example will convey the best idea of this exegesis. Philo is speaking of the Cherubim who were placed, with a flaming sword that turned every way, to guard the approaches to the tree of life. Some supposed that by the Cherubim were typified, in accordance with the astronomical notions of the time, the two celestial spheres, the outer one of the fixed stars, and the interior seven-fold sphere of the planets. The waving sword signified the eternal motion of the heavens. According to others the Cherubim were the two hemispheres, which fronted one another over the mercy-seat, the earth; and the flaming sword was the swift and fiery sun. "But," says Philo, "I once heard even a more solemn word from my soul, accustomed often to be possessed by God and prophesy about things which it knew not; which, if I can, I will recall to the mind and mention. Now, it said to me that in the one really existing God the supreme and primary powers are two, goodness and authority, and that by goodness he has generated the universe, and by authority he rules over what was generated; and that a third thing in the midst, which brings these two together, is Reason [Logos], for that by Reason God is possessed both of rule and of good. [It said] that of rule, therefore, and of goodness, these two powers, the

sitions of the Law to the Palestinian Halacha. He shows that our philosopher sometimes adheres more closely to the letter of a command than the Halacha itself, and thinks that the most important deviations from the Palestinian tradition may be explained by the different circumstances of the Egyptian Jews. Philo himself acknowledges his indebtedness to traditions handed down by the elders of his people, who engaged in the diligent interpretation of the Law of Moses. See *Vita Mos.*, I. 1 (II. 81); *De Circumcisione*, 2 (II. 211); *De Justitia*, 3 (II. 361).

* See, for instance, *Leg. Al.*, I. 18 (I. 55); *Cherubim*, 7-9 (I. 142-4); *Quis rer. div. heres*, 57 (I. 513-14); *Mutat. Nom.*, 25 (I. 599); *Somn.*, I. 2, 8, 9, 19 (I. 621, 626-7, 638).

Cherubim are symbols, and of Reason the flaming sword [is the symbol] ; for Reason is a thing most swift in its motions and hot, and especially that of the Cause, because it anticipated and passed by everything, being both conceived before all things and appearing in all things." Presently he rambles off, as is his wont, to examples from other portions of the history. "Do you not see," he asks, "that also the wise Abraham, when he began to measure all things by God, and to leave nothing to that which is generated, takes an imitation of the flaming sword, 'fire and a knife,' earnestly desiring to destroy and burn up the mortal from himself, in order that with naked intellect he may soar aloft to God? And Balaam, being a vain people, Moses introduces disarmed, . . . for he says to an ass, the irrational preference of life, which every fool has mounted, 'If I had a knife, I would already have killed thee.'"* This may serve as a sample of that strange process by which the beautiful simplicity of nature was clothed in the artificial adornments of the schools, and the personages of the Old Testament, though their historical reality was still admitted, lost the warmth and glow of life, and became the cold puppets of a mystical philosophy. Many other examples will occur in the course of our work.

We should, however, do Philo an injustice if we supposed that he was only a learned trifler. His philosophy, if not characterized by the highest originality, yet pursues its eclectic course with a full consciousness of the deeper speculative problems, and the system has, I believe, been welded together by a mind of firmer grasp and more coherent thought than is generally supposed.† His method of exegesis belonged to the

* Cherub., 7-10 (I. 142-4).

† This view must find its justification in the course of our work. The less favourable judgment is strongly expressed by Vacherot, who says of Philo's syncretism:—"C'est plutôt une juxtaposition qu'une combinaison systématique de doctrines d'origine différente. Ce qui fait l'unité de ce syncrétisme, c'est la prédominance des doctrines et de l'esprit de l'Orient, et non une idée supérieure à laquelle viendraient à la fois se rallier la tradition judaïque et la science

time in which he lived, and we must not allow the tedium of his exposition to hide from us the beauty of his religious conceptions and the just balance of his ethical ideals. His sincere devotion to the higher Will, and his pure love of goodness, were all his own; and we may, in concluding this preliminary sketch, glance by anticipation at a few of the thoughts which serve to exemplify his moral earnestness and his practical wisdom.

Like the Apostle Paul, he was familiar with the internal war, which he pronounces to be "the most difficult and oppressive of all wars."* This conflict is occasioned by the antagonism between soul and body. "Righteousness," he says, "and every virtue love the soul, unrighteousness and every vice the body, and the things friendly to the one are altogether hostile to the other."† The body is by nature evil, and plots against the soul. It is dead, so that each of us carries a corpse; and "the philosopher, being a lover of the beautiful, cares for that which is alive in him, the soul, and neglects that which is dead, the body, aiming only at this, that that which is best, the soul, may not be maltreated by the evil and dead thing with which it is bound up."‡ This view, logically carried out, is the parent of asceticism. It had already collected the Essenes

grecque" (*Histoire critique de l'École d'Alexandrie*. Paris, 1846-51, Vol. I., p. 161). Ritter also expresses a very low opinion both of his originality and of his philosophical power (*History of Ancient Philosophy*, trans. by Morrison, 1838-46, Vol. IV., pp. 418 sq.). Professor Jowett, too, expresses the opinion that, apart from the fact that his writings "are a curious chapter in the history of the human mind, . . . they bear only the appearance of learned trifling"; but in the former aspect he admits their importance (See his *Essay on St. Paul and Philo* in his work on *The Epistles of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians, Romans*. London, 1855, Vol. I., p. 369). After these damaging verdicts it is refreshing to find that Professor J. Rendel Harris has "a profound reverence, amounting almost to a cultus, for the Alexandrian sage," whose very fragments seem "such blessed brokenness of truth just dawning on the world that one would almost imagine him to be holding out to us what had previously passed through the hands of the Master himself" (See *Fragments of Philo Judæus*, newly edited. Cambridge, 1886, pp. 1 sq.). Yet it is only in a very qualified sense that I could call him, with Havet, "un Père de l'Église" (*Le Christianisme et ses origines*. Paris, 1872, II. p. 247).

* *Mundi Op.*, 26 (I. 19).

† *Quis rer. div. heres*, 50 (I. 507).

‡ *Leg. Al.*, III. 22 (I. 101). See also *Agricultura*, 5 (I. 304), where *σάπξ* is used.

in Palestine, and perhaps the Therapeutæ in Egypt,* into separatist communities, and it was destined at a later period to people the Egyptian desert with monks. Yet Philo was not an ascetic. He indeed believed that the beatific vision of God could be reached only by the control of the senses and passions; but this control was not to be attained by artificial methods. He had learned from his allegory that the serpent pleasure bites in the wilderness; and he found in his own experience that often, when he had left his friends and his home, and gone into the desert, that he might contemplate some of the things worth beholding, he gained no benefit, but his mind was dissipated, or bitten by passion; but sometimes in the midst of a crowd he secluded his soul, and thus was taught that "it is not the differences of places that work the good or ill, but God, who moves and guides the chariot of the soul wherever he prefers."† Accordingly he lived in the world, while he tried to keep himself from its evil. He was familiar with, though he disapproved of, the ostentation of Alexandrian society, the magnificent houses, with their superb furniture, the splendid attire, the sumptuous banquets, and the other paraphernalia of luxury brought at a vast expense from all quarters of the world.‡ What, then, is his advice to those who felt the moral dangers of this society? "Do not," he says, "turn to the opposite course, and immediately pursue poverty and abasement, and an austere and solitary life." On the contrary, show how wealth ought to be used for the benefit of others; accept posts of

* The genuineness of the treatise *De Vita Contemplativa*, ascribed to Philo, can no longer be assumed. It has been rejected by Grätz, Kuenen, and others, and has been attacked with especial force by Lucius in a separate work, *Die Therapeuten u. ihre Stellung in der Gesch. der Askese, &c.* Strassburg, 1879. The last-named writer thinks it was composed about the end of the third century, under the name of Philo, as an apology for Christian asceticism. Zeller, who defended the genuineness of the treatise in the second edition of his *Philosophie der Griechen*, admits, in his third, the conclusive character of the arguments adduced by Lucius (III. ii. p. 307).

† Leg. Al., II. 21 (I. 81-2).

‡ Somn., II. 7-9 (I. 665-7).

honour and distinction, and take advantage of your position to share your glory with those who are worthy, to provide safety for the good, and to improve the bad by admonition; and instead of fleeing from the banquet-table, exhibit there the virtue of temperance. Those who, with squalid and melancholy exterior, say that they despise glory and pleasure are only hypocrites. We must first prove our virtue in public and private affairs, and then only may we pass on from the practical to the contemplative life.*

Philo maintained for this practical life a moral standard which, in its severe purity, reminds us of Christian precepts. "It seems to me," he says, "that those who are not entirely uneducated would rather be blinded than see things which they ought not, be deafened than hear injurious words, and have their tongue cut out to prevent them from giving utterance to anything that ought not to be spoken."† Reverence towards God is the greatest of the virtues, through which the soul becomes immortal,‡ and no pardon can be given to those who "blaspheme the Divinity, . . . the Father and Maker of the universe."§ The bread from heaven is "the word of God, and divine Reason [Logos]," "the ethereal wisdom," which God showers from above on intellects that love to see; and this divine ordinance gives light to the seeing soul, and sweetens "those who thirst and hunger after excellence."|| Piety must be sincere and inward. Men are not to make clean their bodies with baths and purifications, while they make no attempt to wash away the passions of the soul by which life is polluted, nor are they to come to the sacred places, clad in white and spotless raiment, while they bring a defiled understanding to the shrine, as though the eye of God saw only what was outside, and did not by its own light discern what was

* De Profugis, 4-6 (I. 549-51). See also Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat, 7 (I. 195).

† Quod det. pot. insid., 48 (I. 224).

§ De Profugis, 16 (I. 558).

‡ Mundi Op., 54 (I. 37).

|| Prof., 25 (I. 566).

invisible.* The tribunal of God is inaccessible to bribes, so that it rejects the guilty, though they offer daily a hundred oxen, and receives the guiltless, though they offer no sacrifice at all; for God delights in fireless altars, round which virtues form the choral dance.† They are to be pitied for their error who mistake bodily mortification for temperance, and ritual for holiness.‡ Related as we are to the supreme Ruler, it is our being's end and aim to say and do everything so as to please the Father and King, to follow him in the ways which the virtues prepare, and to become like our Parent, God.§ The good man acquires excellence and virtue for their own sake alone, and not for the sake of anything else,|| and "the works themselves" are "the perfect reward."¶

With this lofty aim Philo, like Paul, desired to mingle an overflowing joy. He wages war, indeed, against pleasure, which he uses in a bad sense; ** but joy is "the fairest of possessions"; †† "God is the Creator of earnest laughter and joy"; ‡‡ nay, "laughter, the synonym of joy, the best of comforts, is the ideal son of God, §§ who gives him to soothe and cheer most peaceful souls." ||| But "every wise man rejoices in himself, not in his surroundings." ¶¶

Such are a few of the sayings scattered throughout the writings of Philo, which afford us a glimpse into the earnest, pure, and balanced character of a man richly endowed and highly cultured, capable of giving eloquent expression to the best tendencies of his age, but not inspired with the genius to step beyond his age, and through the force of his own personality impress upon the world the formative principle of a new and nobler era.

* Cherubim, 28 (I. 156).

† Plantat. Noe, 25 (I. 345).

‡ Quod det. pot. insid., 7 (I. 195).

§ Mundi Op., 50 (I. 34-5).

|| Leg. Al., III. 58 (I. 120).

¶ Somn., II. 5 (I. 663).

** Leg. Al., III. 35 sqq. (I. 108 sqq.). This subject will be fully treated in the chapter on "The Higher Anthropology."

†† Quod. det. pot. insid., 32 (I. 214).

‡‡ Ibid., 33 (I. 215).

§§ 'Ο ἐνδιάθετος υἱὸς θεοῦ.

||| Mutat. Nom., 23 (I. 598).

¶¶ Quod det. pot. insid., 37 (I. 217).

BOOK I.

GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.

HERACLITUS.

IN the sketch presented in this and the following chapters it is our object to bring before the reader only those portions of Greek philosophy which stand in the nearest relation to the system of Philo, and especially to his doctrine of the Logos. Many distinguished names are, therefore, passed over in silence, and even Plato and Aristotle become subordinate to Heraclitus and the Stoics. The subject which has now to engage our interest is found in the successive attempts of reason to discover the eternal ground of phenomenal existence, and to interpret the method by which the infinite Cause enters into relations with the finite material world and with the soul of man. The doctrine of the Logos, considered as an endeavour to bridge the chasm which separates God and the universe, finds its fullest expression in the writings of Philo; but it owes its terminology and its philosophical form to Greek influence, and is very largely indebted even to schools of thought which recognized no transcendent Cause, but saw the ultimate ground of things in the cosmical Logos itself. It had, accordingly, undergone a long course of development before it was brought into alliance with Hebrew monotheism. To trace this development will mainly engross our attention in the succeeding pages. The proportions of

our treatment, therefore, will be widely different from those which are proper in a complete history of Greek philosophy, and it is no part of our purpose to discuss difficult points which have not a direct bearing on our central topic. With these few words of explanation we may proceed to our task.

The first efforts of Greek philosophy were excited by a contemplation of the phenomena of nature. Physical inquiries, in the course of which the distinction between mind and matter became clear in the consciousness, naturally preceded ethics, an investigation of the principles which ought to regulate our spiritual activity; and successive attempts to construct a theory of the material universe were needed to throw men back upon an inquiry into the nature of the thinking subject, and so prepare the way for logic, the systematic exposition of the laws of thought. Accordingly the Ionian, the Pythagorean, and the Eleatic schools all addressed themselves to the question, What is the essence of things; of what does the material world ultimately consist? The Ionian philosophers solved this question by the hypothesis of a primitive substance. Thales derived all things from water; Anaximander from the infinite,* which, whatever was its precise character, was certainly a kind of matter; Anaximenes from air. The Pythagoreans, proceeding to a more abstract conception, found the essence of things in number, while the Eleatic school resolved it into Being,† one and eternal. We need not dwell upon the various modes by which the multiplicity of phenomena was deduced from the primal essence; for the speculations of these early thinkers do not properly belong to our present subject. They are mentioned that we may understand clearly the advance that was made by the philosophy of Heraclitus the Ephesian, who flourished about 500 B.C.‡ He, like other Ionians, arrived at the idea of a primitive substance; but the search after this was not the

* Τὸ ἄπειρον.

† Τὸ ὅν.

‡ The 69th Olympiad according to Diogenes Laertius, IX. 1.

determining motive of his philosophy. To him the one permanent thing in the universe was the law of phenomenal change, and in the assertion of such a law we come upon the first traces of the doctrine of a cosmical Logos. To make this clear we must give a general sketch of the philosophy of Heraclitus.*

The fundamental position in his system is the doctrine that all things are in a state of constant flow and change. It was a mistake to suppose that visible objects had any permanent existence. Nature loved to conceal itself,† and eyes and ears were bad witnesses for men.‡ What to the unreflecting seemed so stable, in reality never preserved its identity for two successive moments. This view is illustrated by the celebrated dictum that you could not enter the same river twice, for wave constantly succeeds to wave.§ The very sun was new every day.|| The world was like a mixed liquid, which separated into its component parts if it was not stirred,¶ and the creative power was like a child playing draughts.**

This doctrine of perpetual change naturally conducted Heraclitus to his conception of the primitive substance. This must be fire, which appears to be the most movable and convertible of elements. It accordingly was supposed to be the essence of the universe, which was not made by anyone, either of gods or men, but always was and is and shall be an ever-living fire.†† It is a question in what precise manner all things were derived from fire, whether by qualitative change, or simply by condensation and rarefaction. Zeller expresses himself very decidedly in favour of the former view, and appeals in its

* On the relation of Heraclitus to the early schools, see Zeller's *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*; Bd. I., vierte Aufl. Leipzig, 1876, p. 147 sqq. For the Fragments of Heraclitus' work, *Ἐπεὶ φήσεως*, with much collateral matter, see *Heracliti Ephesii reliquiæ*. Recensuit I. Bywater; . . . Oxonii, 1877.

† Fragment x. See Bywater, where the authorities are fully given.

‡ Fragment iv.

§ Fragment xli.

|| Fragment xxxii.

¶ Fragment lxxxiv.

** Fragment lxxix.

†† Fragment xx.

support to the saying, "All things are interchangeable with fire, and fire with all things, as goods with gold and gold with goods."* According to this comparison, he says, it is not the material, but only the value that remains the same, and it would contradict the fundamental doctrine of the flow of things if the derived material were conceived as arising from the primitive substance by mere mechanical juxtaposition and separation. Still more important is the remark that in the surviving fragments of Heraclitus's work the expressions with which he denotes the transition of one element into another are never rarefaction and condensation, combining and separating, but only "changes,"† the kindling and extinction of the fire, the life and death of the elements.‡ Nevertheless, the later Greek authorities very explicitly assert the contrary view. Diogenes Laertius§ declares that according to Heraclitus fire was an element, and by the change of fire all things existed, arising by rarefaction and condensation;|| for that fire, when condensed, became water, and water, when made solid, turned into earth. Plutarch¶ and Simplicius** give a similar representation. It is difficult to believe that the philosopher's own work afforded no justification for such express statements, and I confess Zeller's reasoning does not appear to me absolutely conclusive. It may be, however, that the above-mentioned writers were misled by the proverbial obscurity of Heraclitus, an obscurity which is referred to by Diogenes Laertius in connection with this very point.†† As Zeller points out, a condensation must in any case be supposed in the conversion of fire into water; but, in his

* Fragm. xxii.

† Τροπαί.

‡ See Fragms. xx., xxi., xxv.

§ IX. 8 sq.

|| Ἀραιώσκει καὶ πυκνῶσκει.

¶ Plac. Phil., I. 3, p. 877 C, πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τὸ παχυμερέστατον αὐτοῦ εἰς αὐτὸ συσσελλόμενον γῆν γίνεσθαι, ἔπειτα ἀναχαλωμένην τὴν γῆν ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς φύσει ὕδωρ ἀποτελεῖσθαι, ἀναθυμιάμενον δὲ ἀέρα γίνεσθαι.

** Com. in Arist. Phys., fol. 6 a (Aldus, 1526), Hippasus and Heraclitus ἐκ πυρὸς ποιοῦσι τὰ ὄντα πυκνῶσκει καὶ μανῶσκει.

†† Σαφῶς δὲ οὐδὲν ἐκτίθεται

view, Heraclitus must have regarded the condensation as the effect, not the cause, of the change of substance.*

However this question may be decided, the fire was conceived as moving perpetually along the same line of change, in a downward and an upward direction.† The fire changes into the sea (which stands generally for everything moist), and of the sea half becomes earth (under which are included all solid bodies) and half meteoric light.‡ The last term is only another word for fire. The sea being the intermediate substance on the line of descent and ascent, is constantly changing in both directions, descending into earth, and ascending to resume its pristine form. Elsewhere the word *soul* § is used instead of fire, of which the soul was composed; || and the twofold process of change is thus described: "It is death to souls to become water, and death to water to become earth; but from earth water arises and from water soul."¶ We now see precisely in what the flow of things consists. It is this constant change of substance, the alteration on the ascending line compensating for that on the descending; and so long as objects appear to preserve their identity it is because they receive in one direction exactly as much as they lose in the other.

It immediately follows from this conception that there must be a certain regularity or law in the changeful substance, and if there is no permanence of material composition, there must, nevertheless, be a permanence of relations. The universe, accordingly, is not merely in its essence an eternal, ever-living, and ever-changing fire; it is a cosmos, a scene of orderly arrangement, and the fire in its kindling and extinction proceeds by measures—that is, by some determinate rule.** Agreeably to this conception, Heraclitus says: "The sun will not transgress its measures;

* See Zeller, I. p. 592 sq.

† Πρῆστον, Fragm. xxi.

|| See the authorities in Zeller, I. p. 589, Anm. 1.

** Ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα, Fragm. xx.

† Fragm. lxix.

§ Ψυχή.

¶ Frag. lxviii.

but if so, the Erinyes, the defenders of right,* will find it out.”† So he declares that seasons (or fixed periods, *ῥοαί*) bear all things,‡ and speaks apparently of the invisible and most beautiful harmony of the universe which springs from the strife of things diverse.§

This notion of a universal law is intimately connected, or rather identical, with that of the Logos or cosmical reason.|| An allusion to the Logos, which is quoted more or less fully by several writers, occurred at the beginning of the work “On Nature.”¶ The fragment** runs thus: “Of this Logos existing always men are without understanding,†† both before they have heard and when they have heard for the first time. For, though all things happen according to this Logos, they seem like inexperienced people when they experience such words and facts as I describe, separating each thing according to nature and telling how it is. But whatever they do when awake escapes the notice of all other men, just as they forget whatever they do in their sleep.” As Heinze points out,‡‡ two important conclusions are established by this fragment. In the first place, the Logos is eternal. Aristotle, it is true, complains of the uncertainty of the construction, and is in doubt whether the “always” qualifies the preceding or the following words;§§ but Heinze’s remark, that “existing” is unintelligible without “always,” whereas “without understanding” requires no such adjunct, appears decisive of the question. In the second place, Logos here cannot denote

* *Δίκη*.

† Fragm. xxix.

‡ Fragm. xxxiv.

§ See Fragms. xlv.-xlvii., with the authorities.

|| I should state that in the following account I am largely indebted to Heinze’s *Die Lehre vom Logos in der Griechischen Philosophie*. Oldenburg, 1872.

¶ *Περὶ φύσεως*.

** Fragm. ii. in Bywater.

†† *Λόγου τοῦδε ἰόντος αἰὶ ἀξύνετοι κ.τ.λ.* The manuscripts of Aristotle, Clemens Al., Hippolytus and Eusebius have *τοῦ δέοντος*. Sextus Empiricus, however, reads as above, and no doubt correctly. See Heinze, p. 9, Anm. 3, and the authorities quoted in Bywater.

‡‡ P. 10.

§§ See the passage in Bywater.

simply the discourse on which Heraclitus is entering. For this conclusion Heinze relies on the parallelism between "according to this Logos," and "according to Nature," from which he infers that Logos must have denoted the law of Nature. This inference is, perhaps, not quite beyond the reach of doubt, and the point seems to me to be more securely established by our previous proposition. An eternally-existing Logos cannot have been a particular discourse, but at most a rational law which the discourse attempted to unfold. And although later writers were inclined to press the language of early philosophers into the service of their own systems, we need not altogether overlook the fact that those who had more than a fragment before them understood the word without hesitation in its metaphysical sense. This is true at least of Sextus Empiricus, Hippolytus, and Amelius;* and, if we are to trust an indirect quotation in Diogenes Laertius,† Heraclitus must have used not only the word Logos, but the unambiguous synonym "judgment,"‡ for he says that one thing was wise, to know the judgment by which all things were governed.§

We must now look more nearly at the action of this rational law. We learn from a statement of Philo's|| that Heraclitus proposed as a leading feature of his philosophy the doctrine that the unit, or single object, consisted of two opposites, and that when it was separated the opposites became known. This doctrine is intimately connected with the fundamental idea of perpetual change, combined with the assumption of three types of matter—fire, water, and earth. Things are constantly passing into their opposites, or, as he expresses it, "the cold

* A disciple of Plotinus. See Heinichen's Euseb. Praep. Evan., XI. 19, note 1.

† IX. 1.

‡ Γνώμη.

§ Compare the expression in the Hymn of Cleanthes—"Ὡσθ' ἵνα γίγνεται πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἔόντα—where the metaphysical meaning is fixed by the whole context. The dependence of the Stoics on Heraclitus will be shown farther on. The Hymn is preserved in Stobaeus, Eclogae, I. p. 30 sq.

|| Quis rer. div. her., 43 (l. 503).

things become hot, hot becomes cold, wet becomes dry, parched becomes moist.”* This view is sometimes expressed in a paradoxical manner, as though opposites were in reality the same, and antithetical attributes belonged to the same substance, so that our philosopher laid himself open to the charge of violating the law of logical contradiction.† Honey was both sweet and bitter;‡ “alive and dead, and waking and sleeping, and young and old are the same; for these, when they have changed, are those, and those again, when they have changed, are these.”§ An illustration was found in a spiral instrument used by fullers, which gave at once a circular and an upward motion, so that Heraclitus could say that one and the same way was straight and curved.|| “Good and evil are the same,” as we see in the case of physicians, who torture their patients in order to cure them.¶ To put the matter comprehensively, “God is day, night, winter, summer, war, peace, satiety, famine”;** “one is from all and all from one.”††

In the rivalry of these opposites Heraclitus finds the ultimate cause of phenomena. “War,” he says, “is father of all and king of all, and has pointed out some as gods, others as men, has made some slaves, others free.”‡‡ He censured Homer for wishing that strife should perish from gods and men, for there would not be any harmony if there were not high and low tones, nor would there be animals without male and female, things in each instance opposed to one another.§§ All things, accordingly, arise by way of strife.||| But this strife is not an evil, though it may seem so to men who “do not understand how a thing in differing agrees with itself, a reverting harmony as of a bow and lyre.”¶¶ “To God all things are beautiful and

* Fragm. xxxix.

† A charge made by Aristotle and his commentators. See Zeller, I. p. 600, Anm. 1.

‡ Sextus Empir., Pyrrh II. 63.

§ Fragm. lxxviii. || Fragm. 1., with the quotation from Hippolytus, IX. 10.

¶ Frs. lvii., lviii. ** Fr. xxxvi. †† Fr. lix. ‡‡ Fr. xlv.

§§ Fr. xliii. ||| Κατ' ἑρὶν γίνεσθαι. Fragm. xlv.; also lxii. ¶¶ Fr. xlv.

good and just, but men have supposed some things to be unjust and others just.”* From this it would seem that evil was regarded as purely subjective, and the strife of nature, whatever difficulty it might present to human judgment, moved in orderly and beneficent ways.

Heinze infers, from a comparison of the statements, that all things happen “according to the Logos,” and all things happen “according to strife,” that the Logos and the strife are identical.† This is rather a formal mode of arguing, and, as we have no precise statement of the relation between these two terms, it would, perhaps, be more correct to say that strife is the mode by which the Logos works out its orderly results, while the Logos itself is the rational law by which the strife is interpenetrated and controlled.

Another idea intimately associated with the Logos is that of destiny, *εἰμαρμένη*. The use of this word by Heraclitus himself is guaranteed by a quotation which, unfortunately, contains only the opening words of a sentence.‡ Stobaeus,§ however, to whom we are indebted for the quotation, tells us that “Heraclitus declared the essence of destiny to be a Logos which pervades the substance of the universe,” that “all things are according to destiny,” and that it and necessity are the same. This is confirmed by the testimony of Diogenes Laertius,|| who also uses the words, “that all things happen according to destiny,” and by that of Simplicius,¶ who says, “He makes also a certain arrangement and defined period of the change of the world according to a destined necessity.”**

Yet another conception which we have to consider is that of right, *Δίκη*. We have already seen that its prerogative was extended to the material world in the statement that its defenders, the Erinyes, would punish the sun if it transgressed its bounds. In another fragment we are told that it “will

* Fr. lxi. † P. 16. ‡ Fr. lxii. § Ecl. I, p. 178. || IX. 7.

¶ Com. in Aristot. Phys., fol. 6 a. See the authorities for Fr. xxii.

** Κατά τινα εἰμαρμένην ἀνάγκην.

seize the framers and witnesses of falsehoods.”* This universality of jurisdiction brings it into connection with the principles which we have already noticed, and in a fragment preserved by Origen it is identified with the general war or strife, in accordance with which all things happen.† This statement is indirectly confirmed by a passage in Plato’s “Cratylus,”‡ in which the nature of “the just,” *δίκαιον*, is under consideration, and in which the views of Heraclitus and his school seem to be referred to. In examining the etymology of the word it is said that by all those who assume universal movement it is taught that the universe is interpenetrated with something through which everything arises, and that this is most swift and rare, and, since it goes through (*δια-ιόν*) everything, it is properly called *δίκαιον*. Heinze § observes that we may recognize here the attributes of Heraclitus’s Logos, though it may be doubtful whether the philosopher himself designated the cosmical principle by the word *δίκαιον* or his disciples first adopted the term as equivalent to his *δίκη*. In the farther discussion of the precise nature of the *δίκαιον* two of the opinions which are mentioned are probably divergent views of the Ephesian school. Some believed that it was fire, while others, probably regarding this as too material a conception, supposed that it was the heat which is in fire.

The identity between the Logos and the “just” being thus established, and also that between “the just” and fire, Heinze proceeds to infer the identity of the Logos and fire. He views them as one and the same formative element, only regarded from different sides. Materially apprehended this element, which is ever immanent in the world, is fire, and the fire spiritualized is the Logos. In support of this view he appeals

* Fr. cxviii.

† The emendation of Schleiermacher is generally adopted here, *εἰδέναι χρὴ τὸν πόλεμον ἰόντα ξυρόν, καὶ δίκην ἔρυν*. Without emendation the words are: *εἰ δὲ χρὴ . . . ἐρεῖν*, which, however, in the matter under discussion, yield substantially the same sense (See Fragn. lxii., with the notes).

‡ 412 C.-413 D.

§ P. 22-3.

to one or two passages which we must briefly notice. The divine law, it is said, rules as much as it will;* and elsewhere are the words, "a thunderbolt steers everything."† Now, we may, perhaps, fairly admit the identity of the law with the Logos, and of the thunderbolt with the fire, but whether any inference can be legitimately drawn from a comparison of two detached passages so general and even figurative in their statements, and belonging apparently to totally different connections, may well be doubted. One might say that the captain governed the whole ship, that the pilot steered it, and that the rudder directed its course, but you could not infer from this that the captain, the pilot, and the rudder were identical. The other passage is one the interpretation of which is by no means certain. It has been preserved by Clemens of Alexandria,‡ and, with his explanatory words, stands thus: "But how it [moisture] is again taken up and made red-hot he clearly intimates through these words, 'Sea is dispersed and measured into the same Logos of the kind that it was before it became earth,'§ and similarly also the same things in relation to the other elements."|| Heinze's criticism of this difficult passage appears to be very just, and I cannot do better than repeat his arguments.¶ He first notices the interpretation of Lassalle,** who, on the authority of Eusebius, rejecting "earth," translates: "The sea is poured out and measured according to the same Logos (law) which existed at first, before it itself†† yet existed," thus assuming a pre-existence of the Logos, by which the descending change was governed as well as the ascending. To this it is objected, in the first place, that, "according to the Logos" would not be expressed by ἐς τὸν λόγον, but by κατὰ

* Fragm. xci.

† Frag. xxviii.

‡ Strom. V. 14, p. 712 (Potter), quoted also in Euseb. Praep. Ev. XIII. 13.

§ Θάλασσα διαχέεται καὶ μετρίεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὁκοῖος πρῶτον [Euseb. πρόσθεν] ἣν ἡ γενέσθαι γῆ [Euseb. om. γῆ].

|| Fr. xxiii.

¶ See P. 24 sq.

** Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunklen von Ephesus. Berlin, 1858, II. pp. 61 sqq.

†† The sea.

τὸν λόγον, a phrase which, as we have seen, Heraclitus elsewhere employs;* and, in the second place, Heraclitus nowhere else teaches the doctrine of a pre-existent Logos. Zeller's interpretation† is not more successful. He explains thus: "It extends itself, when it forms itself out of earth, to the same magnitude ‡ which it had before." For this interpretation we should expect *ὁκόσος*, and not *ὁκοῖος*. I do not see much force in the objection that "it is a strange mode of expression if it is said of the sea that it extends itself, while, nevertheless, it does not yet exist, but has first to be formed out of earth."§ Much more serious is the consideration that both the interpretations which we have noticed overlook the purpose for which the words are cited by Clemens, which was to show that in the opinion of Heraclitus water was again taken up and changed into fire. Heinze therefore proposes to understand the Logos as a designation of fire, and, with Eusebius, to omit the "earth." By this suggestion the obscurity of the passage is at once removed. It is then said, in effect, that water is changed back into fire, and resumes the nature which it had before it became water.

If the above criticism be correct, it follows that the Logos was not regarded as immaterial, but as identical with the subtlest form of matter. The system of Heraclitus thus becomes a refined pantheistic materialism. As in some of our modern speculations, matter was supposed to be intrinsically adequate to the production of all its own modifications. Above it there was no divine power, but it was itself its own rational law. Clemens of Alexandria expressly says that Heraclitus

* Fr. ii.

† See I. p. 628, Anm. 3.

‡ Properly "relation," which, however, must be a relation of size.

§ Heinze, p. 25. Zeller does not admit the justice of Heinze's criticism; for *ὁ αὐτὸς οἶος* is the same as *ὁ αὐτὸς ὡς*, and he thinks that, although the fire and the Logos are the same essence, the ideas cannot be used interchangeably, and therefore the word which describes this essence on the side of its intelligence could not be properly used to denote the material substratum as such. We may observe, however, that such an interchange seems to be made, in the opposite direction, when it is said that "a thunderbolt steers everything," for the notion of intelligent law must here be uppermost.

supposed fire to be God.* It was the ever-living principle, whose essence it was by an inherent destiny to go through the orderly cycles of change which constitute the phenomenal universe. The application of the term Logos to this principle shows that Heraclitus recognized an immanent reason in the world; but whether this reason was regarded as possessed of consciousness is a question which cannot be decided with certainty. No precise and indubitable statement on the subject has been preserved; and this fact alone renders it improbable that Heraclitus pronounced definitely in favour of the existence of a conscious intelligence in the universe. The silence especially of Plato and Aristotle affords strong negative evidence, for they could hardly have failed to notice so cardinal a doctrine, one, too, which would have separated Heraclitus so broadly from the other Ionian philosophers; and their selection of Anaxagoras in contradistinction from earlier philosophers as having taught the presence of "mind" in the world may well seem decisive.† The only evidence on the other side is afforded by some fragments to which different meanings have been assigned, and one or two allusions by later writers in which the Logos is spoken of as possessing intelligence and knowledge, but in which we cannot be sure that the phraseology of Heraclitus himself has been retained.‡ These passages, however, are sufficient to awaken some doubt in our minds; and if we have not evidence which justifies us in ascribing conscious intelligence to the Logos of Heraclitus, nevertheless we can hardly avoid the conclusion that he must have used language which was susceptible of different interpretations, and was capable at least of suggesting the doctrine of a later time.

We must next consider the relation of the human soul to the Logos. The soul consists of fire; but in what precise way it

* Cohort. ad Gentes, cap. v., p. 55.

† See Heinze, pp. 35-7. Aristot., *Metaph.*, I. iii. 16 sq., and iv. 5; Plato, *Cratylus*, 413 C.

‡ See the Appendix to this Book, where the subject is more fully treated.

is related to the universal fire is not very clearly stated. The principal passage is found in Aristotle :* “ But Heraclitus also declares that the principle [or primitive element of the universe] is soul, since it is the exhalation [or, as Mr. Wallace† renders it, the ‘fiery process’] out of which all other things arise ; and that accordingly it is a thing least corporeal and in a state of constant flux ; but that what is moved is known only by a thing which is moved.”

Although the construction of this passage is disputed, we may at least gather from it that the soul was of the same nature as the “ principle ” or primitive element of the universe, which, as we know, was fire, and that it was also an exhalation. The use of the latter term is expressly ascribed to Heraclitus by Areius Didymus, who quotes from Cleanthes the statement that “ Zeno calls the soul ‘ perception or exhalation,’ ‡ as Heraclitus,” and presently adds, “ Zeno, then, like Heraclitus, declares the soul to be an exhalation.” § So also Nemesius || informs us that “ Heraclitus says that the soul of the universe ¶ is an exhalation out of the moist portions, ** and that that in animals is of the same kind, from the exhalation outside and from that in themselves.” †† Heinze thinks that these later testimonies are probably founded on the passage in Aristotle, and that the term does not belong to Heraclitus himself. ‡‡ Be

* De An., I. ii. 19. Καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ἐκ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι φησι ψυχὴν, εἴπερ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, ἐξ ἧς τὰλλα συνίστησιν καὶ ἀσωματώτατον ἐν καὶ ῥέον αἰεὶ τὸ ἐκ κινούμενον κινουμένην γινώσκεισθαι. Ἐν κινήσει δ’ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα κἀκείνος ᾔετο. The sense seems to be that the principle and the soul must be of the same nature, because the soul knows τὰ ὄντα, which are only the transformed manifestation of the principle, and, according to Greek philosophical belief, like only could know like.

† Aristotle’s Psychology in Greek and English, with Introduction and Notes. Cambridge, 1882.

‡ Αἴσθησιν ἢ ἀναθυμίασιν.

§ Quoted by Euseb. Praep. Ev. XV. 20.

|| De Nat. hominis, c. ii. p. 28.

¶ Τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν, an expression which we cannot ascribe to the Ephesian.

** Ἀναθυμίασιν ἐκ τῶν ὑγρῶν.

†† Also in Plutarch, Plac. Phil., IV. 3, 6, 898 D.

‡‡ P. 41.

this as it may, it gives us at all events Aristotle's conception of our philosopher's meaning. What, then, is denoted by "exhalation"? Themistius* and Philoponus† make it identical with fire, the latter qualifying it with the epithet "dry," and from its connection with "the principle" there can be no doubt that this interpretation is correct. But why, then, is this word exhalation used instead of the more intelligible fire? Heinze gives, I think, the correct explanation.‡ The exhalation is not "the pure primitive element, out of which all arises and of which all consists, to which certainly the words ἐξ ἧς τὰλλα συνίστησι seem to point, but the fire which on the way upwards develops itself out of the moist constituents of the world. So the souls would first arise on the way upwards, and the farther from the moist, the more fiery they were, so much the purer, so much the wiser would they be." Hence Heraclitus said that "a dry soul is wisest and best,"§ and that "a man, whenever he is drunk, is led reeling by a beardless boy, not understanding whither he is going, having his soul wet."|| I am not aware that any reason is given for this circuitous mode of deriving souls from the elemental fire; but it may be that some such process appeared necessary in order to detach portions from it, and give them an individual existence, and in order to mark a certain remoteness of the soul from the primal substance, of which it was nevertheless composed.

If now we remember the identity of the Logos with the fire, we arrive at the position that the soul is a part of the Logos, not merely inspired or enlightened by it, but a portion of its very substance. We must not, however, regard this portion as permanently separated, and devoted to an individual personal life. Like everything else the soul was in a state of constant flux,¶ and the maintenance of personal identity must have been

* Paraphr. Aristot. De An., Vol. II. p. 24, l. 13 sqq. (ed. Spengel, 1866), τὴν γὰρ ἀναθυμίασιν . . . οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ πῦρ ὑποληπτέον.

† Com. in Arist. De Anima, I. ii. 19. He says that by fire Heraclitus does not mean "flame," which is excess of fire, but τὴν ξηρὰν ἀναθυμίασιν.

‡ Pp. 41-2.

§ Fr. lxxiv.

|| Fr. lxxiii.

¶ Πέρον αἰί.

due to the permanence of the same relations, just as the same eddy may remain in an ever-flowing stream, the same though the water which composes it is different each successive moment. Again, we must bear in mind that the soul, though incorporeal, was nevertheless material, and therefore was capable of replenishment from a material source. All around us is the warm, dry air, which is not a separate element, but included in the primitive fire; and as this is itself the universal Logos, it follows that we maintain our rational life by breathing. This doctrine is set forth by Sextus Empiricus in a remarkable passage, in which a place is found also for the activity of the senses. It runs as follows:—" [Heraclitus] declares the Logos to be the judge of truth, not any random kind, but that which is common and divine.* But what this is must be concisely indicated. For it is the opinion of the physical philosopher that that which environs us† is both rational and intelligent. . . . Accordingly having drawn in this divine Logos, in the opinion of Heraclitus, through inspiration,‡ we become intellectual, and in sleep indeed oblivious, but in waking again possessed of intelligence. For in sleep, the senses being closed, the mind in us is separated from its intimate connection with the environment, the attachment by way of inspiration being alone preserved as a kind of root, and [the mind] when separated loses the power of memory which it had before. But in men who are awake again, having peeped forth through the senses as through windows, and having met with the environment, it clothes itself with rational power. Therefore as coals, when they have come near the fire, become by a change red-hot, and when separated are extinguished, so also the part from the environment which has tarried as a guest in our bodies becomes by separation almost irrational, but by intimate union through most of the avenues [of sense] is rendered of similar nature to the whole [viz., the environment]. Now, this common

* Κοινὸν καὶ θεῖον.

† In its physical sense, ἀναπνοῆς.

‡ Τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς.

and divine Logos, by participation of which we become rational, Heraclitus says is the criterion of truth, whence that which appears to all in common is worthy of credit, for it is grasped by the common and divine Logos, while that which occurs to one only is unworthy of credit for the opposite reason.”* Heinze thinks that this account is confused and contradictory; for first it is said that by breathing we become “intellectual,”† which must mean here the same as “rational,”‡ because in breathing we draw in the divine Logos or reason, and it is by participation of this that we become rational, but afterwards it is said that “rational power” is first acquired in the waking state through the medium of the senses. I venture to doubt the justice of this criticism. “Intellectual” may be equivalent to “rational,” but it is evident that when Sextus first uses the word he considers the attribute of intelligence as capable of a two-fold existence. Breathing goes on in sleep, which obviously exhibits a very different condition from that of waking life; and hence it follows that while we remain “intellectual” through all our changes, yet we are sometimes “oblivious” and sometimes “possessed of intelligence.” The former condition is characterized farther on not as “irrational,” but as “almost irrational.” We may illustrate this position by the saying of Heraclitus that “To those who are awake there is one common world, but of sleepers everyone turns off to a world of his own.”§ This quite coincides with the idea of oblivion, in which, no longer controlled by the senses, those channels of communication with universal nature, the intelligence, not extinct, but “almost irrational,” wanders in pursuit of its own fancies. Distinct from this feeble and oblivious reason is the clothing with rational power (where I think there is some emphasis on the word “power”), the glowing into a red heat of intelligence, which is produced only through the connection with the “environment” established by the senses.

* Adv. Math., VII., 127 sq. p. 397 sq.

† Λογικοί.

‡ Νοετοί.

§ Fr. xcv.

Heinze points out another difficulty in the apparent contradiction between this doctrine and the statement of Areius Didymus, to which we have already referred, that, according to Heraclitus, the soul becomes intelligent through "exhalation." I think, however, the passage from Areius Didymus is open to a somewhat different interpretation from that which Heinze puts upon it. The words "the souls by drawing up exhalations always become intelligent,"* seem to me to belong, not, as Heinze supposes, to Heraclitus, but to Zeno. This is the opinion of Bywater, who says, "This saying, therefore, is to be attributed to Zeno, who no doubt freely cites the words of Heraclitus, and adapts them to his own use."† What is really guaranteed by Cleanthes, who is quoted by Areius Didymus, is the statement, not that the soul, according to Heraclitus, maintains its intelligence through "exhalation," but that it *was* "exhalation." It deserves notice also that in this passage, notwithstanding some uncertainty of reading,‡ the senses and the exhalation are brought into intimate union. It seems to me, then, that the conclusion suggested by our authorities is that the soul was regarded as being in its essence an "exhalation" and that, as this was in a state of unceasing flow, it was constantly replenished by breathing, and, with greater force, though more fitfully, through the action of the senses. This is substantially the conclusion which Heinze derives from what he believes to be a confused and contradictory account.

It appears, then, that the soul is in perpetual organic connection with the universal Logos. We might suppose from this that Heraclitus would entertain an exalted view of human nature, and look upon man as the embodiment and manifestation of eternal reason. Yet nothing can be farther

* Αἱ ψυχαὶ ἀναθυμιώμεναι νοεραὶ αἰεὶ γίνονται.

† Trans. from the Latin note on Fr. xlii.

‡ For the common reading, αἰσθησιν ἢ ἀναθυμίασιν, Wellmann (*apud* Bywater) suggests αἰσθητικὴν ἀναθυμίασιν.

from the fact. We have already seen his contempt for the "unintelligent" multitude, and he indulges in tones of scorn when he speaks even of distinguished poets and philosophers. In his view "many are bad, but few are good; . . . and the majority glut themselves like cattle."* It is true that "thinking† is common to all," and "all human laws are nourished by the one divine [law]";‡ but though the Logos is common, the mass of men live as though they had an intelligence of their own,§ and "they differ with that with which above all they continually associate."|| "The things which they meet with every day appear strange to them";¶ and "having heard without understanding, they are like deaf people; the common saying testifies to them that being present they are absent."** Even "the wisest of men will appear an ape in comparison with God, both in wisdom and in beauty, and in everything else."††

The philosophy of Heraclitus is thus encumbered with an apparent inconsistency, which is nowhere cleared up. Whether he himself was conscious of the difficulty, and offered any solution of it, we are not informed. But as he evidently found the source of error and sin in men's proneness to pursue the individual thought instead of the universal reason, it may be that he saw an inherent necessity of imperfection in the individualizing of detached portions of the Logos. This, however, would not explain the differences among men, or that varying natural character on which man's lot depends.‡‡ We might have recourse to the freedom of the will, only we have no ground for ascribing to Heraclitus the belief in this freedom; and in accordance with the principles of his philosophy we can only relegate the question to the inscrutable workings of that destiny which, by a law indeed conformable to reason, but without conscious purpose, permeated the universe of being.

* Fr. exi.

† Τὸ φρονέειν.

‡ Fr. xci.

§ Fr. xcii.

|| Fr. xciii.

¶ M. Aurelius, IV. 46. Fr. v. note.

** Fr. iii.

†† Fr. xeviii.

‡‡ Ἡθος ἀνθρώπων δαίμων, Fr. exxi. See the explanation of Alexander Aphrodisiensis, De Fato, 6, p. 16 Orelli, quoted by Heinze, p. 50.

It remains for us to sum up the more important results at which we have arrived. The Logos in Heraclitus does not denote "the Word," because, as Heinze intimates, there is no transcendent God whose word it could be. There is therefore no room for the questions regarding his dependent nature, the time when he passed into pronounced existence, or his eternal generation, which arose when the idea passed into the domain of theology, and allied itself with theism. It is eternal and, though the term is not used, self-subsistent. It is the universal reason,* in opposition to the individual thought.† Yet it is not a self-conscious being, acting for a purposed end; rather is it the rational self-evolution of the world, the pristine fire passing of necessity through constant and orderly change. In later times the connection was traced between the Logos on the one side and the outward universe and the soul of man on the other. In St. John these are separate entities; all things were made through the Logos, and he gives light to every man, so that he is still in effect the universal reason. But in Heraclitus the relation is rather that of the whole to the part, and the Logos is inseparable even in thought from the twofold scene of its manifestation. This, however, does not preclude, but rather suggests the fruitful doctrine, that wisdom and virtue are to be found in escape from the narrow individual life, and self-surrender to the universal and eternal reason.

The question has been asked why Heraclitus gave the name of Logos to his cosmical principle. One suggestion is that he simply translated *Honover*, the creative word in the Persian religion. But the extent to which Heraclitus borrowed Oriental ideas is very uncertain, and, as we have just seen, his conception of the Logos excludes the signification "word." Heinze's suggestion seems much more probable, that Heraclitus regarded the rational law which was apparent in the world as analogous to human reason. It is true, what was subjective, conscious intelligence in us was objective, unconscious reason in the

* *Ἕνός λόγος.*

† *Ἰδία φρόνησις.*

world ; but the innermost essence of things seemed to correspond with that which was highest in man, and therefore to be appropriately designated by the same name. The expressions *νοῦς* and *φρόν* were avoided, because they carried in their front the idea of subjective knowledge, whereas in *Logos*, as to a certain extent in our own word "reason," this conception may drop out of view, and nothing remain but that orderly relation which our rational faculty estimates and approves.*

* See Heinze, pp. 56-7. For an estimate of the position of Heraclitus as a philosopher, I may refer to Dr. Edmund Pfeiderer's "Die Philosophie des Heraklit von Ephesus im Lichte der Mysterienidee" (Berlin, 1886), pp. 249 sqq., and to the short, but very interesting essay of Professor Lewis Campbell on "Heraclitus and Parmenides," in "The Theaetetus of Plato, with a revised text and English notes" (Oxford, 1883, 2nd ed.), pp. 241 sqq.

CHAPTER II.

ANAXAGORAS TO ARISTOTLE.

1. *Anaxagoras.*

ANAXAGORAS of Clazomenae (born about 500 B.C.) is the next thinker who claims our attention ; for though he adopted the word "Mind" * instead of "Reason," † his system, which is distinctly in advance of that of Heraclitus, marks a new step in the line of development which resulted in the Alexandrian, and ultimately the Christian doctrine. Like his contemporaries Empedocles and Leucippus, he assumed the existence of primitive and unchangeable forms of matter ; but, unlike them, he regarded these as unlimited both in quality and in number. ‡ This assumption of eternal matter rested on the postulate that nothing could come into being, and nothing could be destroyed ; and the appearances which suggested the ideas of creation and annihilation § were in reality only instances of combination and separation. || It does not belong to our present purpose to follow in detail the physical speculations, which are more properly treated in a general history of philosophy ; and having indicated the fundamental position in Anaxagoras' theory of the universe, we may proceed at once to his conception of the cosmical mind.

* Νοῦς.

† Λόγος. Νοῦς and λόγος were, however, both used in Christian times to denote the Son of God. See, for instance, Athenagoras, Supplic., c. 10, νοῦς καὶ λόγος τοῦ πατρὸς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ.

‡ Fr., 1, 3, 6, 13 ; ed. Schaubach, 1827.

§ Τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι.

|| Συμμίσγεσθαι and διακρίνεσθαι. Fragment 22.

The assumption of eternal materials, constituting a totality of existence incapable alike of increase or diminution, did not explain how these materials originally got into motion, and arranged themselves into an orderly world. Anaxagoras solved this difficulty by his doctrine of the "Mind," and in so doing, if he did not clearly enunciate, he at least foreshadowed the theistic theory of the universe. Whether this Mind was regarded as strictly immaterial, or only as the subtlest form of matter, is not quite clear. It was at all events broadly distinguished from every other substance. It was "the rarest and purest of all things";* and as such it enjoys the possession of certain grand characteristics. It is "infinite and autocratic." "It possesses the greatest power; and mind rules over all things as many as have soul, both the greater and the less, and mind ruled the whole revolution" which was the beginning of the present order of things. As the principle which brought everything into orderly arrangement, it possessed, in addition to this power, universal knowledge. As an all-ruling, all-knowing, and all-pervading power, it is "mixed with nothing, but is alone self-dependent." "Nothing else is wholly separate from all else, except mind, but all mind is alike." "It alone of entities is simple and unmixed and pure."† To these high attributes are we to add that of personality? This would seem to be logically involved in the idea of an all-knowing being; but it is by no means evident that Anaxagoras pushed the human analogy implied in the word "mind" to its logical result. He makes use of expressions which can hardly be reconciled with the notion of personal existence. Thus he says, "In everything there is a portion of everything except mind; in some things there is also mind"‡ where both the connection and the absence of the

* *Λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθάρωτατον.*

† See Fr. 8, and for the last quotation Aristot., *De An.*, I. ii. 16.

‡ Fr. 7.

article show that "mind" must be understood in a partitive sense, and is regarded simply as a substance which exists in different things. The correctness of this interpretation is confirmed by the statement that "all mind is alike, both the greater and the less,"* which is intelligible only when the mind is regarded as a substance which is present in larger or smaller quantities in various objects. It is impossible in our modern thought to reconcile these two orders of conception, but to the Greek thinkers the contradiction was not apparent. We have already encountered the same difficulty in the doctrine of Heraclitus, and we shall meet with it again in that of the Stoics. The ideas of the personal and of the impersonal, of spiritual and material attributes, had not been worked out into the same sharp antithesis which they present to our minds; and that which at one time is spoken of as endowed with knowledge and exercising purpose, descends at another into a mere substance of rationality, so to speak, which takes its place among natural agencies, and like any other substance is capable of being distributed in various proportions.†

A few words must be said as to the relation of the "mind" to the universe and to man. As it was the object of Anaxagoras to explain the material world, and the idea of mind was brought in simply as a necessity of thought, it is not surprising that he made the least possible use of his new doctrine,‡ and instead of appearing as a full-blown teleologist he confined himself as far as possible within the limits of material causation. The one purpose to which he applies the mind is to produce the original revolution which, from a small commencement, spread in wider and wider circles, and by its velocity gave rise to a force which separated the constituents of the

* Fr. 8.

† See this question discussed in Zeller, I. p. 889 sq.

‡ See Plato, *Phaedo*, 98 B. sq., and a similar statement in *Aristot.*, *Metaph.*, I. iv. 5.

universe. These then, under the action of mechanical laws, grouped themselves into ether and air. Of the latter the heavy portions collected in the middle, and formed water, earth, and stones. Some of the stony portions were whirled off by centrifugal force, and, being fired by the ether, became the sun and stars.* The mind plays a large part in the organic world. We have already seen that it was regarded as divisible, and as existing in larger or smaller proportions in different objects. We have now to add that, according to Aristotle, Anaxagoras virtually identified mind with soul or the vital principle by representing it as present in all living things.† Even the plants had their share, for they were regarded as living, and susceptible of pleasure and pain at the growth and falling of their leaves.‡ Hence it would appear that the human soul was a part of the “mind,” literally of the same substance as the universal mind. It was thus essentially eternal and divine (if we may venture to introduce the word divine); but whether it retained its individual being after separation from the body, or was re-absorbed in the cosmical mind, must be left undetermined.

2. *Socrates.*

The teaching of Socrates, though it cannot be said to embody any doctrine of the Logos, yet contains so much that is interesting and suggestive in the domain of thought to which this doctrine belongs, that we cannot afford to pass it over in silence. Socrates was the first to import the idea of teleology into the regions of speculative philosophy. It is true that he handles this subject under the pressure of a religious rather than a philosophical interest, at one time endeavouring to convert Aristodemus, who paid no attention

* See Fr. 1, 2, 8, 17-21, with other authorities quoted by Zeller, I. p. 898, Ann. 3.

† De An., I. ii. 9 and 16.

‡ Aristot., De Plant., I. i. 2.

to the services of religion, and laughed at those who did so,* at another seeking to awaken in Euthydemus a spirit of devout thankfulness and obedience.† Through his personal ascendancy, however, ideas which were not worked out with scientific precision took their place in the world of thought, and had a marked influence upon the subsequent course of speculation.

To Socrates the gods are unmistakably persons, conceived after the human analogy; and it is to prove their possession of personal characteristics, judgment and purpose, rather than their existence, that the teleological argument is used. Aristodemus is first compelled to admit that those who fabricate living beings possessed of intelligence and activity are more worthy of admiration than those who make images which are incapable of intelligence and motion. The admission is, however, qualified: "If at least these [living beings] are produced not by some chance, but by judgment."‡ This at once suggests the idea of final causes. Those things which obviously exist for a useful end, in contradistinction from those things which do not betray the end for which they exist, are the works of judgment. Now, the various parts of the human frame are evidently given for a useful end, the eyes for seeing, the ears for hearing, the nostrils for the enjoyment of scents, the tongue for the sensations of taste. There is evidence of forethought § also in the protection afforded to the sight by the eyelids and the eyebrows, in the fact that the front teeth are fitted for cutting, and the molars for grinding down what they receive from these, and in the proximity of the mouth, through which our sustenance must pass, to the eyes and nostrils. These and other things, made with such forethought, must be works of judgment, and are like the contrivance of some wise artificer.||

* Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, I. iv. 2.

† Ὑπὸ γνῶμης.

§ Πρόνοια.

† Ibid., IV. iii.

|| Δημιουργός. *Mem.*, I. iv. 3-7.

The great object of the divine arrangements is the benefit of man. This is seen in the provision of light, without which our eyes would be useless ; in the time of rest which night affords to the weary ; in the heavenly bodies which regulate the hours of the day and night, and the phases of the moon which disclose to us the divisions of the month ; in the supply of necessary food from the earth, and in the seasons adapted to its production, ministering not only to our needs, but to our pleasures ; in the unstinted abundance of water, which is indispensable for the growth of plants and for our own nutrition ; in fire, which defends us against cold and darkness, and co-operates with us in every art ; in the movements of the sun towards the north and towards the south, providing the suitable degrees of heat and cold, turning precisely when a farther advance would produce excess, and so gradual in its approach and retreat that we are not conscious of the transition to the two extremes. To the objection that the other animals enjoy these advantages as well as men, Socrates replies that the animals too are made for the sake of men. There are many men who do not use the products of the soil for food, but support themselves on the milk and cheese and flesh furnished by their cattle, and all men tame those animals that are useful, and avail themselves of their assistance for war and many other purposes.*

From what has been said it is sufficiently apparent that the gods must care for men ; nevertheless the subject receives a distinct treatment. Man alone among the animals has been made to stand upright, so that he commands a better view in front and sees more easily what is above him. Whereas other creatures have only feet, which are confined to the purpose of progression, man has hands, which fabricate most of the things whereby he enjoys a larger happiness. All animals have a tongue ; but men alone have one which is able to produce

* Mem., IV. iii. 3-10.

articulate voice, and convey their meaning to one another, and through this faculty of interpretation * they are able to teach one another, lay down laws, and enter into civil life. The soul, too, with its faculty of reasoning, is most excellent in man. Man alone can worship the gods, and no other soul is more competent to guard against hunger or thirst or cold or heat, or to cure diseases, or exercise strength, or to toil at learning, or to remember what it has heard or seen or learned. Then the body and soul are adjusted to one another, for "neither could one who had the body of an ox but the judgment of a man, do what he wished, nor do creatures that have hands, but are without intelligence, possess any advantage." The divine care is further shown by the responses of oracles, which tell what will happen and indicate the best course to pursue, and by premonitory signs sent to the Greeks and to all men.†

It thus appears that Socrates taught in the most explicit way the doctrine of a divine purpose in creation, and of personal relations between the divine and the human. But when we come to inquire into the divine nature and the essence of the human soul, we find his views much less clearly expressed. If we are to regard his language as conformed to his genuine conviction, and we have no reason for doing otherwise, we must admit that he was a polytheist; for he again and again speaks of the gods;‡ and he refers with evident faith to "the god in Delphi."§ Yet in a certain sense he is monotheistic. In distinction from "the other" gods he mentions him "who orders and holds together the entire cosmos, in whom are all things beautiful and good."|| So also he speaks of him "who from the beginning makes men,"¶ and of "the eye of God" and "the wisdom (or intelligence) of

* *Ἐρμηνεία*, IV. iii. 11. Cf. Philo's *λόγος ἑρμηνεύς*.

† Mem., I. iv. 11-15; IV. iii. 11, 12.

‡ See, in the passage with which we are dealing, I. iv. 11, 13, 14, 16; IV. iii. 3, 13, 14, 16, 17. See also I. i, 2 sq.

§ IV. iii. 16.

|| IV. iii. 13.

¶ I. iv. 5.

God,"* and again of "the Deity."† From these expressions we may infer that he believed in one supreme and universal God, and, as subordinate to him, in a number of inferior and local divinities. The divine nature ‡ was of such a kind as to see and hear everything at once, and to be present everywhere; for if the human eye can travel over many stadia, we must suppose that the eye of God is capable of universal vision, and if the human soul can think of things present and things far distant, in Egypt and Sicily, the intelligence of God must be competent to take care of all things simultaneously.§ But while thus administering all things God is "invisible to us," even as our own souls are invisible.|| So also the sun cannot be looked at by reason of its very brightness; and the ministers of the gods are viewless, the thunderbolt, which strikes, but is not seen coming or going, and the winds, which are discerned only in their effects.¶ As God is omnipresent, he is not regarded as standing outside nature, but rather as interpenetrating it; and agreeably to this idea we find his intelligence spoken of as "the intelligence in everything,"** disposing everything according to its pleasure, just as the human mind, being within the body, manages it as it pleases.†† This language affords, I think, the nearest resemblance which the teaching of Socrates presents to the future doctrine of the Logos. The resemblance, however, is superficial; for he does not hypostatize the "intelligence," but regards it simply as an attribute of God, and he gives no indication of the difficulty which pressed upon later philosophers, of bringing the eternal and infinite God into immediate relations with the phenomenal and the finite.

We must briefly notice, in conclusion, the nature ascribed to the soul. This, says Socrates, "if anything else that is human does so, partakes of the divine;‡‡ and this participa-

* I. iv. 17.

† Τὸ δαιμόνιον, IV. iii. 14.

‡ Τὸ θεῖον.

§ I. iv. 17, 18.

|| IV. iii. 13; I. iv. 9.

¶ IV. iii. 14.

** Τὴν ἐν παντὶ φρόνησιν.

†† I. iv. 17.

‡‡ IV. iii. 14.

tion he seems to regard as a possession of part of the divine substance. The body, he says, possesses a little portion of earth and water and other things, all so abundant and vast, and we cannot suppose that, mind alone being nowhere, we have carried it off by some lucky chance.* We should observe that we here encounter once more precisely the same difficulty that we met with in the doctrine of Anaxagoras. Socrates evidently believed in the personality of God, and yet he seems to suppose that the universal mind can detach portions of its own substance, which retain, though in a minor degree, all the qualities of mind, and become individual human souls. Such a divisible substance of personality is to us inconceivable, but the idea is clearly founded on the analogy of material substances, which may be indefinitely divided without forfeiture of any of their attributes except bulk.

Being thus a portion of the divine substance, or at least partaking of the divine nature, the soul was capable of knowing God or the gods. It "ought not to despise the invisible ones, but, learning their power from the things that are made,† to honour the Deity."‡ We have already noticed in detail this method of approach to the divine; but Socrates used other arguments resting more directly on the nature of the soul. He appeals to the religious experience of mankind. The gods had implanted in men the opinion that they were able to benefit and to injure, and men could not have been deceived all the time without discovering the deception. The most enduring and wisest of human things, cities and nations, were the most pious, and the most intelligent ages were most attentive to the gods.§ He appeals also to the experience of the individual soul. Those who make trial of the gods, who reverence and honour them, and please them by obeying them as far as possible, shall know, says Socrates, "that I speak the truth."|| In this doctrine he touched the deepest root of

* I. iv. 8.

§ I. iv. 16.

† 'Εκ τῶν γιγνομένων.

|| I. iv. 18; IV. iii. 13, 17.

‡ IV. iii. 14.

divine knowledge, and indicated a great spiritual law, which was at a later time to be proclaimed with a higher sanction—
 “If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself.”*

3. *Plato.*

The philosophy of Plato cannot be said to contain any doctrine of the Logos; but it contains some points of marked affinity with the doctrine of a later time, and has even lent to the Alexandrian conception some of its most important elements. So strong indeed was the influence exercised by the Greek philosopher over the mind of Philo that it was said “either Philo platonizes or Plato philonizes.”† It is necessary, therefore, to give a brief sketch of the Platonic system, touching as lightly as possible those parts which do not immediately concern us.

In the front of Plato's philosophy stands his doctrine of ideas,‡ some knowledge of which is essential to the understanding of Philo. The ideas, though answering to our general or abstract notions, were regarded as eternal, unchangeable realities. They constituted the world of real existence, apprehensible only by the reason,§ as distinguished from the world apprehended by the senses, which occupied a position intermediate between pure being and the absolute negation of being. This doctrine was based on Plato's conception both of the nature of knowing and of the nature of being. Mere sense-perception, which may be mistaken, can give us no real knowledge. That can be found only when we arrive at general notions; and as we can know only that which is, and not that which is not, there must be some reality answering to these notions. So also in the sensible world there is no real being, but only shifting phenomena.

* John vii. 17.

† Hieron., De vir. ill.; other authorities in Gfrörer, Philo u. d. al. Theos., I. p. 2.

‡ Εἰδός or ἰδέα.

§ Νοῦς.

Individual objects of the same class must owe their generic appearance to that which is common to them all; and this common element must be something real, and not a mere abstraction, because each object is an imperfect pattern of the general idea. In one of the most splendid of his myths Plato represents "the colourless and formless and impalpable essence"* as existing in "the super-celestial region," which no earthly poet has yet hymned or will ever hymn worthily;† and elsewhere, in more prosaic form, he locates the ideas by themselves, separate from the objects which participate in them.‡ This description signifies, in other words, that they are exempt from the conditions of space.§ Yet they are not mere forms of the divine thought, but are real substances, meaning by that term not that which is the permanent substratum of varying qualities, which could not be affirmed of the ideas, but that which is not itself an attribute, but enjoys a self-dependent existence. To this world of real being Plato ascribes motion and life and soul and intelligence.|| It is the efficient cause¶ of the phenomenal universe,** and "power"†† is even declared to be the defining mark of "Realities."‡‡ But whether, with Dr. Martineau,§§ we are to say that Plato attributed this causality only to the highest idea, or, with Zeller,||| that he extended it to the whole realm of ideas, we must not attempt to discuss in this short sketch.

The ideas, although regarded as a whole, nevertheless existed in indefinite multitude; for, according to the theory, there was an idea corresponding with every general notion which we are capable of forming, and to such notions no limit is assignable. Nor could the number be diminished by

* Or substance, *οὐσία*.

† Parm., 128 E. sq., 130 B. sq., 135 A.

‡ Sophista, 248 E.

** Philebus, 26 E. sq., 30 A. sq.; Phædo, 95 E., 100 B.

†† *Δύναμις*.

‡‡ *Τὰ ὄντα*. Sophista, 247 E.

§§ Types of Ethical Theory. Oxford, 1885, I. pp. 39 sqq.

||| Phil. der Gr., II. i. (dritte Aufl., 1875), p. 574 sq.

† Phædrus, 247 C.

§ See Timæus, 52 B.

¶ *Αἰρία*.

making one comprehend several, for, as each idea was a distinct entity, one could not be included in another, as is the case in logical thought, but what in our minds is the logical relation of our notions could be represented in them only by the participation of one in another. Plato did not shrink from the legitimate consequences of this curious theory. He admitted the existence of ideas, not only of resemblance, of unity and plurality, of the just, the beautiful, the good, but also of size, strength, health, of master and slave, and even of artificial objects—table, bed, rod of the loom.* In his later years he seems to have wished to confine his doctrine to the productions of nature, and this limitation was accepted by the Platonic school.†

Of these ideas there must be a hierarchy corresponding to their logical relations, and proceeding, therefore, from the highest genus to the lowest species; and the systematic exposition of the whole series is the problem of philosophy. Of the hierarchy of ideas, however, Plato gives no complete account, and we need not pause on the various samples with which he deals, but pass on at once to the consideration of the highest term, the idea of the good.‡ This it is which gives reality to the objects of knowledge, and to him who knows them the faculty by which he does so; it is the cause of all that is right and beautiful, the parent of light in the visible universe,§ and in the intelligible|| the supplier of truth and reason.¶ It follows that it is nothing less than the supreme efficient cause, identical with the “true and divine mind.”** It may seem inconsistent with this conception, that in the *Timæus* “the Maker and Father of this universe”†† is represented as

* See the numerous references in Zeller, II. i. p. 585, Anm. 4.

† Thus Xenocrates defined the idea as *αἰτία παραδειγματική τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἀεὶ συνεστῶτων*. Quoted by Zeller, II. i. p. 588, Anm. 2 of previous page.

‡ *Ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα.* § *Ἐν ὁρατῷ.* || *Ἐν νοητῷ.*

¶ *Repub.*, VI. 508 E.; VII. 517 B. and C.

** See *Phileb.*, 22 C., with Zeller's note, II. i. p. 594, Anm. 4.

†† *Τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντός.*

planning the world in conformity with an eternal pattern ;* but, as Zeller points out,† the creator here can be nothing else than the idea of the good, because he exactly takes the place which is occupied by that idea in the Republic, and, in words which would precisely apply to it, he is called “the best of the intelligible and eternally-existing beings.”‡ Further, he is himself the very pattern which he follows; for the world is called “a sensible God, an image of the intelligible.”§ Elsewhere, again, the world is called “an image of the eternal gods”;|| and these eternal gods, in contradistinction from those that have come into being, can be nothing but the ideas, and therefore he who is highest among them must be the idea of the good. If it be objected that in the beginning of the discussion it is affirmed that he who made the universe “was good,”¶ as though “the good” were only one of his attributes, we must remember that the whole account is conceived in Plato’s mythical style, and does not claim to be expressed with scientific precision, so that the statement in question may be ascribed to a mere popular use of language. This identification of God with the idea of the good is rendered necessary by the whole scope of Plato’s system. The ideas cannot be in any way dependent upon God; for this would be inconsistent with their eternal self-subsistence. Nor, for a similar reason, can God be dependent on the ideas. Nor, lastly, can God and the ideas be placed side by side as two kinds of eternal reality, for we have no intimation of any such dualistic conception; and if God were outside the sphere of the ideas, he could not possess divinity except by participation in ideas, that is by dependence on them, a supposition which we have already rejected. We must conclude, therefore, that the maker of the universe and the idea of the good are synonymous.**

* Παράδειγμα, 28 C.

† II. i. p. 594, Anm. 5.

‡ Τῶν νοητῶν ἀεί τε ὄντων ἄριστον, 37 A.

§ Εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ [sc. θεοῦ] θεὸς αἰσθητός, 92 C.

|| Τῶν αἰδιῶν θεῶν ἄγαλμα, 37 C.

¶ Ἄγαθός ἦν, 29 E.

** See Zeller, II. i. p. 593 sqq.

When we find God thus represented as an idea, and reduced as it were to one of his own attributes, we cannot help remembering the apostolic dictum that "God is love." As love is the supreme term in Christian thought, so was "the good" in Hellenic; and when we understand the words in a general sense, we cannot but admit that we have reached a grand conception when we are told that the idea of the good is supreme among eternal realities, and is the ultimate ground of all phenomenal existence. But in regard to the personality of God we encounter here our old difficulty in perhaps an aggravated form. It is impossible for our minds to associate personality with a mere idea. Yet there is no reason to doubt that, so far as Plato formulated his notion of personality at all, he ascribed it to God. Not only does he frequently use in reference to the gods the popular language, which is applicable only to persons, but he speaks distinctly of the forethought* of God,† and of his will.‡ The universe was produced from the fusion of necessity and mind,§ where the antithesis seems to show that "mind" must be understood as a conscious intelligence; and still more clearly, the divine causality, proceeding "with reason and knowledge," is expressly contrasted with a cause which produces things "spontaneously and without purpose."||

Over against the realm of ideas Plato set, as the negative condition of phenomenal existence, the indeterminate.¶ Whether by this he denoted matter, in the sense of the permanent substratum of the various kinds of material objects, or only space, as the condition of externality, divisibility, and motion, it does not concern us at present to inquire.** However this may be decided, it is certain that Plato distinguished two kinds

* *Πρόνοια*.

† *Timæus*, 30 B.

‡ *Ἐμοῦ γ' ἐθέλοντος*, *ib.*, 41 A.

§ *Ib.*, 48 A.

|| *Τινος αἰτίας ἀντομάτης καὶ ἄνεν διανοίας φουόσης*, *Sophista*, 265 C.

¶ *Τὸ ἄπειρον*.

** See the question discussed at length in *Zeller*, II. i. pp. 603 sqq.

of causality, the necessary and the divine, of which the former was subservient to the latter, but nevertheless possessed sufficient power of its own to limit the divine agency, and make it impossible for the Creator to produce a perfect work.* “In a manner difficult to express and wonderful” the phenomenal universe arose from the action of these causes, thus giving rise to three classes of things, “that which becomes [the phenomenal world], that in which it becomes [the indeterminate], and that from which it is copied [ideas.]”† We need not pause upon the very difficult question which is suggested by this description,—what was the precise relation between the ideal and the phenomenal worlds?—a question on which considerable difference of opinion prevails, and to which Plato himself returns no clear and satisfactory answer. It will be sufficient to state here that he lays down the doctrine that things are what they are only through participation in the ideas;‡ but what is the exact nature of this participation, or how it is possible, he does not attempt to explain, and indeed he seems to admit that the words are only symbols for a fact which cannot be adequately formulated, and he only insists on the proposition that “it is by the beautiful that all beautiful things become beautiful.”§ So, again, he declares that ideas are the patterns of which phenomenal objects are the copies, a description which suggests a much more external relationship than that implied in participation;|| but how an object can be

* Timaeus, 46 C. sq., 48 A., 68 E. sq.

† Tim., 50 C.

‡ Thus he says in Phaedo, 100 C., that anything beautiful is so only because it participates, *μετέχει*, in *αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν*, and this participation is expressed by the words *παρουσία* and *κοινωνία*, ib. D. In the Repub., V. 476 A., the order of participation is reversed, and it is said that the ideas each appear as many, though in reality one, through participation, *κοινωνία*, in actions and bodies and one another. See also Symposium, 211 B.; Parm., 129 A., 130 E.; Euthyd., 301 A.

§ *Τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά*. Phaedo, 100 D.

|| *Παράδειγμα*, Theaet., 176 E.; Repub., VI. 500 E.; IX. 592 B.; Tim., 28 A. sqq., 31 A., 48 E.; *ὁμοίωμα* and related words, Phaedrus, 250 A., Tim., 30 C., D.; *μίμημα*, Tim., 48 E., 50 C., 51 B.; *εἰκών*, Tim., 37 D., 92 C.; *ἄγαλμα*, Tim., 37 C.

like an idea without the existence of something common to the two, that is, of yet another idea, and so on *ad infinitum*, we are not informed. We encounter here the most serious defect in the Platonic system, the point on which the most formidable objections to it hinge; but it does not concern our present subject to delay longer among these difficult questions.

Whatever may have been the precise relationship between the eternal and the phenomenal, it was necessary that Plato should represent to his thought some mode by which this relationship was established, and he effects this purpose by his remarkable theory of a cosmical soul, in which we find the nearest approaches to the doctrine of the Logos. This theory is unfolded in the *Timaeus*, where the question of the genesis of the cosmos is discussed; but it is not always easy to decide how much is to be understood as a literal expression of Plato's views, and how much is to be regarded as the mythical dress in which his opinions are avowedly clothed.* The cosmos is assumed to be "the most beautiful of products,"† and to proceed from "the best of causes,"‡ who framed it in conformity with an eternal pattern.§ The primal ground for the genesis of the universe is sought in the goodness of the creator, "He was good, and in a good being no envy in relation to anything ever resides, but being without this he wished everything to become as like himself as possible." God, then, desiring everything to be good, took all that was visible, and brought it from its inharmonious and disorderly movement into order. But further, as it is not to be supposed that the

See also *Crat.*, 389 A. sq.; *Parm.*, 132 C. sqq. In the latter passage the expressions *παραείγματα* and *ὁμοιώματα* are not used without clear perception of their meaning and consequences, as though that which had a share in the *εἶδος* must resemble it, and might therefore loosely be compared to a copy made from a pattern, but the participation is made to consist of the resemblance, ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ ἐκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς. As an inference from this statement the difficulty mentioned in the text is raised but not solved.

* 29 C., D.

† 'Ο δ' ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων.

‡ 'Ο μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων.

§ 29 A.

best could do anything except what is most beautiful, having found on reflection that nothing devoid of mind would ever be more beautiful than that which has mind, and that mind again cannot belong to anything apart from soul, he who compounded the universe constructed mind in soul, and soul in body, that he might make the best and most beautiful work possible. Thus the cosmos was due to the forethought of God, and was a living being endowed with soul and mind.* Again, there was but one cosmos. For the universe, being beautiful, could not have been made like anything imperfect; and therefore, as it included all visible animals, it must have been framed like that intelligible living being which comprehended all other such beings in itself. Now, this latter is of necessity only one; for if you imagine two, then there must be another to include these two, and consequently the universe would be made like this other. It follows that "there is and yet will be this one only-begotten phenomenal heaven."† As regards the order of genesis, the material universe was not first prepared as a body to receive the soul, but the latter was produced first, because the Creator would not suffer the elder to be ruled by the younger, and consequently made the soul older than the body in genesis as well as in rank.‡ The soul is represented as composed in the following way. Out of the indivisible and ever uniform substance and that which is divisible in relation to bodies the Creator compounded in the midst a third substance, and having added the nature of the same and the different,§ and made a single whole from the constituents, he then divided it according to the astronomical and musical or harmonic proportions, and formed the circles of the fixed stars and the planets.|| He placed the soul in the midst of the body, and extended it¶ through the whole, and surrounded the body with it externally.**

* Ζῶον ἔμψυχον ἐννοῦν τε. 29 E.—30 B.

† Εἰς ὅδε μονογενῆς οὐρανὸς γεγενῶς, 30 C.—31 B.

‡ Ἀρετῇ.

§ Ταῦτόν and θάτερον.

|| 34 C.—36 D. See the notes of Zeller, II. i. p. 646, Anm. 3; p. 651, Anm. 3; p. 653, Anm. 1; and Stallbaum *in loco*.

¶ Ἐτείνε.

** 34 B.

In endeavouring to separate in this account the mythical dress from the serious elements of thought, we may fairly ascribe to the former the procedure by which the soul is compounded and arranged, and to the latter the underlying conceptions without which such a description could hardly have been made. It seems clear, then, that Plato regarded the universe as a living being, penetrated in all its parts, from centre to circumference, with a rational soul. This soul was the mediating term between the ideal and the material, the real and the phenomenal. Like the ideas it was incorporeal; like material objects it had come into being, it existed in space, and was capable of motion. It was the regulative and harmonizing principle in the world;* and just as our body derived its elements from the great body of the universe, so our soul also proceeded from the world's more perfect soul.†

Since we shall meet with a similar theory in Philo, it may be well to state succinctly Plato's conception of the form and arrangement of the universe. As we see so clearly illustrated at the present day, the scientific theory of the universe cannot leave altogether untouched the course of philosophical or theological speculation; and though we need not go into details, we must know in a general way what kind of cosmos it was that had to be explained. Plato, then, supposed that the universe was a sphere, that being the most perfect figure, and no external limb being required by this highest of living creatures. Round the centre of the axis was wrapt the earth, which was also in the spherical form. Thence extended the widening circles of the seven planets, with distances adapted to the harmonic system, arranged in the following order, the Moon, the Sun, Venus, Mercury, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn. Closing this in, and constituting the outer limit of the universe, was the sphere of the fixed stars. The earth reposed immovably in its central position; but the heavenly regions were in active

* See, in addition, *Phileb.*, 30 A. sqq.

† See *Phileb.*, 29 A. sqq. We have already met with this idea in Socrates.

motion. The sphere of the fixed stars moved with unvarying diurnal revolution from east to west in the direction of the equator. It carried with it in its movement the included circles of the planets. Each of these, however, had also a motion of its own from west to east in the direction of the ecliptic, the periodic times increasing with the distance from the earth, if, at least, we except Venus and Mercury, which had the same period as the sun. Together with the heaven, and marked by its movements, time was created, the moving and everlasting image of the motionless eternity, whose unchanging present is broken by no numerical succession, and knows neither past nor future. "The perfect year" was the period required for the planets and the sphere of the fixed stars to return to the same relative position from which they started, and this is affirmed to be "the perfect number," ten thousand years. To the heavenly bodies a rotation on their axes, the movement of reason, is ascribed; and they themselves were living and intelligent beings, higher and more glorious than men, "visible and begotten gods."*

There are some doctrines connected with Plato's anthropology which, though different in form, nevertheless proceed from the same underlying thought as the Alexandrian conceptions. It was considered impossible that the supreme Creator could form anything imperfect; and therefore some mediating instrument of creation had to be found in order to explain the existence of mortality. This difficulty and its solution are presented in the *Timaeus*,† in a mythical description of the creation of man. The Creator addresses the gods whom he has begotten, and reminds them that mortal beings are still wanting to the perfection of the universe. Now, if he himself were to create them, they would be equal to gods. He therefore desires the subordinate divinities to address themselves to the creation of

* *Θεοὶ ὄπατοι καὶ γέννητοί*, *Tim.*, 40 B. See *Tim.*, 35 sqq; other references in Zeller, II. i. pp. 681 sqq.

† 41 sq.

the animals, imitating the power which he had displayed in their own formation; but whatever in them ought to bear the same name as immortals, being called divine and commanding, would be furnished by himself. He then proceeded to compound human souls in the same vessel in which he had already mixed the soul of the universe, employing the same materials only with diminished purity.* The souls were made equal in number to the stars, and assigned one to each. We need not here pursue their downward course into bodies, and their varying destiny according to the degree of their fidelity to their higher nature. It is sufficient to observe that according to the doctrine laid down in the *Timæus* and elsewhere the soul is divine in origin and nature, pre-existent as well as immortal, and therefore an entity distinct from the body, and, like the soul of the universe, forming a link of communion between the ideal and the phenomenal worlds.

We are now prepared to sum up the principal points in which Plato foreshadows the doctrine of the Logos. In the first place, he recognizes, like the other philosophers whom we have already mentioned, the presence of an all-pervading reason in the universe. To denote this reason he employs the word "Mind"†; but the terms preferred by Philo—"Logos" and "Wisdom"—are also introduced in the most exalted sense. The planets are said to have arisen "from the reason and understanding of God,"‡ and we read elsewhere of the "divine reason and knowledge."§ The cause which orders the years and seasons is spoken of as "wisdom and mind."|| These phrases border closely on the terminology of the Logos doctrine. In the conception of a cosmical soul, different from and yet mysteriously related to, the supreme God, Plato does not indeed anticipate the Alexandrian philosophy, but he approaches some

* This view is different from that of the *Philebus* just referred to, in which the soul is rather represented as derived from the soul of the universe.

† Νοῦς.

‡ Ἐκ λόγου καὶ διανοίας θεοῦ. *Tim.*, 38 C.

§ Ἀλόγος τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη θεῖα. *Sophista*, 265 C.

| Σοφία καὶ νοῦς. *Phileb.*, 30 C.

of its characteristic ideas more nearly than any previous thinker, and uses one or two of its characteristic expressions. The Platonic and the Alexandrian doctrines originated, at least to some extent, in the same necessity of thought, the demand for some intermediate link of communication between the eternal and the phenomenal, between God and the world. The highest, it was supposed, could produce by his own immediate act only what was perfect; and as Plato delegates to the subordinate divinities the creation of the mortal part in man, so does Philo assign the same office to ministering powers inferior to God.* The soul, like the Logos, is everywhere present in nature, "stretched" from centre to circumference. With Plato, however, the soul is far more exclusively connected with the material universe than is the Logos in Philo and the early Christian writers. With his Greek feeling for the wonder and beauty of nature, he regarded the world as the body in which the soul dwelt, forming with it one living being. Accordingly, he extends to the Cosmos, or to its noblest part, the heaven, modes of expression which we might expect to find limited to the rational soul itself. If God begat the Logos, so also he was the "Father" who "begat this universe."† If the Logos was, according to the Johannine proem, the only-begotten,‡ so too, with Plato, was the heaven or the Cosmos;§ nay, like the Logos, it was itself a "god," and an "image"|| of the supreme.¶ Thus, without entering upon other connected doctrines in which Philo's dependence on Plato is more strongly marked, we see that for the central ideas of the Logos doctrine itself the earlier philosopher furnished important contributions both of thought and of phraseology, although the form which his views assumed was still widely different from that which afterwards shaped itself under the influence of Jewish and Christian monotheism.

* This subject, with the necessary qualifications, will be fully treated in the proper place.

† Tim., 41 A.

|| Εἰκών.

‡ Μονογενής.

¶ Tim., 92 C.

§ Tim., 31 B; 92 C.

4. *Aristotle.*

One or two points in the philosophy of Aristotle require our notice, not because he has, like Plato, presented us with anything either in thought or phraseology which is analogous to the doctrine of the Logos, but because his dualistic theism brings clearly into view a difficulty for which he himself offers no clear solution, but which the Alexandrian doctrine was intended to meet.

The first point that demands our attention is the fact that Aristotle extends and emphasises the teleological conception of nature. He was dissatisfied with the earlier speculators who confined their attention too exclusively to material causation, and had been especially inattentive to final causes.* By a more careful analysis, he arrived at the conclusion that four ultimate causes might be distinguished: the essence or form (variously called *εἶδος*, *μορφή*, *ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία*, *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*); the material; the source of movement; and the good, the end for the sake of which the movement took place.† These causes are distinguishable not only in thought, but sometimes in reality; and Aristotle is especially careful to mark the separation between efficient and final causation.‡ Nevertheless three of the causes frequently coalesce, for the form and the end are identical, and that from which the movement originates is the same as the form, “for man begets man,”§ and in living beings the vital principle is at once the efficient, the final, and the essential cause.|| Thus in the operations of nature we are confronted with a dual causality,

* Met., I. iii. 3; vii. 5.

† Met., I. iii. 1; Phys., II. iii.

‡ Met., IV. ii. 5 (the same statement in Phys., II. iii. 6); Gen. et Cor., I. vii. 14, *ἔστι δὲ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον ὡς ὕθην ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως τὸ δ' οὐ ἔνεκα οὐ ποιητικόν.*

§ Phys., II. vii. 2.

|| De An., II. iv. 5.

matter and form.* Matter is characterized by susceptibility,† and is only the indefinite condition without which the potential could not become the actual.‡ It is, however, an essence or substance,§ because in all changes there must be something which is subject to the changes, whether they be changes of place, of size, of quality, or of genesis and corruption, emergence into the actual and concrete, or retreat into the privation which leaves only potentiality.|| The form answers to the Platonic "idea," and, as is well known, Aristotle differed from Plato in not allowing to the general idea a separate objective existence, but locating it only in individual objects as the immanent essence of the species to which they belonged; and it is in this sense that Aristotle teaches a doctrine of immanence in opposition to the transcendence of his predecessor. Indeed, so closely does he unite form and matter that these, together with the concrete object which results from their union, constitute the triple division of "perceptible substance."¶ The rational forms of things, therefore, were as real to Aristotle as to Plato, and their orderly persistence seemed to him to indicate an end which was the final cause of the movements of nature. This he taught in opposition to Empedocles, who had maintained that, where all things seemed to have a final cause, the appearance was delusive, and due merely to the survival of the fittest, and the destruction of the unfit.** In Aristotle's view the orderly

* Phys., II. viii. 10.

† "Υλη ἢ ἔλη παθητικόν, Gen. et Cor., I. vii. 16.

‡ "Υλην δὲ λέγω ἣ μὴ τὸδε τι οὐσα ἐνεργεία δυνάμει ἐστὶ τὸδε τι. Met., VII. i. 6.

§ Οὐσία.

|| Met., VII. i. 7 sq.

¶ Ἡ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία. Met., VII. ii. 10. We should observe that he does not make this union quite absolute; for, while he affirms that the concrete object is χωριστὸν ἀπλῶς, he says τῶν κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσιῶν αἱ μὲν αἱ δ' οὐ. ib. i. 6. Οὐσία is defined as τὸ πρῶτως ὄν καὶ οὐ τί ὄν ἀλλ' ὄν ἀπλῶς. To this belongs τὸ ὑποκείμενον, that which, being a subject of predication, is not predicated of anything else. It comprises ἔλη, μορφή, τὸ ἐκ τούτων, for instance, bronze, shape, statue: Met., VI. i. 5; iii. 1 sq.

** Even the expression is hardly an anachronism: ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ ἐνεκά του ἐγίνετο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ ἀνθρώπων. Phys., II. viii. 4.

sequence of nature, leading up to invariable ends, could not be due to chance or spontaneity, but the whole series of movements took place for the sake of the end, which was always attained if nothing interfered. Thus, if a house were a natural object, it would be produced just as it is now by art; and if natural objects were produced not only by nature but by art, they would be produced exactly as nature forms them. If, then, the products of art are for an end, those of nature must be so too; for in both, the posterior bears a similar relation to the prior. This is especially apparent in the instincts of animals, such as ants and spiders, which do not act by art or deliberation, and in the arrangements of plants; and if there are occasionally failures, these too find their parallel in the failures of human skill. But though Aristotle says expressly that nature works towards an end in the same manner as the human mind,* he does not press what is ordinarily called the design argument for theism. He apparently did not identify end with purpose;† for he distinctly says it is absurd for men to suppose that things are not done for the sake of something if they do not see that the moving cause has deliberated. “Yet even art does not deliberate; for even if the ship-building art resided in the timber, it would construct like nature”; so that, if the working for an end is inherent in art, it is also in nature. This is particularly manifest when a physician heals himself; for nature is like him. We thus arrive at the conclusion that nature, consisting of matter and form, is its

* For this particular statement see *De An.*, II. iv. 6. Cf. also the statement, *ἔστι δ' ἐνέκα τοῦ ὅσα τε ἀπὸ διανοίας ἀν' πραχθείη καὶ ὅσα ἀπὸ φύσεως*. *Phys.*, II. v. 2.

† Yet this is not very clear. When he says that of things done for an end *τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν τὰ δ' οὐ κατὰ προαίρεσιν* (*Phys.*, II. v. 2), he seems to include under the latter such events only as are spontaneously or accidentally associated with the fulfilment of a purpose; but the end in nature is shown by the presence of something that cannot be explained by the action of the spontaneous and accidental, and wherever these occur, they must be preceded by *νοῦς* and *φύσις* (*ib.*, vi. 8.). We should also notice the remarkable expression, *ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάρτην ποιοῦσιν* (*De Caelo*, I. iv. 6).

own end, towards the realization of which it works by an inherent tendency. This doctrine is original with Aristotle.*

It is apparent from this account that nature involves a continual process of becoming. Perceptible substance is changeable, and all change implies a transition from the potential to the actual. This transition cannot be conceived unless matter and form are, in the last resort, exempt from origination; for change requires something to be changed, something into which it is changed, and something by which it is changed, that is, matter, form, and the first mover. We are thus required to find an efficient cause for an eternal process. Now, as "everything that is moved must of necessity be moved by something,"† this process brings before us an endless series of things which both move something and are moved. In a finite series we must ultimately reach a first mover which moves itself, but in an infinite series there is no first.‡ The source of movement, therefore, must be sought outside the substances which are moved, and there must be, as the prime mover, a motionless substance, eternal as the movement which has to be explained. Of this substance the essence must be actuality, for otherwise nothing would exist; and it must continually exercise efficiency.§ It must be one, simple, and self-identical, for the movement is one and continuous;|| and, being actuality, it is without matter.¶ It is without magnitude, for it moves infinite time, and therefore is not limited, and magnitude implies limitation; and, as all changes involve local motion, it is unchangeable and unsusceptible.** On such a first principle†† heaven and nature depend. Where, then, can we find this motionless and immaterial essence?

* For the whole discussion, see *Phys.*, II. viii.

† *Phys.*, VII. i. 1 and *Metaph.*, XI. viii. 4.

‡ See *Phys.*, VIII. v. 3.

§ 'Αεὶ ἐνεργοῦν. See *Met.*, X. vi. 1, 4 sqq.; viii. 3; *Phys.*, VIII. v. 10 sqq.; vi. 6.

|| *Phys.*, VIII. vi. 7 sqq.

¶ *Met.*, XI. viii. 18.

** 'Απαθής. *Met.*, XI. vii. 12 sq.; *Phys.*, VIII. vii. 1 sqq.; x. 1 sqq.; *Gen. et Cor.*, I. vii. 14.

†† 'Αρχή.

Only in thought. Even with us contemplation is the sweetest and best thing; so that if God is always as we are sometimes, it is wonderful, and, if he has a yet higher excellence, it is more wonderful. The energy of mind is life, and God is energy (or actuality), and self-regulated energy is his best and eternal life. God, then, is living, eternal, best, so that life and continuous and eternal duration belong to God; for this is God.* But we must pursue this lofty theme a little farther. If the divine Mind thought of nothing, it would be as though asleep if its thought were contingent on something else, it would not be the best substance. It therefore thinks unchangeably and eternally of itself; and the ultimate principle is that in which thinker and thought coalesce and become identical.†

We have thus arrived at a philosophically formulated theism, and have found a God transcendent above the universe;‡ but we feel at once that the theory, with all its acuteness and ingenuity, is equally incapable of satisfying the religious instincts and of explaining in a tenable manner the dependence of the universe on God. The metaphysical quest of the most perfect being has reduced God to simple self-contemplation, and, if we carry out the argument consistently, denies to him creative energy no less than susceptibility to influences from without. He may not think of anything external to himself, and therefore all communion with the human soul is impossible, and the religious life is cut away at the very roots, or at least frittered down into an admiring contemplation of the perfect. As little can he act upon the material universe of which he is the cause only by being the supreme end which the universe "desires" to attain.§ This "desire," beautiful as a poetical expression of an orderly evolution, gives no philosophical account of the relation between the absolute

* Met., XI. vii. 6 sqq.

† This is expressed by the formula, *ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις*. See Met., XI. ix. 1 sqq.

‡ *Οὐσία τις ἀτέλιος καὶ ἀκίνητος καὶ κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν*. Met., XI. vii. 12.

§ See De An., II. iv. 3.

Being and the finite world ; for an end cannot, according to Aristotle himself, be spoken of as efficient except metaphorically,* and therefore in denying to God all issuing of energy from himself to act on that which is other than himself, you seem to deny to him all true causality ; and accordingly even the causality which, in some not very intelligible way, is allowed to him as "the first mover" is reduced to a minimum, and confined to the revolution of the outer sphere of the universe, the circular motion alone being constant and uniform.† We are thus confronted with the great difficulty which religious philosophy has to meet. The abstract idea of divine perfection has brought us to a lonely and self-centred consciousness, towards which the world and man may wearily strive, but from which they can receive neither help nor sympathy. How are we to restore for religion the communion which is thus broken, and recover for philosophy a closer relation between the finite and the infinite ? This is the main problem which the Alexandrian doctrine of the Logos endeavoured to solve.

* Gen. et Cor., I. vii. 14.

† Met., XI. vii. 6 ; Phys., VIII. ix. 1 sqq.

CHAPTER III.

THE STOICS.

IN passing from Aristotle to the Stoics we not only come to that school which, among all the schools which arose upon Grecian soil, most fully developed a doctrine of the Logos, but we enter upon that long period of waning genius and of devotion to the more practical aspects of philosophy to which, by its character and affinities, the Jewish-Alexandrian system properly belongs. The speculative power of Greek thought, which culminated in Aristotle, shared the declining fortunes of political life. From troubled and vexatious surroundings philosophy turned to the inner forces of the mind, and sought to generate a calmness of soul which should be independent of the world's changes. Incorporated into a vast empire which embraced various nationalities, it began to extend its view, and to recognize the existence of a common human nature, and of reciprocal duties between man and man, which rested upon this common nature independently of political considerations. Hence its course was to a large extent determined by the great march of events, and by the practical necessities of mankind. A marked predominance was given to ethical and religious questions, and the search for an inward centre of repose led gradually on from Stoical severity of morals to Neo-Platonic mysticism. The secrets of nature were no longer so carefully explored, but in this department of inquiry reliance was placed for the most part

on ancient authorities ; and if the old metaphysical problems still pressed for a solution, the speculative interest in their investigation was mastered by the moral. This general characteristic of the later Hellenic schools, due perhaps in part to the reaction of Oriental influence, and to the Semitic origin or associations of the most distinguished among the early Stoics,* must have rendered them more attractive to Jewish eclecticism, which, necessarily approaching philosophical questions under the control of religion, could appropriate only what seemed to be in harmony with an authoritative moral code and an inherited theism.

In noticing those parts of the Stoical philosophy which here concern us we must observe that we have to deal no longer with the opinions of an individual, but with those of a school ; for of the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founder and principal elaborator of this system, only fragments have survived, and we owe our information to the works of the later Stoics, and indirectly to the accounts of those who were not themselves members of the sect. For our present purpose, however, this deficiency in the early sources is unimportant, because the system was fully formulated by Chrysippus,† and from his time, though not without minor modifications, remained substantially unchanged.

The celebrated Stoical doctrine that man ought to live conformably to nature betrays at once the ethical source of the interest which the members of this school felt in the outer universe, and the religious light in which they regarded it. The Stoic in Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*‡ clearly expresses the connection which bound together the study of nature, religion, and morals, when he says that by the contemplation of the heavenly bodies the mind receives a knowledge of the

* See Sir A. Grant's *Ethics of Aristotle*, 1th ed., 1885, I. p. 307 sqq.

† About 280 to about 208 B.C.

‡ II. 61.

gods; from which arises piety, with which are conjoined justice and the rest of the virtues, out of which issues a blessed life equal and similar to that of the gods, inferior only in regard to immortality, which has no relation to living well. To reach the true order of genesis in their thought we must reverse this climax. A blessed and divine life, superior to the inevitable vicissitudes of earthly existence, was the ideal which possessed the minds of the Stoics; and bringing their moral and religious earnestness to the investigation of nature they were unable to accept Aristotle's transcendent and lonely Deity, and resorted in preference to a monistic system, which practically identified nature and God, and constituted a spiritualized materialism. For the support of this conclusion nothing was better adapted than the physics of Heraclitus, which had already introduced the idea of a material Logos. The philosophy of the Ephesian thinker was, accordingly, adopted to a large extent by the Stoics; but with it was incorporated in the completest way the teleological conception of Socrates and Aristotle.

The teleology of the Stoics was mainly directed to proving the existence of reason or wisdom in the universe.* They argued from the analogy of human art, and contended that the orderly movements and immutable constancy of the universe were just as clear an evidence of controlling reason as could be found in a statue or picture, in the course of a ship or in a sun-dial.† This argument is fully elaborated in connection with the Stoical physics in the latter part of the second book of the *De Natura Deorum*.‡ It reminds us in many of its instances of Socrates' discussion of the subject, and it is not necessary for us to dwell upon it at length. We

* Λόγος, σοφία, ratio, sapientia, explained as mens, consilium, cogitatio, prudentia; Cic., *De Nat. Deor.*, II. 7.

† Cic., *N. D.*, II. 34, 35. ‡ Cap. 39 sqq.

ought, however, to notice the prominence which is given to the *beauty* of the world. The earth with its clothing of flowers and trees in the most profuse variety, the cool perennial springs, the pellucid flow of rivers, the verdant banks, deep caverns, jagged rocks, lofty mountains and wide-spreading plains, the flight and song of birds, the pastures of cattle, and the life of the denizens of the woods, the race of men adorning every place with their works, the charm of the sea, with its various islands and lovely coasts and strange inhabitants, the air with its clouds and rain and storms, and, above all, the splendour of the sky, and the constancy and order of its luminaries, are lovingly dwelt upon as surpassingly admirable and beautiful. These things cannot be even understood, much less produced, without the highest reason.* But though so much importance was attached to the teleological evidence, other arguments of a more subtle character were not overlooked. Zeno, with his dry syllogistic method, argued thus:—"That which uses reason is better than that which does not use reason; but nothing is better than the universe; therefore the universe uses reason." And again, "Of nothing that is without sense can any part be sentient; but parts of the universe are sentient; the universe, therefore, is not without sense." And once more, "Nothing that is destitute of mind and reason can generate from itself a living being endowed with reason; but the universe generates living beings endowed with reason; therefore the universe is a living being and endowed with reason."† Closely connected with this is another argument drawn from the part to the whole:—"As there is no part of our body which is not of less value than we ourselves, thus the universal world is necessarily of more value than any part of the universe. And if this is so, the world is of necessity wise; for if it were

* Cic., N. D., II. 39-44.

† N. D., II. 8. Sextus Emp., Adv. Math., IX. 101-4, p. 575.

not so, man, who is a part of the world, ought, since he has a share of reason, to be of more value than the whole world." Further, if we observe the ascending scale, plants, the lower animals, man, we must go on to the fourth and highest grade, and conclude that in the universe, which is above man, there is inherent the perfect and absolute reason. For everything has its perfect end; and though in other instances this end may be impeded by external obstacles, there is nothing external to interfere with the perfection of nature, and the universe, therefore, has no deficiencies, but is complete in every part, and must of necessity be intelligent and wise.* Chrysippus proves the existence of God by a similar ascent from the lower to the higher:—"If," he says, "there is something in nature which the mind of man, which human reason, strength, or power cannot produce, assuredly that which produces it is better than man. Yet the heavenly bodies, and all those things of which the order is eternal, cannot be made by man. Therefore that by which they are made is better than man. But what would you rather call this than God? For if there are not gods, what can there be in nature better than man? For in him alone is reason, than which nothing can be more excellent."† Allied to this is yet another argument. Every kind of thing which is not elementary contains in it some sovereign principle, as mind in man, in the brutes something similar to mind. The sovereign principle‡ is that to which nothing, in each kind, can or ought to be superior. Therefore that in which is the sovereign principle of universal nature, must be the best of all things, and the most worthy of power and dominion; and this is nothing else than reason.§ These are the most characteristic arguments of the Stoics; but they appealed also to the persistency and universality|| of religious belief, which they

* N. D., II. 12, 13.

§ N. D., II. 11.

† Quoted N. D., II. 6.

|| See Seneca, Ep. cxvii. 5.

‡ 'Ηγεμονικόν.

contrasted with the transitory character of false opinions, and they were not uninfluenced by considerations which we can regard only as superstitious. Appeal was made to alleged appearances of gods, which furnished historical evidence of their presence; divination was accepted as a real method of withdrawing the veil from future events; and thunderstorms, pestilence, earthquakes and other natural portents, were believed to give valid indications of approaching calamity.*

If now we inquire into the precise nature of the divine reason or Logos, it will have been observed in the above arguments that it is not spoken of as detached from the universe through which it is manifested, but, on the contrary, it is the universe itself which is spoken of as wise and absolutely perfect. Of the conception of a power transcending the material world, and moulding its reluctant mass into what is, after all, only an imperfect expression of the supreme thought, there is not a trace. This peculiarity in the Stoical view was an inevitable consequence of their materialism, on which, therefore, we must dwell for a few moments. The Stoics, with their practical turn of mind, were unable to get beyond the idea of material causation. Their doctrine of causality was, apparently, founded on the relation of substance and attribute so universally exhibited by the objects around. The cause of anything was real and a body, but that of which it was the cause was neither real nor a body, but an accident or property.† This order of thought, however, is quite compatible with a more extended meaning of the word substance; but according to the Stoics substance could be nothing else than body,‡ and, lest we should be under any

* N.D., II. 2-5.

† See the statements of Zeno, Chrysippus, and Poseidonius in Stobaeus, Ecl., I. pp. 336 and 338.

‡ Diog. La., VII. 150.

misapprehension as to the strictly materialistic signification of body,* we are expressly told that body is that which has three dimensions,† and that empty space is incorporeal.‡ Hence it was a Stoical axiom that whatever has causal power is body.§

From this position it follows that the supreme cause, God or the Logos (who were not distinguished from one another ||), must be corporeal, not in the sense of having a body, but as being himself a material substance. This, accordingly, is expressly affirmed. Zeno and Chrysippus declared that God was “the purest body”;¶ and if we have not an equally explicit reference to early authorities in support of the statement that the Logos was body, we have, at least, the testimony of Origen that the Stoics regarded the Logos as nothing else than corporeal spirit,** in contradistinction from the doctrine of the Christians, who, while maintaining that God was spirit, denied that he was body;†† and perhaps we may appeal in this connection to the admission of Seneca,‡‡ that his school generally regarded wisdom (*sapientia*) as a body, for wisdom is easily interchanged with reason (*ratio*).

In opposition to this view a passage of Seneca is appealed to in which he speaks of the Former of the universe as incorporeal reason.§§ Heinze |||| points out that we must either substitute “corporeal” for the present reading, or that Seneca departs on this occasion from the opinion of his school, notwithstanding

* Σῶμα.

† Diog., VII. 135.

‡ Ib., 140.

§ Quod facit, corpus est. Seneca, Ep. cvi. 4, cxvii. 2. See also the opinion of Zeno in Cicero, Academ., I. 11; cf. also Plut., Plac. Phil., IV. 20, p. 902 F.

|| See them identified in Diog., VII. 134, τὸν . . . λόγον τὸν θεόν.

¶ Hippolytus, Ref. I. 21. See also Clem. Al., Strom., I. 11, p. 346, σῶμα ὄντα τὸν θεόν, and Aristocles in Euseb., Praep. Evan., XV. 14.

** Πνεῦμα σωματικόν.

†† Contra Celsum, VI. 71, referred to by Heinze, p. 90, Anm. 1, as the only place where he has found body predicated of the Logos.

‡‡ Ep. cxvii. 1, 2.

§§ Incorporealis ratio. De consolatione ad Helviam, viii. 3.

P. 90.

his general adherence to it. In regard to the former suggestion, it seems to me that the reading "corporeal" would be frigid, because, according to the hypothesis, all reason was corporeal, and the epithet would add nothing to the sense of the passage, whereas "incorporeal" stands in natural antithesis to the universe and the mighty works of which reason is represented as the artificer. We find also that in one or two kindred questions Seneca plainly avows his disagreement with the dogma of his sect. In Epistle cvi. he concedes that the various mental affections—malignity, envy, pride, fortitude, prudence, reverence, joy—are all bodies, on the ground that they influence our bodies, and that they could not do so without corporeal contact; but he anticipates and accepts the retort that this is only learned trifling. In another Epistle* he discusses the further opinion of the Stoics, that the virtues were living beings, declares himself to be of a different view, and ridicules the doctrine as leading to endless absurdity. His own opinion, however, seems equally inconsistent with the separate corporeal entity of the virtues. Justice, he says, is the mind in a certain condition,† or more precisely, a condition and power of the mind,‡ the same mind being convertible into various forms.§ Consistently with this view he says, in yet another Epistle,|| that wisdom is the mind in a state of perfection,¶ or a condition of the perfect mind,** and accordingly he affirms that "when we say wisdom, we understand something incorporeal."†† It is evident, therefore, that on this point Seneca does not represent the Stoical position, and it may seem only a step further in his deviation from the

* cxiii.

† Animus quodammodo se habens.

‡ Habitus animi et quaedam vis.

§ cxiii. 6, 7.

|| cxvii. 11 sqq.

¶ Mens perfecta, vel ad summum optimumque perducta.

** Habitus perfectae mentis.

†† Quum dicimus sapientiam, incorporale quiddam intelligimus.

orthodox tenets to speak of incorporeal reason. But if he really made use of this expression, he must for the moment have thought of reason not as the causal substance, but only as one of its modes, and his language cannot escape the charge of want of precision. In any case his statement cannot be cited as evidence that the Stoics did not regard the supreme reason as itself corporeal.*

It remains, then, for us to determine more precisely the character of the material substance with which the Logos was identical. This was, to use the most general term, the ether. We have the authority of Cicero for saying that Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus concurred in this doctrine, notwithstanding considerable variety of expression in regard to the nature of God.† By this ether we are to understand not a substance distinct from the elements of the universe, but rather, in accordance with the physics of Heraclitus, the primeval fire, which changes itself into the various forms of being. Zeno expressly rejected the doctrine of a fifth nature or element, out of which mind could be made, and laid it down that fire was the element which produced everything.‡ But as the belief in the existence of four material elements was now fully established, he modified the doctrine of Heraclitus, and maintained that the fire changed through *air* into water, of which the coarser portion condensed into earth, and part remained water, while that which was lightest was evaporated into air, and this by farther rarefaction returned to fire.§ The

* It seems hardly necessary to refer to the reading *ἀσωμάτους εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς* in Diogenes Laertius, VII. 134, although it rests on the authority of Suidas (sub voc., *ἀρχή*), as the context evidently requires the usual reading, *σώματα*, and the statement would stand in contradiction to the plain assertions of other writers. (See Origen, Cont. Cels., VI. 71, and other authorities in Heinze, p. 91.)

† De Nat. Deor., I. 14, 15. In Academ., II. 41, this view is ascribed "Zenoni et reliquis fere Stoicis." See also Antipater of Tyre in Diog., VII. 139.

‡ Cicero, Acad., I. 11.

§ Stob., Ecl., I. 370-2; Diog., VII. 142; Cic., De N. D., II. 33. See the same change described by Chrysippus, in Plut., De Repug. Sto., c. 41, p. 1053 A.

Stoics, accordingly, accepted in the most literal sense the doctrine expressed by our poet of the seasons:—

“These, as they change, Almighty Father, these
Are but the varied God.”*

God, or, as Cicero and Diogenes have it, “nature” was a “fabricating fire proceeding by a way [that is, by regular system] to the genesis of the universe.”† Zeno called him “the fiery mind of the universe.”‡ It is to be observed, however, that a distinction was made, at least by Cleanthes, between the ordinary fire which we use for our various purposes and that which is contained in the bodies of animals. The former, wherever it comes, disturbs and dissipates everything; but that which resides in the body, on the contrary, being vital and salutary, preserves, nourishes, and sustains all things. The nature of this distinction is not very clearly drawn, but seems to consist in the greater purity of the universal fire.§

If now we inquire how it was that the all-pervading reason ever came to be regarded as fire or heat, the arguments of the Stoics enable us to answer this question much more fully than the meagre fragments of Heraclitus. Everything, it was observed, which undergoes the process of nourishment and growth, contained heat, without which it could neither be nourished nor grow. That which grows, moreover, has a fixed and equable movement, and as long as this remains, life remains; but when heat, the source of motion, is chilled, death ensues. As all animal and vegetable life is thus dependent upon heat, it follows that heat has in it a vital force which permeates the world. That this heat is really present in the world is shown by such familiar facts as eliciting sparks

* Thomson, Hymn.

† Πῦρ τεχνικόν, ὁδῶ βαδίζον ἐπὶ γενέσει κόσμον, ignem artificiosum ad gignendum progredientem via. Stobaeus, Ecl., I. 64-6; Athenagoras, Supplic., c. 6; Plut., Plac. Phil., I. 7, p. 881 F.; Diog., VII. 156; Cicero, De N. D., II. 22.

‡ Νοῦν κόσμου πύρρινον. Stob., Ecl., I. 60.

§ Cicero, De N. D., II. 15 and 11.

by the collision of stones, and drawing warm water from perennial wells, showing the internal heat of the earth. That water contained heat was proved by the simple fact of its being liquid, for on becoming cold it congealed into ice or snow; and the sea, when agitated by winds, made palpable its hidden warmth. The air, also, cold as it may seem, is mingled with heat; for it arises from evaporation through the movement of the heat contained in water, a process which we see illustrated when water is boiled. Fire is, of course, in its whole nature burning, and hence it follows that the four elements are interpenetrated with heat. This fiery warmth, then, is the cause of all production; and as it is the source of movement and sentiency in men and brutes, the universe cannot be without sense. Nay further, as self-motion is the attribute of mind alone, and as the universal heat moves not from foreign impulse, but of its own accord, it must of necessity be mind.* Thus we arrive at last at the fire-Logos, and bring to a point the converging lines of physical and religious speculation.

The Stoics, however, had another designation for God, which at first sight might appear inconsistent with the above view. They frequently speak of him as spirit.† This term must, in accordance with the basis of the whole system, be understood in its strictly physical sense, as air or breath. Antipater, indeed, expressly says that the substance of God is airlike;‡ and if he qualifies his statement by making it *like* air, instead of simply air itself, he can only mean that it is purer and more subtle than our earthly atmosphere. This view might appear inconsistent with the fiery nature of the Logos; but we must remember that Heraclitus made no distinction between fire and air, and though the Stoics accepted the later fourfold division of the elements, and even distinguished air

* Cicero, De N. D., II. 9-12.

† See Stobaeus, Ecl., I. 58, 60; Sextus Emp., Pyrrhon. Institutiones, III. 218, p. 182; Seneca, Consol. ad Helv. viii. 4; Cicero, De N. D., II. 7; Clem., Al. Strom., V. 14, p. 699; Origen, Cont. Cels., VI. 71.

‡ Ἀεροφοιδής. Diog., VII. 148.

as the cold element in opposition to fire,* still they classed these two rarer forms of matter together as efficient,† in contrast with the mere susceptibility‡ of earth and water.§ Agreeably to this division, they taught that there were two first principles,|| that which was susceptible,¶ the substance devoid of qualities, to which they gave the name of matter,** and that which was creative,†† the Logos or God in matter. Hence it was alleged that the universe consisted of matter and God; and on the metamorphosis of the primitive substance into the four elements, the latter was represented by the two which, from their lightness, mobility, and all-pervading character, seemed the sources of creative power.‡‡

This divine character was ascribed to air, partly on account of its all-pervading tendency; at least, this attribute was frequently referred to, and we find here the Stoical expression for the omnipresence of God, and their physical explanation of the universal control of reason. The harmony which prevailed throughout the changes of the universe, it was maintained, was inexplicable, unless all things “were held together by one divine and continuous spirit.” §§ Seneca speaks of God, among other descriptions, as “the divine spirit diffused through all things, the greatest and the least, with equal tension.” |||| By the word “equal,” he must mean that the tension was everywhere equally real, not that it was equally great; for he says that the air is affected by that which is nearest to it, and that its highest part is the driest and warmest, and therefore the rarest, on account of the vicinity of the eternal fires, and is distinguished by these attributes from the dense and misty atmosphere which adjoins the earth. ¶¶ What

* Diog., VII. 137; Seneca, *Naturales Quaestiones*, II. x. 4. † *Δραστική*.

‡ *Παθητικά*.

§ Nemesius, *Nat. hom.*, c. v. p. 72.

|| *Ἀρχαί*.

¶ *Τὸ πάσχον*.

** *Ἔλη*.

†† *Τὸ ποιοῦν*.

‡‡ Diog., VII. 134; Sextus Emp., *Adv. Mathemat.*, IX. 11, p. 550; Stobaeus, *Ecl.*, I. 306; Seneca, *Ep.* lxxv. 2, 3, 24.

§§ Cic., *De N. D.*, II. 7.

|||| *Consol. ad Helv.*, viii. 4.

¶¶ *Natur. Quaest.*, II. x.

is important to observe, is that, in spite of such variations, it is regarded, in opposition to the atomic theory, as one uniform, elastic, all-permeating substance, diffused through water and through solid bodies, and absolutely incapable of being divided even by walls and lofty mountains, which are impervious to us, but not to air.* This elastic pervasiveness is technically called *τόνος*, intentio, tenor, and the spirit or air is said to “permeate all things.”†

As the fiery spirit was also intelligent,‡ and identical with the universal mind, we find this same physical language applied to God or the Logos alike in the earliest and the latest form of Stoicism. Zeno declared “that the Logos of the universe pervaded”§ matter, and, according to Tatian, he did not shrink from expressing the logical consequences of this doctrine in words which were calculated to offend, saying that God was present “in ditches and worms and workers of infamy.”|| This is quite in the spirit of the anecdote related of Heraclitus, that when some strangers hesitated to visit him in his kitchen, he called out to them to enter boldly, for there also there were gods.¶ In loftier strain Cleanthes teaches the same doctrine, hymning Zeus, the most glorious of the immortals, who holds in invincible hands the two-edged, fiery, ever-living thunderbolt, wherewith he directs the universal reason,** which roams through all things, mingling with lights,

* Ib., II. iv. and vi. sqq.

† *Διὰ πάντων διήκειν* or *διέρχασθαι*, *permeare*, *pertinere*. See, besides the passages already referred to, Alexander Aphrod., *De mixtione*, fol. 142 a (ed. Aldus, 1527), and the following discussion; Plutarch, *De communibus Notitiis*, c. 49, p. 1085 D., and Plac. Phil., I. 7, p. 882 A.; Stobaeus, *Ecl.*, I. 66; Origen, *Cont. Cels.*, VI. 71; Cicero, *De N. D.*, II. 28; *Fragmentum Censorino adscriptum* § I. p. 75 (ed. Otto Jahn, Berlin, 1845).

‡ *Πνεῦμα νοερὸν καὶ πυρῶδες*. Poseidonius in Stob., *Ecl.*, I. 58.

§ *Διαθεῖν*. Stobaeus, I. 322.

¶ Orat. ad Graecos, cap. 3. Clem. Al. (*Cohort. ad Gentes*, cap. v, p. 58) refers to this as a disgraceful feature of Stoical philosophy—*διὰ πάσης ὕλης, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀτιμοσύνης*. Sextus Emp. ascribes this view to the Stoics, but contents himself with a general reference to “things that are ugly.” (Pyrrhon. *Inst.*, III. 218, p. 182.)

¶ Aristot., *De Part. An.*, I. v. 6.

** *Κοινὸς λόγος*.

both great and small. Apart from Zeus, no work is done in earth or heaven or sea, except what the wicked do through their own folly.* The distinction which is here made between

* See the Hymn of Cleanthes, Stob., Ecl., I. 30 sq.

HYMN OF CLEANTHES.

Most glorious God, invoked by many names,
 O Zeus, eternally omnipotent,
 The Lord of nature, ruling all by law,
 Hail! For all men may speak to thee unblamed;
 From thee we spring, with reasoned speech endowed
 Alone of tribes that live and creep on earth.
 Thee will I hymn, and ever sing thy power.
 Thee all this cosmos, circling round the earth,
 Obeys, and willingly is ruled by thee.
 Thou holdest in unconquerable hands
 So grand a minister, the double-edged,
 The burning, ever-living thunderbolt;
 For 'neath its strokes all things in nature awed
 Shudder; and thou therewith directest wise
 The universal reason, which through all
 Roams, mingling with the lights both great and small
 The great, supreme, all-penetrating king.
 Nor without thee, O God, is any work
 Performed on earth or sea, or in the vault
 Ethereal and divine, save whatso'er
 The wicked do through folly of their own.
 But thou canst perfect make e'en monstrous things,
 And order the disordered; things not dear
 Are dear to thee: for into one thou so
 Hast harmonized the whole, the good and ill,
 That one eternal reason dwells in all;
 From which the wicked flee, ill-fated men,
 Who, longing ever to obtain the good,
 Nor see nor hear God's universal law,
 Obeying which they might achieve a life
 Worthy, enriched with mind; but they in haste
 Forsaking good seek each some different ill.
 For glory some arouse the eager strife;
 And some, disordered, turn to gain; and some
 Pursue, ungoverned, bodily delights.
 But Zeus, all-bounteous, wrapt in sable cloud,
 Thou ruler of the thunder, oh! redeem
 Mankind from mournful ignorance. Do thou
 Dispel, O Father, from our souls this fault,

the supreme God and the Logos, which reminds us of the later doctrine, and the distinction of both from the lightning or fire, must be ascribed to the poetry rather than the philosophy of Cleanthes.* The later writers remain true to the earliest representation. Seneca speaks of God as "the divine Reason inserted in the whole world and in its parts,"† and M. Antoninus defines the wise soul as that which knows the beginning and the end, and the Logos which permeates the substance of the world.‡ The attribute of all-penetrating continuity carried with it, as we have seen in the Hymn of Cleanthes, the administration of the universe, and this administration was conceived as extending through all time, according to appointed periods,§ a statement which refers to the well-known doctrine that the elements returned periodically into their pristine fire, to recommence the same vast cycle of change.||

And grant that we attain that wisdom high
On which relying thou dost rule the world
With justice; so that honoured thus by thee,
Thee we in turn may honour, and may hymn
Unceasingly thy works, as doth beseem
A mortal, since nor men nor gods can know
A grander honour than to justly hymn
The universal and eternal law.

* Compare, however, Chrysippus, who speaks of the Logos of nature (Plut., De Repug. Sto., c. 34, p. 1050 A. and C.) and of the Logos of Zeus (ib., 35, p. 1050 E. and 47, p. 1056 C.). There can be no doubt that the three terms denote the same reality contemplated in different lights, and the form of expression referred to occurs so easily to the mind that we cannot wonder at its occasional adoption. M. Antoninus also speaks of τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ [τοῦ γεννήσαντος, i.e. God] (IV. 14).

† De Beneficiis, IV. vii. 1.

‡ Τὸν ἐὰν τῆς οὐσίας διήκοντα λόγον, V. 32. See also the language of Poseidonius, εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ [τοῦ κόσμου] μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ, καθάπερ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς. Diog., VII. 138.

§ M. Ant., V. 32.

|| The word here used is οἰκονομεῖν. More frequently we find διοικεῖν, as in M. Ant., IV. 46, VI. 1 and 5, and Areius Didymus ap. Euseb., Praep. Ev., XV. 15; also διέπειν, M. Ant., V. 21, and διεξάγειν (properly "to conduct to its issue," meaning probably in this connection, "to bring to the end of a world-period"), Diog., VII. 149; Stob., Ecl., I. 182. See Heinze's note, p. 84, Anm. 4.

Such, then, being the nature of the Logos, it is not surprising that it was called by various names according to the function which it was supposed to fulfil in the economy of the world. Cleanthes addresses Zeus as many-named;* and Chrysippus sometimes adopted, instead of the word Logos, Destiny, Truth, Cause, Nature, Necessity and other appellations.† The reason for this practice is finely explained by Seneca. He speaks of Jove as “the ruler and guardian of the universe, mind and spirit of the world, the lord and artificer of this fabric, to whom every name is suitable. Do you wish,” he continues, “to call him fate? You will not err. He it is from whom all things are suspended, the cause of causes. Do you wish to speak of him as providence? You will speak rightly. For he it is by whose counsel provision is made for this universe, so that without obstruction it goes forth and unfolds its acts. Do you wish to call him nature? You will not do wrong. For it is he from whom all things have derived their nativity, by whose spirit we live. Do you wish to call him the universe? You will not be mistaken. For he himself is the whole which you see, being placed upon his own parts, sustaining both himself and the things that are his.”‡ On the more important of these appellations we must dwell for a few moments.

The strongest expression of the Stoical pantheism is found in the statement, which we have just encountered in Seneca, that God and the universe are interchangeable terms. We learn from Cicero that this was distinctly asserted by the founder of the school. It followed inevitably from the doctrine of the genesis of the elements, which has been already explained; and if the accepted axiom that nothing was better

* Πολυώνυμος, Hymn, as above.

† Εἰμαρμένη, ἀλήθεια, αἰτία, φύσις, ἀνάγκη. Stob., Ecl., I. 180.

‡ Nat. Quaest., II. xlv. See also Consol. ad Helv., viii. 4; De Ben., IV. vii. 2 (tot appellationes ejus possunt esse, quot munera); Diog., VII. 135, 147; Areius Did., ap. Euseb., Pr. Ev., XV. 15; Stob., Ecl., I. 66; and Cicero, De N. D., I. 14.

than the universe proved it to be endowed with reason, it proved no less that it was wise, happy, and eternal, and therefore God.* The word God is not used here, as it was by Plato, in a subordinate sense, but denotes, as Origen says, "the first God."† To the word *cosmos*, however, different definitions were given, which will help to explain some apparent inconsistency of language. On the one hand it was used to denote the universal and primitive substance, incapable of either genesis or decay, the artificer of that periodical arrangement which constitutes the world known to our experience, and at the appointed time resuming the whole substance into itself, and generating it from itself once more. It is strictly in this sense of the word that the universe is called God. But it is also used for the present order of things, "the system of heaven and earth, and the natures contained in these; or the system of gods and men and the things that have been made for their sake."‡ Hence it was possible without any real contradiction to speak of God as the soul of the universe, and to represent matter as to some extent analogous with the body in man. Matter, however, unlike our bodies, is inseparable from its soul, and perishes only in the sense of being absorbed into it, so that, though the universe has its appointed course, it cannot die.§ Matter, then, was a lower form of the divine existence, the non-rational|| appearing as a distinct manifestation;¶ and therefore it was quite compatible with the Stoical view to speak of the universe in its present form as having, like man, a sovereign principle.** This was identified with the element or the region where the divine seemed to be gathered, as it were, to a focus; and while by some

* De N. D., II. 8. See also 11, 14, and 17.

† Τὸν πρῶτον θεόν. Cont. Cels., V. 7.

‡ See Diog., VII. 137-8; Stob., Ecl., I. 444-6; Ar. Did. ap. Eus., Pr. Ev., XV. 15.

§ See Chrysip. ap. Plut., Repug. Sto., c. 39, p. 1052 C. See also Stob., Ecl., I. 58; Cicero, De N. D., I. 14.

|| **λογον*.

¶ See Plut., De Commun. Notitiis, c. 48, p. 1085 B.

** **ἡγεμονικόν*, principatus. Cic., De N. D., II. 11.

this name was extended to the ether, by others to the sky, it was confined by Cleanthes to the great luminary which bathes the world in its light and marks the seasons and the year.* But from this supreme centre of divine manifestation the eternal reason was diffused, like the splendour of the sun, through the universe of being; and it is therefore no just reproach to Cleanthes if he assigned the name of God, now to the universe itself, now to the mind of universal nature, and again, with the utmost certainty, to the ether, the extreme and all-embracing heat.†

Another name frequently given by the Stoics to the supreme power is nature. We have already seen that God and nature were defined in identical terms as the "fabricating fire"; and Seneca asks, "what else is nature but God and the divine Reason inserted in the whole universe and in its parts?"‡ The latter words disclose to us the obvious reason for the use of this expression. Nature most readily suggested, as it does with ourselves, the indwelling and formative power which manifests itself in the ever-changing scene around.§ In a theistic system it represents only one side of the divine agency, leaving an infinite reserve of supernatural being; but in the Stoical pantheism the divine and the natural absolutely coalesce, and at most express only different ways of regarding the same reality. Accordingly, both the creation and the administration of the universe are ascribed to nature;|| and Chrysippus, representing it as all-pervading, and coupling with it the Logos to show that it is no blind and senseless force, declares that not even the least thing can happen otherwise than according to universal nature¶ and its reason.**

* Diog., VII. 139; Ar. Did. as before.

† See Cic., De N. D., I. 14.

‡ De Ben., IV. vii. 1. See also viii. 2.

§ Cf. M. Anton., IV. 36.

|| M. Ant., VII. 25 and 75, and VI. 9; Cornutus, Nat. Deorum, c. vi., p. 147.

¶ Τὴν κοινὴν φύσιν.

** Plut., De Repug. Sto., c. 34, p. 1050 A. and C. Cf. the statement of Seneca that even things which seem confused and uncertain, such as rain and clouds, do not happen without reason, but have their causes (De Providentia, i. 3).

To individual natures many impediments may occur, but to that of the universe* there can be none.†

This view of the unrestricted and permeating operation of nature readily connects itself with the idea of destiny, which we have already met among the designations of Jove.‡ Everything, it was declared, happened according to destiny, and destiny may be most briefly defined as "the continuous cause of things."§ The variations of this definition all bring before us the same thought, and describe what we should call natural causation, an unbroken series of changes, each absolutely dependent on its antecedents.|| When this destiny was regarded chiefly on its physical side, it was also called necessity. The author of the *De Placitis Philosophorum*, indeed, in a rather confused sentence, declares that the Stoics made a distinction between these terms, and that, like Plato, they understood by necessity an invincible and forcible cause, but by destiny an ordered combination of causes, in which was included that which depends on ourselves;¶ but when the writer adds that according to this view some things were destined and others not, he contradicts more trustworthy sources and is certainly in error. Stobaens tells us that Chrysippus uses "necessity," among other appellations, interchangeably with "reason" and "nature,"** and that the Stoics made no distinction between the enforced†† and the destined.‡‡ More frequently, however, the wonderful nexus of orderly causation exhibited by nature was regarded as the expression of reason. Destiny was not the blind drift of irrational forces,

* Ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις.

† Plut., *De Repug. Sto.*, c. 47, p. 1056 E.

‡ When Poseidonius (*Stob.*, *Ecl.*, I. 178) represents Zeus as first, nature second, and destiny third, he must refer not to a real distinction, but to the order of conception.

§ Diog., VII. 149.

|| See especially the definition of Chrysippus in A. Gellius, VII. (VI.), ii. 1-3; also Cicero, *De Divinat.*, I. 55; Seneca, *Consol. ad Helv.*, viii. 3; *De Ben.*, IV. vii. 2; *De Provid.*, v. 7.

¶ I. 27, p. 885 A.

** *Ecl.*, I. 180.

†† Κατηναγκασμένον.

‡‡ Εἰμαρμένον. *Ib.*, 176.

but its essence was a spiritual power which conducted an orderly administration of the universe. It was, in other words, "the reason of the cosmos, or the reason* of the things administered in the cosmos by providence, or the reason according to which the past has happened, the present happens, and the future will happen."† A rational destiny is a law; and accordingly this term also is met with. It denotes not, as so often with ourselves, a mere inevitable sequence, but is an expression of, or rather is identical with, reason;‡ and thus at every turn we are brought back to the all-penetrating Logos.

Under the influence of religious emotion the law of destiny becomes providence.§ According to Zeno we may speak indifferently of destiny, nature, and providence,|| and we have already seen that the last term was included among the numerous appellations of God. We learn from Cicero¶ that the discussion of this topic was usually divided into three parts. In the first place the reality of providence was inferred from the existence of the gods. If they existed, it necessarily followed that they did something, and this something was glorious. Now, nothing could be more glorious than the administration of the universe; and this, accordingly, must be directed by the divine counsel, for there is nothing higher

* According to Plutarch's reading, "the law."

† Chrysippus in Stob., Ecl., I. 180; Plut., Plac. Phil., I. 28, p. 885 B. See also Diog., VII. 149. The statement in Stob., Ecl., I. 322, that "some" call the Logos destiny may perhaps only imply that Zeno, whose opinion is given, asserted that what some described as a mere destiny was, in reality, nothing less than the all-pervading Logos. The words will, I think, bear this interpretation, and therefore need not imply any difference of opinion among the Stoics upon this point.

‡ See the Hymn of Cleanthes, where κοινὸς λόγος and κοινὸς νόμος seem to be only different aspects of the same reality; also Seneca, De Providentia, i. 2, aeternae legis imperio (of the movement of the heavens); Areius Did. ap. Eus., Pr. Ev., XV. 15, λόγου . . . ὅς ἐστι φύσει νόμος (cf. Cic., N. D., II. 62, ratione utentes, jure ac lege vivunt); M. Ant., X. 25; Diog., VII. 88, ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινὸς ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος (in immediate reference, however, to ethics).

§ Πράνοια.

|| Stob., Ecl., I. 178.

¶ De N. D., II. 30 sqq.

than God, to whom this work could belong. Again, the divine reason and wisdom were the source of the same properties in man; and as mankind exercised these in civil government, so the gods must exercise them in things the greatest and the best, that is, in the government of the universe. Finally, as the sun, moon, and stars, the heaven and the universe itself were all gods, it followed that everything was ruled by divine wisdom. In the second place, evidence was adduced that all things were under the direction of a rational nature; and thirdly, the admirable structure of things heavenly and earthly was dwelt upon. These two lines of argument have been already alluded to in considering the steps by which the idea of the Logos was reached, and it is unnecessary for us to trace them farther at present. We must, however, notice the purpose which, it was alleged, providence had in view. The universe at large was made for the sake of gods and men; but its several contents were prepared for the enjoyment of mankind. The latter proposition was established by pointing out the advantages which men derived from the various products of nature. Even the heavenly bodies, though it was their principal object to maintain the coherence of the entire system, nevertheless ministered to man by appealing to his reason and his sense of beauty. But the earth, with its teeming fruitfulness, evidently lavished its stores for his sake alone. For not only were its richest and most tempting supplies, such as the olive and the vine, withheld from the lower animals through their ignorance of agriculture, but if the brutes did plunder a portion of nature's provision, it was not for their sake that earth's abundance was displayed, any more than men garnered up their wheat for the sake of the pilfering mice and ants. Nay, the lower animals themselves were made for the sake of man, as was apparent from the various uses to which they were applied, the sheep providing us with clothing, the dogs acting as our faithful guardians and hunters, the oxen with their strong shoulders tugging at the plough, and even the pig,

which was good for nothing but eating, being furnished with a vital principle simply to act as salt and keep it from putrescence. The wild animals, too, afforded the wholesome discipline of hunting, or were tamed to be subservient to human purposes. And lastly, the earth was full of mineral wealth, which it yielded to the discovery of man alone. Appeal was also made, as we have seen, to divination, and in this connection it was urged that divine care not only embraced mankind as a whole, but descended to individual men. There was indeed no line which could be justly drawn to limit the action of providence. If it included the world, then surely also its parts, Europe, Asia, Africa; if these, then likewise Rome, Athens, Sparta; and if these, again, then Fabricius, Metellus, Africanus. "No man was ever great without some divine inspiration."*

In advocating this view the Stoics encountered in its full force the difficulty to which every doctrine of providence must find some reply. If divine reason orders all things, even down to the minutest details, what explanation are we to give of the evil which prevails in the world? The Stoics, with their exalted and rigid morality, were peculiarly impressed by the darker aspects of human life. All things, they declared, were full of wickedness, and the whole of life, from its beginning to its close, was marked by deformity, failure, and confusion, having no part pure or free from blame.† The existence of wickedness naturally suggests the question of free will; but reserving this for future consideration, we must at present view the problem of evil in its more general aspects. Whether there be free will or not, why is the possibility of wrong left open? Why does a world exist in which there can be such things as injustice, falsehood, and murder? And why are the good, no less than the wicked, exposed to the most appalling calamities?

In regard to the general question of the existence of evil three principal lines of thought were followed.

* Cic., *De N. D.*, II. 62-6.

† Plut., *De Com. Notit.*, c. 14, p. 1066 A. See also c. 33, p. 1076 C.

Chrysippus quite consistently maintained that even moral evil* arose somehow in accordance with the reason of nature.† If good is to exist, then, by a necessity of reason, evil must present itself at the same time; for of contraries neither can exist without the other, and they stand only through their mutual support. Whence could arise the sense of justice if there were no wrongs? Or what is justice but the negation of injustice? How could fortitude or self-restraint be understood except from the antithesis of cowardice or intemperance? Just as the true implies the false, so good and evil, happiness and misery, pleasure and pain, must exist concurrently, like two objects supported each by the other's vertex, so that if you remove one, you remove both.‡ To this view it may fairly be objected, as it is by Plutarch, that by parity of reasoning a chorus could not have harmony unless some one in it sang out of tune, and there could not be health of body unless some member were diseased.§ But making reason, as they did, paramount in the universe, it was not unnatural for the Stoics to confound the necessities of thought with the necessities of existence. The argument which we have just sketched shows that they started from the logical position that good could be *known* only as antithetical to evil, and they apparently assumed that this was equivalent to saying that in this way only could it exist. Prudence, it was urged, being a knowledge of good and evil, would be altogether destroyed if there were no evils,|| and, as it is only by folly that we apprehend prudence, prudence without folly would apprehend neither itself nor folly.¶ Thus a law of mental association

* Ἡ κακία.

† Πῶς κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον, quoted from his work, *Περὶ φύσεως*, by Plut., *De Com. Notit.*, c. 13, p. 1065 B., and *De Repug. Sto.*, c. 35, p. 1050 F.

‡ See Aulus Gellius, *Noct. Att.*, VII. (VI.), i. where this argument is sketched from Chrysippus's 4th book "On Providence." See also the statement of Chrysippus that it is neither possible nor expedient to abolish moral evil entirely, ap. Plut., *De Repug. Sto.*, c. 36, p. 1051 B.

§ *De Com. Not.*, c. 13, p. 1065 B.

|| Plut., *De Com. Not.*, c. 16, p. 1066 D.

¶ *Ib.*, c. 18, p. 1067 D.

was regarded as representing the inevitable realities of external being.

Another mode of meeting the difficulty was founded on the relation of the part to the whole. The universe, considered as a whole, was perfect, because there was nothing extraneous to it which could interfere with its destined end. But its parts were not perfect, because they did not exist for themselves, but stood in relation to the whole; so that, while they contributed to the fulfilment of the general plan, the development of their individual nature was necessarily exposed to many obstructions.* Chrysippus illustrated this position by an example drawn from literary practice. "As comedies," he says, "bear ridiculous titles, which in themselves are worthless, but add a certain grace to the entire poem, so you may blame moral evil in itself, but it is not without use to the rest of the world."†

The third way in which some evils were accounted for was by regarding them as mere concomitant results of a large and beneficent purpose. This view was advocated by Chrysippus in answer to the question, whether the providence which produced mankind also produced the diseases and bodily infirmities from which mankind suffer. He supposed that the liability to disease did not enter into the principal design of nature; for this would be unworthy of the parent of all good. But when nature produced many things of the highest utility, other things of a hurtful quality made their appearance at the same time, and these were created not by nature, but, as he expressed it, by way of accompaniment.‡ Thus when nature constructed the human body, a more subtle reason and the very purpose of the work required that the head should be composed of fine and minute bones. But this advantage in the more important matter was attended by the disadvantage of leaving the head poorly defended, and liable to be broken

* See Plut., *De Repug. Sto.*, c. 44, p. 1054 F.; and c. 47, p. 1056 E.

† Plut., *De Com. Notit.*, c. 14, p. 1065 D.

‡ Κατὰ παρακολούθησιν.

by slight blows. Thus diseases arose simultaneously with health, and vices sprang into being while the design of nature gave birth to virtue.*

We must now turn to the other phase of the difficulty. Admitting that evil has a necessary place in the world, still we may ask, How is it, if we live under a righteous providence, that the good are exposed to suffering? In reply to this question, it is not sufficient to say, with Seneca,† “No evil can happen to the good man; opposites do not blend.” This statement rests upon the well-known Stoical doctrine that good and evil existed only within the sphere of morals, and that all which lay outside that sphere must be classed as indifferent. Had this doctrine been rigidly carried out, the problem under consideration could only have been rejected as something unreal; for if suffering was indifferent, it was a matter of no consequence whether the good man was involved in calamity or not. But practically it was found necessary to draw a distinction among indifferent things themselves, and to class some as preferable, others as objectionable, while only such trivialities as whether we should pay with this coin or with that were allowed to remain indifferent in the strictest sense.‡ Though no evil, therefore, could befall the good man, he experienced many things that were not in themselves to be preferred; and of this fact some explanation had to be given. The Stoic in Cicero’s *De Natura Deorum* § touches the question for a moment. We must not suppose, he says, that if any one’s crops are injured by the weather, he is either hated or neglected by God; “the gods care for great things, neglect the little.” This is a mere evasion of the difficulty, and is quite inconsistent with the doctrine of an all-permeating Reason, present in the meanest and ugliest creatures no less

* From the 4th book on Providence, ap. A. Gell., *Noct. Att.*, VII. (VI.), i.

† *De Provid.*, ii. 1.

‡ See this doctrine fully treated, with copious references to the sources, in Zeller, III. i., pp. 208 sqq., and 256 sqq.

§ II. 66.

than in the great and beautiful. Seneca devotes a short treatise* to the solution of this problem, and no doubt presents us, for the most part, with considerations which were current among the Stoics of an earlier time. He undertakes to show that the adversity which befalls the good was only a blessing in disguise, and was really a benefit both to the very men who experienced it and to mankind at large. To prove that men may derive good from seeming ill, he appeals to the familiar example of medical practice, in which physicians resort to painful operations in order to save life, and he strengthens the plausibility of his position by referring to its admitted converse, that men are often injured by the prosperity which they admire and seek. Towards the sufferer himself adversity answers a twofold purpose. It disciplines and confirms his virtue just as the athlete gathers strength and skill from conflict and blows. "Without an antagonist virtue withers." God, therefore, exercising towards the good, whom he greatly loves, the forethought of a father rather than the indulgence of a mother, exposes them to the assaults of fortune, that they may attain to the highest possible excellence. And again, it is only through trial that men can prove the nobility which is in them. Their glory is proportioned to their pain. Great examples are produced only by misfortune, and "calamity is virtue's opportunity." Farther, the sufferings of the good are a benefit to mankind at large, by teaching them that the things which they desire or dread are neither good nor evil. This lesson could not be learned if what is pleasant fell to the lot only of the good, and what is painful was felt only by the bad.† And if it is said that it is unjust for the good man to be weak or in fetters, while the wicked walk in freedom with sound bodies, then is it not unjust for brave men to take up arms and spend their nights in the camp while the licentious

* *Quare aliqua incommoda bonis viris accidunt cum providentia sit, sive de providentia.*

† Compare the similar thought in Augustin, *De Civ. Dei*, I. 8.

are meanwhile safe in the city, or for the Senate to prolong their consultations through the whole day while worthless people are amusing their leisure in the field or in a pastry-cook's? The fact is, good men spend, and are spent, of their own will. They are not dragged by fortune, but follow it with equal pace. It is their consolation that they are carried along with the universe, that all things flow by a certain and eternal law. "Cause hangs on cause; and the long order of things draws out private and public events." Our joys, our tears were pre-determined. The gods are involved in the same necessity. "The very Founder and Ruler of all things wrote, indeed, the fates, but follows them; he always obeys; he ordered once." But still the difficulty recurs: "Why was God so unjust in the distribution of fate as to assign to good men poverty and wounds and painful deaths?" Here Seneca is compelled, for a moment, to depart from the Stoical position, and have recourse to a dualistic conception. "The artificer," he replies, "cannot change the material," and certain things are inseparably united.* He does not, however, elaborate the thought, and he soon returns to a more familiar strain. God has removed from the good all that is really evil, crimes and wicked thoughts. If they suffer hardships, it is that they may teach others to suffer. The bad may be surrounded by illusory good, but have no solid and genuine bliss. The virtuous have a certain and enduring good, which is placed within. It is their bliss not to require bliss, and their minds have been armed against the suffering which they cannot escape. But, after all his high-flown language, placing the virtuous man above God himself, because the latter is only extraneous to suffering, while the former is above it, he comes down to the ultimate Stoical solution. God has taken care that no one shall detain us against our will. The way out lies open. If we do

* Contrast with this Plutarch's representation of the Stoical doctrine:—ὁὐ γὰρ ἡ γε ὕλη τὸ κακὸν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς παρέσχηκεν. ἀποιος γὰρ ἐστι, κ.τ.λ. De Repug. Sto., c. 34, p. 1076 C.

not wish to fight, we may flee. Nothing is easier than to die. This is really tantamount to the despair of any satisfying theory, and marks a contradiction in the doctrine of the Stoics, of which their opponents were not slow to take advantage.* With all their noble thoughts, they failed to attain the idea of a providence whose ways may be trusted when they are not known, and which it is good to follow with devout and unquestioning submission.

We have now noticed the all-pervading character of the Logos under various aspects, rising from the simply physical conception to that of the providential government of the world. We have still to refer to a suggestive mode of regarding it, which was elaborated by the Stoics, and became fruitful of results in the later theology. I allude to the doctrine of the "seminal Logos."† This phrase expresses in a concise form a theory of rational evolution, and by its two terms combines the teleological idea of the universe with that of slow and orderly development. In order clearly to understand this we must follow the successive steps of the doctrine.

The Stoics were fond of dwelling upon the seed, with its wonderful power of unfolding itself into a finished organism. They defined it as that which was capable of producing things similar to that from which it was itself derived.‡ Its essence they supposed to consist of spirit, that is breath or air,§ an idea which was probably suggested by the apparently rational force enfolded in the seed (for we must remember the identification of air with the Logos), but which Chrysippus endeavoured to establish by the statement that when very old seeds are planted in the ground they do not grow, evidently because their power has been breathed away.||

* See Plut., *De Com. Notit.*, c. 22, p. 1069 E.

† Λόγος σπέρματικός.

‡ Diog., VII. 158.

§ Πνεῦμα.

|| Diog., VII. 159. See the opinion of Zeno in Areius Did., ap. Eus., *Praep. Ev.*, XV. 20, where he represents the seed in the case of man as πνεῦμα . . . ψυχῆς μέρος καὶ ἀπόσπασμα.

Nowhere was the faculty of nature so conspicuous ; for small as the seed was, if only it fell into the proper receptacle, and obtained the material suited to its nourishment and growth, it produced each thing of its own kind, proving that nature moved in a rational and orderly course, and exercised a cunning which no art, no manual skill could rival.* Here also the vastness of the force which permeated nature was strikingly manifest ; for minute seeds, finding their way into stony crevices, grow with such power that their fine and delicate roots fissure the rocks and cause monuments to moulder into ruins.† The remarkable efficacy of the seed was sometimes expressed in the paradoxical statement that the seed was more and greater than the thing produced from it,‡ and that “sperm”§ was called from “spiral,”|| tapering from an ample to a trifling bulk.¶ This of course cannot have been intended to refer, as Plutarch understands it, to the relative size of the seed and its product ; for even Stoics knew that seeds, though the causes of all things, were nevertheless the smallest parts of the things which they produced.** The meaning must have been that the seed, as the efficient cause, contained implicitly all and more than all that appeared in the fully developed organism, and the comparison with the spiral may perhaps refer to the decreasing force of the organism as it recedes in time from its origin, becoming subject at last to decay and death.

The idea of the seed being thus full of suggestion, it was easy to extend it beyond the organic bodies to which the name is generally confined. We have just learned from Seneca that seeds were the causes of all things ; and, according to M. Antoninus, it evinced a great want of philosophical training

* Cic., De N. D., II. 32.

† Seneca, Nat. Quaest., II. vi. 5. This power is ascribed to the intentio spiritus.

‡ Plut., De Com. Notit., c. 35, p. 1077 A.

§ Σπέρμα.

¶ Σπείρασις.

¶ Ib., B.

** Seneca, De Ben., III. xxix. 4.

to suppose that the only seeds were the objects which are ordinarily so called.* If we may trust our authorities, Heraclitus anticipated the Stoics even here, and declared that destiny or its substance was the seed of the genesis of the universe;† but as the words are not professedly quoted, they may perhaps have received a Stoical colouring. Be this as it may, the school of Zeno taught distinctly that the primeval fire was, as it were, a seed, having the reasons and causes of all things past, present, and future.‡ Sometimes the words of comparison are dropped, and it is simply affirmed that the fire is the seed of the universe which is about to be formed; and as things are thus indebted for their origin to a seed, so in their periodic conflagration they are resolved into seed, from which the old order develops itself once more.§ By this language it was intended to represent the universe as an organism, unfolding into regulated manifestation the implicit contents of the originating substance. As the tree lay hidden in the seed, as the infant yet unborn had the law of beard and gray hairs, and the whole system of the future man, so all heavenly and earthly things were wrapt in the origin of the universe, and issued forth, as by a natural growth, at their determined times.||

If, then, the primeval fire was thus both *reason* and *seed*, it was but one step farther to combine the two ideas into one expression, *seminal reason*. We must remember the changes, already described, which the fire undergoes in the formation of the universe. According to Seneca, when the fire, at the end

* IV. 36.

† Plut., Plac. Phil., I. 28, p. 885 A.; Stob., Ecl., I. 178.

‡ Τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς αἰτίαις. Aristocles in Euseb., Pr. Ev., XV. 14. See also Stob., Ecl., I. 414.

§ See the De Incorrumpibilitate Mundi ascribed to Philo, 19 (II. 505-6), where the opinion of Chrysippus is given; Plut., de Com. Notit., c. 35, p. 1077 B.; Eus., Pr. Ev., XV. 18; M. Ant., IV. 36, where, instead of the fire, we have πᾶν τὸ ὄν.

|| See Seneca, Nat. Quaest., III. xxix. 3; Cic., De N. D., II. 22; Diog., VII. 148 Stob., Ecl., I. 372.

of a world-period, has converted everything into itself, it then subsides and is extinguished, and nothing is left but moisture. In this lies the hope of the future world; and thus, while fire is the end of the world, moisture is its beginning.* This moisture or water we must conceive as something different from the substance known to us by that name; for the formation of the four elements is regarded as subsequent to this earliest change in the primeval fire. It is here, where first the ideas of seed and receptacle, of active and passive, of God and matter can arise, that the seminal Logos is found. God at first is by himself; but when he changes the whole pristine substance through air into water, he is left remaining in the moisture in his capacity of seminal Logos, and, as such, bends matter to his purposes, and proceeds first of all to the production of the four elements.† The seminal Logos, therefore, is none other than God himself, regarded as the organic principle of the universe, working by rational methods towards a determined end.

If the cosmos regarded as a single organism was interpenetrated by one informing Logos, it would naturally follow that the several organic bodies comprised within the cosmos had also their seminal Logoi which were included within the Logos of the universe. Accordingly we find a statement to this effect appended to the definition of God which we have already noticed. He was a fabricating fire, "comprising all the seminal Logoi, according to which all things arise in conformity with destiny."‡ These were received and retained by matter, and hence proceeded the orderly unfolding of all things.§ The presence of these Logoi constituted the identity of objects amid the constant transformation of the elements; and as it was the

* Nat. Quaest., III. xiii.

† See this account in Diog., VII. 136.

Stob., Ecl., I. 66; Plut., Plac. Phil., I. 7, p. 881 F.; Athenag. Suppl., c. 6.

§ See Origen, Cont. Cels., IV. 48, where the view of Chrysippus is given in explanation of a mythological picture. See also Sextus, Adv. Math., IX. 103, p. 575; Cornutus, Nat. Deor., c. xxvii., p. 203; and M. Ant., IX. 1; where the same conception is presented in a different form.

special property of a seed to produce something like that from which it was derived, they formed the permanent characteristic of a class, giving the appropriate shape to the individuals which composed it.* At this point they exhibit some analogy to the Platonic ideas; but the order of thought in the two instances moves in opposite directions. The Stoics denied all substantive reality to general notions;† and accordingly, instead of regarding individuals as imperfect copies of a perfect generic type, they ascribed the likeness which subsisted among individuals of the same class to the process of seminal development, which proceeded by the law of material, though rational, causation. We have seen how this idea was contained in the phrase under consideration; but when the thought of rational guidance was less prominent, other expressions were sometimes used, such as “seminal power”;‡ and “productive powers.”§

This line of thought would seem strictly applicable only to organic existence. It was, however, extended to the whole realm of nature,|| though in what precise way it was applied to inorganic substances we are not informed. In their case the idea of the seed would easily retire into the background; and accordingly we hear of Logoi without the accompanying qualification. In giving one of their curious etymologies the Stoics said that nature was so called as “being an inflation¶ and dispersion of the Logoi and numbers opened and loosened by it.”** So again we are told that the pristine fire, like a seed, contained the Logoi and causes of all things;†† and M. Antoninus tells us that nature conceived certain Logoi of future things.‡‡ In all these passages the seminal idea is included in the context; but Cornutus, in passages where no

* Proclus, Com. in Plato. Parmen., lib. IV. Vol. V., p. 135 (ed. Cousin, Paris, 1820-3); Seneca, Ep., xc. 29.

† Stob., Ecl., I. 332; Diog., VII. 61; Plut., Plac. Phil., I. 10, p. 882 E.

‡ Σπέρματικὴ δύναμις in God. Cornut., Nat. Deor., c. xxvii. p. 205.

§ Δυνάμεις γόνιμοι of nature. M. Anton., IX. 1. || Diog., VII. 148.

¶ The connection can be seen only in the Greek, φύσιν ἐμφύσησιν οὐσαν.

** Plut., De Com. Notit., c. 35, p. 1077 B.

†† Aristocles in Eus., Pr. Ev., XV. 14.

‡‡ IX. 1.

such idea is apparent, speaks of the Logoi of nature,* and of the Logoi comprehended in Atlas as representative of the universe.†

We need only add, on this part of our subject, that the seminal Logoi found their unity in the universal Logos, in which, as we have seen, they were contained. Perhaps it would not be too much to say that they are the universal reason resolving itself into multiform manifestation; so that we even find the singular and plural used by M. Antoninus with apparently identical meaning. The souls of the dead, he says, are taken up into the seminal Logos of the universe;‡ and elsewhere he remarks that "Alexander of Macedon and his muleteer, at their death, entered the same condition; for they were either taken into the same seminal Logoi of the universe, or were scattered in like manner into its atoms."§

Having completed our notice of the Logos in its relation to the universe at large, we must now examine its special relation to man. We might suppose from its all-pervading nature that its characteristic life would be everywhere equally manifest, and that man would participate in it only in the same way as the inferior orders of being. But this was not so. In animated nature there was an ascending scale; and the lower animals, though superior to vegetables and possessed of soul,|| were still irrational. But to man the gods had sent down the Logos out of heaven, and had made him alone rational among the living creatures upon earth.¶ In his case a portion of the universal reason had detached itself, and constituted his personality. "Reason," says Seneca, "is nothing else than a part of the divine spirit immersed in the human body."** The soul, mind, or reason of each was a piece

* Nat. Deor., c. v., p. 145. † Ib., c. xxvi., p. 202. ‡ IV. 21 and 14.

§ VI. 24. For a fuller treatment of the whole subject than is necessary to our purpose, and especially for the relation of the λόγοι σπερματικοί to the Stoical categories, see Heinze, pp. 107 sqq. (on the categories, pp. 117 sqq.).

|| Ψυχή, vital principle.

¶ Cornut., Nat. Deor., c. xvi., p. 164; cf. Diog., VII. 86; M. Ant., IX. 8, 9.

** Ep. lxvi. 12. See also xcii. 1.

drawn off* from Zeus† or God.‡ It was an emanation§ of him who administered the universe.|| Hence it was the divinity¶ whom Zeus had given to each as president and sovereign,** the God who dwelt as a guest within the human frame.†† The sacred spirit had his seat within, the observer and guardian of men's good and ill.‡‡ There is therefore, in reality, only one intelligent soul, however it may seem divided by the natures in which it dwells; just as there is one common substance of all bodies, and we breathe but one air, and there is only one light of the sun, however it may be broken up by walls, mountains, and innumerable other obstacles.§§ Thus, not only the unity of the race was established, but man was lifted into a higher fellowship. The universe was, as it were, a city inhabited by gods and men. The gods enjoyed the leadership, and men were subject; but they had communion with one another on account of their participation in the Logos, which is by nature the law in this vast commonwealth.||||

Heinze¶¶ calls attention to a passage in Diogenes Laertius,*** in which the opinion of Poseidonius upon this subject is represented in a manner which does not quite coincide with the Stoical doctrine. It is there stated that mind penetrates every part of the universe, as the soul in us, but some things to a greater, others to a less, extent. For it has pervaded some things, such as the bones and sinews, as a habit or permanent quality,††† but other things, such as the sovereign principle,‡‡‡ as mind. This statement, as Heinze points out, seems to represent the sovereign principle in man as something different in substance from the universal mind; for

* Ἀπόσπασμα.

† M. Ant., V. 27.

‡ Epictet., Dissert., I. xiv. 6; II. viii. 11. § Ἀπόρροια. || M. Ant., II. 4.

¶ Ὁ δαίμων. ** M. Ant., V. 27; cf. XII. 26. †† Sen., Ep. xxxi. 11.

‡‡ Sen., Ep. xli. 2; cf. Epictet., Dissert., II. viii. 12-14.

§§ M. Ant., IX. 8; XII. 30.

¶¶ Areius Did. in Euseb., Pr. Ev., XV. 15; Cic., De N. D., II. 31 and 62. See also Seneca, Ep. xcii. 27, Ratio vero dis hominibusque communis est: hæc in illis consummata est, in nobis consummabilis.

¶¶ P. 146.

*** VII. 138-9.

††† Ἐξῆς.

‡‡‡ Τὸ ἡγεμονικόν.

the former assumes the character of a receptacle capable of being permeated by the latter. I think, however, we may see in this passage not a difference of opinion, but merely a looseness of expression. It is perhaps not impossible that, as the immediate reference is to the human *body*, the "sovereign principle" may here stand for the heart, which, according to the general opinion of the Stoics, was the central seat of the soul, the organ where alone the soul manifested itself as reason or mind.* This interpretation would remove even the semblance of a different view.

However this may be decided, there is no doubt that the sovereign principle of the soul itself was the rational or intellectual faculty.† This is only another term for Logos; but curiously enough, the word Logos itself does not seem to be technically used to denote the highest part of the soul. Indeed, we even find it classed with perception, assent, and impulse, as a property included in the sovereign principle, like sweetness and fragrance in an apple.‡ If this be a correct reproduction of Stoical language, we must understand Logos in quite a subordinate sense, not as the substantive reason itself, but only as one of the modes of its exercise. But we may perhaps view the statement with some suspicion; for in a parallel passage found elsewhere the word "sensations" is substituted for "reason."§

The sovereign principle was only one of eight parts into which the soul was usually divided by the Stoics. The other seven parts were the five senses and the faculties of speech and reproduction. Consistently with a materialistic view these were conceived as extended from the sovereign principle in the

* On this opinion see Zeller, III. i. p. 197, Anm. 2.

† Λογισμός, Plut., Plac. Phil., IV. 21, p. 903 B.; τὸ λογιστικόν, Diog., VII. 157; ἡ διάνοια, τὸ διανοητικόν, ib., 110, Stob., Ecl., II. 116. Seneca, however, says, In hoc principali est aliquid irrationale, est et rationale; illud huic servit. Ep. xcii. 1; but here he speaks of the animus as a whole in contradistinction from corpus.

‡ Jamblichus in Stob., Ecl., I. 876 and 878. § Plac. Phil., IV. 21, p. 903 A.

heart to their several organs, like the feelers of a polypus, and were regarded as so many spirits or breaths of air.* Of these, the faculty of speech, as the instrument of rational communication, appeared to be in the closest connection with the sovereign principle; so much so indeed that the chief argument for locating the latter in the heart was founded on the fact that the voice issues not from the hollow of the skull, but from the chest.† The voice converts into intelligible sound the thoughts which else were hidden in the soul; and hence arises a distinction (afterwards transferred to theology), which was not indeed first observed, but first provided with a permanent nomenclature by the Stoics, that between the internal and the uttered Logos.‡ Zeller regards these words as representing the distinction between the unspoken and the uttered thought. "The same Logos," he says, "which is thought so long as it remains in the breast, becomes the word when it issues from it"; and hence he derives the two main departments of Stoical logic, those relating to thoughts and to words.§ I think, however, that Heinze is correct in maintaining that, although the term "internal Logos" is occasionally defined by non-Stoical writers so as to limit it to a single thought which is without vocal expression, this is not the sense in which the Stoics themselves employed it.|| The principal passage describing the Stoical view of this subject is contained in Sextus Empiricus.¶ The question is raised

* See Plut., *Plac. Phil.*, IV. 4, 8, and 21, pp. 898 E., 899 D., 903 A.-C.; Jamblichus ap. Stob., *Ecl.*, I. 876, 878. The πνεύματα are said διατείνειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ. They are also spoken of as ἐκπεφυκότα καὶ ἐκτεινόμενα εἰς τὸ σῶμα, or simply as τεταμένα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγ. ἐπὶ τὰ ὄργανα. This language furnishes a human analogy for the later doctrine about the divine powers.

† See Zeller, *III. i.* p. 197, Anm. 2.

‡ Λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λ. προφορικός. Aristotle had already distinguished ὁ ἐξω λόγος and ὁ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. *Analyt. post.*, I. x. 6. The distinction, but not the phrase, is also in Plato, *Sophist.*, 263 E., where δῖα νοῖα is the inward δῖα λόγος of the soul with itself, and the stream that flows from it in speech is λόγος.

§ *III. i.* p. 67.

|| See p. 140, where the definitions of Hesychius and Nemesius are given.

¶ *Pyrhron. Instit.*, I. 65-72, pp. 18-20.

whether the so-called irrational animals possess reason (or Logos), and the dog is selected as an example to be tested. Logos is divided into internal and uttered, and it is then stated that according to the Stoics the former is concerned with the choice of what is suitable and the avoidance of what is alien to one's self, the knowledge of the arts which conduce to this end, and the apprehension of the virtues adapted to one's own nature and relating to the passions. The dog conforms to all the requirements of the definition, and therefore, so far as the "internal Logos" is concerned, he is perfect. In this statement it is evident, both from the definition and from the argument founded upon it, that we are dealing not with individual thoughts, but with the faculty of reason. The word Logos is used in the sense in which we have hitherto met with it, and denotes that part of the universal Logos which, as we have seen, resides in man, and which, since it is now capable through speech of becoming an objective reason, requires an epithet to mark its inward character. It was in this sense that the term passed into Christian theology, where the divine "internal Logos" is not a particular thought in the mind of God, but his eternal reason. The "uttered Logos," accordingly, is strictly uttered reason. It is "the reporter of the inward thoughts,"* and agreeably to this definition the word Logos, when used by itself to denote something spoken, signifies not a word, but a rational statement. It was natural, however, that when the distinction was drawn between inward and uttered reason, the latter should sometimes be loosely used of the mere faculty of speech. Sextus tells us that the dogmatists (*i.e.* the Stoics) declared that men differed from the irrational animals not in the "uttered Logos," since ravens, parrots, and jays uttered articulate sounds, but in the "internal Logos." Here the term implies nothing more than the power of pronunciation. Sextus, taking the term in its truer sense, and perceiving that if there be no Logos within none can be

* *Τῶν ἔνδον λογισμῶν ἱξάγγελος.* Heraclitus, Alleg. Hom., c. 72.

uttered, contends that if animals have the "uttered Logos" they must of necessity have the "internal" as well.* It is clear, however, that the expression is not justly applicable to the imitative chatter of birds,† unless, indeed, the Stoics would have maintained that a proposition repeated by a parrot was just as rational, although it expressed a reason residing not in himself, but in his teacher. Be this as it may, the "uttered Logos" is strictly the correlative of the "internal Logos," whose silent operations it reveals through the organs of speech.

The points of most interest to us at present in the Stoical view of man's intellectual and moral constitution spring immediately from their fundamental theory. The soul, being strictly a part of the universal Logos, was not an eternal individual entity which took up its temporary abode in the prison-house of the body, but first sprang into separate existence along with its corporeal dwelling. It derived its natural origin from parts of the souls of the parents,‡ and grew by an orderly development, possessing prior to birth only a vegetative existence, but afterwards, when it was chilled by the air and hardened, rising into animal life.§ That minds were thus really born was inferred by Panaetius from the resemblance which children bore to their parents not only in body, but in mental qualities.|| From this doctrine it was a necessary inference that the soul was not immortal; for it was an accepted axiom that whatsoever is born must perish.¶ The Stoics allowed to the soul, however, a continued existence after death, lasting, at least in the case of the wise, to the great conflagration, when it would be reabsorbed into the soul of the universe.**

* Adv. Math., VIII. 275, p. 510, and 287, p. 512.

† The λόγος in the sense of speech was defined as *φωνή σημαντική, ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη*. Diog., VII. 56.

‡ Areius Did. in Euseb., Pr. Ev., XV. 20.

§ Chrysip. in Plut., De Repug. Stoic., c. 41, p. 1052 F.

|| Cicero, Tusc. Disp., I. 32.

¶ Ibid.

** Diog., VII. 156-7; Areius Did., Eus., Pr. Ev., XV. 20; Plut., Plac. Phil., IV. 7, p. 899 C. On this subject, which we need not pursue farther, see Zeller, III. i. p. 202, Anm. 1, and pp. 201 sqq.

In conformity with this view the Logos in man was supposed to be gradually evolved through the experiences of life. At birth the sovereign principle of the soul was like a sheet of paper, waiting to receive the transcript of ideas. The first impressions were those communicated through the senses. These were retained in the memory; and a multitude of similar recollections constituted experience. Thus were generated by a natural process some of our general notions, which were called "presumptions,"* the fundamental ideas which, on account of their inartificial genesis, were the same in all men. Our other notions† were gained by our own diligence and instruction. It was from the former that the Logos which entitles us to the name of rational derived its completion, the period of growth being the first seven, or, according to another statement, fourteen years.‡ The reason, being thus established, was able to proceed by logical processes to the apprehension of truths not otherwise attainable, and to infer, for instance, the existence and providence of the gods.§ It does not belong to our present subject to follow in detail the philosophy of cognition, and with regard to this portion of their theory we need only remark that some of the more ancient Stoics, including Poseidonius, found in right reason|| the criterion of truth.¶ Right reason itself, however, requires some means of recognition; and as the school attached great importance to the convictions of mankind,** and contrasted the judgments of nature with the figments of mere opinion,†† we must suppose that they found the mark of right reason in its agreement with the universal or common reason,‡‡ which, pervading all things, was the general inheritance of men, and revealed itself in their persistent beliefs.

* Προλήψεις.

† Called distinctively *ἐννοεῖαι*.

‡ Plut., Plac. Phil., IV. 11, p.900 B. C.; for the fourteen years, Jamblichus in Stob., Ecl., I. 792.

§ Diog., VII. 52.

|| Ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος.

¶ Diog., VII. 54.

** Seneca, Ep. cxvii. 6.

†† Cic., De N. D., II. 2.

‡‡ Κοινὸς λόγος.

In the department of ethics, too, right reason occupies a prominent place, and is acknowledged as the standard of virtuous action. This acknowledgment, however, is only the result of a more general principle. The primary animal instinct was an impulse not towards pleasure, but towards self-preservation, leading the animal to repel what was injurious, to seek what was adapted to its constitution. Hence arose the universal law for sentient beings, that it was their end to live according to nature.* This rule, in the case of the lower animals, is satisfied by their living according to impulse,† which in them is predominant. But man has a rational constitution; and, as soon as his reason is developed from its infantine germs, it devolves on him to live according to reason, which in the rational animal is identical with living according to nature.‡ For man, therefore, the blessed life consists in the perfection of his reason, which alone can render him self-dependent and superior to the assaults of fortune; which imparts a perception of all truth, and gives order, moderation, and dignity in action, a will harmless and benignant, at once lovable and admirable; in a word, a mind such as becomes God.§ This is the life of virtue, which is the only good.|| Whether man was to follow only the universal nature, or also the human, was differently decided by Cleanthes and Chrysippus; but in either case it was the end of his being to abstain from everything forbidden by the universal law,¶ which is the right reason that pervades all things, identical with Zeus, who directs the administration of the world; and in more religious phrase, the virtue of the blessed man, and the pros-

* Ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει, or simply κατὰ φύσιν. Zeno defined the τέλος as ὁμολ. ζῆν, Cleanthes added τῇ φύσει, and Chrysippus, for the sake of greater clearness, expanded the phrase into ζῆν κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων. There were also other variations. See Stob., Ecl., II. 134.

† Κατὰ τὴν ὁρμήν.

‡ M. Ant., VII. 11.

§ Seneca, Ep., xcii. 2, 3.

|| Diog., VII. 94, 101; Stob., Ecl., II. 202. See several other references in Zeller, III. i. p. 212, Ann. 1.

¶ Ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός.

perous flow of his life, consisted in his doing all things in harmony with the divinity in each, according to the will of the administrator of the universe.*

From this description of virtue, combined with the universal sovereignty of the Logos, we might expect that all men would be virtuous. But, as we have seen, the Stoics were painfully alive to the existence of moral evil. We have already considered, in its general bearings, the problem which is thus created; and we have now to trace the origin of evil in the individual man. In the early period of life, before the reason is developed, man is imbued with the feelings of pleasure and pain, and these affections are so deeply ingrained in his nature that reason, when it is added, is scarcely able to root them up and destroy them, but is obliged to wage a constant war against them so as to constrain them into obedience.† This remark we may legitimately extend to the other principal passions—desire and fear. The original springs of action, indeed, come unperverted from the hand of nature; but man is perverted sometimes by the seductiveness of external affairs, sometimes by the instruction of companions.‡ Thus passion§ is not natural, but is, according to Zeno, “an irrational movement of the soul contrary to nature, or an impulse in excess.”|| But though it is thus opposed to “right and natural reason,”¶ yet, strange to say, it is an affection of the sovereign principle, the understanding itself.** It is indeed a form of judgment,†† avarice, for instance, being a supposition that money is intrinsically excellent; ‡‡ fear,

* For the general course of the above account, see Diog., VII. 85-89. See also Sen., Ep., exxi. 14 sqq., and A. Gell., Noct. Att., XII. v. 7.

In regard to law, see the definition in Stobaeus, λόγον ὁρθὸν ὄντα προστακτικὸν μὲν ὢν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸν ἔτι ὢν οὐ ποιητέον. Ecl., II. 190-2, 204; Flor., xlv. 12. Hence ἀμάρτημα was defined as τὸ παρὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον πραττόμενον ἢ ἐν ᾧ παραλείπεται τι καθῆκον ὑπὸ λογικοῦ ζήλου. Stob., Ecl., II. 184.

† A. Gell., XII. v. 8. ‡ Diog., VII. 89. § Τὸ πάθος. Diog., VII. 110.

¶ Παρὰ τὸν ὁρθὸν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν λόγον. Stob., Ecl., II. 170.

** Plut., De Virtute Morali, c. 3, p. 441 C. †† Κρίσις. ‡‡ Diog., VII. 111.

an opinion in regard to impending evil, which seems to be intolerable; desire, an opinion in regard to coming good, which is made by habit to be already present.* We must not, however, confound these judgments with men's speculative errors, such as may exist, for instance, in regard to the question whether atoms are the primitive elements† of the world. They are mere opinions,‡ weak in character and recent in origin, and thus standing in opposition to our permanent rational conviction. Every passion, therefore, though a depraved and unchastened reason,§ is really disobedient to reason;|| and it has such power of compulsion that often persons who are affected by it, though they see that it is expedient not to do something, nevertheless, being carried away by the vehemence of their feelings, as by an intractable horse, are brought to do the thing which their better judgment disapproves.¶ Such is the character of single outbursts of passion; but if the passions be unchecked by reason, they pass beyond this stage, become deep-seated and inveterate habits, and so constitute a disease of the mind, afflicting it in either a chronic or a simply recurrent form.** In accordance with this account of the sources of sin, the Stoical ideal of virtue consisted in a passionless calm. The wise man was without passion,†† not, however, as others might be, from hardness and inflexibility, but from his superiority to all disorders of the mind.‡‡

We have seen before that the existence of moral evil was supposed to be necessarily involved in the divine plan of

* Cic., Tusc. Disp., IV. 7.

† 'Αρχαί.

‡ Δόξαι.

§ Λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον.

|| 'Απειθείς λόγῳ, οἱ παρὰ τὸν αἰροῦντα λόγον.

¶ See Stob., Ecl., II. 168-174; Plut., De Virt. Mor., c. 3, p. 441 D.; Cic., ib.

** Diog., VII. 115; Stob., Ecl., II. 182; Cic., Tusc. Disp., IV. 10 sqq.

†† 'Απαθής.

‡‡ Diog., VII. 117. Seneca says, "Quid est beata vita? securitas et perpetua tranquillitas." It depended on this one condition, "ut in nobis ratio perfecta sit." Ep. xcii. 3 and 2.

the world. An examination of human nature presents the same view in a more startling form. From the above sketch it would seem to follow that sin was the inevitable result of that rational evolution which affected the soul no less than the outer universe, it being intrinsically impossible that the slowly growing reason which man possesses by virtue of his humanity should alone overcome the impulse to which he is subject by virtue of his being an animal. To what extent, then, is man responsible? Is his individual wrong-doing to be charged upon providence, or has he power over his own conduct so as to be justly amenable to blame and punishment?

These questions introduce a problem to which it was impossible for the Stoics, with their monistic theory, to give any satisfactory solution. Their philosophical speculation and their ethical consciousness drew them in opposite directions; the one leading them into the most unqualified determinism, the other demanding free will as the very condition of its existence. Accordingly, we meet with contradictory statements in regard to the ultimate cause of sin. In one place Chrysippus maintains that our external condition, whether we are ill or maimed, whether we have become grammarians or musicians, necessarily depends on the general administration of the world; that a similar remark must be extended to our virtue and vice; and that not even the least individual thing can happen otherwise than according to universal nature and its reason; that is, as Plutarch explains, destiny, providence, and Zeus.* These statements are made in his treatise upon nature. But when he comes to deal with the gods and with the office of judge, he contends that it is unreasonable to suppose that the divinity is even partly the cause of what is base,† just as a law is not partly the cause of transgression.‡ And, conversely, it was maintained that God bestowed only things indifferent—riches,

* Plut., De Repug. Sto., c. 34, p. 1050 A. B.

† *Τῶν αἰσχυρῶν τὸ θεῖον παραίτιον γίνεσθαι οὐκ εὐλογόν ἐστιν.*

‡ *Ib.*, c. 33, p. 1049 E.

health, children, and such things, but not virtue, for moral good was self-chosen.*

Now, if we ask for the precise point where the faculty of choice was exercised, we are told that it was in the assent which the mind gave to its perceptions. Mental representations, as coming from without, were dependent on conditions not in our own power; but the assent was at our own disposal and voluntary.† By assuming this position Chrysippus believed that he could preserve a doctrine of destiny while escaping from that of necessity. For the justification of the former doctrine, he supposed it sufficient to maintain that nothing could happen without some conditioning antecedent in the unchangeable causal nexus of the universe. This requirement was secured for human activity by maintaining that volitions must be preceded by a mental picture, and that this latter was simply one of the links in the chain of universal causality. At this point Chrysippus introduced a distinction between perfect and principal causes on the one hand, and assistant and proximate causes on the other,‡ and placed destiny, so far as it related to human assent, in the latter category. Thus the assent itself, though it could have no existence apart from the operation of external causes, nevertheless remained at our own disposal, to give or to withhold.§ According to this account it would seem that the mind was regarded as exercising a real, though only a co-operative, causality in the production of voluntary actions. This position is not set aside by the unqualified denial given by Chrysippus to the notion of a mental activity wholly unconditioned by extrinsic causes. It had been maintained that if it were necessary to choose one of two objects similar in kind and of equal

* Τὸ καλὸν ἀνθαίρετόν ἐστι. Plut., De Repug. Sto., c. 31, p. 1048 D.; De Com. Notit., c. 32, p. 1075 E.

† Cic., Academ., I. 11.

‡ Αὐτοτελής and προκαταρκτικὴ αἰτία, "perfectae et principales" and "adjuvantes et proximae."

§ Cic., De Fato, 18. See also Plut., De Repug. Sto., c. 47, p. 1055 F.—1056 B.

value, when no cause led the choice to one rather than the other, the mind would cut the difficulty for itself. Chrysippus replied by instancing the die and the balance, which could not fall or incline in different ways at different times without some cause, either in themselves or their surroundings. There was no such thing as the uncaused or the self-moving; and in the cases supposed there were really present some obscure causes which, unobserved by us, determined the result.* This is a subtle and, I think, a correct remark. But these instances of random selection are not the genuine types of our volitional choice. It may be quite true that the mind never moves without motives, and that it is, therefore, not "self-moved,"† and yet it may be equally true that its assent is in its own power, and that it can choose freely among a variety of conflicting motives. The real difficulty in the Stoical doctrine is that of ascribing to detached fragments of the universal Logos an independent causal power, which may be even antagonistic to the action of the totality which includes them. Yet even as much as this would seem to be implied when Cleanthes says that no work is done on earth or in heaven without God, except what the wicked do by their own folly, and that, while God has harmonized into one all things, both good and evil, the wicked flee from the eternal Logos, and neither look at nor hear God's universal law.‡ Here it is evident that the wicked, however their conduct may be over-ruled and made subservient to the divine order,§ are regarded as constituting in themselves an element of discord, and cutting themselves off from the guidance of the supreme Reason. This, however, cannot be accepted as a strictly philosophical statement, and Chrysippus

* Plut., De Repug. Sto., c. 23, p. 1045 B.—D.

† *Ἀυτόματον*.

‡ Hymn, as before.

§ See the homely illustration cited by Hippolytus: when a dog is fastened to a carriage, if it wishes to follow, it is both drawn and follows voluntarily, but if it does not wish to follow, it will be forced to do so. Similarly, men must enter their destined path whether they will or not (Ref., I. 21).

tried in vain to rebut the objection urged against his doctrine of destiny, that according to it even sin proceeded not from the human will, but from the necessity of fate. The original disposition, he maintained, was determined by destiny, and according as it was fine or rude it modified the influences which pressed upon it from the external world, so that a rough and ignorant mind, even when under a slight pressure, rushed through its own obliquity and voluntary impulse into faults and errors. He illustrated this by the instance of a cylindrical stone, which, if you throw it down a slope, owes its initial movement to the impulse which you have given it, but presently rolls along not because you are propelling it, but in consequence of its own form. Thus it is settled by destiny and reason that bad dispositions should not be free from sins and errors, and while the order, reason, and necessity of fate provide initial causes of a certain kind, nevertheless, every man's own will and disposition govern his mental impulses and his actions. No one, accordingly, is to be tolerated who attributes his crimes not to his own temerity, but to fate.* It is evident that this argument simply alters the place of the difficulty, and provides it with no real solution. Destiny is no longer the immediate cause of individual acts; but as it creates the original character, and the actions flow necessarily from the combined working of character and circumstance, every deed is the remote product of a destiny which we are powerless to alter. Freedom is not the power of self-determination, but merely the opportunity of following our natural bent without the interference of external obstructions; and the divine Logos is, after all, the ultimate cause of evil. Thus there remains an inconsistency between the physics and the ethics of the Stoics which their keenest thinker was unable to remove, and in the last resort the human mind, no less than external nature, was wrapt in the folds of a necessarian pantheism.

Before closing our account of the Stoics, we must notice the

* A. Gell., Noct. Att., VII. (VI.), ii.; Cic., De Fato, 19.

allegorical method which they so freely employed, and which became such a marked feature of the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy. With the progress of thought it became impossible for cultured men to accept the ancient mythology in its literal meaning, and yet, hallowed as it was by long tradition, by the splendour of the poetry in which it was enshrined, and by popular veneration, it presented claims to respect which it was difficult to resist. Not only with a view to influencing the minds of the people at large, but in order to satisfy his own inherited belief, the philosopher would begin to look for subtle meanings hidden beneath the surface of the mythological tales, and to infer from their very grossness and absurdity that their authors must have intended to exhibit through their sensuous imagery some profound or edifying truth. We need not here trace minutely the process by which, in course of time, the myths were systematically turned into allegories. Suffice it to say that the method made its appearance among the older philosophers, for instance, in Democritus, and in Metrodorus of Lampsacus, and other followers of Anaxagoras, that it gained increasing favour in the period of the Sophists, was occasionally used by Aristotle, and received a wider extension from the Cynics.* It was, however, reserved for the Stoics to bring it to its full development and extend it over the whole range of the current superstition. Happily, two works proceeding from this school have been preserved, which exhibit not only the method which was pursued, but the particular results which were attained; one by Heraclitus, on "Homeric Allegories," the other by Cornutus, on "The Nature of the Gods."

We find here, as an efficient instrument of interpretation, that wonderful system of etymology which was afterwards wielded with such reckless disregard of philological possibility by Philo. The soul of the universe was called *Ζεύς*, from *ζῆν*, because it lived through all and was the cause of life to the living, or *κατὰ τὸ ζέον τῆς ὕλης*, a derivation connected with the doctrine

* See Zeller, III. i. p. 322, Anm. 1.

that Zeus was the pristine fire.* With a change of form the name became Δεύς, perhaps ἀπὸ τοῦ δεύειν τὴν γῆν, ἢ μεταδιδόναι τοῖς ζῶσι ζωτικῆς ἰκμάδος. The Supreme was called, in the oblique case, Δία, because δι' αὐτὸν γίνεται καὶ σώζεται τὰ πάντα.† Ἥρα was the air, ἀήρ, the name of the goddess making its appearance when this word is repeated, thus, ἀηραηρ;‡ and she was, therefore, assigned as a sister and wife to Zeus, because the air is most closely conjoined to the original fire. These divinities were represented as the children of Κρόνος and Πέα, because they sprang in regular measures of time, χρόνος, ἐκ τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ρεύσεως.§ The Roman Stoics adopted the same vicious method. Saturnus, they thought, was so called because *se saturat annis*; Mavors, because *magna vortit*; Minerva, because *minuit* or *minatur*; Venus, because *venit ad omnia*; Juno, *a juvando*; Neptunus, *a nando*; Ceres, as though Geres, *a gerendis frugibus*.||

Not to multiply examples, we may follow a little more in detail a single instance which is more closely connected with our subject. Hermes, we are told, was selected as leader of the Graces¶ because one ought to be reasonable in one's graciousness,** for Hermes is reason, the Logos whom the gods sent to us out of heaven. He has been so called ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐρεῖν μήσασθαι, from contriving speech, or ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔρυμα ἡμῖν εἶναι, from being our safeguard. Hence he has been called διάκτορος, either from being διάτορος καὶ τρανός, piercing and clear, or from conducting, διάγειν, our thoughts into the souls of our neighbours. In accordance with this attribute tongues were dedicated to him. He bears the name of ἐριούνιος, the bringer of luck, from the great benefit which he confers on those who use him, and of σῶκος, strong, as being σωτήρ τῶν οἴκων. The title ἀκάκητα, the

* See this last in Athenag., Suppl. c. 6 and 22.

† Corn., c. ii. p. 141.

§ Corn., c. iii. p. 143.

¶ Χάριτες.

‡ Athenag., Suppl., c. 22.

|| Cic., De N. D., II. 26; III. 24.

** Εὐλογίστως εἰῆ χαρίζεσθαι.

guileless one, signifies that reason tends not to injure, but to save ; and hence Health, Ὑγεία, has been associated with him. He is Ἀργειφόντης, as though ἀργεφάντης, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀργῶς πάντα φαίνειν, or, taking ἀργός in its other sense of *swift*, from the swiftness in the voice, φωνή. He carries a golden wand on account of the value of seasonable admonitions. He is the herald of the gods, because, through sounding voice, he presents to the ear the things signified by reason ; and their angel or messenger, since we know the will of the gods from the clear views afforded us by reason. He carries winged sandals in agreement with Homer's "winged words." He is fabled to be the conductor of souls, Ψυχοπομπός, because it is reason's special task to guide the soul ; and he is furnished with a rod wherewith he soothes the eyes of men, and, again, wakes those that sleep, because he can close the eyes of the understanding and stir up the languid. The serpents twined about his herald's rod symbolize his power of charming the brutal, dissolving their differences, and binding them together in an indissoluble knot. His parents were represented as Zeus and Maia, to show that reason was the offspring of reflection and inquiry.* The square images of Hermes, without hands and feet, betoken the security of reason, which, even when it falls, still finds a basis, and needs not hands or feet to accomplish what lies before it. His images are placed upon the roads, and he is called ἐνόδιος and ἡγεμόνιος, as we require reason for our guide in everything, and in our purposes it is reason that leads us into the right way. Because the Logos is common, κοινός, and is the same in men and gods, it is customary to say, when one finds anything on the road, that the Hermes is common, meaning that what is found is to be shared. They heap up stones to the images of Hermes, perhaps, among other possible reasons, as a symbol that the προφορικὸς λόγος consists of small parts. He is the god of commerce and gain, as being

* In allusion to the derivation of μαῖα, a midwife, from μῶ or μαίω = ζητῶ. See Villoison's note in Osann's edition of Cornutus, *in loco*.

alone the cause of true gain to men. He is the inventor of the lyre, as of the harmony of disposition by which the living attain to bliss. Those who wished to exhibit his power, even through what was incongruous, represented him as a thief, for he secretly withdraws from men their previous opinions, and sometimes by his persuasiveness steals the truth, for sophistry is the property of those who know how to make use of speech, λόγος. He is called νόμιος* because he is νόμος, enjoining what ought to be done, forbidding what ought not to be done. Finally, in the wrestling schools they worshipped him along with Herakles, as it is necessary to use strength with consideration, for to him who relies only on force of body, but neglects reason, which has introduced the arts into life, the words of the poet may be addressed: "Infatuated, thy own strength will destroy thee."†

Cornutus, from whom the above account is abstracted, was, indeed, a late writer, but he probably drew from ancient sources, and especially from the three earliest representatives of the school,‡ and we may, therefore, infer from the strange ingenuity of his exposition how fully the allegorical method was developed before the Alexandrian Jews applied it as a solvent of scriptural difficulties, and we may judge from the foregoing example how faithfully Philo followed the footsteps of his predecessors in the philosophical schools of Greece.

Almost every portion of the Stoical system on which we have touched has an instructive bearing, both in thought and phraseology, on our future inquiries, but still it may be useful to sum up in a few words the principal results which we have gained. It may seem strange that a philosophy which, by its fundamental postulates of materialism and pantheism, was so widely separated from Jewish and Christian thought, nevertheless contained so much which was capable of being moulded to the purposes of a theistic faith; yet these very postulates,

* Really from his being a "pastoral" god. † Cornutus, c. xvi., pp. 164 sqq.

‡ See Villoison's Prolegomena, pp. xxxix. sqq.

when combined with the Socratic teleology, contributed to the doctrine of the Logos some of its most important features. The Logos was God, the eternal Reason, unfolding himself in beautiful and varied manifestations. Still, as God could be viewed under other aspects, it was possible to speak of the Logos of Zeus, thus introducing a distinction in the midst of identity. This Reason was extended, as a living breath, through every portion of the universe, and, as the *λόγος σπερματικός*, evolved itself towards a predetermined end. Pervading all things it became a providence, presiding over the administration of the universe, inspiring the noble and virtuous, and still educing good from ill. It was in a pre-eminent degree the ground of human nature. A portion of it dwelt in each man, thereby constituting a *κοινὸς λόγος*, and establishing a universal communion of gods and men. As the silent thought needed a channel of communication, the Logos in man assumed the twofold form of *ἐνδιάθετος* and *προφορικός*. Since reason was slowly developed and men were liable to error, a criterion of truth was found in *ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος*. This, since wrong-doing involved an error of judgment, was also the basis of morals, and, as such, became the universal law, in obedience to which the wise man attained to a passionless serenity, and an absolute and willing surrender to the divine will.*

* See the fine words in Diog., VII. 88, *Εἶναι δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὖροισιν βίον, ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ' ἐκάστῳ δαίμονος πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἐιοικητοῦ βούλησιν.*

APPENDIX TO BOOK I.

ON THE QUESTION WHETHER HERACLITUS RECOGNIZED A CONSCIOUS INTELLIGENCE IN THE UNIVERSE.*

IN treating of this question, Bernays† relies on several passages to establish a different conclusion from that arrived at in the text. The first is a fragment preserved by Hippolytus‡:—*οὐκ ἐμοῦ* [cor. *ἐμεῦ*] *ἀλλὰ τοῦ δόγματος* [for which Bernays suggests *λόγου*] *ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν* [Bern. cor. —*εἶναι*] *σοφόν ἐστιν, ἐν πάντα εἰδέναι*. These words Bernays translates as follows:—“It is wise, listening not to me, but to the Logos, to confess that one knows all.” But, as Heinze points out, this meaning is not at all suited to the purpose for which the citation is made. The doctrine of Heraclitus, which Hippolytus wishes to illustrate, is *ἐνς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν*, and therefore we must look for a meaning akin to this in the passage which is quoted. Miller removes this difficulty by changing *εἰδέναι* into *εἶναι*, while Mullach suggests *γίνεσθαι*. But even the simpler of these changes cannot be admitted; for, as Heinze remarks, the intelligible *εἶναι* was not likely to be altered into the difficult *εἰδέναι*, and I think Hippolytus, in the words which follow, clearly refers to the reading which our MS. exhibits: *ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ ἴσασι πάντες οὐδὲ ὁμολογοῦσιν*. These words also imply

* See Chapter I., p. 39.

† See his article, “Neue Bruchstücke des Heraklit von Ephesus,” in the *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*, 1854, IX. pp. 241 sqq. His views are examined by Heinze, pp. 28 sqq.

‡ Ref. om. haer., IX. 9. Fragment i.

§ “*Εν* is a conjecture, but a probable one, of Bernays.

that the two infinitives in the fragment are co-ordinate, and if we translate—"it is wise to come to an agreement, to know one as all," every difficulty vanishes; but with the difficulty vanishes also the evidence afforded by this passage that Heraclitus believed in the existence of a knowing mind in nature.

The second passage is contained in Diogenes Laertius*:—*“Πολυμαθήν νόον οὐ διδάσκει*, for it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hecataeus; *εἶναι γὰρ ἐν τὸ σοφὸν ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, ἥτε οἱ ἐγκυβερνήσει πάντα διὰ πάντων.*” Various emendations for the last clause, which follows the text of the first edition of Stephanus, may be seen in Bywater. The two most plausible are his own, *ἧ οἶται κυβερνᾶσθαι*, and that of Schleiermacher, *ἥτ’ οἷη κυβερνήσει*, in which, however, the future seems unmeaning. We need not pause to consider this textual question; for it is quite clear that the belief in a *γνώμη*, by which all things were governed, is here ascribed to Heraclitus. The word *γνώμη*, however, does not, any more than *λόγος*, necessarily imply conscious intelligence. It may denote only that rational law which, as we have seen, pervades the universe; and although to unspeculative minds this rational law may seem to point to an intelligent Being of whose will it is the expression, these two ideas are in philosophy quite distinct, and it is possible to believe in a cosmical power whose controlling and harmonious activity enters the field of consciousness for the first time in the human understanding. The conception of such a power would fully accord with the pantheism of Heraclitus.

Thirdly, appeal is made to the words *σοφὸν ἐστι πάντων κεχωρισμένον*, which Lassalle† understands as meaning that “the absolute is lifted away from all sensible being.” But they may certainly mean, as Heinze supposes, nothing more than that wisdom is separated from all men, a sentiment which corresponds with the contempt expressed by our philosopher in other passages for the folly of mankind. Lassalle refutes

* IX. 1.

† Die Philos. Herakleitos, I. pp. 341 sqq.

this translation, which he cites from Ritter, by two notes of admiration.*

Fourthly, the testimony of Hippolytus is explicit:—"He† says also that this fire is intelligent,‡ and the cause of the administration of the universe."§ Could we be certain that Heraclitus himself had used the word *φρόνιμον*, the force of this testimony could hardly be explained away; but Hippolytus does not here profess to quote the very phraseology employed by the Ephesian thinker, and in adopting the word *φρόνιμον* he may be simply presenting his own mistaken interpretation. The attribute of intelligence might well seem to belong to the fire if it presided over the administration of the universe. We may account in a similar way for the statement of Sextus Empiricus||, that Heraclitus considered the *περιέχον* to be *λογικόν* and *φρενῆρες*, and we may perhaps set against this the affirmation of Diogenes Laertius,¶ that he does not explain the nature of the *περιέχον*.**

The last passage is contained in Plutarch's treatise, *De Iside et Osiride*††:—"Now, the nature which lives and sees and has the beginning of motion from itself, and a knowledge of things that belong to it, and things that are foreign to it, has in some way or other‡‡ drawn an emanation and part *ἐκ τοῦ φρονοῦντος ὅπως κυβερνᾶται τὸ σύμπαν, καθ' Ἡράκλειτον*." If we could be sure that these last words were used by Heraclitus, it would settle the question; but, unfortunately, we

* P. 344, Anm.

† Heraclitus.

‡ *φρόνιμον*.

§ Ref., IX. 10.

|| Adv. Mathematicos, VII. 127, p. 398. cf. VIII. 286, p. 512. The first passage is—*ἀρίσκει γὰρ τῷ φυσικῷ το περιέχον ἡμᾶς λογικόν τε ὃν καὶ φρενῆρες*. The second is—*καὶ μὴν ῥητῶς ὁ Ἡράκλειτός φησι τὸ μὴ εἶναι λογικὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, μόνον δ' ὑπάρχειν φρενῆρες τὸ περιέχον*. 'Ρητῶς here might possibly only apply to the former statement which relates to the topic under immediate consideration, but the repetition of the same word, *φρενῆρες*, in the two passages is certainly significant. If, however, Heraclitus actually used this term, it does not necessarily imply a conscious intelligence any more than *λογικόν*.

¶ IX. 9.

** Τὸ ἐν περιέχον ὁποῖόν ἐστιν οὐ δηλοῖ.

†† C. 77, p. 382 B., quoted in the note to Fr. xix.

‡‡ Adopting the reading *ἀμωσγίπως* for the common *ἄλλως τε*. Heinze reads *ἄλλοθεν*, p. 33.

cannot tell whether Plutarch is quoting any of the philosopher's words, or is merely reporting in his own language what he believed to be his opinion. If the latter be the case, it is difficult to decide how much of the sentence is intended to be covered by καθ' Ἡράκλειτον. The former part does not agree strictly with Heraclitus's doctrine of the soul as it is described to us by Sextus Empiricus;* but the reference must be extended so as to include τοῦ φρονούντος, for there is nothing distinctive in the remaining words. Even Bernays, however, believes that we have not here the language of Heraclitus, but only Plutarch's interpretation of his γνώμη.† This seems the more probable because Plutarch is not expounding the opinions of the Ephesian philosopher, but simply alludes to him as a high authority for the view which he himself advances; and again it is not his purpose to explain the nature of the ultimate cause, but by means of the doctrine of the divine derivation of the soul to prove that the divine is properly looked for there, and not in forms and colours, however costly.

* Adv. Math., VII. 127 sqq., p. 397 sq.

† See his article in the Rhein. Museum, p. 255 sq.



BOOK II.

BLENDING OF HELLENISM AND JUDAISM TILL THE TIME OF PHILO.



CHAPTER I.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE LOGOS IN THE OLD TESTAMENT.

WITH Stoicism we bring our survey of purely Greek speculation to a close. In it the doctrine of the Logos reached its highest development prior to its contact with Jewish and Christian influences ; and though the eclectic tendencies of Greek thought helped to prepare the way for the Alexandrian philosophy, they did not contribute any idea of such importance as to require our separate notice. In quitting the Hellenic schools, and turning to the utterances of Moses and the Prophets, we pass from philosophy to religion. We find no longer a body of thought elaborated by the slow process of reasoning, but the authoritative declaration of truths borne in upon the mind, and announcing themselves there as the word of God. This change must correspond with a different attitude of mind, and a different mode of viewing the great problem of existence. We must endeavour to understand wherein this difference essentially consists, and notice the dominant ideas which were characteristic of Hebrew faith, and which, as soon as the Jewish mind entered the fields of philosophical speculation, necessarily controlled every research, and presented themselves, not for inquiry into their truth, but only for systematic exposition and rational justification.

Speaking broadly, we may say that the popular religion among the Greeks was a religion of nature. It was not

merely that every department of nature had its appropriate deity, and a divine beauty or power shone in the ordered splendour of the heavens, flashed in the lightning, foamed in the troubled sea, or lurked in the clouded mystery of the mountain-top, but that the gods themselves had sprung into being in the course of the destined evolution of the universe. Instead of standing over against nature as its eternal and absolute cause, they were in fact its products, and not exempt from its possible vicissitudes. However widely the philosophers might dissent from the current mythology, the tendency of mind which, in search of a religion, thus blended the ideas of the natural and the divine, is apparent in the line of speculation which we have just traced. Philosophy, indeed, necessarily sought after the absolute, and it found the ultimate cause in mind or reason, which, even in the Stoical pantheism, stood in an antithetic relation to the grosser forms of matter; but whether it spoke of the universe as a son of God, itself divine, or represented it as the rational evolution of the divine substance, it still mingled the antithetic ideas in an organic unity. When God is thus regarded prevailingly as the cause of the universe, which is the objective manifestation of his being and the truest reflection of what he essentially is, we cannot be surprised that, though his wisdom or reason is amply dwelt upon, as being so unmistakably evident in the sublime order and beauty of nature, the idea of his personality is nevertheless vague and uncertain, and little room is left for the exercise of his free volition.

The Hebrew mind, by following another track, arrived at a widely different result. However some of the writers of the Old Testament may be impressed by the wonders of nature, it is not there primarily that the clearest revelation of God is found. It is no longer the relation of God and nature, but the relation of God and man, which constitutes the all-absorbing problem. The son of God is not now the universe, but Israel. Man was made in the image of God; and it is in him, accord-

ingly, in the religious yearnings of the heart and the solemn admonitions of the conscience, that the truest idea of the divine must be sought. Yet here a contrariety soon becomes apparent. Man is not true to his own ideal. A higher will speaks within him, which he disobeys, and yet he is constrained to acknowledge its sovereign rights and spotless holiness. Consequently, the divine and the human stand over against one another, joined in an ideal unity, but separated by the actual estrangement of sin. God's personality, in its antithesis to that of man, is at last clearly defined, and he is revealed as the supreme and righteous Will. When this conception was carried over into the realm of nature, the universe was inevitably regarded as a creation. It was completely distinct from God, owing its existence solely to the fiat of the divine volition, and dependent on the same free determination for the continuance of its various processes. This monotheistic faith was fundamental in the Hebrew mind. However protracted may have been the struggle to elevate the mass of the people above the nature-worship of the surrounding countries, it was to this conclusion that the highest inspiration of Israel irresistibly tended, and long before the period of which we have to treat, it had settled itself immovably in the belief of the nation. As soon, therefore, as contact with Greek thought aroused the activity of the speculative reason, and the needs of an apologetic interest demanded a philosophical exposition of Jewish faith, the established monotheism was carried as a controlling idea into every speculation, and every attempt to determine the relations between God and man, or between God and the universe, necessarily rejected all solutions that could impair the transcendent divine sovereignty. Indeed, the tendency of philosophy among the Jews was so to emphasize this transcendence as to remove God from all communication with nature and with man, and to place him in such lonely perfection that human wisdom could never find him.

From this result, however, the Jews were saved by another

belief, almost equally fundamental. The same spiritual experience which reveals God as the transcendent and authoritative Will reveals him also as one who speaks in the human soul, and calls it to participate in his own life. "Ye shall be holy, for I am holy,"* are words which come from a commanding height, and yet bespeak an ideal relationship of closest intimacy. If our sense of sin stands in opposition to the infinite righteousness of God, yet it tells us also that his holy Spirit is within us, and that only his lovingkindness can create in us a clean heart.† And if men, in the presence of Him who is from everlasting to everlasting, are but as a sleep, or like the grass which perishes in a day,‡ still they are conscious of the searchings of his thought, and can find no secret place where they can escape the presence of his Spirit.§ Now, these deeper experiences may and do come far more fully to some than to others, and may utter themselves, now in the formal requirements of a divine law, now in the fervid appeals of prophecy, or, again, in the lyrical outpouring of the heart's devotion. In this way a sacred literature arises, and the master-minds, which speak as they are moved by the Holy Spirit, leave behind them an authority which controls the thoughts of a more reflective and less inspired age. Among the Jews the Scriptures were gradually formed into a canon, the truth and accuracy of which could not be called in question by any devout member of the chosen race. We have already seen with what unswerving fidelity Philo adhered in principle to this position, maintaining the infallible correctness even of the LXX, and evading all difficulties by the method of allegorical interpretation. On this point we need not again dwell. What we have to observe is that the Scriptures, however boldly their clearest statements might sometimes be explained away, nevertheless exercised a very real influence in determining the direction of thought, and guaranteed, by historical evidence, the reality of communion between God and man.

* Levit. xi. 44.

† See Psalm li.

‡ Psalm xc.

§ Psalm cxxxix.

It was, then, the problem of the Alexandrian philosophy to harmonize, in conformity with Greek method and with the assistance of Greek ideas, these two tendencies of thought, neither of which could it disown without being false to the Jewish faith. It endeavoured to bring the transcendent God, whose essence was incognizable by the human mind, into the requisite relations with nature and man by the mediation of certain powers; and if in this attempt there is apparent a certain vacillation of thought or of expression running through the whole discussion, as it is known to us in the writings of Philo, this is due, I think, not wholly to the contrariety between Hellenic philosophy and Hebrew religion, but in part at least to the duality in the religious experience which has been described above.

If this remark be correct, we may expect to find in the Old Testament, not indeed a philosophical theory of God's relations to the world, but some attempt to represent, at least to the religious imagination, the manner in which he took part in mundane affairs, and we may detect there the germs which afterwards unfolded themselves into the doctrine of the Logos. The simplest mode in which the divine relations to the world are described is adapted only to an unreflective stage of religion. The analogy of our human personality is pushed to its extreme limits, and, just as man might go to inspect some work which he had fabricated, God comes down from the sky, which rose as a solid dome above the earth, to view for himself the affairs of men, to rebuke their sin, to scatter their devices, to direct them by warnings and promises. It may indeed be difficult to decide how far this kind of language was intended by the writers to be understood metaphorically, but we can hardly doubt that the mass of the people would be satisfied with its literal meaning, and that their idea of God was the purest anthropomorphism. The harshest features of this conception are softened by the introduction of angels. These form a host of emissaries, ever ready to obey the com-

mands of God and to carry his behests to men. This primitive doctrine of mediating powers does not, however, modify the metaphysical aspects of Hebrew faith, or bring the divine essence into any nearer relation with the world. They are not emanations from the divine substance which interpenetrate the substance of the universe, but are created beings, themselves a part of the universe, and standing between God and man precisely as an ambassador may stand between a monarch and his subjects; and the most that we can say is that they render apprehensible by thought, in its less cultivated condition, the omnipresence of the divine activity. But there is one mysterious expression which lends itself more easily to the support of the Alexandrian doctrine, and indicates the dawning consciousness that the mediating power which effects the revelation of God to man must be essentially divine. "The angel of the Lord,"* or "the angel of God,"† is sometimes used interchangeably with God himself. This practice occurs first in the story of Hagar, where the angel of Yahveh appears to her in the wilderness, and, taking on himself the divine office, promises to multiply her posterity. It is added that she called the name of Yahveh who spoke to her, "Thou God seest me."‡ Similarly, "the angel of God" appeared in a dream to Jacob, and announced himself as the God of Bethel.§ Still more remarkable is the revelation to Moses in the burning bush. "The angel of Yahveh" declares himself to be "The God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob."|| Whether the phrase under consideration corresponded with any very definite conception may well be doubted, and we need not consider whether it was intended to denote a distinct person, different from and yet so close to God as to seem blended into one with him, or was

* מַלְאָךְ יְהוָה

† מַלְאָךְ אֱלֹהִים

‡ Gen. xvi. 7 sqq.

§ Gen. xxxi. 11 sqq.

| Ex. iii. 2 sqq. For other instances, see Gen. xxi. 17. sqq.; xxii. 11 sqq.; Ex. xiv. 19, compared with xiii. 21; xxiii. 20 sqq.; Num. xxii. 9 sqq., compared with 22 sqq.; Jud. vi. 11 sqq., xiii. 9 sqq.

used simply as a reverent periphrasis for God himself. Perhaps the writers themselves could not have told us; for their minds followed the religious tendency, and adopted language which satisfied the religious need, without submitting every expression to the analytical scrutiny of thought. But in any case, we may discern here the dim feeling that that in God which is capable of manifestation is distinguishable from his transcendent and incomprehensible essence.

A somewhat similar remark will apply to another expression which, through the medium of the Greek translation, contributed important materials to the later theology. I refer to "the word of the Lord."* "The word"† is frequently rendered *ῥῆμα* by the LXX, but in the passages of greatest significance for our present purpose it is translated *λόγος*, and thus, whatever may have been its original purport, easily lends itself as an authority for a doctrine for which scriptural proof was desired, and indeed suggests to the prepared mind an extent of meaning which was not at first contemplated. The creation and permanent administration of the world are ascribed to the Word and Spirit (or breath) of God. "By the word of Yahveh,"‡ we are told, "were the heavens made and all their host by the breath of his mouth."§ So again, the Word and Spirit of God are sent forth to melt the snow and ice, and restore its flow to the hardened water,|| and his Word is executed by the stormy wind.¶ This language of the poets corresponds precisely with the description in Genesis, where the Spirit of God is represented as brooding on the face of the waters, and each successive act of creation is the immediate result of a divine utterance. The ideas of the Spirit or breath and of the Word are closely related. As the latter is the articulate shape or expression of the former, the limited manifestation of the vital principle, so in the account of the creation the Spirit of God seems to represent the

* דְּבַר־יְהוָה † דְּבַר ‡ דְּבַר יְהוָה, τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ κυρίου.

§ Psalm xxxiii. (LXX, xxxii.) 6.

|| Psalm cxlvii. 18.

¶ Psalm cxlviii. 8.

divine power in its totality, ready to act amid the still shapeless chaos, while the successive utterances or commands indicate the special direction of this power, give concrete form to the divine thought, and turn the chaos into a cosmos. That this distinction should not be generally observed, is only natural, and we cannot be surprised to find that the Spirit and the Word are, as in the above passages, employed as strictly parallel expressions. Turning now from the language to the thought, we must admit that, though it is not philosophically formulated, and though it is clothed in a figurative dress, we have here a theory of the relation in which God stands to the universe, and of the manner in which he communicates with it. The prominent idea is that of the absolute and irresistible power of God. With him merely to breathe upon the rude material of the world is to fill it with vital energy, and to speak is to create.* The idea of mediation was perhaps hardly thought of, and if any difficulty was felt, it was solved by the instant obedience of created things; but nevertheless the Spirit and the Word, though partaking of his essence, are not identical with God himself, but are powers which at his will he sends forth to execute his purposes, and which may be readily conceived as assuming a distinct existence.

As the Word of the Lord is thus regarded as the agency employed in creation, it is also the medium of divine illumination in the hearts of men. At the close of the remarkable account of the call of Samuel to the prophetic office, it is said that "Yahveh was revealed to Samuel in Shilo by the word of Yahveh."† In conformity with this statement the "Word" is again and again represented as the organ of communication with the prophets.‡ And here, I think, we may once more

* Cf. Psalm xxxiii. 9, "For he spake, and it was; he commanded, and it stood."

† 1 Sam. iii. 21. The LXX omit here "By the word of the Lord."

‡ See Isai. ii. 1 (in Is., נִבְיָא, the utterance or oracle, is generally preferred); Jer. i. 2, 4, 11, 13, xiii. 8, xxx. (LXX, xxxvii.) 1; Ezek. iii. 16, vi. 1, vii. 1, xi. 14, &c.; Hos. i. 1; Joel i. 1; Jonah i. 1, iii. 1; Mic. i. 1; Zeph. i. 1; Hag. i. 1;

observe a distinction between the Word and the Spirit similar to that already noticed. The Spirit raises the mind into prophetic exaltation, and renders it capable of hearing the inward voice of God;* the Word applies the "wild seraphic fire" to definite purposes, and sends the prophet to announce a specific message. It is, however, impossible to discover any tendency to regard the Word as a distinct hypostasis. It does not issue from God like a ray of light, and gleam into a personal existence of its own. It is simply that which God speaks to the human soul, and its only objective being is found in the written prophecy and the codified law. It thus to some extent stands in opposition to the later idea of the Logos. It is not yet the eternal Reason revealing itself within the consciousness of man; it only discloses that portion of the divine will which God is pleased to communicate in the shape of warning, appeal, or precept. Even the poetical personifications are few and feebly marked. When we are told that God's word runs very swiftly,† or that it shall not return without accomplishing that for which it was sent,‡ we have at most a picturesque affirmation of the speedy and certain execution of the divine command. And when it is said that it is "right," or that it is "settled for ever in the heavens,"§ the attributes are quite appropriate to an ordinance of God. We must conclude, therefore, that the expression which we are reviewing is related to the Alexandrian doctrine more closely in phraseology than in thought; yet it is not without significance that the two spheres of nature and of man find their unity with one another and their connection with God through the medium of the same eternal Word, which, in the Old Testament as in the New, is, though in a Zech. i. 1, iv. 8, &c.; Mal. i. 1 (where we have the fuller expression, **מִשָּׁל דְּבַר יְהוָה**). In all these passages the LXX render the term by *λόγος*.

* See Num. xi. 25-29, xxiv. 2; 1 Sam. x. 10; Isai. lxi. 1; Joel ii. 28 (iii. 1, in the Hebrew).

† Psalm cxlvii. 15.

‡ Isai. lv. 11. Here the LXX have τὸ ῥῆμά μου.

§ Psalm xxxiii. 4, cxix. 89.

less developed sense, a lamp to our feet and a light to our path.*

A farther stage of thought is reached when the agency of wisdom in the creation is celebrated. The "Word," as we have seen, suggests predominantly the idea of all-commanding power. The first impression which the contemplation of nature makes on the untutored mind must be that of stupendous force. Her regular processes, the rising and setting of the sun, the revolution of the stars, the return of the seasons, move on with a constancy which no human strength can resist; and the violence of the storm, the destructive sweep of the torrent or the flood, the blasting potency of the lightning, and the advance of the invisible pestilence which no doors or bars can keep out, must cast their spell over the least reflective. In these things the omnipotence of God is seen, that Power above nature, who sets fast the mountains, dries with his rebuke the tumultuous deluge, and makes a decree which the submissive waves never venture to transgress. But as man's knowledge extends, and he becomes capable of viewing creation as a whole, something higher than power reveals itself. The world is not the scene of a capricious despotism, but is full of orderly arrangements and wonderful adaptations of the several parts to one another. The intelligence and goodness which are dimly known through human consciousness are there in measureless perfection. God's tender mercies are over all his works;† and not only is he of great power, but his understanding is beyond the reckoning of our numbers.‡ These qualities meet in the attribute of wisdom, which constitutes the unity of the moral and intellectual realms. In that noble hymn of praise, the one hundred and fourth Psalm, it is said that God has made all his manifold works in wisdom;§ and in two compositions, widely different in character, but each belonging to a reflective age, the divine wisdom is spoken of at length, and

* Psalm cxix. 105. The LXX here read *νόμος*.

† Psalm cxlv. 9.

‡ Psalm cxlvii. 5.

§ Verse 20.

certain lines of thought, destined to be filled in at a later time, are grandly described, not, however, in the exact phrase of philosophy, but, true to the highest genius of the Hebrews, in the glowing language of devout admiration.

In the book of Proverbs* Wisdom is boldly personified, and the leading ideas of the doctrine of the Logos are set forth in the splendour of poetical diction. Wisdom is represented as appearing in places of public resort, and calling upon men to hear her, and live in accordance with her advice; and to induce them to do so, she describes the nobility of her character and her ancient life with God. The Lord possessed or created her as the beginning of his way;† from of old was she anointed; when there were no watery depths, and ere the foundations of the mountains were sunk, was she born; and in the creation of heaven and earth and sea she was by the side of God as an artificer, and was daily his delight,‡ In Wisdom are summed up the principal attributes of God—truth and righteousness, counsel, understanding and strength,§ so that it denotes in a single term all that is great and good in the divine essence. But amid this dignity and power she is accessible to men, and they that seek shall find her. She is the source of sovereignty, of durable riches and righteousness; to find her is to find life, and he that hearkens to her is blessed.||

The description of Wisdom in the book of Job,¶ though closely allied with that in Proverbs, is not so fully worked out, and does not submit itself so readily to theological interpretation; but a few points of great interest are clearly marked. Wisdom is represented as something more than a mere attribute. It is

* iii. 13-26, iv. 5-13, vii. 4, viii. 1-ix. 12. This section of Proverbs is placed by a critic at once so fearless and so cautious as Canon Cheyne, within the kingdom of Judah, but towards its close. Job he believes to be as late as the Exile. See his *Job and Solomon, or the Wisdom of the Old Testament*, London, 1887, pp. 71 sqq., 85, 157, 165 sqq.

† קַדְמוֹתַי, LXX, *ἐκτισέ με ἀρχὴν ὧν αὐτοῦ*

‡ viii. 22-30. See also iii. 19, 20. § viii. 7, 8, 14. ¶ viii. 15-18, 34, 35.

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not indeed personified, for it is compared to a precious possession, the price of which surpasses all earthly wealth; but still it stands apart from God, as though it had a place of its own, approached by a mysterious path. This is of course only a figure of speech; but when the imagination conceived it as thus becoming objective to the divine consciousness, the first step was taken towards its poetical, and ultimately its real personification. This objective existence of Wisdom is pictured as prior to the creation; for when God made a weight for the wind and weighed the waters by measure, when he made a decree for the rain and a way for the lightning, then did he see it and declare it, he prepared it and also searched it out. But though its existence is apparent in the works of God, it is far beyond the range of human apprehension. Man may detect the hidden veins of silver, and cut through the dark mine a path which the vulture's eye has not seen; but Wisdom he cannot find or purchase. That is revealed to God alone, who can look to the ends of the earth, and see under the whole heaven. Yet even man may have his share in this heavenly treasure; for God has declared that for man wisdom consists in reverencing the Lord and departing from evil.

It is evident from the whole complexion of the passages in Proverbs in which Wisdom is described that the personification, however highly wrought, must be regarded as purely poetical, and we cannot suppose that the writer looked upon Wisdom as a distinct being possessed of divine attributes. This view is confirmed by the absence of personification in Job. But, while admitting this, we nevertheless discern in these writings an answer to the problem which, as we have seen, was suggested by the twofold tendency of Hebrew faith. If God was infinitely exalted above nature as its Creator and Ruler, still every part bore traces of his Wisdom. And what was this Wisdom but the expression of his essential being, that which was with him from the olden time, before the earth and the heavens were made? We are not indeed yet told that Wisdom

permeated all things ; but if it directed the creation it must have been permanently embodied, as it were, in the laws of nature. Unless it was regarded as still giving tokens of its presence in the world, the idea of its creative activity could not have arisen ; and thus the universe is brought into a nearer relation with God, and is not merely obedient to his sovereign command, but is an abiding expression of his intelligence and goodness. Again, the same Wisdom which is manifest in the works of God may dwell with man. It is that in the fathomless abyss of the divine Being which is apprehensible by human thought ; it is that which in the midst of human error and sin reveals itself as divine and eternal. Present in the creative counsels, it yet may come as the giver of life and blessedness to those who watch and wait for its presence, and reverence Him who is its source. Hence Wisdom is the principle of unity in God and man and the universe. Dwelling as the supreme term in God's interior being, it has stepped forth, as it were, into independent existence, leaving its impress as their grandest character in earth and sky, and pleading with man as his higher nature, the divine ideal in him towards which he must ever tend.

CHAPTER II.

ECCLESIASTICUS.

BEFORE we enter on a consideration of the Alexandrian literature, we must notice another work of Palestinian origin, which, though it adds but little to the thoughts already gleaned from the canonical books, shows in an interesting way how these thoughts were cherished by a learned Jew of later times. I refer to "The wisdom of Jesus the son of Sirach," commonly called Ecclesiasticus. This work, no longer possessed in the original language, was written in Hebrew, but translated into Greek by the author's grandson, and preserved in the LXX version of the Scriptures. We need not enter here on the disputed question of its date; for it is sufficient for our present purpose to know that it certainly belongs either to the third or to the early part of the second century before Christ. That it proceeded from an inhabitant of Palestine is rendered certain not only by the express statement of the author,* but by the language in which it was written, the style of its composition, the general character of its thought, and its doctrine in regard to particular points.† The only question which can arise in this connection is whether it may not, as is maintained, though in different forms, by Gfrörer and Dähne, contain an intermixture of Alexandrian elements. This question will be riper for discussion after we have considered the view of Wisdom which the book presents.

* 1. 27.

† See these stated at length in Dähne, *Gesch. Darst. der jüdisch-alex. Religions-Phil.*, II. p. 126 sqq.

The two most important descriptions of Wisdom occur in the first and the twenty-fourth chapters. In the latter, which is evidently an imitation of the eighth chapter of Proverbs, the writer attempts a higher than his usual strain, and, through a bold personification, Wisdom is introduced as the speaker, and sounds forth her own praises. The same subject is treated, though with less fulness, in several other portions of the work. "All Wisdom," we are told, "is from the Lord, and is with him for ever."* "She came forth from the mouth of the Most High,"† an expression which, though the transition is never made in Ecclesiasticus, easily suggests the passage of Wisdom into Word, and its emergence into objective existence when the creative word was first spoken. This kind of separate existence seems to be implied also in the creation of Wisdom. "It has been created before all things."‡ The Lord "himself created it, and saw, and counted it out."§ We cannot reasonably speak of that as created which we regard as nothing more than a divine attribute; and making all allowance for the poetical and figurative character of the language, we may fairly say that since Wisdom appeared to dwell as an embodied thought in the universe, and was evidently communicable to man, it seemed to step forth from the category of simple quality, and to become clothed with substantial being. Thus conceived, it too is dependent for its existence on the creative power of God, and is subject to the will of Him who "alone is wise, exceedingly to be feared, seated on his throne, the Lord."|| God, having created it "from the olden time,"¶ "from the beginning,"** "poured it out over all his works."†† Then Wisdom covered the earth as a mist. She pitched her tent in high places, and her throne was in a pillar of cloud. She alone compassed the circle of the heaven, and walked about in the abysmal depths; she gained a possession in the waves of the sea, and in all the

* i. 1.

† xxiv. 3.

‡ i. 4.

§ i. 9.

|| i. 8.

¶ 'Εξ αἰῶνος, i. 4; πρὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος, xxiv. 9.

** xxiv. 9.

†† i. 9.

earth.* Thus pervading every part of the vast creation, she was inscrutable to mortal eyes; for who could count the sand of the seas, and the drops of rain, and the days of eternity, or who could trace the height of heaven and the breadth of earth?† The first [who sought her] did not make an end of knowing her, and the last did not trace her out; for her thought is fuller than the sea, and her counsel than the great abyss.‡ Nevertheless she dwelt, according to the divine gift, with all flesh,§ and had a possession in every people and nation. With all these she sought rest and an inheritance; and then he who created her and all things, commanded her and caused her tent to rest, and said, in Jacob pitch thy tent, and in Israel receive an inheritance. Accordingly she ministered in the holy tabernacle, and was established in Zion, in Jerusalem the beloved city.|| All her glorious qualities were summed up in the “book of the covenant of the Most High God, the law which Moses commanded.”¶ This statement exhibits in a clear light the prevailing ethical character of the writer’s view. Wisdom, so far as it could be possessed by man, had little to do with philosophical speculation. It concerned itself with the practical affairs of life, with religious and social duties, and left unnoticed, or at least unprobed, the great mysteries of being. Hence its sum and substance consisted in a spirit of reverent and loving obedience to the divine commands. “All wisdom is the fear of the Lord, and in all wisdom is doing of the law.”** To fear God is the beginning and root of wisdom, and also its fulness and crown;†† and as some might be inclined to rate too highly its intellectual side, the author warns us that the “knowledge of wickedness is not wisdom,”‡‡ and again exclaims, “How great is he who has found wisdom, but he is not above him who fears the Lord.”§§ It is, accordingly, on the pious, who love God

* xxiv. 3-6.

† i. 2, 3.

‡ xxiv. 28, 29.

§ i. 10.

¶ xxiv. 6-11.

|| xxiv. 23.

** xix. 20.

†† i. 14, 16, 18, 20.

‡‡ xix. 22.

§§ xxv. 10.

and keep his commandments, that the gift in its highest form is bestowed.* But not in a moment does the fruition of her delights rejoice the soul. She must be sought with patient and earnest watching;† and it is only after a period of stern discipline‡ that her fetters are turned into a robe of glory, and her sons, exalted to be judges of the nations, put on a crown of joy, and exult in the revelation of her secrets.§

Such is the picture of Wisdom drawn for us by Jesus the son of Sirach. At first sight it appears a faithful, though rather a tame, copy from the brilliant representation in Proverbs, and it is difficult to discover any line or colour which betrays the work of a non-Palestinian hand. Gfrörer, however, believes that the twenty-fourth chapter is the composition of an Alexandrian Jew, which was simply appropriated and transferred to his own pages by the eclectic skill of our author.|| Dähne, while rejecting this hypothesis, is nevertheless of opinion that the book contains marked Alexandrian features. These, he thinks, are due partly to the translator, who was captivated by the Egyptian culture, and partly to subsequent alterations, to which gnomic literature is peculiarly exposed.¶ The latter view, as it leaves the description of Wisdom unmolested, does not concern us here; but as Gfrörer rests the probability of his case to a large extent on the appearance of Alexandrian elements in other portions of the work, we must briefly examine the allegation which is maintained alike by him and Dähne.

Particular stress is laid upon the account of Enoch, of whom it is said** that he “pleased the Lord and was translated,†† an example of repentance to the generations.”‡‡ Now, in the writings of Philo, the Patriarchs are introduced as representatives of various moral conditions, and Enoch is the chosen type

* xliii. 33; i. 10, 26.

† iv. 11; xiv. 22-24.

‡ iv. 17; vi. 18 sqq.

§ iv. 11-15, 18; vi. 28 sqq.; xiv. 20; xv. 1 sqq.

|| See his view fully unfolded in his *Philo u. d. alex. Theos.*, II. pp. 18 sqq.

¶ II. pp. 141 sqq.

** xliv. 16.

†† *Μετἐέθῃ*.

‡‡ See Gfrörer, II. 39 sqq.; Dähne, II. 143.

of repentance. Philo, in his accustomed manner, gives an allegorical interpretation of the words of the LXX,* *μετέθηκεν αὐτὸν ὁ θεός*, which is suitable to the idea of penitence and change of character. Hence it is inferred that the expression in Ecclesiasticus was founded on the text of the LXX, and was, therefore, of Egyptian origin. Gfrörer stoutly maintains that the Hebrew narrative enforces a totally different conception. There the whole of Enoch's life is heavenly, and there is no room for sin and repentance. But this, as Fritzsche points out, is a mistaken view. We are told in Genesis that Enoch lived sixty-five years, and begat Methuselah, and walked with God after he begat Methuselah three hundred years. The inference might easily be drawn that he was a sinner during the former period, but then repented and walked with God, and by his translation became a glorious example of the saving power of penitence.† On the other hand, the Greek translation does not lend itself any better than the Hebrew to such an exegesis, for, though its words are adapted to his purpose by the skilful allegorizing of Philo, they do not in themselves suggest the idea which they are forced to subserve. That idea must have come from some other source, and, as Fritzsche observes, rather produced than sprang from the allegory. We cannot admit, therefore, that there is here any proof of Alexandrian influence.

Dähne‡ calls attention to another passage,§ which presents a remarkable analogy to the LXX rendering of Deut. xxxii. 8. The Alexandrian translators tell us that "when the Most High divided the nations, when he dispersed the sons of Adam, he fixed the boundaries of the nations according to the number of the angels of God, and his people Jacob became the portion of the Lord"; according to Ecclesiasticus, "He appointed for every nation a chief,|| and Israel is the portion of the Lord."

* Gen. v. 24.

† See the Kurzg. ex. Handb. zu den Apokryphen des A. T., fünfte Lieferung, 1859, Einleit., p. xxxv.-vi.

‡ II. p. 141.

§ xvii. 17.

|| Ἡ γούμενον.

Now, in Dähne's opinion, we have here a distinct reflection of the Alexandrian doctrine that the Gentiles were unable to rise above the apprehension of the divine powers or angels, and that, consequently, they were placed under the leadership of these by the supreme God, while the true Israelites, who attained to the knowledge of God as he is in himself, were chosen by the Highest as his own portion. This appears to me to be a very precarious argument. What is characteristically Alexandrian in the doctrine in question is the philosophical distinction between the two modes of apprehending the divine, and of this there is not a trace in Ecclesiasticus. The belief that the various nations were presided over by guardian angels is found in the book of Daniel, and it is quite as likely to have grown up in Palestine as in Egypt. Dähne is peculiarly unfortunate in appealing here to the word *ὑψιστος*, as though in itself it proved familiarity with Alexandrian modes of thought, for in the verse of the LXX it is a faithful rendering of the Hebrew *עֶלְיוֹן*, and in Ecclesiasticus the very frequency of its occurrence forbids us to ascribe it either to the translator or to a later corruptor of the text. In the face of Dähne's criticism it is curious to compare the constant use of the word in Ecclesiasticus with the paucity of its occurrence in a kindred book, the Wisdom of Solomon, which is an acknowledged product of Alexandrian Judaism. In the latter work, if I am not mistaken, it is found only twice.*

To his remarks upon these brief passages, whose erasure would leave the genius of the book absolutely unaltered, Dähne only adds that self-seeking and arrogance are treated as the proper germ of all sin,† and his proof is complete that the Alexandrian theology exercised an important influence on Ecclesiasticus, and made it a strange blending of divergent tendencies.‡ Gfrörer further adduces the blending of the most explicit doctrine of free will with traces of a theory of predestination, the doctrine about good and evil spirits, and

* v. 15, vi. 3.

† P. 142.

‡ P. 144.

the union of faith and hope as means of grace, though, with curious inconsequence, he admits that this last is not more Alexandrian than Palestinian.* The acknowledgment betrays the weak point in the whole position. The occurrence of a few scattered resemblances of thought cannot prove a relation of dependence. It must be shown not only that the phrases and sentiments which are appealed to were to be found in Alexandria, but that they cannot possibly have been indigenous to Palestine. This has scarcely been attempted, or, when attempted, has failed to carry conviction. The distinguishing marks of Alexandrianism are the presence of speculative philosophy and acquaintance with Greek culture, and of neither of these is there a trace in Ecclesiasticus. Dähne, indeed, disputes this assertion,† and with microscopic glance detects an instance in which a figure of speech was rifled from the treasury of the Peripatetics. At the end of the main portion of the work, just before the prayer with which it concludes,‡ the son of Sirach pronounces him blessed who shall observe the precepts laid down in the book, for if he shall do them he shall be strong for all things, because the light of the Lord will guide his way. Now, Aristobulus informs us that some of the Peripatetics had compared wisdom to a torch, because those who followed it were undisturbed through their whole life. "The similarity of both expressions is evident." If this is all that can be urged to prove that the son of Sirach was versed in Grecian lore, or that his composition was interpolated by some one more scholarly than himself, the case must be considered hopeless; and when we find such an argument gravely advanced in the nineteenth century by a writer of unusual merit, we may cease to condemn the ingenuity which could find in Aristotle manifest tokens of dependence on the Pentateuch.

It is now apparent that there is no antecedent probability to support Gfrörer's hypothesis respecting the origin of

* P. 43 sqq.

† P. 144, Anm. 54.

‡ l. 28-9.

the twenty-fourth chapter. We must, however, notice as succinctly as possible the prolix arguments which he founds upon the nature of the chapter itself. And first, one or two points in his exegesis require our attention. In verse 3 it is said, "I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, and as a mist I covered the earth." Gfrörer* thinks that the latter expression was derived from Genesis ii. 6, where it is said that a mist went up and watered the face of the ground, and that this was regarded as parallel to the statement in i. 2, that the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. If this exposition could be made good, it would bring Wisdom into a new allegorical connection with a phrase employed in the history of the creation, and to that small extent there would be an advance upon previous thought. It is, however, extremely doubtful whether the author did not derive the comparison from his own resources. 'Ομίχλη answers rather to the Hebrew $\pi\tilde{\nu}\tilde{\nu}$, darkness, than to $\tau\tilde{\nu}$, exhalation or vapour, the word used in Genesis, and the reference seems to be, not to the fructifying mist, but to the dark, mysterious folds with which Wisdom enwrapt the earth before she formed it into its separate and orderly parts.† In any case, the influence of the LXX, which in Genesis ii. 6, has $\pi\eta\eta\eta$, and not $\acute{o}\mu\acute{\iota}\chi\lambda\eta$, cannot be pleaded in support of the alleged Alexandrianism.

Far more stress is laid by Gfrörer‡ on the words in the fourth verse, "I pitched my tent in high places, and my throne is in a pillar of cloud." The latter expression, he insists, must refer to the pillar of cloud in the wilderness, in which later Alexandrian writers recognized the presence of the divine wisdom. No one, he maintains, could possibly speak of a pillar of cloud if he simply meant clouds in general, because there is no sensible resemblance between a cloud and a pillar. I do not know whether there is any sensible resemblance between a wife and a pillar, but in xxxvi. 29,§ she is described as a pillar

* P. 20-21.

† Pp. 21 sqq.

‡ See Fritzsehe in loco.

§ 24 in the English.

of rest, and it is obvious that the point of the comparison is not in the similarity of the human form to a pillar, but in the supporting power possessed alike by a pillar and by conjugal affection. So, too, a cloud which enthrones Wisdom may resemble a pillar, not in its shape, but in its use. It is not improbable, however, that the figure may have been suggested by the narrative in Exodus; but, if so, the pillar of cloud was appropriated as the permanent throne of Wisdom, for, notwithstanding Gfrörer's contemptuous rejection of such a plea, the context forbids us to recognize here an allusion to a single historical event. In the previous verse the origin of Wisdom and her connection with the creation are made known; in the present one her exalted, heavenly abode is described; then follows her relation to the various parts of the physical universe and to the nations of the world, and, finally, in the eighth and following verses her closer connection with Israel is set forth in detail. This natural order would be unaccountably disturbed if we accepted Gfrörer's interpretation, and therefore I see no reason to doubt that we are still within the circle of Palestinian ideas.

There is another point about which Gfrörer is peculiarly positive.* He considers it to be impossible that the first portion of the chapter† and the second‡ can have proceeded from the same mental associations. In the exalted description of Wisdom as a creative power he traces the presence of Alexandrian thought; in the statement that "all these are the book of the covenant," he sees unmistakably the narrowness of Palestine. He endeavours to explain this mixed appearance by supposing that the son of Sirach borrowed this chapter from the work of a Jew no longer known, who probably resided in Egypt, and belonged to an intermediate party, which sought to reconcile the higher theosophy of Alexandria with the traditional faith.§ I confess I am quite unable to feel the difficulty which Gfrörer thus cleverly resolves. The progress of the chapter leads

* P. 30 sqq.

† 1-22.

‡ 23-29.

§ P. 3

quite naturally to the glorification of the law. There is a gradual narrowing of the range of Wisdom, till it is brought to a focus in what to every Jew was its supreme embodiment—creation as a whole, its various parts, the nations, Israel, Jerusalem, the Law. It is surely forcing the author's words to say that they imply the identity of a book with the Wisdom which created the universe; they rather mean that the glorious attributes and promises which have just been ascribed to Wisdom may be predicated of the law which overflows with wisdom and understanding, a sentiment which would be accepted as readily by Philo as by Ezra. The theory, therefore, of an authorship distracted between Alexandria and Palestine has no sufficient ground on which to rest.

Lastly, Gfrörer believes that the twenty-fourth chapter is widely distinguished in tone and contents from the other passages of Ecclesiasticus in which the praises of Wisdom are celebrated, and that the probability of a different authorship is thereby established.* He does not succeed, however, in pointing to any radical diversity of conception. The leading thoughts of the twenty-fourth chapter are not obscurely shadowed forth elsewhere, and it is not strange that the writer should devote a particular section to setting them forth in more elevated and poetical language. To have repeated the description elsewhere would have been a literary blunder; and we cannot but remember that here also the son of Sirach only follows the example of the compiler of Proverbs, where the eighth chapter stands quite alone in the grandeur of its ideas and the splendour of its style.

I conclude, then, that in the doctrine of this book we are still completely within the lines of Palestinian development. The distinguishing marks of Alexandrianism are wanting, the blending of Greek culture and the speculative character of the thought. It is not under the pressure of any philosophical necessity that Wisdom is brought upon the scene. Her

* P. 34 sqq.

appearance resolves no mystery, and fills no lacuna in an elaborate theory of the universe, and there is nothing in the train of ideas or the quality of the language to carry us beyond the limits of imaginative personification. We can trace no farther advance in the long interval that elapsed between the publication of Proverbs and that of Ecclesiasticus, and accordingly the canonical book marks the flood-tide of purely Hebrew religion in the particular direction which we are considering. We have already endeavoured to find the spiritual facts and to trace the spiritual necessities out of which the conception of Wisdom was slowly formed. The needs of religion and of imagination were now satisfied; and till philosophy intruded upon the sacred domain, with its hard questions and its deep glance into the mystery of things, the soul was content with what had been already gained. In the troubled and dangerous period after the Babylonian exile, when Israel, with its grand inheritance of the Law and the Prophets, might so easily have melted away and been lost among surrounding nations, it was necessary to fix the buttresses of its peculiar life with immovable rigidity and to forbid excursions into the wild and lawless region that lay beyond. The free creative spirit retired before the scrupulous devotion to a nobler past; wisdom was identified more and more with the written law, and it was not till a portion of the Jews were driven by the force of circumstances into the spacious fields of Hellenic life, and were induced, partly by genuine admiration, partly by an apologetic purpose, to study the noblest products of Greek genius, that the fruitful germs began once more to grow, and wider conceptions to be formed of God and his relation to the world. In this new phase of the Jewish mind, however, we see not an original inspiration, but an eclectic philosophy. There was not sufficient fervour to fuse into permanent union the diverse elements of thought, and Alexandrianism, in its Jewish garb, failed to exert a wide or lasting influence on either of the two

worlds which it sought to harmonize. It was reserved for the commanding force of Christianity, taking a new departure, to appropriate from it the elements suited to its own genius, and to bring to the Gentiles the holiest treasures of Judaism. But as preparing the way for this great movement, the Alexandrian philosophy takes a high place ; its most distinguished exponent has left his impress in patristic literature ; and the hues of its thought are still discernible in the theology of Christendom. To describe its leading doctrines is the next portion of our task.*

* I have not referred to the account of wisdom in Baruch, iii. 12—iv. 4, as it is of the most general character, and throws no additional light on our subject.

CHAPTER III.

THE SEPTUAGINT.

THE earliest work of undeniably Alexandrian origin which we possess is the LXX version of the Scriptures. Perhaps we should more correctly describe it as a series of works, for it proceeded from various hands, and successive portions of it were translated at different times. In a strictly accurate version there would be no place for the obtrusion of the particular views entertained by the translators, nor even in the loosest ought we to look for more than obscure traces of their philosophical creed. The LXX, as is well known, is not in all respects a faithful representative of the Masoretic text. In several passages changes have been introduced of such a character that they can be regarded only as intentional adaptations of the ancient Scriptures to modern or Hellenistic opinions; and Dähne* has devoted all his acumen to the discovery of a full-fledged Alexandrianism lurking under these diversified expressions. The care and ingenuity of his arguments cannot be denied; but they suffer from an excessive subtlety, and are in many cases more interesting than convincing. Gfrörer's section on the same subject† is much slighter, and advances a more modest claim on behalf of the LXX; but, nevertheless, it draws one or two big conclusions from very inadequate premises.

A full examination of this topic belongs rather to a work on the LXX than to an attempt to trace the historical growth of

* II. pp. 1-72.

† II. pp. 8-18.

the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy; for it is not pretended that the philosophical ideas which are ascribed to the Greek translation could be found there if they were not previously known to us from other sources. Since, however, the translators must at least have had some general acquaintance with the popular forms of Greek speculation, and certain tendencies of mind are betrayed by their modifications of the Hebrew text, we must notice the more important points in the discussion.

We must turn first to a few passages which seem to imply some modification in the conception of God. In Levit. xxiv. 15, 16, the LXX read *ἄνθρωπος ὃς ἐὰν καταράσῃται θεὸν ἁμαρτίαν λήψεται· ὀνομάζων δὲ τὸ ὄνομα κυρίου θανάτῳ θανατούσθω*. According to Dähne,* it is inconceivable that the translators can have really intended to imply that it was a more deadly sin to name the name of God than to curse him; and they must, therefore, have had in their minds the explanation which Philo at a later time gave to their words: by *θεόν* they must have meant one of the gods of the Gentiles, and they must have entertained the philosophical doctrine of the namelessness of the Perfect One. We must observe, however, that *ὀνομάζων* is not an improper rendering of *לְקַח*, which is an ambiguous word, meaning both “to specify or call by name,” and “to curse.” Dähne himself calls attention to the fact that Aquila agrees here with the LXX; and he might have added that Onkelos understands the passage in the same way.† Abba Shaül went so far as to exclude from the future world him who pronounced the name by its own letters.‡ We need not look, then, for a philosophical dogma concealed under the translation in the LXX, which is sufficiently explained by the ambiguity of the original text, and by the reverent anxiety to shield the most holy name from every possible profanation. We may, however, mark the existence of this feeling, which

* H. pp. 25-27.

† דִּפְרַשׁ שְׁמַיִדִּי

‡ Mishnah, Synhed. X. [XI.] 1.

may very well have grown up upon Jewish soil, though it afterwards sought in Alexandria its philosophical justification.

In the translation of Exodus iii. 14, where $\acute{o} \acute{\omega}\nu$ is used as the designation of God, Dähne* discovers the Alexandrian doctrine that man could know of God only that he existed, but not what he was. The passage was no doubt useful to those who adopted this view; but although the expression $\acute{o} \acute{\omega}\nu$ does not verbally reproduce the Hebrew, it is a very natural explanation of it, and may have been intended to imply no more than the self-existent or eternal one.

We stand upon firmer ground when we come to the modifications which have been introduced into anthropomorphic statements. These, as Dähne observes,† have not been uniformly altered; but still the changes are too frequent and remarkable to be ascribed to chance. A few examples will be sufficient. In Genesis vi. 6, 7, the statement that God *repented* of having made man is softened into the milder expression, “He took it to heart.”‡ In Exodus xxiv. 9, 10, we are told that Moses and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the Elders of Israel, went up and saw the God of Israel. This becomes in the LXX, “They saw the place where the God of Israel stood.” In Exodus xv. 3, “The Lord is a man of war,” becomes “The Lord is one who crushes wars.”§ In Joshua iv. 24, “The power”|| is substituted for “the hand” of the Lord; and in Isaiah vi. 1, though the visual perception of God is allowed to stand, “the train of his robe” is converted into “his glory.”¶ Changes like these betray a disinclination to ascribe the human form or human passions to the Divine Being; but, as Zeller points out,** they are quite inadequate to prove that the peculiar doctrines of Philo had already come into existence. That God was invisible and incapable of such a feeling as repentance was a universal tenet

* P. 27-29.

† P. 39.

‡ Ἐνεθυμήθη.

§ Συντρίβων πολέμους.

¶ Ἡ ἐνδραμис.

|| Τῆς ἐδύξης αὐτοῦ.

** Die Philos. der Gr., III. ii. p. 254.

of Greek philosophy ; and without any immediate dependence on the doctrine of the philosophers the translators may well have derived this belief from the general influences of the culture amid which they lived. Zeller adds a parenthetical doubt whether we need have recourse to foreign influence at all. This doubt is surely reasonable. Faith in the spirituality and perfection of God is the natural outgrowth of Hebrew religion, and it is well known that the Targums, which represent the more purely Jewish tradition, contain softenings of anthropomorphic expressions precisely similar in character to those which occur in the LXX.* To illustrate this statement I may adduce two examples connected with the passages above referred to. In Exodus xv. 3, for "a man of war," Onkelos substitutes "a Lord of victory in battles";† and in xxiv. 10, 11, instead of "they saw God," he reads "they saw the glory of God."‡ What we really learn, then, from these passages is not that the Alexandrian philosophy had already been cast in its peculiar mould in the time of the Greek translators, but that there was a growing tendency among cultivated men, in the Jewish no less than the Hellenic world, to adopt more elevated views of God, and to remove from their idea of him all commingling of human imperfection. Thus was formed a point of contact between the two realms of religion and of thought ; and the Jewish thinkers, who afterwards ventured on the uncertain path of philosophical speculation, were not seduced into a course wholly alien to their habits of mind, but sought means of expressing, in the terms of enlightened reason, the supreme perfection which they had long religiously adored.

The attempt to go beyond this position, and fix upon the

* The evidences adduced by Freudenthal (*Hellenistische Studien*, 1875, pp. 68-77) to prove the influence of Hellenistic on Palestinian interpretation hardly diminish the force of this consideration ; for so far as Greek ideas were sanctioned by the Rabbinical schools of Palestine and Babylonia, they cannot have been foreign to the permanent genius of Judaism.

† פֶּרִי מִלְחָמָה בְּמִלְחָמָה - יְיָ

‡ מִלְחָמָה בְּמִלְחָמָה, יְיָ

LXX a specific acquaintance with the doctrines of the Greek schools, appears to me to be actuated by a desire, equal to that of Philo himself, to detect Alexandrianism in so venerable a text. We may examine among Dähne's allegations those which possess the strongest support.

It was maintained by the Alexandrian thinkers that prior to the visible universe there existed, as conditions of its appearance, an invisible image of it, and a mass of formless matter on which this image was to be impressed. Dähne,* following the lead not only of Philo, but of Clement of Alexandria,† believes that this doctrine is expressed in the translation of Genesis i. 2, ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος. The two epithets are undoubtedly suitable for describing the ideal world on the one hand, and the shapeless matter on the other; but in order to give them this application, we ought to be able to translate the sentence thus:—'There was an invisible and also an unfashioned world. The grammatical construction, however, will not allow us to separate the two epithets, and assign to ἡ γῆ two antithetic meanings. The adjectives are combined into one description of the same earth, and must be intended simply to set forth that chaotic condition which is no less clearly implied by the Hebrew words. 'Αόρατος may then intimate only that the earth, which was not separated from the superincumbent waters till the third day, was still concealed beneath the dark abyss.‡

Dähne§ further draws forth the doctrine of pre-existent ideas from the inserted ἐντὶ in Genesis ii. 9 and 19:—"God moreover caused every tree to spring out of the earth," "God formed moreover out of the earth every beast of the field." Dähne accepts Philo's explanation: God had created the ideas of trees and beasts, and he constructed moreover their material

* P. 11 sq. † Strom., V. 14, p. 702; Dähne, p. 11, Anm. 26.

‡ Josephus explains it as "concealed by deep darkness." Ant., I. 1, § 1.

§ P. 12 sq.

counterparts in the visible universe. This is highly ingenious; but the *ἔτι* naturally denotes, “in addition to what has been already mentioned,” and not “in addition to something of which not the slightest intimation has been given.” Again, in Genesis ii. 5, the Greek translation asserts that God made “every green herb of the field before it was produced* upon the earth, and all grass of the field before it sprung up.”† To what can this refer, except the invisible ideas of the plants? The words of the original text, says Dähne, give a totally different sense. No doubt they do; but it ought to be observed that the Hebrew might possibly admit of the Greek rendering, for *בְּרֵאשִׁית* is occasionally used in the sense of *בְּפְרֵאשִׁית*, “before.”‡ If there is here anything more than a blunder, and we are to look for some misleading idea in the translator’s mind, it is not difficult to find an intelligible meaning without resorting to Platonism: the plants must have been created by a special fiat before it was possible for them to grow in the ordinary way under the influence of showers and of human industry. Nor is the belief in pre-existent generic ideas proved by the insertion of *κατὰ γένος καὶ καθ’ ὁμοιότητα* in Genesis i. 11;§ for the words do not necessarily imply more than the Hebrew *לְמִינֵהוּ* which occurs before the end of the verse. A passage of higher importance remains for our consideration. In Isaiah xlv. 18, are these words:—“Thus saith the Lord who made the heaven, *οὗτος ὁ θεὸς ὁ καταδείξας τὴν γῆν, καὶ ποιήσας αὐτήν, αὐτὸς διώρισεν αὐτήν,*” κ.τ.λ. The term *καταδείξας*, in Dähne’s opinion,|| finds no appropriate meaning except in the Alexandrian cosmology: it denotes the bringing forth of the invisible image of the universe into visible existence. Similarly *διώρισεν* must refer to the defining and marking-off of the primitive materials into an orderly world. This explanation is hardly set aside by Zeller’s brief

* *Πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι.*

† See Ex. xii. 34; Josh. iii. 1.

‡ P. 15 sq.

† *Πρὸ τοῦ ἀνατεῖλαι.*

§ Dähne, p. 13. sq.

remark that the words of the original text* likewise denote not creating, but forming and setting fast;† for these ideas are not expressed by the Greek terms. *Καταδείξας* especially is no representative of the Hebrew, and I think we must admit that the rendering of this passage has been coloured by philosophical conceptions; but whether these were consciously held as part of a system, or were vaguely floating about in the popular thought of the time, may well be doubted. Still, if we can see in the words here employed no more than a sign of indirect and conversational acquaintance with Greek learning, the fact is one of considerable interest, as marking the first tentative approaches of Hebrew faith to Occidental thought. We must not omit to observe that the strange word *κατέδειξε* is used in another passage, where it stands for the Hebrew *סִפְּרָה*.‡ This circumstance may confirm the remarks already made; but we can hardly follow Dähne when he finds the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers in the succeeding clause, *ὁ ἐκφέρων κατ' ἀριθμὸν τὸν κόσμον αὐτοῦ*, for *κατ' ἀριθμόν* is a correct translation of *רִשְׁבָּה*; *τὸν κόσμον* is an admissible explanation of *סִפְּרָה*; and the *αὐτοῦ* for *αὐτῶν* may be due to a difference of reading in the Hebrew text.

Passing to anthropology, we find two or three passages which betray some acquaintance with the theory and the terms of the Platonists and the Stoics. In Job vii. 15, instead of “my soul chooses strangling,” the LXX has the singular statement, *ἀπαλλάξεις ἀπὸ πνεύματός μου τὴν ψυχὴν μου*, which, whatever may have been the cause of such a departure from the Hebrew, recognizes a distinction between the *πνεῦμα* and the *ψυχή*. In Psalm l. (li.) 12 (Hebrew 14) are the words *πνεύματι ἡγεμονικῶ στήριξόν με*. We have here a sufficiently correct rendering of *רִיחַ נְיָבִים*, for *נְיָבִים* is several times represented by *ἄρχοντες*;§ but the selection of the philosophical term *ἡγεμονικός* can hardly be accidental. Dähne||

* *יָצַר* and *בִּנָּה*

† Phil. d. Gr., III. ii. p. 255, Anm. 1.

‡ Isai. xl. 26.

§ Job. xxxiv. 18; Ps. cvi (cvii.), 40, cxii. (cxiii.) 8, cxvii. (cxviii.) 9. || P. 59.

further adduces Genesis iii. 14, where the serpent is sentenced to go ἐπὶ τῷ στήθει σου καὶ τῇ κοιλίᾳ, and believes that there is here a reference to the division of the human faculties into λογιστικόν, θυμικόν, and ἐπιθυμικόν,* which were assigned severally to the head, the chest, and the abdomen. The Seventy, familiar with allegory, signified by their addition to the Hebrew text that the serpent pleasure exercises his activity in the two latter departments of our being. It may be so; but the argument is, to say the least, extremely precarious, for the two words may be nothing more than a pleonasm, or may even have arisen accidentally out of an alternative translation. Lastly, Dähne† calls attention to Deut. xxx. 14, where to the Hebrew statement that “the word is very nigh thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart,” the LXX adds “and in thy hands.” He supposes that this translation was intentionally adapted to the distribution of the active powers of man which found favour among the later Alexandrians. But surely the addition may have been made not in order to classify human activity, but to declare that the commandment of God was not only in men’s mouths and hearts, but also, as incorporated in the book of the law, was placed in their hands—a statement which might seem peculiarly appropriate when the precious volume was about to be committed for the first time to the hands of the great out-lying world.

Thus far, though we have discovered some traces of a general acquaintance with Greek philosophical language, we have not come upon any doctrine specifically Alexandrian. This is no longer the case when it is maintained that the translators believed in the existence of hypostatized divine powers, which stood as intermediate agents between God and the universe.‡ Here Dähne admits that the evidence is at first sight against the view which he embraces; but he assumes that the translators used the words θεός and κύριος not only to denote the supreme God, but in the same subordinate sense in

* So Dähne gives the last word. † Pp. 59 sq. ‡ See Dähne, pp. 48 sqq.

which, as we shall see hereafter, they were frequently employed by Philo. This, however, is pure conjecture, and the elaborate show of evidence conjured up by Dähne contains really no tangible argument. Equally does evidence fail him as to the Alexandrian use of such expressions as *ὁ θεὸς τῶν δυνάμεων*. He himself points out* that the use of the word in other connections does not justify us in assigning to it here any higher signification than that of "the heavenly hosts"; and he is obliged to rest his whole case upon a single passage, which, by his own confession, is inconclusive. In Isaiah xlii. 13 the words *יְהוָה בְּגִבּוֹר יָצָא* † have been rendered *κύριος ὁ θεὸς τῶν δυνάμεων ἐξελεύσεται*. Now, as *גִּבּוֹר* represents the attribute by which God exercises force, *δυνάμεων* must here stand not for the hosts which inhabit the heavenly regions and are obedient to God, but for the powers which belong essentially to the divine nature itself. Yet, on the other hand, the use of the plural forbids us to understand the expression as equivalent to "the mighty God," which would require the singular, just as we must say not a man of forces, but a man of force. We are therefore led to the conception of powers which are essentially divine, and yet not individually one with God. This is a subtle exposition, but it seems to me much more reasonable to take the word in the sense of hosts. This is one of the passages where the translators are anxious to avoid anthropomorphism, for the succeeding phrase *בְּאִישׁ מִלְחָמוֹת* is turned into *συντρίψει πόλεμον*. Now, *גִּבּוֹר* signifies not only "strong," but the strong man who, as such, is chief or commander, and therefore nothing could be more natural than to make it refer in its present connection to the commander of the heavenly hosts, and to paraphrase it by the familiar expression, *ὁ θεὸς τῶν δυνάμεων*.

It is not necessary for us to follow Dähne's arguments in farther detail. As Zeller has well pointed out, they conduct us, where they are valid, only to Jewish conceptions which were

* P. 52.

† "The Lord will go forth as a hero or mighty man."

not confined to the Alexandrian school, and in other instances they are either wholly unimportant, or depend on mere errors of translation, on corruption or interpolation in the text of the LXX, or on variations of reading in the Hebrew.*

Gfrörer attains his conclusions by an easier and less tedious method. He shows, quite correctly, that the translators did not believe that God was discernible by the physical eye.† This, being interpreted, means "They remove the supreme God in every way out of the visible world"; and as at the same time they believed in a revelation, they must have accepted the doctrine of divine powers and intermediate beings.‡ The cogency of this reasoning, especially when we remember the Jewish belief in angels, is above, or below, the reach of comment. Next, the inference is drawn from two passages,§ one of which is imperfectly quoted, that the Messiah was raised to the rank of "an eternal heavenly nature."|| This inference is, to say the least, extremely doubtful,¶ and it needs more than the "little step" which Gfrörer imagines to reach the identification of the Messiah with the Logos. Gfrörer, indeed, concedes that the passages which he adduces are insufficient to prove that the translators themselves made this small advance; but he considers it quite possible that "the people" were more precipitate, and that long before the time of Christ the identification was complete. The sober historical inquirer must ask for some less shadowy and conjectural basis on which to rest so solid and important a conclusion.

On the whole, then, we have failed to discover the Alexandrian philosophy in the pages of the LXX, but we feel that we have not only entered on a period when the Jew could venture to translate his sacred literature out of the holy tongue into the language of profane culture, but have come within the range of Greek society, and caught at least the popular echoes

* Phil. d. Gr., III. ii. pp. 255 sq.

† Pp. 9-15.

‡ Pp. 15 and 17

§ Isai. ix. 6; Ps. cix. (cx.) 3.

¶ Pp. 16-17.

• See the author's "The Jewish Messiah," p. 290 sq.

of its philosophical terms and ideas. At the same time we have witnessed a movement towards higher metaphysical conceptions of the Divine Being, and have observed a few of those peculiarities of translation which, whether through accident or design, lent themselves to the support of doctrines which we find fully formulated in the writings of Philo.

CHAPTER IV.

JEWISH-ALEXANDRIAN LITERATURE : SIBYLLINE ORACLES.

WERE we tracing the history of Jewish-Alexandrian culture instead of following the development of a particular system of philosophy, we should have to pause upon several works or fragments of works which help to fill the long period between the earliest part of the LXX and Philo. Among historical writings we should have to notice not only 2nd and 3rd Maccabees,* but the fragments of the chronicler Demetrius, whose dry and faithful narrative has not yet succumbed to the temptations of a foreign rhetoric or the fictitious embellishments of party zeal, and of Artapanos or Pseudo-Artapanos, who, in order to commend Moses to the favourable consideration of Gentiles, does not hesitate to identify him with Musaeus and the Egyptian Hermes,† and to bedizen him with a tawdry display of Egyptian legend.‡ We should have to observe, besides the gnomic verses of Pseudo-Phocylides,§ the wrecks

* See Gfrörer, II. pp. 52-61 ; Dähne, II. pp. 180-190.

† *Διὰ τὴν τῶν ἱερῶν γραμμάτων ἐρμηνείαν.*

‡ On Demetrius, see Dähne, II. p. 220, Freudenthal, *Hellenistische Studien*. pp. 35-82 : on Artapanos, Dähne, pp. 200-203, Freud., *ib.*, pp. 143-174.

§ See Jacob Bernays, *Ueber das Phokylideische Gedicht. Ein Beitrag zur hellenistischen Litteratur*, Berlin, 1856, where the text is given, preceded by an introductory essay. Bernays ascribes the poem to an Alexandrian Jew, and places it between the reign of Ptolemy Philometor and that of Nero. The verses—

*μηδὲ κασιγνήτης ἐς ἀπότροπον ἐλθέμεν εὐνήν,
μηδὲ κασιγνήτων ἀλόχων ἐπὶ δέμνια βαίνειν*

(181 and 194),

which still remain of a poem on Jerusalem by an earlier Philo,* and of a tragedy on the Exodus by Ezechiel,† curious attempts to set forth the stirring events of Jewish history in the pomp of epic and dramatic verse. Still less could we refuse to pause on Fourth Maccabees, a discourse, perhaps a sermon, which is intended to prove, from the example of the Maccabean martyrs, the supremacy of reason over the passions, and, in the discussion of its theme, is studiously accommodated to the rules of Greek oratory, and mingles not unaptly the severity of Stoical ethics with the lofty demands of Hebrew monotheism.‡ All these furnish topics of interest, and to those who traverse the ruins of Egyptian literature, asking everywhere for the ideas of Philo, do not grudge the desired traces of their presence. These traces are, however, so slight or so doubtful that we can afford to disregard them; and while the works in question illustrate the influence which was exercised over Judaism by Grecian models of style and thought, they also prove that this influence was of varied character, and did not

incline me to think that it was composed while the memory of such marriages as that of Ptolemy Philadelphus was still fresh in the minds of the Egyptian Jews.

The following parallels to New Testament sentiments are interesting, though probably accidental:—

ἡ φιλοχρημοσύνη μήτηρ κακότητος ἀπάσης.

(42.)

οὐδεὶς γινώσκει τί μεταύριον.

(116.)

The phrase *καιρῷ λατρεύειν* (121) reminds one of the well-known variation in Rom. xii. 11.

The following motto for Conservatives is worth quoting:—

λαῶ μὴ πιστεue' πολύτροπός ἐστιν ὁμιλος·

λαός τοι καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πῦρ ἀκατάσχετα πάντα.

(95 sq.)

The author, the almost forgotten darling of extinct schoolmasters, apparently did not share the democratic proclivities of Philo.

* Eus., Pr. Ev., IX. 20, 24, 37.

† Ib. 28-29.

‡ See J. Freudenthal, *Die Flavius Josephus beigelegte Schrift Ueber die Herrschaft der Vernunft* (IV. Makkabäerbuch), eine Predigt aus dem ersten nachchristlichen Jahrhundert, Breslau, 1869; Gfrörer, II. pp. 173-200; Dähne, II. pp. 190-199.

lead with any uniformity to that particular type of philosophy with which, through the accident of time or the eminence of its most distinguished representative, we are best acquainted.* But a few works still remain which lie more directly on our path, and which, whether on account of the value of their contents, or owing to the important position generally assigned to them in the discussion of our subject, we should not be justified in neglecting. These are a portion of the Sibylline Oracles, the Book of Wisdom, the letter of Aristeeas, and the fragments of Aristobulus. It has been customary to regard the Peripatetic Aristobulus as practically the founder of the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy, and it might seem reasonable to place him at the head of our list; but as it is very ably contended by Grätz that the fragments ascribed to him are of a pseudonymous character, and were written as late as the reign of Tiberius, as the force of the argument depends on our previous acquaintance with the letter of Aristeeas, and as these suspicious productions throw a scanty and questionable light on the development of philosophical thought, it will be best suited to our plan to confine ourselves at present to tracing the progress of speculation in the Sibylline Oracles and the Book of Wisdom, and to reserve the discussion of Aristeeas and Aristobulus for an appendix.†

THE SIBYLLINE ORACLES.

The only portion of the Sibylline Oracles which belongs to the period of which we are treating is the third book. This book may be assigned with some probability to about the year 140 B.C.‡ It is generally admitted to be of Egyptian origin, a fact which is guaranteed not only by the language and the

* See Freudenthal, IV. Mak., pp. 38 sq.

† See the Appendix at the end of the present Book, pp. 230 sqq.

‡ See a summary of the evidence in the author's "The Jewish Messiah," pp. 14-15.

drapery of heathen prophecy wherein the thought is clothed, which at that early period we can hardly trace to any other home, but also by its pointed references to the reigning Ptolemy,* and to that worship of animals which gave to Egypt an unenviable pre-eminence in the shame of superstition.† The important sections of this poem which relate to the future glory of Israel have been considered elsewhere, and we may now confine our attention to the two fragments of the Proœmium which have been preserved by Theophilus of Antioch.

Apart from the philosophical ideas contained in the Sibylline Oracles, the mere adoption of such a vehicle for their communication is not without significance. It betokens a new regard for the Hellenic race when the holiest beliefs and the most fervent hopes of Judaism are clothed in the guise of Gentile prophecy. In the historical survey of a large portion of the known world, and the attempt to trace, however imperfectly, a providential plan in the fate of cities and nations, we see the widening horizon of interest and of thought. And when the Sibyl, in language not untinctured by the philosophy of the west, calls on Greek or Egyptian to renounce his idols and worship the only God, we seem to hear the plea that heathenism itself had something nobler than its superstitions, that idolatry was a sin against better knowledge, and that the highest utterances of Gentile wisdom proclaimed the eternal Creator and Ruler of men. We have at length fairly entered the border territory where two distinct civilizations blend; the home of faith and righteousness is casting wistful glances into the realms of intellect and beauty, the Israelite has consented to sing in a strange land one of the songs of Zion, and the strains of Isaiah and Ezekiel are adapted to the lyre of Greece.

But let us review the particular doctrines which are put

* Verses 192-3, 318, 608.

† Fragment of Proem, II. 22, 27-8.

into the mouth of the Sibyl. The central truth of Judaism is enforced with reiterated emphasis: there is but one true God, who is alone in his superlative greatness, and to whom alone worship ought to be paid. This assertion that the Supreme ought to be the sole object of adoration is contrasted with the idolatrous practices of polytheism. The claim of demons and of the lower animals to divine honours is contemptuously dismissed, while that of earth-born heroes is set aside by an appeal to the philosophic maxim that whatever comes into being also perishes. A contemplation of the degrading rites, and familiarity with the puerile notions that prevailed among the masses of the heathen population, would naturally turn the thoughts, by the force of contrast, to the transcendent perfection of God; and it may be that the worship of cats and crocodiles in Egypt was not without its influence in leading the revolted mind of the Jewish thinker to dwell with awe on the exalted and incomprehensible glory of Him on whom the universe depended. At all events, the Creator's loftiest attributes are set forth as though in antithesis to the very failings which proved the gods of the heathen to be undivine. He is imperishable, everlasting, self-existent, alone subsisting from eternity to eternity. Nay, He alone really *is*, while men, under the doom of mortality, are nothing. He is omnipotent, and wholly invisible to the fleshly eye. Men cannot gaze even upon the rays of the sun, much less can they behold the heavenly and immortal God.* Yet he is not conceived as absolutely exempt from the conditions of space, for he dwells in the firmament or the ether.† This might, indeed, be nothing more than a poetical phrase, were it not that his residence in the golden heaven is contrasted with the exposure of idols to the attacks of moths and spiders.‡ Here the superiority of the Omnipresent to all the limitations of

* See I. 1, 7-17, 20, 32, 36 (this verse is added by Friedlieb from Lactantius), II. 1-3, 17, 36, 46.

† I. 11, II. 17.

‡ II. 25-6.

locality would have formed as striking an antithesis. From his heavenly abode, however, he exercises creative power, and rules throughout the universe. He it was that created the heaven itself, the sun and stars and moon, the fruitful earth, ocean's billows, the high mountains and perennial streams. It was he who peopled the world with living beings, producing in the deep the countless multitude of aquatic tribes, making the air musical with the song of birds and the hum of the tawny bee, and placing the wild beasts in the mountain glen.* Nor does he ever neglect what he has made. He is "all-nourishing," "the leader of the cosmos," the constant ruler of all things.† This varied creation is incomprehensible to man, but is known to him who made it from the beginning.‡ Unseen himself, he beholds all else; he is the "supreme Knower," the witness of everything, the all-surveying king and overseer of men.§ Far from the deadly poison of heathen divinities, with him is life and eternal light, and he pours forth upon men joy sweeter than honey.|| But it is not only the beneficent agencies of nature that come from him. In connection with the most destructive forces, the unity of God is again solemnly affirmed, so that the author excludes at once the evil power of demons worshipped by the heathen and the subordinate, if still divine, causality which Jewish philosophy afterwards admitted:—"There is one God sending upon [the world] rains, winds, earthquakes, lightnings, famines, pestilences, and dismal sorrows, snow-storms, and ice."¶ But these things, which violate the physical beauty of the world, are, it would seem, the representatives of its moral order. War and plague and tearful grief express the divine indignation against the wicked and unjust,** while the good are rewarded with good even beyond the measure of their deserts.†† And the moral

* II. 3 sqq. † I. 5, 15, 17, 35. ‡ II. 14-16. § I. 3, 4, 8, II. 42.

|| II. 32 sqq. I see no reason for adopting the suggestion approved by Gfrörer (p. 130), to change *χάρμα* in verse 35 into *κρᾶμα*, for there is nothing in the text to indicate the composition of this mixture.

¶ I. 32-4.

** II. 19-20.

†† Ib., 18.

government which thus becomes apparent will be carried to its changeless consummation in a future scene. The idolatrous have quaffed the wine-cup of judgment, pure, potent, and full, and the gleam of blazing fire is coming upon them, and they shall be burned for ever the livelong day. But those who honour the true God shall inherit life, and dwell for eternal time in the luxuriant garden of Paradise.*

The anthropology of the writer, though not very fully given, may be traced with some distinctness. Man is composed of flesh and mind or spirit.† The spirit has been placed by God in all men, and made the leader of all mortals.‡ The origin of this spirit is not farther dwelt upon; but from the manner of expression we may perhaps fairly infer that it was regarded as more nearly akin to the divine essence, and to that extent less of a mere creation than the bodily frame. In virtue of this kinship it would possess a natural sovereignty, and so long as it was uncorrupted would lead men to truth and goodness. A more direct indwelling of God in man is, however, plainly taught: he “is in all mortals as the faculty of judgment in a common light.”§ Thus to all who cared to see, and who cherished wisdom in their breasts, he was clear as the light of the sun.|| But how this indwelling was conceived we are not informed, though it is apparently inconsistent with the doctrine that God’s abode was in the sky. Perhaps the author may have placed the two ideas side by side without

* II. 38 sqq.

† Σάρξ, νοῦς, πνεῦμα, I. 1, 5, 9, 10, 14, II. 15, 40, 41.

‡ I. 5 and 6.

§ Πᾶσι βοροῖσιν ἐνὼν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν φαῖ κοινῷ, I. 18. I see no sufficient reason for adopting the conjectural emendation of Maranus, *βοροῖσι νέμων*. No doubt the *μ* and *ν* have a greater resemblance in manuscripts than in our printed books; but still they are very clearly distinguished by the stroke which carries on the *μ* to the next letter. Nor can I discover any contradiction between the common reading and the statement in verses 5 and 6 already referred to; for the human spirit would be required as the organ in which God might dwell. Mind is the leader of men; but it requires itself the divine illumination. See Otto, who accepts the change of reading, Theoph. ad Autol., II. 36, note 16.

|| I. 28 sqq.

being struck by their incongruity, and there may have been in his mind some lurking mode of reconciliation which he had not yet drawn into the light of self-conscious thought. Were we able to question him, he might, continuing the simile of the sun, reply that as the sun, without quitting its place in the heavenly sphere, floods the world with its beams, so God, though dwelling in the remote ether, might yet come as rays of light to souls whose habitation was on earth. This would conduct us to a doctrine of the extension and diffusion, and then of the substantive reality of the divine powers. These steps, however, have not been taken by our author, and we must be content to mark the point where questions tending in this direction would inevitably arise in more reflective minds.

Another difficulty which presents itself is this: if God reveals himself so clearly within the human soul, whence come our ignorance and our sin? Gfrörer says that in the writer's view the flesh "is the source of all weakness, without doubt also of evil desires; for though he does not expressly say this, he nevertheless depreciates the flesh in every way."^{*} If by this it is meant that the flesh is the fountain of moral evil, I think the inference is not warranted by our author's language. The flesh is with him a sign of infirmity and transiency, but never of sin. In the opening words of the first fragment it is coupled with the mortality and nothingness of men; and instead of being regarded as the cause of their sinful pride, it is noticed as a reason for humility. Further on, its mortality is again referred to, and it is contended that material so frail cannot behold the heavenly and immortal God;† and yet again, still in connection with mortality, it is declared incapable of knowing all the wonders of creation.‡ Here, then, nothing evil is ascribed to the flesh; it is only its frail and perishable character to which our attention is directed. It is this which constitutes its contrast

* P. 131.

† I. 9-14.

‡ II. 13.

with God the imperishable and eternal, this which ought to induce humility and godly fear in men. But instead of being humbled by a sense of weakness, and by reflecting on the brief span of life, men are puffed up with an empty conceit. This quality, opposed as it is to a just sense of the divine greatness and power, is a folly and even an insanity, which plunges those who succumb to it into midnight darkness, and deprives them of all intuition of the light, which yet is ever there, waiting to be known. This is the source of their stupid and shameful idolatries, and their worship of beasts and demons. Their error is not in the understanding, but the will; their madness is not in the flesh, but the spirit; and they may, if they please, forsake the darkness, recover from their intoxication, and come to a sound mind.* Sin is thus traced not to man's bodily constitution, but to that part of him which is most divine. The antagonism of flesh and spirit, the one tending earthward, the other heavenward, is not yet; nor is there any sign that the body is regarded even as the prison of the aspiring soul. Rather does it fulfil the holy duty of warning man against presumption, and reminding this proud leader among created things† of the limitations of his knowledge and the dependence of his life.

It appears, then, that in these interesting fragments we have a clear outline of a thoughtful religious creed. But it seems to me that there are only the faintest indications of what is generally known as the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy. Its allegorical interpretation, its tendency to ascetic dualism, its ecstasie vision of God, its incorporation of purely Greek conceptions, its doctrine of mediating powers are all absent. We are indeed on our way thither. New methods of research must inevitably come in with the use of that wonderful intellectual instrument, the language of Greece;

* I. 2 sqq., 23 sqq., II. 21, sqq., 40, 41.

† II. 12-14.

the rhapsodies of the Sibyl will be succeeded by the measured thought of the philosopher; new problems are already suggested to us, and the idea that a divine light dwells in all men is yet to become largely fruitful; but on the whole the substance of the teaching is still Hebrew, only the form is Greek.

CHAPTER V.

THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON.

THE Book of Wisdom, or the Wisdom of Solomon, to some extent reverses the order of relation between the form and the substance which we observed in the Sibylline Oracles. The form is Hebraic. Through a considerable portion of the work the parallelism of Hebrew poetry is preserved, and everywhere the style is more closely related to the sententiousness of Proverbs and Ecclesiasticus than to the connected reasoning or flowing rhetoric of Greek writers. This is only in keeping with its assumed character; for its admonitions are put into the mouth, not of a heathen prophetess, but of an Israelite king. On the other hand, the substance, though necessarily retaining the distinctive and characteristic faith of Judaism, is much more deeply tinged with ideas borrowed directly from the philosophic schools; and accordingly, while differing so widely in the nature of its composition from Philo, it approaches his mental contour and peculiar thoughts more nearly than any other surviving representative of the Jewish-Alexandrian literature.

In these remarks we are assuming that we have before us the work of a single author, and that that author was a Jew resident in Egypt. Notwithstanding the existence of opinions and arguments adverse to such an assumption, some of which have enjoyed the support of distinguished names, these points are now so generally admitted, that we need not dwell upon the very satisfactory proofs by which they are established.*

* See them fully treated by Grimm in the *Kurzgef. exeg. Handb. zu den Apok. des A. T.*, 6te Lieferung., 1860, Einleit.; the unity, p. 9 sqq., the authorship, p. 16 sqq.

One or two other matters, however, require a brief notice before we proceed to unfold the doctrinal contents of the book.

Some of the ablest writers on our subject believe that the author belonged to the sect of the Therapeutae, or at least to a circle nearly related to the Essenic party.* Gfrörer appeals with some confidence to a passage in which a blessing is pronounced on the barren woman who is unstained by sin, and on the eunuch who is free from wickedness in his deeds and from evil thoughts against the Lord.† This, he conceives, is quite opposed to the prevalent Jewish opinion that a numerous progeny was the highest of earthly blessings, and childlessness a heavy curse. Grätz,‡ apparently putting the same interpretation on the passage, regards it as a later importation from the Christian nunnery. I venture to think, however, that our author's sentiment is precisely the opposite of that which is ascribed to him. In order to extract the required meaning, Gfrörer translates *στειρα* by "virgin," and *εὐνοῦχος* by "unmarried." But there is really no allusion to virginity. The writer refers to the condition, clearly regarded as unfortunate, of those who were incapable of having children, and declares that even they, if they are virtuous, are more blessed than the impious and adulterers can ever be in their numerous offspring. As Christ intends to denote the very extremity of sorrow when he foretells the "days in which they shall say, blessed are the barren,"§ so here the whole force of the contrast depends on the acceptance of the ordinary Jewish belief.

A similar criticism will apply to another passage, formerly relied upon by Zeller, in which it is said that old age is not measured by the number of years, but by the possession of wisdom.|| This, it appears to me, bears only the most

* So Gfrörer, II. p. 265 sqq.; Dähne more doubtfully, II. p. 170; Zeller, III. ii. p. 274. The earlier writers assume the genuineness of the *De Vita Contemplativa*.

† iii. 13, 14. See also iv. 1, "Better is childlessness with virtue."

‡ *Gesch. der Juden*, III., 1863, p. 444.

§ Luke xxiii. 29.

|| iv. 7-9.

superficial resemblance to the statement in the *De Vita Contemplativa* that the Therapeutae reckoned seniority not by the actual age, but by the order of admission into the sect and the number of years which had been devoted to the study of speculative philosophy.* Our author is combating an objection to the doctrine of a providential government of the world, which was founded on the undeniable fact that the righteous not only were sometimes without the blessing of children, but were even subject to premature death. This he repels not by reference to a Therapeutic practice, but by saying in effect that the real value of life depends not on its length, but on its contents, and that wisdom, even apart from years, is venerable.

The only other argument of any weight is founded on a supposed reference to the Therapeutic prayers at sunrise. Speaking of the manna in the wilderness, the writer says that, though it was not destroyed by fire (in the process of cooking), it melted as soon as it was warmed by a ray of the sun, "that it may be known that one ought to anticipate the sun in giving thanks to thee, and towards dawn† to supplicate thee, for the hope of a thankless man melts as wintry hoar-frost."‡ This might possibly refer to the prayers of the Therapeutae, though I cannot assent to the statement of Gfrörer§ that it is in precise agreement with the accounts of Philo and Josephus; on the contrary, it differs in essential points. According to Philo (or rather the unknown author of the *De Vita Contemplativa*) the Therapeutae offered their prayers, not before sunrise, but while the sun was rising, or, as he elsewhere expresses it, when they saw the sun rising.|| Gfrörer, through a curious misunderstanding of a Greek expression, makes the Wisdom of Solomon self-contradictory, and so drags it into partial agreement with the work ascribed to Philo. He thinks that *πρὸς ἀνατολὴν φωτός* means *at sunrise*, and that the verse,

* De Vit. cont., 8 (II. 481).

† Πρὸς ἀνατολὴν φωτός.

‡ xvi. 27-29.

§ P. 270.

|| De Vit. cont., 3 (II. 475), and 11 (II. 485-6).

accordingly, teaches that the prayers should begin *before* sunrise, but reach their height only when the first golden beams became visible. The Greek words, however, mean *towards*, and therefore *before* dawn; the two clauses support one another, and both point to a time different from that of the Therapeutic prayers. We must observe, however, that Josephus places the morning prayers of the Essenes before sunrise. If we turn now to the substance of the prayers, we find even a more marked discordance. The Therapeutae prayed for true prosperity, that their understanding might be filled with heavenly light, or, as it is otherwise expressed, for prosperity and truth and keenness of intellectual vision. Here the sun is regarded as the symbol of spiritual light, and hence the appropriateness of offering the prayer at the moment of his appearance. But in the Wisdom of Solomon there is not a word about mental illumination. The sun is not now the symbol of truth, but rather the hot and melting power which compelled the Israelites to collect their God-given food before it rose, and thereby reminded men that, if they would not see their hopes melt like hoar-frost, they ought to give thanks before they encountered the burning day. Thus the whole order of thought varies from that contained in the account of the Therapeutae, and the different time of prayer is carefully adapted to the thought. But we have farther to remark that the distinctive peculiarity of the Therapeutic prayers consisted in the attitude of the suppliants. They set their eyes and their whole body towards the east, or, as Josephus says of the Essenes, they uttered their prayers towards the sun,* as if entreating it to rise. From the Book of Wisdom this singular feature is entirely absent, and nothing is left to identify its recommendation with the practice of the Therapeutae. Gfrörer indeed labours hard to prove that these early petitions were confined to the Essenes and the kindred sect in Egypt; but in order to do so he is obliged to assume that the

* Εἰς αὐτόν.

Vathîkîn, the pious, who are referred to in the Talmud* and Tosiphta† as advocates of a similar custom, were perhaps the Essenes or their remnants. Grätz, however, classes them with the Pharisaical party;‡ and in any case it is not a violent supposition that some of the Jews in Egypt may have adopted so simple and devout a habit as giving thanks before day-break without submitting themselves to the discipline of a sect.

On the whole, then, it appears that there is no sufficient reason for ascribing a Therapeutic§ origin to the Book of Wisdom, and we cannot make use of this conjectured source in estimating either its character or date. On the other hand, we may fairly infer from its incorporation in the LXX that it appealed to a wide circle of readers, and represented the prevailing tone of thought among the Alexandrian Jews.

Of its date the book contains no decisive indication, and consequently various opinions have been held on that point. Mr. S. Sharpe|| ascribes to the work an origin and date which would make it useless for our present inquiry. While accepting the general opinion that the author "was a Jew of the Alexandrian school," he regards him as "a convert to Christianity." He does so on the ground that "the righteous man" described in chapters ii., iv., and v., must be "meant for the Founder of our religion." It cannot be denied that some of the circumstances remind us, in a remarkable way, of the closing hours of Christ's earthly life; but, on the other hand, "the righteous man" does not stand out with the distinct individuality of an historical person, nor is he invested with that supremacy which even an Ebionite Christian must have recognized in his Messiah.¶ He is an abstract

* Bab. 9 b., 25 b., 26 a. † Berachoth, c. 1. ‡ Gesch. der Jud., III. p. 444.

§ We may still use the term to denote "a circle nearly related to the Essenic party," if such existed in Egypt.

|| The History of Egypt from the earliest times till the conquest by the Arabs A.D. 640, sixth edition, 1876, II. p. 141. See also the History of the Hebrew Nation and its Literature, 1869, p. 227.

¶ If he ἀλαζονεύεται πατέρα θεόν, and claimed to be υἱὸς θεοῦ (ii. 16 and 18), still he is only one of several, counted ἐν υἱοῖς θεοῦ (v. 5).

form, representing those who are persecuted and slain by the impious, and whose expressions of trust and hope are ridiculed as standing in opposition to the hard facts of experience. If we regard him as the collective impersonation of the faithful among the Israelites, who suffered at the hands of their enemies (including apostates from the Jewish law), the requirements of the passage appear to be satisfied; and even Grätz, who thinks that he detects a few Christian interpolations, does not place the account of the righteous man under suspicion. In the absence, then, of undeniably Christian colouring or of clear allusion to Christian events, we may accept the prevailing opinion that the work is of purely Jewish authorship. Still less convincing is Mr. Sharpe's statement that the author "wrote after the conquest of Judæa by Vespasian, as he says that God's people were crushed by their enemies." In proof of this statement there is merely a reference to xv. 14. Here, however, there is no mention of a conquest, but only a general allusion to all the enemies that oppressed the Israelites; and in the long historical retrospect which is thus opened there is nothing to show that the Romans are included.

Grätz is equally confident that the persecution under Caligula, and the claims to divine honours advanced by that imperial fool, come under the writer's hostile criticism.* The worship paid to the statues of kings is undoubtedly described;† but it does not follow that the deification of the Roman Cæsars was already known. The deification of the Ptolemies preceded that of the Cæsars,‡ and the writer could

* *Gesch. der Jud.*, III. p. 442-3.

† xiv. 16-20.

‡ It is sufficient to refer to the inscription on the Rosetta stone, in which the gods Soteres, the gods Adelphi, the gods Euergetæ, the gods Philopatores, are mentioned, and an order is given that the statue of the god Ptolemy Epiphanes shall be worshipped in every temple in Egypt, and be carried out in the processions with those of the gods of the country. Similarly, divine honours were to be paid to Ptolemy Euergetes and his queen, as Benefactor-gods, in all the temples of Egypt, as we learn from the stone found at San in 1865 by Mariette and Lepsius. The substance of the former may be seen in Sharpe's

not look across to the Pharos lighthouse without remembering the human gods to whom it was dedicated. The language in which the origin of this custom is unfolded is far too calm and philosophical to have been called forth by the attempted outrages of Caligula. It precisely suits the Oriental flattery which so readily accepted the godhead of the Greek sovereigns; but not a word is said about the endeavour to force this idolatry on the Jews, or the order to desecrate the temple and the synagogues. It seems to me, therefore, that the passage, instead of proving that the book was subsequent to the persecution which had so nearly driven the Jews into armed revolt, affords negative evidence of a prior date; for the writer could hardly have refrained from branding that one feature by which the policy of Caligula was so cruelly distinguished from the vulgar king-worship which had so long prevailed.

Zeller, while admitting that there is some force in Grätz's argument, considers it inconclusive, and abandoning this outpost, falls back on the expression, "Ye judges of the ends of the earth,"* which he thinks points rather to the dominion of the Romans than that of the Ptolemies, and he is disposed to place the work in the time of Augustus.† There is, however, no reason for limiting the address to the rulers of the country where the author lived. Speaking in the name of Solomon, he appeals to kings everywhere; and there is nothing in his admonitions to suggest that the once commanding monarchy of Egypt had dwindled into a mere province of a great military empire. His acquaintance with the advancing

History of Egypt, I. pp. 381 sq., and of the latter in Professor Mahaffy's *Alexander's Empire*, p. 157, note. See also Philo's testimony, οὗς θεοὺς καὶ ἐνόμιζον καὶ ἔγραφον καὶ ἐκάλουν, *Leg. ad Cai.* 20 (II. 566).

* Δικασταὶ περάτων γῆς, vi. 1.

† III. ii. p. 273, Ann. 3. Zeller also appeals to the statement that images were made of kings because they dwelt at a distance, εἰδὲ τὸ μακρὰν οἰκεῖν, xiv. 17; but this is equally applicable to the Egyptian monarchs, whose images were not confined to Alexandria.

power of Rome we cannot reasonably doubt; but there is nothing to show whether he regarded it with hope or with dread, and the absence of all clear allusion to that grinding despotism which was ultimately to crush the Jewish nationality favours the opinion of those who find in the period of the Ptolemies the time when the work was composed.

The positive arguments in support of this view are perhaps not very cogent, but in default of better evidence they are entitled to control our judgment. From the long account, which is given in the later portion of the book, of the triumph of the Israelites over the Egyptians at the time of the Exodus, combined with the frequent references to beast-worship,* it seems a reasonable conclusion that the inhabitants of Egypt were the mocking enemies against whom the writer directed his polemic. It is true that their enmity did not cease when Egypt passed under the dominion of Rome; but here they take the rank of principals in their hostility, and not of subordinate, though willing agents of a foreign power. If this inference be correct, we must place the book in the time of the later Ptolemies, when the Jews no longer enjoyed the high consideration which had first tempted them to Alexandria, and the worthless lives of the rulers must have excited feelings of repugnance and scorn in every noble breast. We may farther judge that the glory of the Maccabees had already faded, for in the flush of their triumph we should have had an exultant rather than an apologetic tone, and an assertion of the present fulfilment of Israel's desire instead of the "hope full of immortality."† We thus arrive

* xi. 15, 16, xii. 23-4, xiii. 10, 14, xv. 18.

† iii. 4. Mr. Deane prefers a still earlier date. He infers from vi. 5 and 9, xii. 22, 23, xiv., "&c.," that it was a time of persecution, and then observes that the only persecutions which the Jews suffered under the Ptolemies took place in the reigns of Ptolemy Philopator (b.c. 221-204), and Ptolemy VII or Physcon (b.c. 170-117). Thence he concludes that "we may safely date the production of the book between b.c. 217 and b.c. 145, that is between the epoch marked by the religious oppression under Philopator, and that rendered memorable by the enormities of the bloated sensualist Physcon." [The Book of Wisdom. The

at a date considerably earlier than the writings of Philo, and with this result the philosophy of the book is in complete agreement. We here occupy a less advanced stage of Alexandrian speculation than is represented by Philo. Not only are some of his most prominent doctrines entirely wanting, but, what is more important, those that are present are in a less developed form. The accuracy of this statement will become apparent as our exposition proceeds, and we may now revert to our proper task of tracing the growth of Hellenistic thought.

Touehing first upon the writer's method, we may inquire whether he was acquainted with that system of allegorical interpretation which was so abundantly used by Philo. Among the passages pressed into the service by Gfrörer* there are two which point unmistakably in this direction. In the first it is said that Wisdom, at the time of the Exodus, led the Israelites in a wonderful path, and "became to them a shelter by day, and a flame of stars by night."† Here, although it does not suit the author's plan to enter, like Philo, into a detailed exegesis, it is evident that the pillar of cloud and of fire is allegorized into Wisdom.‡ In the second passage we are told that on the long robe of the high priest was the whole cosmos.§ This brief statement would be unintelligible, were

Greek text, the Latin Vulgate and the authorized English version, with an introduction, critical apparatus and a commentary, by William J. Deane, M.A., Oxford, 1881, p. 32.] The allusions appear to me quite too general to sustain the weight of this conclusion, and especially the use of the present tense in xii. 22 points only to a constant principle of the divine government. Professor Plumptre thinks that "Wisdom" was written by Apollos before he was converted, and the Epistle to the Hebrews by him after his conversion. See two articles in the *Expositor*, Vol. I. pp. 329 sqq. and 409 sqq. Mr. Deane thinks "the difference of style is too great to be reasonably attributed to different phases of the same intellect" [p. 35]. The argument rests chiefly on coincidences of phraseology.

* II. p. 207-9.

† x. 17.

‡ Cf. Philo, *Quis rer. div. haer.*, 42 (I. 501), where he speaks of the cloud as gently dropping down wisdom on virtuous understandings, and brings it into connection with the Logos; and *Vita Mosis*, I. 29 (II. 107), where he suggests that there was, perhaps, one of the lieutenants of the great king, an invisible angel, wrapt up in the cloud.

§ xviii. 24.

it not for the elaborate explanations of Philo* and Josephus;† and it is a reasonable inference that when this otherwise obscure allusion was made, the symbolical interpretation of the high-priest's dress must have been well known, and a school of allegorists have been already in existence.

The allegorical method, however, is not applied to the construction and proof of doctrines. Indeed, there is little connected reasoning of any kind in the work. Its statements are dogmatic, and any arguments by which they may be supported are rather hinted in the form of an appeal to the common sense of mankind than drawn up with logical coherence. It is as though the process of investigation had been conducted elsewhere, and led to results esteemed satisfactory by an important section of the Jewish community, and this were a kind of manifesto, setting forth with poetic beauty and richness the faith of those who believed that orthodox Judaism might still be saved and brought into unison with the highest philosophy. When we attempt, therefore, to arrange its thoughts into a theory of the universe, we must not be surprised if some connecting links are wanting, if a phrase occasionally suggests more than it expresses, and if a few momentous questions receive answers of doubtful meaning. We must remember too that while a system of thought is still growing, its successive stages and ultimate logical results disclose themselves only by degrees. For a time an explanation may be deemed sufficient which contains, unperceived and unresolved, a variety of problems destined to try the skill of some future inquirer, and we are not justified in forcing upon one of its earliest exponents its implicit contents, which may never have become explicit in his consciousness. The critical historian is apt to be impatient of vagueness, and in a question which appears to him inevitable, and

* Vita Mosis, III. 11-14 (II. 151-5); De monarchia, II. 5-6 (II. 225-7).

† Ant., III. 7, § 7.

did in fact arise inevitably in the course of development, he will have it that each writer must have had an opinion one way or the other; whereas to many thinkers the question may never have occurred, and were we able to propound it to them, we should find them unprovided with an answer. We must be careful, even in the case of a suggestive author, not to ascribe to him greater clearness and completeness of thought than is fairly deducible from his language. With these precautions we proceed to unfold the doctrines of the Wisdom of Solomon.

We may start with the fundamental postulate of Judaism—There is no God save the one whom Israel worshipped. He lives in solitary supremacy, responsible to himself alone.* In contrast with the phenomenal universe he is real being. This seems to be the force of τὸν ὄντα†—"All men were thoughtless‡ by nature, in whom was ignorance of God, and who from the good things that were seen were unable to know *Him who is.*" We have already met with this designation of God in the LXX, and we shall meet it repeatedly in Philo. In itself it might denote the eternal, self-existent One, or him of whom existence only can be predicated, or him who really exists, in opposition to the pretended gods of heathenism. The connection appears to require the first of these meanings; for the phenomenal world, on account of its transiency, cannot be regarded as ultimate, but points to an unseen reality, the eternal and unchangeable ground of all that we behold. The same idea is expressed under a different form when God is described as "eternal light."§ The rays that visibly illumine heaven and earth, the flashes of wisdom in the human soul, demand a source which is not phenomenal; and God is the real intellectual light, of which the light of stars and sun, and the brightest thoughts of men, are but the symbol or the image. This line of thought leads directly to the idea of

* xii. 12-14.

† xiii. 1.

‡ Μάρτυροι.

§ vii. 26.

creation, and accordingly God is spoken of as the artificer* who created or prepared† the various objects of nature, fire, air, and water, the sphere of the constellations, and the lamps of heaven.‡ The author, however, appears to have departed from the Hebrew doctrine of creation out of nothing, and to have accepted in its place the belief of the Platonists that there was a pre-existing material, formless but susceptible, out of which the universe was constructed. He expressly says that God “created the cosmos out of formless matter”;§ and that he refers to the primary act of creation, and leaves no room for a previous creation of matter out of nothing, is evident from the fact that the formation of the world is adduced as a pledge of the divine omnipotence, and had he supposed that the whole system of things had been called into being out of perfect emptiness, he would surely have availed himself of this more striking mode of conception.|| In another passage we meet with a word which is derived from the same order of thought. Speaking of the miracles which were wrought in favour of the Israelites at the time of the Exodus, the writer says that “the whole creation in its own kind was again impressed anew.”¶ This language suggests the comparison of matter to a lump of wax, which is capable of receiving the impression of various seals; originally devoid of attributes, it owes to divine agency the qualities which separate it into kinds, and make it subserve such a multiplicity of purposes. Thus the conversion of chaos into cosmos is the author’s highest idea of creation, and, while he admits the omnipotence of God, it is the order and beauty of the world that excite his wonder. God lays a restraint upon the exercise of his own power, and has “arranged all things by measure and number and weight”;** and as “the progenitor of beauty” he has given their charm to earth and sky.††

* Τεχνίτης.

† Ἐκτίσιν, κατασκευάσας, γενεσιουργός.

‡ xiii. 1-5.

§ Ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης, xi. 17.

|| See Grimm *in loco*.

• Διευποῦτο, xix. 6.

** xi. 20.

†† xiii. 3.

But while the universe is thus an expression of the greatness, power, and beauty of God, he remains transcendent above it, with unexhausted resources. His power is equal to every demand, and is present whenever he may choose to exert it.* “The whole cosmos before” him “is as a weight out of a balance, and as an early drop of dew when it has come down upon the earth.”† The first of these comparisons was probably suggested by Isaiah xl. 15, where the LXX gives “the weight” instead of “the dust” of the balance.‡ It denotes something light and trifling, just enough to cause an inclination of the scale, and giving no sense of weight when held in the hand. To the sustaining power of God the vast universe is no more than the smallest weight to our human strength. The dewdrop, which so soon yields to the burning sun, marks rather the transiency of the world, whose incalculable period melts and is lost in the divine eternity. Perhaps nothing more than this was in the writer’s mind; but yet we may fairly notice the appropriateness of the simile. The tiny globe of liquid, refracting the sun’s rays, and dazzling the eye with colours of exquisite purity, seems to ensphere a universe of beauty, and, like the modest flower in whose bosom it lies,

“can give

Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears.”

He who lavishes the perfection of infinite art on the adornment of an evanescent drop, and makes his living spirit palpitate in its varied hues, can as easily charge a world with its myriad wonders, and sprinkle the wide vault of heaven with ethereal fires. Small and great, transient and durable, are both alike to Him. In the “holy heavens” is the throne of his glory,§ and, be it sun or be it dewdrop, it is only by his will that anything abides.||

From this we proceed by an easy inference to the motive of creation. Possessing unlimited power to carry out his

* xi. 17, 23, xii. 18.

† xi. 22.

‡ ῥοπή ζυγόν: here, ῥοπή ἐκ πλαστίγγων.

§ ix. 10, 4, xviii. 15.

|| xi. 25.

purposes God must have acted from love, and this love must embrace all that is, for if God had hated anything he would not have made it.*

By parity of reasoning we arrive at the doctrine of a merciful providence. God has not simply set the world agoing, and then withdrawn into cold seclusion, but he continues to administer all things,† and it is even his “providence” that steers the bark, and gives it a secure path among the billows.‡ The principles of his government are justice and truth, mercy, kindness, and long-suffering.§ It is amongst men, within the moral sphere, that the exercise of these attributes is especially manifest. God “made small and great, and exercises his providence for all alike.”|| He is the lover of souls, or of the living,¶ a statement which we may understand in its widest acceptance, because it is made in connection with the wicked, who are mercifully allowed time for repentance. This love, however, is so qualified by moral distinctions that on occasion a very different language may be used. It is amongst “his holy ones” that God’s “grace and mercy” are conspicuous, while the impious undergo the punishment which they deserve.** The divine love (in the highest sense) is extended only to him who dwells with wisdom,†† while the impious man and his idol, the fruit of his impiety, are in an equal measure hateful to God.‡‡ For the exercise of this moral discrimination the Creator possesses an immediate knowledge of men’s most inward secrets, for he is not only the hearer of their speech, but the witness of their feelings and their thoughts.§§ In what precise manner the omnipresence which is implied in this searching of the heart is conceived will be discussed farther on; meanwhile we

* xi. 24.

† Διοικεῖν, xii. 18, xv. 1; ἡγεῖται, xii. 15.

‡ xiv. 3.

§ xi. 23; xii. 15, 18; xv. 1.

|| vi. 8.

¶ xi. 26, φιλόψυχος, a word classically used to denote “too fond of life,” and hence “cowardly.”

** iii. 9, 10.

†† vii. 28.

‡‡ xiv. 9.

§§ i. 6.

encounter the difficulty which besets every doctrine of providence, and not least that of the ancient Hebrews. The righteous Lord must make a distinction in his treatment of the good and bad, showing favour to the former, and visiting the latter with pain; how is it, then, that the wicked are ever endowed with wealth and power, with long life and a numerous offspring, and are able to boast that they will take their own might for their law of righteousness, while the just man, exposed to their oppression, sinks in poverty and derision into an untimely grave? Men are perplexed at these things only because they know not the mysteries of God. The immortal future will unravel the dread secret, and show the mockers that eternal justice rules. Only in the eyes of the foolish do the righteous seem to die; they are in peace and live for evermore; and if any just man succumbs to early death, it is because he was well-pleasing to God, and has been translated to a restful region, where

“ From the contagion of the world’s slow stain
He is secure, and now can never mourn
A heart grown cold, a head grown grey, in vain.”

From the world of incorruption, then, a light streams down upon the gloomy scenes of earth. Righteousness belongs to the realm of enduring realities, while the things on which the wicked build their hopes are empty and unprofitable; and therefore privation, accompanied by wisdom and goodness, is intrinsically better than worldly advantage disfigured by folly and vice. The sufferings of the good are a discipline by which, like gold in a furnace, they are proved, and shown to be worthy of God; and they are few in comparison with the greatness of the future benefit. The wicked, on the other hand, may enjoy for a time a seeming prosperity; but even in this world their happiness has no deep and permanent root, and attains only a sickly and uncertain growth. It is through the mercy of God, who affords them an opportunity for repentance, that swift punishment does not fall upon their evil

deeds; and if they continue impenitent, the extreme penalty will at last overtake them.* And here two dire forms, borrowed from the poetry and philosophy of Greece, emerge into view, Necessity and avenging Right.† To the former is assigned the terrible duty of blinding the judgment of the impious, and inducing an oblivion of those sorrows which might have touched the heart, and turned the tears shed over the tombs of the dead into tears of penitential grief.

Have we here a doctrine of reprobation, and are we taught that an iron fatality of sin hems the guilty round, and, checking the first flow of better aspiration, forbids them ever to escape? In the absence of any definite assertion of free will it might almost seem so; but there are some considerations which should make us pause before adopting such a conclusion. Not only is the doctrine of free will explicitly affirmed, as we shall see, amid the ampler discussions of Philo, but a view which would represent God as the immediate cause of evil would be opposed to the whole genius of the Alexandrian philosophy, and would hardly be consistent with the author's own statement that God loves everything that he has made. Nor does the passage itself, in which the action of necessity is described, justify, when closely scanned, so extreme an interpretation. God is spoken of as foreknowing but not as foreordaining the future, and the necessity is a meet or deserved necessity,‡ whose object it is to insure the completion of the still defective punishment. It appears, then, that the voluntary impenitence of the guilty is assumed, and the temporary wavering in their evil course (exemplified by the vacillation of the Egyptians before the Exodus) is due, not to any change of will, but to the smart of present suffering. Then comes into operation a moral law, which forces men, when they have refused the genuine, to take the spurious;

* For the foregoing, see i. 15, ii. 6-22, iii. 2-17, iv. 3-14, v. 1 sqq., xi. 15 sqq., xii. 2, 10, 20.

† *Ἀνάγκη* and *δικη*.

‡ *Ἡ ἀξία . . . ἀνάγκη*.

and those who would not repent of their sin repent of the weakness which had almost induced them to submit to the higher will. The heart is hardened and hurries on to the final calamity. Thus the work of necessity is to bring about a judicial blindness, and prevent those who will not be saved by virtue from escaping through the craft of prudence.*

In another passage† the doctrine of hereditary and innate corruption is distinctly taught, and this may seem logically to imply that individual souls are doomed, through the circumstances of their birth, to a depravity which they cannot shun. The author, however, does not draw this conclusion, and we are bound to consider the purpose which he had in view. He is illustrating the patience and mercy of God, who brings his punishments only by slow degrees on even the most incorrigible offenders. The old inhabitants of Canaan had incurred the hatred of God on account of their abominable practices; but even to them, since they were men (and therefore dear to the lover of souls), God allowed room for repentance, though he was “not ignorant that their origin was wicked, and their vice innate, and that their thought would not change for ever, for it was a cursed seed from the beginning.” Now, it will be observed that the divine aversion to the Canaanites is here made to rest entirely on their evil practices, and the thought that God had compelled them to follow these practices is not even distantly suggested. God is aware that they were a vile race from the first, and foreknows their impenitence; but this is mentioned only to aggravate their guilt, and to place his forbearance in a more striking light. It is true that a difficulty is thus created which the author does not notice. In the particular historical example which he has chosen, he discerns the fact that even in the moral world the principle of individualism has certain undefined limitations. Groups of men, such as nations, are formed, as it were, into collective moral organisms, swayed by the same tendencies, and pursuing

* See xix. 1-5.

† xii. 2 sqq.

through long periods the same line of virtue or of depravity. How is this fact to be reconciled with the doctrine of free will and individual responsibility? The author has not told us; but we may with some probability conjecture that, if the question had occurred to him, he would have called to his aid his belief in the pre-existence of the soul, which will be noticed farther on. An hereditary corporeal taint would provide a fitting habitation for a soul which had already sinned, and, while leaving the guilt within the spiritual part, would create the bias by which the direction and manifestation of that guilt should be determined. But this is perhaps one of those cases where the contents of his own thought did not unfold themselves in the consciousness of the writer.

The allusions to "avenging Right" do not require many remarks, for they are few and brief, and none of them presents an example of highly wrought personification.* She is simply represented as a power which pursues the wicked, and from which not even one who merely speaks unjust things may hope to escape. In one passage its functions are assigned to the "eternal providence."† Thus, while "the cosmos is the champion of the righteous,"‡ a dread mysterious agent dogs the steps of the unjust, and drinks the very whispers of their guilt. On this subject we shall have more to say when we meet with it once again in the writings of Philo.

The interpretation which we have given to the author's view of necessity is confirmed by the positive statement, which is made in a single important instance, that God is not the creator of evil. Men are exhorted not to strive eagerly for death in the error of their life, or draw destruction on themselves in the works of their hands; "for God did not make death, nor is he delighted with the destruction of living beings, for he created all things for existence."§ This passage, which is not without difficulties, will be farther considered

* See i. 8, xi, 20, xiv. 31, xviii. 11.

† xvi. 17. See also v. 20.

‡ xvii. 2.

§ i. 12-14.

when we speak of the doctrine of immortality; at present we must observe that the possibility of frustrating the beneficent purposes of God is distinctly recognized. Man is exhibited as a self-determining agent, who is responsible for his own fate; and so far from God's having predestined anything to spiritual death, he did not make death at all, but man brought it on himself as part of the contents of sin. Here God and man are the only antithetic powers; but a parallel passage,* if we may trust our present text, introduces the antagonism of God and the devil. The words stand thus:—"God created man for incorruption, and made him an image of his own essence; but through envy of the devil death entered into the world, and they that are on his side experience it." Grätz† insists that the second of these two verses is a Christian interpolation; but his three reasons do not appear to have much force. He says the verse disturbs in the highest degree the connection of the passage. It seems to me, on the contrary, so precisely suited to the connection that, if it were not there, we should feel that something was wanting. Grätz, however, was unable to follow the thread of thought; for he strangely asserts that the last clause "has absolutely no sense." Yet the sense is surely sufficiently plain: though blameless souls only appear to die, those who are on the devil's side really experience death, a doctrine which is not only intelligible, but in exact agreement with that which we have learned from the previous passage. In any case the fact that a line makes nonsense does not necessarily betray the hand of a Christian. The third reason is more weighty: it is that in the Jewish writings of this period no analogy can be found to the doctrine of the cosmical power of the devil. Yet it does not prove that the doctrine is "incontestably a Christian addition." For the Wisdom of Solomon is in some respects a unique book, and in the absence of general grounds (such as exist, for instance, in the case of the Book of Enoch and Fourth Ezra)

* ii. 23, 24.

† *Gesch. der Jud.*, III. p. 444.

for doubting the genuineness of its text, we are not justified in rejecting a statement simply on account of its singularity. Moreover, we must not forget that the story of the fallen angels, and their malignant interference in the affairs of men, is not foreign to the Jewish apocalyptic literature, and that the belief in demoniacal possession was not due to the inventive skill of Christians. If it be said that these are not examples of the "cosmical power" of the devil, we may reply that no cosmical power is attributed to him in the present passage. A single event is referred to, the entrance of death into the world, that is, the first instance of its occurrence, which was due, as related in Genesis, to the seductive influence of the serpent. Our author's departure from the general view, therefore, does not extend beyond his recognition of the devil as the real agent in the temptation of Eve. As this transaction was in itself temporary and local, the verse does not necessarily present the devil as a cosmical power. Though the leader in the world of evil, he still may be only one of the great host of the fallen; and we go beyond the evidence when we infer that the author based his philosophy on any more fearful dualism, one more deeply grounded in the eternal nature of things, than that which he has already admitted in the antithesis of God and man. On this point we must be content to allow his opinions to remain in the obscurity in which he has left them.

In these remarks we have assumed that by *διάβολος* the devil is meant. Dähne, however, basing his judgment on the fact that the introduction of an evil principle in opposition to the divine is foreign to pure Alexandrianism, believes that this word is merely a name for the serpent, which is so called on account of its character of tempter. He then applies to the serpent Philo's interpretation, and understands by it that evil pleasure which, by its seductions, alienates man from God.* To this explanation of the passage there are some serious

* II. p. 172, Anm. 100.

objections. There is nothing whatever in the words themselves to suggest it; and if it be correct it would almost seem as if the writer had deliberately spread a mist before the eyes of his readers. If he meant pleasure, why did he choose such a misleading word as devil, and thus produce a double obscurity, devil requiring to be translated into serpent, and serpent, in its turn, waiting to be allegorized into pleasure? The mention of envy increases the difficulty, for envy is a personal attribute, and not likely to be selected as pleasure's characteristic mark. On the other hand, there is nothing to recommend Dähne's interpretation except the assumed necessity of reconciling the Wisdom of Solomon with the writings of Philo. But the adoption of the latter as the norm for the whole of the Jewish-Alexandrian literature is not warranted by any facts, either known or probable, and the method, pursued alike by Gfrörer and Dähne, of first giving a complete account of Philo's philosophy and then hunting for pieces of that philosophy in the remaining literature, not only hides the genetic development of thought, but is liable to derange the judgment of the historical critic. In the present instance it seems most probable that at first the serpent was regarded as a satanic agent, or allegorized into the devil, and then, when the system of allegory was more advanced, and philosophy had declared itself against the domination of fiendish powers, it was taken as the symbol of the impersonal principle of evil which was found in pleasure. It is thus that a tendency of thought gradually eliminates inconsistent elements, and arrives at its own logical results. For these reasons I must adhere to the interpretation previously given.

From the whole of the foregoing exposition it is apparent that our author did not regard God as either unknowable or unknown. The sources from which our knowledge of him is derived are two. In the first place, the external universe reveals him with such distinctness as to leave men without excuse when they fail to discover its Creator and Lord. But

it necessarily reveals him only in his relation to itself. By the mere fact of its phenomenal character it points, as we have seen, to an eternal artificer; the greatness and beauty which are manifest in the splendid objects of the earth and the heaven imply the existence of a Primal Source who is greater and more beautiful than they; and the cosmic force and energy which strike us with amazement are indications of One who is more powerful than all.* Beyond this no claim is made on behalf of nature. It discloses the existence of God and the presence of those attributes which are apprehensible by the intellect, but when we inquire into the mind and will of God we must seek a different source of illumination. These might well seem to be altogether beyond the range of human faculties, which are barely adequate to the apprehension even of earthly things, and they would be really so unless God bestowed wisdom and sent his Holy Spirit from on high. He thus reveals himself no longer through outward nature, but through the spiritual faculties within, and, accordingly, this higher form of revelation depends on moral purity as its condition. Perverse thoughts separate from God, and wisdom will not enter a soul that practises evil arts, but the Lord is found by those who tempt him not, and manifests himself to those who do not disobey him.†

In the doctrine thus presented the incomprehensibility of God is surely much less prominent a feature than his self-revelation. Nevertheless, we may readily concede to Gfrörer that our author did not entertain the opinion that, even with the help of the Holy Spirit, a man could completely and perfectly see through the divine essence;‡ for the most fanatical presumption could hardly make so preposterous a claim. But when he adds that the writer shared the fundamental Alexandrian doctrine of the hidden God it is not so easy to assent. The views of Pseudo-Solomon upon this point do not bear the mark of any particular philosophical system,

* xiii. 1-9.

† i. 2-4, ix. 13-17.

‡ II. p. 215.

and the little that he says about the difficulty of understanding the divine purposes does not go at all beyond the doctrine of the Old Testament, or, indeed, exceed the language of natural and universal piety.

We may hazard a similar remark in reference to the doctrine of God's transcendence above the world. This, as we have seen, is plainly asserted, but it is asserted in such a way as not to preclude the immediate action of God, both in nature and in man. That the divine throne was in heaven is an old Hebrew conception, and our author accepts it without attempting any philosophical explanation, or representing God as exalted above all possible contact with the phenomenal world. Indeed, so little is he affected by what are commonly regarded as essential Alexandrian ideas on this subject that he freely employs anthropomorphic expressions. The Lord will laugh at the wicked.* The righteous shall receive the diadem of beauty from his hand and be shielded by his right hand and his arm.† We and our words are in his hand;‡ his hand fights on behalf of the righteous;§ his all-powerful hand created the cosmos;|| and by his hand the migrating Israelites were sheltered.¶ None can resist the might of his arm;** his hand it is impossible to escape, and by the strength of his arm the wicked were chastised.†† Had the author been moved by a philosophical dread of anthropomorphism and held a developed doctrine of intermediate agents, we should have heard, not of the hand and arm of God, but of his beneficent and punitive powers, and it remains a singular feature of this work, that its doctrine of God, though not without suggesting one or two lines of transition, yet gives us so little preparation for the important part which is ascribed to wisdom in the creation and government of the world.

But before we enter upon this topic, we must notice the writer's anthropology.

* iv. 18.

† v. 16.

‡ vii. 16.

§ x. 20.

|| xi. 17.

¶ xix. 8.

** xi. 21.

†† xvi. 15, 16.

Man possesses the dual constitution of soul and body.* The soul,† as the vital and intellectual principle, embraces the whole of his higher nature, and is, therefore, used interchangeably with mind‡ and spirit.§ Only from one passage would it be possible to infer a threefold division.|| Here the “active soul” and the “vital spirit” are both referred to as breathed in by God; but as the two expressions occur in parallel clauses, we may fairly interpret them in the light of the opinion already stated, and regard soul and spirit as two names for the same thing. The distinction will then lie in the functions of the soul as represented by the two epithets, the one referring only to the animating principle, the other to the powers of thought and will.¶ This might prepare the way for a more elaborate distribution of human faculties; but beyond this the author does not proceed.

Agreeably to the mode of conception which we find still farther developed in Philo, the pre-existence of the soul is not obscurely taught. “I was a boy of good disposition,” says the writer, “and obtained a good soul; nay rather, being good, I came into an unpolluted body.”** This passage has, indeed, received interpretations which relieved it from the burden of what seemed to Christian commentators an obnoxious doctrine, but these interpretations are, for the most part, influenced by dogmatic requirements and offer violence to the plain meaning of the words.†† Coming into the body can refer only to the time when the union of body and soul took place; and if entering an undefiled body is the result of personal goodness, that goodness must have been manifested in a previous state of existence. This clear statement is introduced as a correction of the more ambiguous clause immediately preceding; but I am not sure that the nature of the correction is always rightly understood. Saying that “I

* i. 4, viii. 19, 20, ix. 15.

† *Ψυχή*.

‡ *Noûς*, ix. 15.

§ *Πνεῦμα*, ii. 3, xvi. 14, and xv. 16, compared with xv. 8.

xv. 11.

¶ See Grimm *in loco*. ** viii. 19, 20. †† See them referred to in Grimm.

obtained a good soul" is not inconsistent with the doctrine of pre-existence; strictly construed it would rather seem to imply it. But the writer here speaks as though his personality were distinct from the soul, and belonged only to the compound human organism. This is the point of view which he wishes to alter. The body is no part of the personality, but only a temporary dwelling which the soul, the real person, enters and quits. It is not correct, therefore, to say that I *obtained* a soul; I *am* a soul, and came into a body without any change of my identity. But, though its connection with the body is then only a transient phase of the soul's existence, yet the dwelling ought to be worthy of the tenant. It is implied by the statement before us that souls, prior to their entrance upon their earthly life, might be divided into good and bad, and that the quality of the bodies which they obtained was dependent on their moral condition. If an undefiled body, one not swayed by brutal passions, was assigned to a good soul, by parity of reasoning a corrupt soul must have obtained a body fitted to express and intensify its worst proclivities. Hence is justified the suggestion which was made above in regard to hereditary sin.

Gfrörer, while admitting without hesitation that the doctrine of the pre-existence of souls is here taught, yet finds a contradiction of that doctrine in the passage already referred to, where it is said that God breathed into man an active soul.* This statement, he says, pre-supposes a literal interpretation of Genesis ii. 7, according to which the first man became a living soul through the divine breath; and, accordingly, the writer's philosophy and his faith in revelation are allowed to stand in unreconciled antagonism. I have no doubt that Gfrörer is correct both in assuming a reference to Genesis and in his interpretation of the words which there occur, but it is not so easy to allow that a thoughtful writer, such as our author shows himself to be, can flatly contradict himself

within the limits of a small work. It is more likely that he had his own explanation of Genesis, and by the divine breathing understood simply that exertion of power by which the soul was brought into union with the body.

This view of the soul naturally carries with it the doctrine that the body, instead of being the expressive organ of the spirit, is a burden and a hindrance. If the reasoning faculties would soar and endeavour to understand the counsel of God, they are prone to fall, "for a corruptible body burdens the soul, and the earthy tabernacle weighs down the thoughtful mind."* Here the body is not represented as the active source of sin, but only as a passive check upon the higher aspirations. It is the "muddy vesture of decay" which grossly closes us in and prevents us from hearing the celestial harmonies, but not yet the fierce enemy which lusts against the spirit. Indeed, in the domain of morals it is regarded as sharing the ethical quality of the soul, and we hear nothing of sin warring in the members while the inward and real man delights in the law of God. "Wisdom will not enter a soul of evil artifice, nor dwell in a body pledged to sin."† This statement can hardly prove, as Gfrörer alleges,‡ that the body was looked upon as "a source of sin," but only recognizes the undeniable fact that there are propensities to which the body may be sinfully devoted. Would philosophers of any school refuse to apply the language of Pseudo-Solomon to the bloated bulk or the trembling hand of the glutton or the drunkard? On the other hand, we have already seen that a good soul has an unpolluted body, and when we place these passages side by side it seems a proper inference that the soul's tenement is in itself morally neutral, but reflects the hues of virtue or of guilt which belong to the animating spirit. Nor is this inference set aside by the prayer for self-mastery as the fundamental condition of all excellence,§ for, even if we concede to Gfrörer that this self-mastery relates to the control of the fleshly desires, yet

* ix, 13-15.

† i. 4

‡ P. 240.

§ viii, 21.

the sin may reside, not in the desires, but in their unrestrained indulgence. We need not go to Alexandria to learn that the sensualist is not on the high road to celestial wisdom, and we must not note as characteristic of a school what is really a commonplace of universal morality. The tendency to depreciate the body as a clog upon the ethereal flight of the spirit has clearly begun, but man is not yet bound to a corpse, nor an agonized cry for redemption wrung from the imprisoned soul.

But notwithstanding the burden of his corporeal nature, man was created in the image of God, and intended to share the incorruptibility of the divine essence.* From this glorious destiny he fell through sin, which "brought death into the world and all our woe."† How far the fall consisted of a universal deterioration of human nature, derived from the primitive transgression of Adam, is not very clearly defined. That death in the physical sense happened to all men was an obvious fact, and that it was supposed to be transmitted by inheritance from the first offender may be gathered from the words, "I also am a mortal man, like all, and a descendant of the earthborn who was first formed."‡ But there is no evidence that a similar view was held in regard to sin. The possibility of righteousness, and personal responsibility for wrong-doing, are invariably assumed; and the singling out of the Canaanites as a tribe sprung from an evil root marks them as an exception to the general condition of our race. The fratricidal wrath of Cain is attributed to his own departure from wisdom, and is contrasted with the reinstated purity of Adam.§ In the same passage it is said that wisdom "preserved the first-formed father of the cosmos, when created alone, and rescued him from his own transgression, and gave him strength to rule all things." Dähne|| thinks that "his own transgression"¶ undoubtedly refers, in accordance with

* ii. 23.

§ x. 1-3.

† See i. 13-16, ii. 21-24.

|| P. 168.

‡ vii. 1.

¶ Παράπτωμα ἴδιον.

Alexandrian theory, to the fall “peculiar to man as such,” by which, though a pure spirit, he united himself with the earthly. This explanation, however, is far-fetched, for there is nothing whatever in the context to suggest it. The epithet “own,” moreover, seems to limit the transgression to Adam himself, instead of extending it into the peculiarity of the genus. We must therefore understand the words in their most natural sense, as an allusion to the well-known story of the fall; and we then learn that, in the writer’s view, the fall was not irremediable, but with the help of wisdom Adam still retained his supremacy among created things.* Nor was this an exceptional act of mercy. The divine purpose towards the human race was not abrogated through the disobedience of its progenitor. God designed man to rule over his creatures, to “administer the world in holiness and righteousness, and exercise judgment in uprightness of soul”;† and it is certainly implied that it was each man’s own fault if he failed to rise to the greatness of his destiny. This open possibility of noble achievement is not inconsistent with a certain measure of natural infirmity and downward tendency; but whatever disability held man back from the attainment of his ideal was due, as we have seen, to his bodily constitution, and not to an inherited taint of sin. Our author fully admits the weakness of human resolve, and, while making each man accountable for his own wrong-doing, does not overlook the need of divine help. He declares that it is only through the gift of God, bestowed in answer to prayer, that he can master his lower impulses, and reach the highest life.‡ He is thus led to rely not on a perfection of obedience which is impossible to the unsanctified heart, but on a wisdom which is not inherent in the human mind, but found only in communion with God. It

* See variations of Dähne’s opinion in Grimm. I need only refer to Gfrörer’s singular notion that *μόνον κτισθέντα* proves the writer’s acquaintance with the opinion that the primitive man united both sexes in his own person. P. 241.

† ix. 2, 3.

‡ viii. 21.

is through this that men learn what is pleasing to God, through this that their works become acceptable to him, and by wisdom they are saved.*

The possessor of this wisdom is the "wise"† or (more usually) the "righteous" man;‡ and so essential is it to real goodness that even if some one were perfect among the sons of men, yet in the absence of wisdom from God he would be esteemed as nothing.§ It therefore belongs to a circle of ideas which seem, in the writer's view, to be practically interchangeable, and which, as subsisting only in the divine realm, naturally conduct the thoughts to immortality. "Immortality is in the relationship of wisdom,"|| that is to say, in the affinity contracted with wisdom by receiving it into the mind. Wisdom, regarded as a form of apprehension, becomes equivalent to the knowledge of God, and hence we read, "To be acquainted with thee is complete righteousness, and to know thy might is the root of immortality."¶ Here the spiritual intuitions blend into one with moral excellence, showing that the latter was regarded as something inward. Thus in its ethical aspect wisdom is synonymous with righteousness. "Righteousness is immortal,"** and accordingly cannot be reduced to a perishing attribute of individual men, but must be, like wisdom, an eternal principle, in which men may in various measures participate.

The unity of the moral life, which is found in this lofty principle, breaks itself up in practice into a plurality of virtues. Wisdom "teaches temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude."†† Beyond this accepted philosophical classification the author only casually strays, for it is no part of his task to delineate the varieties of human duty. The necessity for piety as the supreme virtue, on which all others depend, is assumed

* vii. 7, ix. 12, 18.

† *Δίκαιος*, ii. 10, 12, 18, iii. 1, 10, iv. 7, 16, &c.

§ ix. 6.

¶ xv. 3.

** i. 15.

† iv. 17.

|| viii. 17.

†† viii. 7.

throughout the work. Indeed, although the subject is not elaborated, this would seem to be the point where human responsibility centres. If no virtue can be attained except through prayer, and if men are nevertheless accountable, we must suppose that life with God is the normal condition, from which men depart only through sin, while their fidelity to it is simply the acceptance of a gift universally offered. In accordance with this view mere ignorance of God is treated as an unpardonable offence,* and idolatry as "the beginning and cause and end of all evil."† Contrasted with this primal apostasy is trust in God,‡ which leads to an abiding in him, and an understanding of truth; and if it is said conversely that the "grace of faith" will be conferred on him who has not offended in deed or word, this can only illustrate the principle that to him that hath shall be given.§ Nor does the writer overlook the kindred excellence of love to God,|| and that love of wisdom which carries with it the observance of her laws,¶ while the duty of benevolence towards man is enforced by appeal to the divine example.**

We have previously observed that the love of God is extended to all men, but that nevertheless it varies in quality according to the desert of the object towards which it is directed. The righteous are pleasing to God, and are loved by him,†† while the wicked, though dealt with patiently and judged equitably, incur the divine hatred by their evil deeds.‡‡ Towards the one class God acts as an "admonishing father," towards the other as a "severe king."§§ This is a distinction universal in its character, and founded on no national or theological peculiarity. It is one which reappears among every people and at all times, and seems quite opposed to the exclusive pretensions of a chosen race. It did not, however, so present

* xiii. 1-9, xiv. 22, and see xvi. 16, xii. 27.

† xiv. 27. See the whole passage.

‡ xii. 2, xvi. 24, 26.

§ See iii. 9 and 14.

|| iii. 9.

¶ vi. 19.

** xii. 19, 22.

†† iv. 10.

‡‡ xii. 2 sqq.

§§ xi. 10.

itself to the mind of our author. To him the Israelites, and they alone, are the people of God,* “a holy people and blameless seed.”† They are collectively the “son of God,”‡ individually his “sons,” or, in fuller phrase, his “sons and daughters.”§ They are his “holy” and “elect,”|| and their land is “the most honoured of all” in the eyes of God.¶ Now, the question arises, did this position contradict the author’s ethical universalism, and did he hold two incompatible ideas in his mind without being aware of their incongruity? I think not; and if we remember how different his circumstances were from ours, we can understand the possibility of his entertaining in combination what seem to us incompatible beliefs. As a simple matter of fact, a tremendous moral chasm seemed to separate the Jewish and Gentile worlds. Fidelity to the only true God was the highest virtue; idolatry was the sum of all iniquities. The pages of Scripture told how the Israelites had been always surrounded by worshippers of idols, and how children had been immolated in their dreadful and unnatural rites; and still the Egyptian was doing homage to beasts, and the Greek degrading himself with foul mysteries and bacchanalian revels, while the splendid capital of the Ptolemies applauded and neglected the precepts of morality, and darkened under the shade of adultery and murder, of theft and perjury.** In the presence of this contrast with the lofty doctrine and the pure ideal of life which shone in the “uncorrupted light of the law,”†† and which had been glorified by national struggles and martyr-deaths, the fact that the Israelites were the chosen people of God seemed to rest, not

* ix. 7, xii. 19, xvi. 2, xviii. 7, xix. 5, 22.

† x. 15.

‡ xviii. 13.

§ The last expression ix. 7; *υιοί*, xii. 19, 21, xvi. 10, 26, xviii. 4. See also ii. 18, v. 5; *παῖδες*, xii. 7, 20, xix. 6.

¶ x. 17, xviii. 1, 5, iii. 9, iv. 15. In the last two passages the limitation is not marked, but we must interpret them agreeably to the clear statements which are made elsewhere.

¶ xii. 7.

** See the description of the results of idolatry, xiv. 12, 22 sqq. †† xviii. 4.

on anything arbitrary or capricious, but on a grand moral and spiritual distinction. This actual coincidence, therefore, between the presumed election of God and the ethical appearances of the world, as they presented themselves to the eye of the writer, will go far towards explaining his position. It does not, however, exhaust the difficulty of the problem, for how came the ethical facts to distribute themselves in so strange a manner? Although no precise answer is given to this question, the author's views may be gathered with sufficient distinctness. The Israelites as a nation were placed in a category by themselves in consequence of the oaths and covenants given by God to the fathers of the race.* On what ground the original covenant was made, whether purely for the fulfilment of the divine purpose in controlling the history of the world, or in part as a response to patriarchal faithfulness, is not discussed. But the promise of blessings having once been given, a greater tenderness of providential care guided the destinies of the Hebrews, and the punishments which they needed were of a gentler and more disciplinary character.† We must observe, moreover, that the land of Canaan enjoys the divine preference quite apart from the virtue of its inhabitants, and the Israelites are brought into it in order that it may receive a worthy population.‡ It is evident, therefore, that our author did not conceive the administration of the world as regulated solely in accordance with the moral deserts of men, but believed that some great plan was in course of fulfilment, which, however it might be modified by human unfaithfulness, had its source entirely within the supreme Will.

This fact, however, could not diminish the guilt of idolatry and its attendant sins. If one nation was sedulously preserved from such apostasy, there is no intimation that the rest were

* xii. 21, xviii. 6.

† xii. 20-22, and generally the whole account of the early history of the Israelites in the later part of the book.

‡ xii. 7.

driven into it. It did not exist from the beginning ;* and far from representing the normal life of man, it marked a gradual decline, from the first misplacement of the heart's highest affection down to the most loathsome aberrations of vice. The supposed origin of idolatry is traced, agreeably to the speculations of Euhemerus, with remarkable delicacy, and discovers the hand of one who knew that sin did not enter the soul in the fulness of its repulsive deformity, but insinuated itself through faults akin to virtue. A father pining in untimely grief for a child snatched from his embrace made an image of the dead, and, bestowing on it too fond an honour, instituted rites that were due only to God. From custom the impious practice passed into law ; and the evil was aggravated when subjects began, through flattery, to worship the images of their distant rulers, while ambitious artists provided additional attraction for the foolish crowd by the beauty of their workmanship. From this time the descent was rapid into all the abominations of heathenism.† But the Gentiles were not abandoned for ever to the evil which they had chosen. The mercy of God sought to lead them to repentance.‡ Idolatry was not to last for ever, but sprung as it was from the empty thoughts of men it was doomed to a speedy end.§ We must, therefore, conclude that our author regarded the election of the Israelites as only part of a more universal plan. They had been chosen to keep alive a spark of divine truth, which should at last kindle into flame among all nations, and illumine the world with "the light of righteousness."||

It remains for us under this head to examine more in detail the doctrine of immortality, on which we have already touched. Our chief difficulty in treating of this subject arises from the ambiguity of some of the principal terms in which the doctrine is expressed. It will be remembered

* xiv. 13.

† xiv. 15 sqq.

‡ xi. 23.

§ xiv. 13, 14.

|| v. 6, simply for the expression.

that the writer, in his desire to connect the divine causality only with good, declares that God did not make death, but created man for incorruption,* and it was through envy of the devil that death entered into the world. What kind of death is here intended—spiritual or physical, or both? That the reference is to spiritual death—that is, to the loss of the soul's true and blessed life—may be inferred with some probability from the words which immediately precede the statement that God did not make death.† “A lying mouth,” it is said, “kills the soul,” an expression which is itself of doubtful import; but its meaning is determined by the succeeding exhortation not to strive after death, because God is not pleased with the destruction of the living,—as though death were so opposed to the divine purpose that it could be obtained only through a criminal zeal. Such language could not be used of our physical dissolution in a world where every plant withers and every animal restores his body to the dust. All doubt is removed by the added statement, that “righteousness is immortal”; for this antithesis will hold good only in the spiritual realm—the righteous, as our author confesses, dying to this world as surely and as easily as the wicked. The interpretation which is thus suggested by the passage itself is confirmed by expressions in other parts of the book. Immediately after the declaration that death entered the world through envy of the devil, the writer proceeds to deny the reality of death in the case of the righteous. It is only in the eyes of fools that they seem to die; in reality, “their souls are in the hand of God,” and “they are in peace.”‡ But in an altered connection, when simply physical death is referred to, the author abandons the restrictions which we have just noticed. In allusion to the plague which destroyed a number of the Israelites after the rebellion of Korah, it is said that “experience of death touched even righteous men” in the wilderness.§ Here, it is true, the

* Ἀφθαρσία

† i. 11-12.

‡ iii. 1-3.

§ xviii. 20.

form of expression seems to represent death as something exceptional in the experience of the righteous, and we might suppose that a hyperphysical death was still intended. But the context furnishes a different explanation. The perishing of men under the ravages of a plague can affect only the earthly life, and the exceptional character of this destruction of the righteous is found in its accomplishment by supernatural means in consequence of the divine displeasure. A more fearful desolation has just been described—Egypt's loss of her firstborn; and here the writer does not hesitate to attribute the calamity, if not immediately to God, yet to a divine agent, who executed his orders, and "filled all things with death."* In the same strain of thought Solomon is represented as saying in his address to the Deity: "Thou hast the power of life and death, and bringest down to the gates of Hades, and bringest up."† It is evident, therefore, that the death which entered the world through diabolical agency, and which men incur through their own voluntary sin, is something which affects the inner condition of the soul itself, and not that mere separation of soul and body which, in the case of the righteous, is a passage from mortality to life.

After death, in the ordinary sense, there will be a day of judgment, or, as it is variously called, "a day of distinguishing,"‡ "an examination,"§ an "inspection of souls,"|| a "reckoning of sins."¶ How this day of judgment was conceived we are not distinctly informed, and it seems as if the popular expectations were mingled with a more philosophical idea. At one time the souls of the righteous appear to pass at once into the highest condition of blessedness,** and again the righteous and the wicked are assembled to receive their final sentence, and the latter

* xviii. 16.

† xvi. 13.

‡ iii. 18.

§ i. 9.

|| iii. 13.

¶ iv. 20. The terms are *ἡμέρα διαγνώσεως, ἐξέτασις, ἐπισκοπὴ ψυχῶν, συλλογισμὸς ἁμαρτημάτων.*

** iii. 1 sqq.

are horrified at beholding the triumph of the good.* There is no hint of a bodily resurrection, and it is clearly implied that a spiritual immortality alone entered into the contemplation of the writer; and yet we are told, in reference to the future state, that the righteous "shall judge nations and rule over peoples, and the Lord shall reign over them for ever."† Grimm, indeed, supposes that in the latter passage there is an abrupt transition from the blessedness of the deceased righteous to the kindred subject of the future glory of Israel upon earth; and Gfrörer‡ infers that the righteous were expected to return to earth, not, of course, to resume their fleshly bodies, but to be clothed in bodies of light, and so be made capable of sharing in the worldly joys of the kingdom of God. Either of these explanations may be correct; but I think it is equally probable that the author allowed his language to be coloured by the vivid hues of popular conceptions, which, as a philosopher, he was inclined to reject. It is not uncommon for phrases, with transfigured meaning, to survive the theology from which they sprung.§

However this may be determined, there is no doubt that the righteous were to be richly rewarded. They were to bear a crown for having won in the contest for unpolluted prizes.|| They were to live for ever, and to receive the kingdom of comeliness and the diadem of beauty from the hand of the Lord. The zeal of God should be their panoply, and creation the armour of their defence against their enemies; righteousness should be their breast-plate, sincere judgment their helmet, and holiness their shield; and the universe would fight on their side against the wicked.¶ Here again the thoughts of the writer evidently stray to the ultimate victory of righteousness in the world; but the language

* iv. 20 sqq.

† iii. 8.

‡ P. 256 sqq.

§ In iv. 16, "the deceased righteous will condemn the living impious," Grimm is compelled to resort to an "*ideal* condemnation," the conduct of the righteous furnishing the standard of judgment.

|| iv. 2.

¶ v. 15 sqq.

is so highly figurative that it would be hazardous to fix upon him any defined eschatology. His deliberate convictions we may sum up in a single pregnant phrase, "Incorruption causes to be near to God."*

The wicked, on the other hand, must pay a penalty appropriate to their sin.† At the day of judgment they shall have neither hope nor consolation.‡ Not only will they have the vexation of seeing the triumph of the righteous whom they despised, and lamenting their own guilty blindness in choosing earthly things which leave not a trace of their fleeting joys behind them,§ but they shall be flung headlong in speechless woe, and become an object of scorn among the dead for ever.|| But as their saddest punishment they shall be received into a darkness whose image is found in the "heavy night" which once rested upon the land of Egypt.¶ Where the soul only is immortal we must understand this darkness figuratively. The unrighteous are "more grievous to themselves than darkness",** and the inevitable effect of sin is exclusion from the light of God. In this representation the continued existence of all men is clearly assumed, and we need do little more than mention the opinion of K. G. Bretschneider, that our author believed in the annihilation of the wicked. He founds his opinion on the fact that the death of the wicked is contrasted with the immortality of the righteous, and therefore cannot refer to bodily death, to which the righteous were no less exposed.†† But even if we had not the example of Philo to support us, we might fairly speak of the soul's death when we refer, not to its extinction, but to the forfeiture, through sin, of its highest and truest life.

We might suppose that the theory of the universe was now complete; and were our exposition to close at this

* vi. 20.

† iii. 10.

‡ iii. 18.

§ v. 1 sqq.

|| iv. 18, 19.

¶ xvii. 20.

** Ibid.

†† See his *Systematische Darstellung der Dogmatik und Moral der apocryphischen Schriften des A. T.*, Leipzig, 1805, pp. 308 sqq.

point, we should hardly be sensible of any chasm requiring to be filled, or any contrariety of view demanding reconciliation. Nevertheless, both in the physical and in the moral spheres certain questions present themselves, which lead by an easy transition to the doctrine of Wisdom: how was it that God, who was enthroned in the heavens, was yet omnipresent in the universe? What was that superhuman wisdom which was given to man in answer to prayer? In the solution of these questions there is a far closer union of Hebrew and Greek ideas than we have hitherto encountered; and we may, therefore, be the less surprised if the lines of thought are not traced with a steady hand, and the vagueness of conception endeavours to hide itself in the figurative language of poetry. The writer was evidently impressed by the Stoical theory of an all-penetrating divine principle, which appeared in the universe as a rational order, and in man as conscious reason; and he freely employs Stoical thoughts and expressions. But his inherited faith made it impossible for him to accept the pantheism of the Greek school; and accordingly his philosophy is an eclectic attempt to reconcile the dogma of a transcendent God, above and outside the universe, with the pantheistic conception of his immanence in nature and in man. For this purpose he availed himself not of the Stoical Logos, but of the Hebrew "Wisdom." In the noble description in Proverbs, written, as he must have believed, by that Solomon in whose person he spoke, he found the necessary materials ready to his hand, requiring only some allowable extension of thought, and the importation of philosophical terms.

Almost at the beginning of his work he explains the omnipresence of God by assuming the all-pervasive character of the divine Spirit. God, he says, is a witness of the reins and the heart, and a hearer of the tongue, "because the Spirit of the Lord has filled the universe, and that which holds all things together has knowledge of the voice."* Here "the

* i. 6, 7.

Spirit of the Lord" is evidently, in a certain sense, distinct from God himself. It is not the central personality, and does not comprise the essence of God, but is rather an extension of his being, which brings him into relation with the phenomenal world. Yet, on the other hand, it is equally apparent that the Spirit is not regarded as detached from God, so as to become a separate and subordinate person. It is not represented as a minister appointed to make inquisition into the sins of men, and report them to the supreme Ruler; but God himself is, through his Spirit, the witness of the heart, and it is implied that what is known to the latter is *ipso facto* known to the former. Perhaps this mode of conception will be more intelligible if we recollect that Spirit* properly means breath, or air, and that breath, in the minds of the ancients, was intimately associated with the vital principle. The divine Spirit was, as it were, the breath of God, diffused through space, bringing his energy to bear upon phenomena, and conveying the reaction of phenomena back into his consciousness.

But that which proceeds from the innermost being of the all-wise God, and holds together a cosmos, must be something more than an energy; it must be a rational and holy energy, and can be nothing less than the divine wisdom itself. Accordingly Spirit and Wisdom seem to be used by the author as different names for the same reality. Immediately before the passage to which we have just referred, it is said that "Wisdom will not enter a soul of evil devices for the Spirit of instruction is holy Wisdom is a Spirit that loves mankind," or, according to another reading which is strongly supported, "The *Spirit of Wisdom* is a lover of mankind."† It is added that Wisdom "will not leave a blasphemer unpunished, because God is witness of his reins"; and he is so, as we have seen, because his Spirit has filled the world. These phrases, occurring in such a connection of

* Πνεῦμα.

† i. 4-6.

thought, certainly point to the substantial identity of Wisdom with the Spirit of the Lord. Again, they seem to be used with strictly parallel meaning when the question is asked, "Who would know thy counsel, unless thou didst give Wisdom, and send thy Holy Spirit?"* Elsewhere, instead of the single word "Wisdom," we are told that the "Spirit of Wisdom" comes to man; but this phrase appears to be the precise equivalent of "understanding," which is used in the parallel clause of the same verse,† and once more in another passage it is Wisdom itself that is sent from heaven to be present with man.‡ The conclusion is forced upon us that "Wisdom" and the "Spirit of Wisdom" are interchangeable terms, and that the latter expression is therefore an instance of that genitive of apposition which, though rare in classical writers, is not infrequent in the Scriptures.§ Only one passage, in the received text, points to a distinction between them—"There is in her a Spirit"|| possessing a variety of attributes to which we shall presently recur. Here, however, a different reading—"She [Wisdom] is a Spirit,"¶ is strongly supported by Greek manuscripts and by the citation of Eusebius in his *Praeparatio Evangelii*.** On the other hand the common reading has the authority not only of several of the Greek manuscripts, but of the four versions;†† and both on this account and because it is decidedly the more difficult it is preferred by Grimm. If we allow it to stand, we need not stray beyond the limits of the passage itself in order to learn that the distinction is one of words rather than of reality; for a few lines farther down‡‡ "Wisdom" once more takes the place of the "Spirit" which is said to be "in it." We may, I think, account for the expression by supposing that the author, in the midst of his highly wrought description, conceived Wisdom so vividly under

* ix. 17.

† vii. 7.

‡ ix. 10.

§ For examples of this construction see Winer's *Grammatik*, 7th edition, 1867, p. 494-5.

|| Ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πνεῦμα, vii. 22.

¶ Αὐτή or αὐτή for ἐν αὐτῇ.

** XI. 14.

†† Latin, Syriac, Arabic, Armenian.

‡‡ vii. 24.

the form of human personality that he not unnaturally ascribed to it the possession of a spirit, although the latter, when philosophically considered, merged into its essence and became identical with it. We must remember, too, that the words denote different aspects of the same being, Wisdom indicating its moral and rational essence, while Spirit represents rather its capacity for external action and distribution.

The origin assigned to Wisdom completely answers to its identification with the Spirit of the Lord. "It is a vapour* of the power of God, and a pure emanation of the glory of the Omnipotent; therefore nothing polluted steals into it. For it is a reflection of eternal light; and a spotless mirror of the energy of God, and an image of his goodness."† It is evident that we are dealing in this passage with figures of speech, which serve only as symbols of the divine reality. In proof of this affirmation it is needless to appeal to the usage of later writers. The vapour, the mirror, and the reflection betray at once their metaphorical character, and there is no reason for supposing that our author identified God with light in any material sense. Indeed, as though to guard himself against the possibility of such misapprehension, he presently declares that Wisdom "is more comely than the sun, and above all the ordering of stars; compared with light she is found preferable, for this is succeeded by night, but against Wisdom evil has no power."‡ The latter words prove, if proof be needed, that we are viewing the spiritual under the veil of the physical. We must not, however, fail to notice the special appropriateness of the figure which is here employed. Light, as the great revealer of the universe, has passed into the common language

* Ἀτμός, referring, no doubt, to the vapour of the breath.

† vii. 25-6. Ἀπαύγασμα may be either the direct ray, or the reflection. The latter meaning seems preferable here owing to the close association of the word with *mirror* and *image*. Besides, to say that wisdom was a ray, and therefore an emanation, that is a ray, would be tautological; but to infer that it must be an emanation of the divine glory because we recognize it as a reflection of that glory, is correct reasoning. See the meaning of the word in Philo discussed by Grimm *in loco*.

‡ vii. 29, 30.

of mankind as the symbol of intellectual perception and knowledge, and owing to its exquisite beauty and purity, which no contact with the foulest objects can defile, it represents that holiness which preserves itself unstained in the midst of a corrupt world. Thus our author speaks of the "light of righteousness" and the "light of law."* But the Alexandrian thinkers availed themselves of this familiar image to illustrate their philosophy, and render apprehensible the relation between God, as existing in his own central glory, and his Spirit, as present throughout the world. The light which gladdens the earth, and, to all appearance, reaches with instantaneous flash from the eastern to the western horizon, visibly centres in one glowing sphere. This dazzling orb never touches the dull and troubled earth, but moves serenely in the far distance, and yet land and sea, river and desert, gleam beneath its burning rays. These rays are not itself; for it is in the heaven, while they are here, in the street, in the market, in the field, mingling with our most intimate life. Yet they are not distinct from it; for you cannot cut them off, and retain them when it is gone. They are therefore a solar energy, emanating from the focus of power, and, though exerting characteristic influences on every variety of object, never breaking loose into separate existence, or violating the indissoluble unity of their source. In some analogous way in the supersensible world, which can be described only through figures borrowed from the sensible, the Spirit emanates from God, and exhibits to the reason of man the impress of Wisdom in every part of creation; yet this ray, streaming from the divine glory, and reflected in material things, is inseparable from God, and were it possible to imagine him withdrawn, the Spirit would vanish at the same instant, and the cosmos relapse into chaos.

"Should He hide his face, the astonished sun,
And all the extinguished stars, would loosening reel
Wide from their spheres, and chaos come again."

* V. 6, xviii. 4.

The attributes of Wisdom are conceived in accordance with this analogy. They are enumerated in a long list; and as they amount to exactly twenty-one, their number is probably not accidental, but deliberately adopted as the product of the two sacred numbers, 3 and 7. "There is in her," it is said, "a spirit intelligent,* holy, only-begotten, manifold, rare,† mobile, piercing,‡ undefiled, clear,§ incapable of harm,|| loving the good, sharp, unimpeded, beneficent, philanthropic, firm,¶ un-failing,** free from care, all-powerful, all-surveying, proceeding through all intelligent, pure, most rare spirits."†† A few of the more important attributes are taken up, and further dwelt upon, in the succeeding verses. The mobility of Wisdom, and its sharp, irresistible penetration, are thus described: "Wisdom is a thing more movable than all motion, and permeates and proceeds through all things on account of its purity."‡‡ The Stoical character of the latter clause will be at once recognized; the former expresses the inconceivable rapidity of Wisdom, which baffles all our measures of movement, a notion suggested, as the context shows, by the apparently instantaneous transit of light, but perhaps also deriving support from the mysterious nature of thought, which can transfer itself in a moment to the most distant scenes. The epithets, "only-begotten" and "manifold,"§§ also receive some additional explanation. These are two contrasted terms, and must be considered in relation to one another. The former expresses that unity which, through the necessity of thought, we ascribe to wisdom. We cannot rationally speak of two or

* Νοερόν. Cf. the πνεῦμα νοερόν of the Stoics. See p. 87

† Λεπτόν. Cf. Anaxagoras's description of the cosmical νοῦς as λεπτότατον τε πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρότατον. See p. 49.

‡ Τρανόν, either penetrating, or clear in character and understanding. The former seems most suitable as an extension of the idea of mobility.

§ Σαφές, pure like light, or perspicuous in thought. The former best suits its position between two words of kindred meaning.

|| Ἀήμαντον, which may be either active or passive.

¶ Unchangeable.

** Certain in its operations.

†† vii. 22-3.

‡‡ vii. 24.

§§ Μονογενές, πολυμέρες.

more wisdoms, but only of one; and therefore, considered ontologically, it must be a single essence, "only-begotten," and not one of several similar emanations. Nevertheless in this unity it must be "manifold" as its modes of action are various. Whether we view the stately order of the heavens, or turn our gaze upon the earth, and notice the countless tribes of animals, the lavish bounty of garden and field, the periodic overflow of the mighty river, or the submissive retreat of the threatening tide, everywhere we meet with perpetual variety, yet everywhere, through this diversity of manifestation, the same Wisdom shines, revealing, in what else would appear a multitudinous struggle of anarchic violence, the ideal unity of a cosmos. Thus it is that Wisdom, "being one, possesses all power, and, remaining in herself, renews all things."*

After this enumeration of attributes, it is not surprising that Wisdom is spoken of, whether literally or poetically, as a distinct person. She is the "Assessor" of God's throne;† and, as such, "the Lord of all loved her; for she is initiated into the knowledge of God, and a chooser of his works."‡ Her participation in the divine knowledge is due to her intimate association with God. She knows his works, and is acquainted with what is pleasing in his eyes, because she is with him,§ and was present|| when he made the cosmos.¶ This presence need not imply that Wisdom was a mere spectator, while God fashioned the universe without her help, but rather refers to her character of assessor, according to which she would share in the divine counsels, and see to the execution of the divine commands, so that it is not contradictory to that more active operation which, as we shall see, is elsewhere

* *Μία δὲ οὐσα πάντα ἑνεται, καὶ μένουσα ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ πάντα καινίζει*, vii. 27.

† ix. 4, *τὴν τῶν σῶν θρόνων πάρεδρον σοφίαν*. Cf. Pindar, *Διὸς ξενίου πάρεδρος ἀσκήται* *Θέμις* (Olymp. viii. 21-2); and Sophocles, *Δίκη ξύνεδρος Ζηνός* (Ed. Col. 1384).

‡ viii. 3, 4.

§ *Μετὰ σοῦ*.

|| *Παρούσα*.

¶ ix. 9.

ascribed to her.* But, as befits an assistant, she is at the absolute disposal of God. He is "the Guide of Wisdom," and "in his hand . . . is all understanding."† It is he who gives her,‡ and sends her forth from the holy heavens to be present with men.§

We must bear this subordination in mind while we farther trace her relation to the universe and to man. She is "the artificer of all things,"|| and her activity in the universe never ceases. As we have seen, the Spirit of the Lord has filled the world, and holds all things together; and it is the presence of this "incorruptible Spirit in all things,"¶ that attracts towards them the divine love and compassion.** As an all-permeating principle†† Wisdom still "effects all things;"‡‡ "she extends mightily from end to end, and administers all things well."§§ If these expressions stood alone, we should be obliged to regard Wisdom as the creator and governor of the world, and assign to her, without further question, all the attributes of personality. But in respect to the cardinal points precisely the same language is used of God. He made the world.|||| He is its artificer,¶¶ and "administers*** all things."††† It is clear, therefore, that Wisdom exercises not a primary, nor even a delegated, but simply an instrumental agency, and that all her activity is in reality the activity of God. This result is in exact accordance with the doctrine that Wisdom is an inseparable emanation of the divine essence; and we cannot doubt that the author expresses his precise conviction when he says that God made all things by his word, and prepared man by his wisdom‡‡‡—a position which at once reconciles statements that are contradictory only in appearance.

In considering the anthropology of this book we have

* Heinze insists that in any case there is a clear contradiction; p. 197.

† vii. 15, 16.

‡ ix. 17.

§ ix. 10.

|| Πάντων τεχνίτης, vii. 21; cf. viii. 6.

¶ Πασι is ambiguous. The context, I think, shows it to be neuter, though at the same time men are the foremost objects in the writer's thought.

** xi. 24—xii. 1.

†† vii. 24.

‡‡ viii. 5.

§§ viii. 1.

|||| ix. 9, xi. 24. ¶¶ Τεχνίτης, xiii. 1. *** Διεικδν. ††† xv. 1. ‡‡‡ ix. 1, 2.

noticed the most essential points in the general relations of Wisdom to mankind, and we need not repeat what was then said; nor need we dwell upon the praises which the author lavishes upon Wisdom as “brilliant and unfading,”* as sitting near the doors of him who rises early that he may find her,† and wandering about in search of those who are worthy of her,‡ as the bestower of untold wealth,§ and as conferring, through the accomplishments with which she endows her votaries, the highest honour and power, and immortal reputation even in this world;|| for these eulogies belong rather to the domain of edification than of speculative thought. It is, however, important to observe that in addition to the universal relation in which Wisdom stands towards men, she also enters into a special historical connection with them, and has chosen organs of her higher manifestations. “From generation to generation, passing into holy souls, she prepares friends of God and prophets.”¶ It might be inferred from this statement that our author did not limit prophetic inspiration to a glorious past, and believe that the present had only the cold reflection of a wisdom which had long set; and this position would accord with the whole genius of his work. But as, in this passage, he is speaking expressly in the person of Solomon, the inference is hardly a safe one, and he may refer only to the ancient prophets, whose works had already been collected into a sacred canon. At all events, it is among the heroes of primeval history, and in the early dawn of Israel’s nationality, that he seeks for examples to illustrate the redeeming power of Wisdom. It was she who rescued the first-formed father of the world from his transgression, and saved the deluged earth, by means of paltry timber steering the righteous man. It was she, too, that amid the confusion of the nations, harmonious only in wickedness, knew the righteous [Abraham], and kept him blameless

* vi. 13; cf. vii. 10.

§ vii. 11, 13, 14, viii. 5.

† vi. 15.

|| viii. 8 sqq.

‡ vi. 17.

¶ vii. 27.

before God. She delivered a righteous man [Lot] when he fled from the descending fire of the Pentapolis, and guided in straight paths a righteous fugitive from his brother's wrath; nor did she abandon a righteous man when sold, but went down with him into a pit, and in his fetters did not leave him, till she brought him the sceptre of a kingdom. She entered into the soul of a servant of the Lord, and opposed terrible kings with wonders and signs. She led a holy people by a marvellous way, and became to them a shelter by day and a flame of stars by night. She brought them through the Red Sea, and drowned their enemies, and opened the mouth of the dumb to hymn their thanks to the holy name of God.* At this point the eulogy of Wisdom comes to an end, and in the sequel the providential care of the Israelities is for the most part assigned to the agency of God. The ascription of so prominent a part to Wisdom in directing the early fortunes of mankind is apparently founded on the general principle that the righteous must be under the special protection of that power which is the source of righteousness; and there is no indication of the writer's having based his view on any supposed evidence in the scriptural narratives. Nevertheless we cannot help tracing here the germ of that theory which found the presence of the Logos in so many passages of the Old Testament, and which, having applied the philosophical conception to unlock their difficulties, then reversed the process, and treated the passages as the fountain and proof of the philosophy. Thus, as perhaps in other instances, the doctrine came first; the interpretation followed in its wake.

One or two questions, to which it is impossible to give an uncontroverted answer, are suggested by the foregoing exposition. Heinze raises the inquiry whether Wisdom is essentially separated from God, or is to be regarded as one of his attributes.† While he himself, on account of the poetical and unphilosophical character of the book, adopts the latter

* x.

† p. 198.

alternative, it seems to me that we cannot accept either. The question is framed in accordance with our modern conceptions, and not from the point of view of a philosophy, which, however difficult it may be for us to understand, was seriously held by ancient thinkers as an explanation of the universe. It is surely going beyond the due allowance to be made for poetical language to suppose that by all that the writer says about the presence of Wisdom in nature and in man he only meant that material things were wisely made, and that men, in their lower degree, were wise as well as God. It seems clear that he regarded Wisdom as a real essence, the attribute of nothing, though manifest in everything, and that he did not look, for instance, upon Solomon, Socrates, or Plato as each possessing his own separate quality which entitled him to be called a wise man, and would forthwith cease if his personal existence terminated, but as all participating in the same divine substance, which would be equally there though they were not. So neither was it a mere attribute of God; for an attribute could not, as a subtle and pervasive energy, hold the universe together, and reveal itself within the hearts of holy men. Yet, on the other hand, it was not essentially separated from God, but rather belonged inseparably to the divine essence, of which it was an extension or effluence. It was, if we may borrow the language of a later time, consubstantial with God, and so far from being a mere attribute, was itself, in its indivisible union with God, the seat of divine attributes. Heinze's view is partly based on the fact to which we have not failed to advert, that Wisdom is not required as the source of an activity which could not be ascribed to the perfect nature of God. But, as he himself observes, while in other respects the ideas of God and of Wisdom seem to coalesce, the all-permeating character of the latter is not ascribed to the former; and it was precisely at this point that we found the philosophical necessity for the doctrine. How is God to be brought into

omnipresent phenomenal relations? This question is solved by the doctrine which we have unfolded; but it is not solved if Wisdom be regarded either as an attribute or as an independent substance.

The solution thus arrived at immediately suggests a further inquiry. Did our author, still following the lead of the Stoics, assign a *material* nature to Wisdom or the Spirit? He attributes to it extension, mobility, rarity, which we are accustomed to consider as qualities of matter. Nevertheless his whole doctrine is opposed to the idea that Wisdom was any part of that "formless matter" of which the universe was originally made. God and matter stand over against one another, and the mediation is effected, not by any refined essence within the latter, but by a movement and emanation of the former. But a divine essence pervading matter, and manifesting itself in phenomena, is inconceivable apart from the specified attributes; and it would therefore seem that Wisdom was a self-adaptation of the inviolable spirituality of God to material conditions, an assumption of the necessary community of nature, in order to bring the infinite and eternal into those relations of space and time which are implied in the creation and government of the world of sense. But this assumption of extension and movement was not, I think, supposed to carry with it the notion of something corporeal; and I cannot agree with Heinze* that, if the author had clearly proposed to himself the question, he would have been obliged to decide against the immateriality of the "Spirit." In these remarks, however, we are only attempting to unveil a latent thought.

Even more obscure is the author's position in regard to the personality of Wisdom. Here there can be no doubt that we must make large allowance for the poetic adornment of his thought; and when he represents Wisdom as the assessor of God and present when he made the world, and as therefore

* P. 196.

knowing and understanding all things, placing her thus as an independent power by the side of the Supreme, we must limit the significance of these bold expressions by his more philosophical language. In the enumeration, however, of the attributes of Wisdom we must remember that intelligence and holiness are placed foremost in the list, and are not these the qualities of a person? Undoubtedly they are, and yet it would be hazardous to carry into this ancient book an inference which seems so plain to the common sense of our own day. Wisdom, as an object of thought, includes holiness and intelligence, and therefore, as real being, must be holy and intelligent; but it may possess these attributes, not as an individual person, but simply as an expression of the divine personality. It is only in this sense that it can be termed "all-powerful," for the writer can hardly have intended to recognize two omnipotent beings; but as "an emanation of the glory of the omnipotent," it necessarily carried with it the divine attributes, even as the rays from a glowing furnace carry with them light and heat. Thus its power was the divine power, its holiness the divine holiness; and I think we shall not go far astray if we venture to sum up our author's view on this point in the brief statement that Wisdom is personal, but not a person.

One other subject must engage a moment's attention before we part from this suggestive book. Three times the writer alludes to the Logos of God, and the question arises whether he in any degree anticipated Philo's use of the term. As we have seen, Wisdom takes the place which was occupied by the Logos in Greek philosophy, and subsequently in the Alexandrian speculation itself. Now, in the first passage where the word in question occurs, it is parallel with "wisdom," and might therefore be used only to vary the mode of expressing the same idea:—"God of our fathers and Lord of mercy, who didst make all things by thy word,* and prepare man by thy

* Ἐν λόγῳ σου.

wisdom.”* In judging of this passage, it may not be out of place to observe that the word Logos is used elsewhere in its sense of thought or the rational principle, and not of speech. The unbelievers are represented as saying, “the Logos is a spark in the movement of our heart, which being extinguished, the body will become ashes.”† From this application of the term in the case of man, it would be easy to proceed to its analogous application in the case of God, and to use it as the equivalent of the divine Reason or Wisdom. It is by no means certain, however, that the writer took this farther step; for his language here does not in itself transgress Old Testament usage, and in the absence of any precise identification of Wisdom and Logos, it is safest to take the latter in its familiar sense of the word or commandment of God. The same interpretation suits the second passage, where, in allusion to the suffering of the Israelites from the attacks of venomous serpents in the wilderness, it is said, “for it was neither herb nor emollient that cured them, but thy Logos, O Lord, which heals all things.”‡ This use of the word is exactly similar to that which we noticed in the Greek translation of the canonical books, and a close parallel is pointed out in Psalm cvi. 20, “He sent his word,§ and healed them.” In the remaining passage the Logos is boldly personified. The writer is describing the destruction of the first-born of Egypt, and his patriotic enthusiasm rouses him to his highest poetical flight:—“When tranquil silence folded all things, and night in her own swiftness was in the midst of her course, thy all-powerful Logos leaped from heaven, from royal thrones, a stern warrior, into the midst of the doomed land, bearing as a sharp sword thy sincere commandment, and, having taken his stand, filled all things with death; and he touched heaven, and walked

* ix. 1, 2.

† ii. 2, 3. Some commentators have understood the term here in the sense of speech; but how any unbeliever could have given such a definition of speech it is not easy to imagine. See Grimm.

‡ xvi. 12.

§ Λόγον.

upon earth.”* This appalling and relentless vengeance on the enemy reminds the author that even Israelites had tasted of punitive death in the wilderness; but in this case the destroyer stayed his hand, awed by the intercession and the mystic dress of Aaron. The connection renders it probable that the “destroyer” is still the Logos, and the more so as the term is borrowed, not from the narrative in Numbers, in connection with which it is used, but from the account in Exodus† of the destruction of the first-born.‡ In both instances, however, it is perfectly clear that we are dealing with poetry, and not with philosophy; and any inference respecting the writer’s metaphysics, drawn from such a passage, must be extremely precarious. Nevertheless it is frequently inferred from the resemblance between the description which is here given of the Logos and that of the destroying angel in 1 Chronicles xxi. 16,§ that our author must have intended more than a poetical personification. I am unable to recognize the validity of this conclusion. Even if it were certain that the writer had in his mind the narrative in Chronicles, he yet may have borrowed from it a suggestion to embellish his poetry without intending to commit himself to the identification of the Logos in Egypt with the angel in Jerusalem. If we go so far, we must go much farther, and assent to the opinion of Gfrörer|| that, by the recognition of a superior being, endowed with divine attributes (such as omnipotence), the Logos-doctrine which we find in Philo is completely introduced. But this opinion leads naturally to the identity of the Logos and Wisdom; for if they were regarded as two co-equal divine beings, it is difficult to explain the marked inequality in the treatment which they receive. Gfrörer himself admits that this last step would carry us beyond the evidence; and

* xviii. 14-16.

† xii. 23.

‡ This circumstance is noticed by Gfrörer, p. 236.

§ “David . . . saw the angel of the Lord stand between the earth and the heaven, having a drawn sword in his hand stretched out over Jerusalem.”

|| P. 236.

therefore I think we must retrace our path, and rest in the conclusion that the Logos is a poetical personification of the word of God in the sense which is met so frequently in the writings of the Old Testament.

It cannot, however, be denied that the way is now prepared for Philo's doctrine of the Logos. When we remember that this term in its sense of "the word" denotes, not anything that may happen to be spoken, but always an expression of reason, we see how natural it is to place it side by side with Wisdom, from which it flows as from a fountain. This association, being once established, would tend towards a cohesion verging into identity; and hence the metaphysical conceptions which had already clustered around Wisdom would pass to the Logos, and receive that farther development which their new companionship suggested. Nor must we omit to notice the introduction of the Logos, even figuratively, as the divine agent in Old Testament scenes, where the Scriptures themselves make no allusion to the "word." In the one case we hear of a mysterious "destroyer," in the other of "the glory of the Lord,"* and of "wrath" going out from his presence;† and these are apparently interpreted into the Logos. Here, then, is an exegetical key which is capable of unlocking many riddles, and by the help of which, when smoothed with the oil of allegory, one could stealthily introduce the beauteous and varied pride of Greek philosophy into the severe temple of the Jewish Law, and then draw her triumphantly forth, as from her native shrine. But to follow these developments we must turn to the pages of Philo.‡

* Numbers xvi. 42 in LXX and English; xvii. 7 in Heb.

† Verse 46 (11 Heb.).

‡ Dr. E. Pfeleiderer points out in detail (which may admit some difference, or at least suspense, of judgment) the unquestionable dependence of the Wisdom of Solomon on the philosophical writings of Greece. He thinks especially that he has proved a direct acquaintance with Heraclitus. See his *Philos. des Heraklit*, pp. 289. sqq. This is a point on which we cannot enter at present; and it is the less necessary for us to do so, as it does not affect our general view of the character and position of the work.

APPENDIX TO BOOK II.

ARISTEAS AND ARISTOBULUS.

1. *Letter of Aristeas.*

THE so-called letter of Aristeas professes to be written by a Greek,* occupying some position of distinction and influence at the court of Ptolemy Philadelphus.† It is addressed to his brother Philocrates, who had lately arrived in Egypt,‡ and gives a detailed narrative of the events connected with the translation of the Jewish Law into Greek. Demetrius Phalereus, who had been appointed over the Library by the king, was anxious to collect, if possible, all the books in the world, and suggested to Ptolemy the desirability of obtaining a translation of the Jewish Law. The king entered heartily into the proposal, and determined to send ambassadors to Jerusalem to ask the high-priest for a copy of the Law and a commission of seventy-two experienced men, six from each tribe, to act as translators. Andreas, an officer of the body-guard, and Aristeas, were selected as the royal messengers, and despatched with magnificent presents, of which an elaborate account is given. Eleazar, the high-priest, at once acceded to a request

* 'Ημεῖς . . . προσονομάζοντες ἑτέρως Ζῆνα, p. III. My quotations are from Hody's edition, printed at the beginning of his work *De Bibliorum textibus originalibus, Versionibus Graecis, et Latina Vulgata*, Oxonii MDCCV.

† 285-283 B.C. in association with his father; 283-247 alone. He is identified as Philadelphus in the letter by allusions to his "father" as Ptolemy the son of Lagus, p. III.; cf. IV. and VI. The position of Aristeas is shown by his personal intercession with the king on behalf of the Jewish slaves, and by his selection as one of the ambassadors to Jerusalem, *τιμωμένους παρ' ἡμῖν*, p. VI.

‡ Pp. I., II., XV.

proffered in so splendid a manner; and after explaining to the ambassadors the reason for some of the Jewish practices that appeared superstitious, he chose the company of translators, and dismissed them, loaded with presents for the king. The delegates were received at court with the highest honour. All others who had business there were ordered to withdraw, and the king gazed with admiration and reverence on the parchments which contained the Jewish Laws written in letters of gold. Sumptuous apartments were provided for the visitors. Ptolemy himself entertained them at his table for seven successive days, and proposed to each some question designed to test the depth and readiness of his wisdom. After the Jews had passed with applause through this ordeal, they addressed themselves to the work of translation. A place was assigned to them on the Island of Pharos, remote from the din of the city. Every morning they presented themselves at court, and then worked till the ninth hour of the day. In seventy-two days their labours were completed; Demetrius read the translation to the assembled Jews of Alexandria, and an imprecation was pronounced against all who should tamper with it by adding, transposing, or removing. It was next read to the king, who was greatly astonished at the wisdom of the legislator, and asked Demetrius how it was that none of the historians and poets had mentioned such great events. Demetrius replied that it was owing to the solemnity and the divine origin of the Law, and some who had wished to incorporate portions of it in their own work had been smitten by God, and forced to desist from their undertaking. Finally the translators were rewarded with handsome gifts, and sent back to Palestine.

Such is a brief sketch of the contents of a letter which for so many centuries was regarded as an authentic document, but has, since the appearance of Hody's *Dissertation Contra Historiam LXX interpretum Aristee nomine inscriptam*,*

* First published in 1685, and then, enlarged, in *De Bib. text. orig.*

been generally recognized as a Jewish fabrication. It is unnecessary to repeat here the conclusive arguments against the genuineness of a composition whose spuriousness is apparent on the face of it to the better trained eye of modern criticism; but a few words must be said respecting its probable date. It is certainly earlier than Josephus, who expressly refers to it, and gives a copious abridgment of its principal contents.* It is probably earlier than Philo; for his comparatively brief narrative agrees with it in its general outline. It deserves notice, however, that while he accords extravagant praise to Philadelphus, he says nothing of Demetrius Phalereus, whose appearance on the scene occasions the gravest historical difficulty. It is conceivable that he was willing to accept a story which chimed in with his prejudices, but was too well acquainted with the history of Alexandria to follow Aristeas in so serious a blunder; and I think there is some indication of his later date in his acceptance of the current belief,† which goes far beyond the statements of the letter, that the translators were guided by inspiration to the choice of the same words, and were therefore not so much translators as “hierophants and prophets.”‡ Had this belief existed in the time of Pseudo-Aristeas, he would hardly have omitted a circumstance so well calculated to dignify a translation whose glorious origin he was anxious to set forth. This being conceded, it seems to follow that the book must have been in circulation for a considerable time before Philo wrote, and hence it is placed by several competent critics in the first century before Christ.§ Grätz, however, who has freshly examined the subject, assigns it very confidently to the early years of the reign of Tiberius, about 15-21 A.D., still allowing nearly a generation to elapse before it was used, as he

* Ant., XII. 2. The work is mentioned in § 12.

† *Φασι*.

‡ Vita Mos., II. 5-7 (II. 138-40).

§ Hody, p. 89, “Paulo ante natum Christum”; Ewald, *Gesch. d. V. Is.* IV. p. 323; Zeller, *Phil. der Gr.*, III. ii. p. 268 sq.

thinks, by Philo.* He relies principally upon a reference to informers, where the word *ἐμφανιστής* is used, and it is said that the king puts such persons to death.† He sees here an allusion to that pernicious class of men who became so notorious under the Roman empire. The word *ἐμφανιστής* is not classical, but is used to translate the Latin *delator*.‡ We may follow him with less certainty when he says that the passage incontestably refers to the punishment of two Roman knights, inflicted by a decree of the Senate which was passed at the instigation of the emperor, for bringing false charges of treason against the Praetor Magius Caccilianus, A.D. 21, and to the order which, according to Dio Cassius, was issued by Tiberius, that the worst informers should be put to death in one day, and that no discharged soldier should become an informer.§ The words *καθὼς μεταλαμβάνομεν*, on which Grätz relies as showing that the circumstance was unexpected, are dramatically suited to the person of Eleazar, into whose mouth they are put; and the statement that Ptolemy had informers executed might only express the author's views of what ought to be done with that mischievous class. Another allusion to Roman habits is found in the statement that the translators presented themselves every morning at court and saluted the king.|| This "officium salutationis" did not exist under the Ptolemies, but sprang up at Rome out of the relation between patron and client.¶ Grätz farther contends that the description of the castle in Jerusalem** points to the tower of Antonia, which was built by Herod the Great.†† In the

* See two articles, Die Abfassungszeit des Pseudo-Aristeas, in the Monatschrift für Gesch. und Wiss. des Judenthums, 1876, pp. 289-308 and 337-349.

† P. XIX. Contrast with this the invitation to inform against those who should disobey the decree requiring the liberation of the Jewish slaves, p. IV.

‡ P. 293-4. I may observe that the classical word *συκοφάντης* was not unknown to the Alexandrian Jews, for it is found in Philo, where it is used, not to denote the race of informers, but in its wider sense of slanderer. See Cherub., 11 (1. 145).

§ P. 303-5; Tacitus, An., III. 37; Dio LVIII. 21.

¶ P. 294-5.

** P. XIII.

¶ P. XXXIV.

†† P. 295-6.

fanciful description of the Temple,* the unsparing expense which was lavished upon the gates is particularly noticed. Now, the gold and silver which adorned the gates of Herod's temple were the gift of Alexander Lysimachus, the Alabarch of Alexandria, Philo's brother. The date of this gift cannot be exactly determined, but was certainly after the time of Augustus. This circumstance would naturally be known to an Alexandrian writer.† I may add to these indications of a late date, an apparent allusion to the Ptolemies as an extinct dynasty: *πάντα γὰρ . . . τοῖς βασιλεῦσι τούτοις διωκεῖτο*,‡ where the author seems for a moment to have forgotten the character in which he was writing. These arguments do not amount to demonstration, but in the absence of opposing evidence they justify us in assigning to the composition of the letter a somewhat later time than has been generally assumed. It was a time when the Jews were put upon their defence, and Grätz regards this work as an apology designed to glorify Moses and everything belonging to the Jewish people, and written perhaps in reply to Lysimachus of Alexandria or Cyrene.§

Before we proceed to notice the traces of Alexandrianism which are found in this letter we must dwell for a moment upon one or two other points which have a bearing upon our examination of the fragments ascribed to Aristobulus. Our author has, in Grätz's opinion, laid the scene in the time of Philadelphus because he was aware that that sovereign had devoted himself to the extension of the library.|| There is, however, nothing absolutely improbable in the supposition that the Law may have been translated during this reign; but by representing Demetrius Phalereus as the promoter of the work the writer has committed an historical error which is happily capable of proof. Demetrius had repaired for safety to the court of Ptolemy Soter, and was held by him in

* P. XI.

† P. 297-9. See Joseph. Bell. Jud., V. 5, § 3.

‡ P. V.

§ P. 344.

|| P. 308.

high estimation. He incurred, however, the enmity of Soter's successor. Diogenes Laertius* quotes from Hermippus a statement that Demetrius advised Ptolemy to leave the kingdom to his children by Eurydice, and that as the king did not comply, but handed it on to the son of Berenice, he was kept in prison in the country by the latter after the death of Soter, until a decision should be formed respecting him. There, Diogenes continues, probably following the same authority, he died through the bite of an asp in the hand. As Hermippus of Smyrna, the historian referred to, flourished at the close of the reign of Philadelphus, he was likely to be well informed upon this subject, and Hody has amply vindicated his authority against the defenders of Pseudo-Aristeas.† Even Valckenaer concedes that the testimony of Hermippus must be accepted, but maintains that it is not inconsistent with the supposition that Demetrius may have remained in favour for one or two years before the advice which he had given came to the knowledge of the new sovereign.‡ He farther admits that he was not properly the custodian of the royal library in the reign of the first Ptolemy, because the duty was at that time discharged by Zenodotus, and, although many of the librarians are mentioned by ancient writers, Demetrius is not named as one of them.§ Valckenaer is not concerned to defend the letter of Aristeas, but wishes only to save the credit of Aristobulus, whose statement will be examined farther on; but his suggestion that the translation was begun under the care of Demetrius during the last two years of Ptolemy Soter, when Philadelphus was associated with him in the government,|| had already been advanced on behalf of Aristeas. Hody disposes of this plea by showing that according to the letter the translation was made after Philadelphus had reigned for

* V. 78.

† P. 9 sqq.

‡ *Diatrise de Aristobulo Judæo; Philosopho Peripatetico Alexandrino. Lugduni Batavorum, mccccvi., p. 52 sqq.*

§ P. 56.

|| P. 57.

several years.* So far, then, as Pseudo-Aristeas is concerned, the introduction of Demetrius Phalereus is a pure falsification. He might, however, have been wrong in the time, and not in the man; but if it can be shown that there was a natural source for his error, other than a confused historical tradition, we must reasonably conclude that he was the author of a story which was so gratifying to Jewish vanity, but has so little probability to recommend it. Now, we know from the example of Josephus (and indeed of Pseudo-Aristeas himself) that the Jews were a little touchy about the neglect of their nation, which was apparent in Greek writers. This feeling contributed to the production of pseudo-epigraphical works, which were more or less successful in deceiving the public. Josephus allowed himself to be misled through the same sentiment in his judgment of certain books, and he refers to Demetrius Phalereus, the elder Philo, and Eupolemus as Greek writers who had devoted their attention to Jewish affairs. In regard to Eupolemus and Philo we can hardly doubt that he was mistaken, for their surviving fragments betray a Jewish origin.† Was he not equally mistaken, as Huet supposed, about Demetrius Phalereus? There was a Jewish chronographer, Demetrius, who, in his book "about the kings in Judæa," brings his dates down to Ptolemy IV.‡ This date makes it impossible to identify him with Demetrius Phalereus; but it is not impossible that Josephus overlooked this difficulty, and, in his anxiety to vindicate the claims of the Jews, carelessly ascribed the work of the obscure chronologist to the prolific pen of the distinguished Greek. Nevertheless, Dähne defends the statement of Josephus;§ but we cannot attach much weight to his literary judgment when he proceeds to ascribe to the Greek writer the fragments of Demetrius pre-

* P. 19 sqq.

† For Eupolemus, see Euseb., *Praep. Ev.*, IX. 17, 26, 30 sqq. 39; Philo, *ib.* 20, 24, 37. Dähne regards Eupolemus as a heathen writer, II. p. 221.

‡ Clem. Al., *Strom.*, I. 21, p. 403 Potter.

§ II. p. 220.

served by Eusebius;* for not only do these obviously belong to a work of the same kind as that cited by Clement, but it is incredible that the cultured and accomplished heathen spent his time in investigating the years and months in which Jacob's children were born, and other minute points of Hebrew chronology. Unfortunately Josephus does not give the title of the work to which he refers; but, in the absence of more decisive evidence, I cannot but think it most probable that he has made a mistake about Demetrius as well as about the other two writers. Now, Grätz believes that Pseudo-Aristeas fell into the same error, and for the same reason. Demetrius Phalereus was a celebrated writer, and we may add that a mistake so flattering to Jewish pride was well suited to the purpose which the author had in view. He was now able to assume that the friend and adviser of Ptolemy had a predilection for Jewish literature, and might with some plausibility be credited with the office of recommending the king to procure the translation of the Scriptures. It was only one step farther to install him as librarian of Ptolemy Philadelphus, careless of his exalted rank, and of the hostility with which the king regarded him.† This is a reasonable explanation of a story which is confessedly false. If we accept it, it follows that the ascription to Demetrius Phalereus of any share in the production of the Greek version of the Scriptures rests, not on an historical fact, nor even on a legend, but solely on the assertion of Pseudo-Aristeas, and that therefore allusions to the part played by the exiled Greek may be used to test the comparative date of writings of disputed origin.

Schürer dismisses the view of Grätz with contempt, and takes no notice of his arguments. He himself goes to the other extreme, and regards it as "tolerably certain" that the book appeared not later than about 200 B.C. His main argument is that it must have been used by Aristobulus, who adopts the unhistorical legend about Demetrius Phalereus. I fully agree

* *Praep. Ev.*, IX. 21, 29.

† *Article*, p. 306-7.

with him in the latter view; but then who will guarantee the authenticity of Aristobulus? The relation between the two works proves rather the spuriousness of the latter than the early origin of the former. It is not intrinsically probable that the false story about Demetrius arose at a time when the real facts could have been easily ascertained. Schürer further lays stress upon the fact that there is no allusion to events or circumstances of a later date than 200 B.C., and he thinks it beyond the power of a forger to adapt himself so completely to a period that had passed away. I cannot think that the adaptation is so recondite as to lend much weight to this argument, especially as we have seen some reason for supposing that the author has not been absolutely successful in this respect. Schürer alludes to an argument of Mendelssohn's, that the composition must be as late as the first half of the first century before Christ, because it is said that Judæa had good harbours, namely, Ascalon, Joppa, Gaza, and Ptolemaïs, and this could not have been said before the conquest of these maritime towns by Alexander Jannæus. To this Schürer replies that Ascalon and Ptolemaïs never were united to Judæa, even by Alexander, and therefore the argument falls to the ground. As regards the particular period, the reply is sufficient; nevertheless we must ask, was not the writer more likely to make this faulty statement after the political relations of the whole district had undergone a variety of changes? Moreover, the statement about Ptolemaïs is curious. If the opinion of some is correct, that Accho received that name from Ptolemy Lathurus (B.C. 103), Schürer's whole argument falls to the ground. Others, however, suppose that it was called after Ptolemy Lagi, and, if so, its name will give no clue to the date of our author. Something, however, may be learned from his manner of referring to the town. He says, ἔχει γὰρ [ἡ χώρα] καὶ λιμένας . . . ὁμοίως δὲ Πτολεμαΐδα, τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως ἐκτισμένην (p. XIV.). Now, Philadelphus founded, not the Phœnician Ptolemaïs, but Ptolemaïs Theron

on the coast of the Red Sea. Have we not here some signs of confusion which are indicative of a date long subsequent to the supposed events? We are no doubt dealing with delicate probabilities; but, on the whole, it seems to me that the date selected by Schürer is much too early, and that the whole character of the work points to a time when the Jews, suffering under oppression and scorn, were anxious to show what prosperity they once enjoyed, and in what distinguished honour they had been held.*

The contributions to our knowledge of the Jewish-Alexandrian philosophy which are afforded by this literary fabrication are of the most meagre character. It throws no light whatever upon the origin or development of that philosophy, and it is chiefly interesting as showing that even so commonplace a writer resorted to allegorical interpretation in order to defend the Law against the attacks of the Greeks. The ambassadors of Eleazar are represented as expressing to him the difficulty which they felt in regard to the Jewish abstinence from certain kinds of food; for this appeared to them to savour of superstition. Eleazar points out in reply that the observances to which exception was taken were designed to separate the Jews as by an iron wall from the pollution of the idolatrous nations around them. But there was also a deeper reason, of which he proceeds to give a few examples. All the birds which the Jews were permitted to eat were tame, and used only a vegetable food, whereas those which were forbidden were wild, carnivorous, and violent. By calling these unclean, Moses taught the adherents of the Law that they ought to be just, and not through confidence in their strength to be violent towards anyone. Similarly, the requirement that quadrupeds which were used for food should have a cloven foot signified that the Israelites must distinguish their actions, and keep themselves separated from the evil practices of other men; and the farther requirement that they

* For Schürer's view, see his *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, II. p. 821 sq.

should chew the cud indicated the duty of ruminating, and continually bringing to mind God, the Ruler and Preserver.*

In the doctrine of God there is little that is distinctive. Perhaps its most remarkable feature is the admission that the Greeks worshipped the same God as the Jews, "the Overseer and Creator of all things," only calling him by a different name, Zeus. The admission is in appearance reversed in order to suit the pretended character of the book, and Aristeas pleads on behalf of the Jews that they revered the same God as all other men, but especially the Greeks. This cannot well be regarded as a mere adaptation to the assumed nationality of Aristeas; for such a plea would hardly have occurred to the author unless he himself recognized a fundamental agreement under the diverse forms of religion. The allusion which immediately follows to the Stoic etymology, which derives Zeus from his life-giving power, *ζωοποιεῖν*, betrays at least a superficial acquaintance with Greek philosophy.† This hospitality towards the Greek religion does not, however, impair the soundness of the writer's monotheism. He whom the Jews adore is the true and only God.‡ His power extends over the whole creation.§ He rules and works everywhere, and controls even the thoughts of men, who do not direct their own purposes, but must wait upon him with whom is the preparation of the mind for good.|| His knowledge is universal; every thought is clear to him, and one cannot escape his notice in doing anything wrong.¶ His administration is exercised with kindness and equity; he benefits the whole cosmos, and pours his blessings on mankind, providing them with health and food and all other things at the proper season.** Two expressions occur which

* P. XVI. sqq. See Philo's similar interpretation, *De Concupiscentia*, 5 and 9 (II. 353 sqq.).

† P. III. ‡ *Τὸν κατ' ἀλήθειαν θεόν, τὸν μόνον θεόν*, p. XVII.

§ Ib. || P. XXII., question 7; XXIV. 16; XXVI. 25; XXVII. 32, 33.

¶ P. XXI., question 2; XXIV. 16. ** XXIX. 45, 49; XXI. 1, 3; XXIV. 16.

at first sight seem to have a philosophical colouring. God is said to be free from all anger,* and to be without needs.† The first statement reminds us of the doctrine that God's perfect nature is untouched by the passions‡ to which mankind are exposed; but the context shows that it is used purely in a moral sense, to emphasize the kindness and gentleness of the divine government. A similar remark will apply to the second statement; for it refers, not to the self-sufficing perfection of God, which places him beyond the reach of wants, but to his equity,§ which the king is urged to imitate, instead of coveting many possessions. The following thought harmonizes with Alexandrian sentiment, though it is not distinctive of it—that the highest glory consists in honouring God, not with gifts or sacrifices, but with purity of soul.||

There is no satisfactory evidence that the author was acquainted with the doctrine of intermediate powers. The divine power¶ is indeed several times referred to, but not in a way that is suggestive of Philo's philosophy.** There is only one passage to which Gfrörer†† ventures to appeal in this connection. Eleazar says, in reply to the questions of his visitors, "There is one only God, and his power is through all things: [all things] become manifest [to him], every place being filled with his might, and none of the things done secretly by men upon earth escapes his notice."‡‡ Gfrörer observes that the author appears to have distinguished God himself from his power, for he might much more easily have said, "He himself fills and pervades all things." I think it is true that we have here a philosophical representation of the divine omnipresence; but there is no evidence that the

* Χωρίς ὀργῆς ἀπάσης, p. XXIX., question 45. † Ἀπροσδέης, p. XXIV. 17.

‡ Πάθος.

§ The word is coupled with ἐπιεικής.

|| P. XXVI., question 30.

¶ Θεία or θεοῦ δύναμις.

** See p. XXVII., question 31; XXVIII. 44; XXX. 56. †† II. p. 63.

‡‡ Μόνος ὁ θεὸς ἐστὶ, καὶ διὰ πάντων ἡ δύναμις τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ φανερά γίνεται, πεπληρωμένον παντὸς τόπου τῆς ἐνδαστείας, κ.τ.λ. Gfrörer supplies before φανερά, where something is evidently wanting, πάντα αὐτῷ. P. XVI.

writer had exercised his own thought upon the subject, and it is impossible to judge from this vague reminiscence of philosophical language how far the doctrine of which it seems like an echo had yet received articulate expression.

To these traces of an Alexandrian leaning we need only add, that Pseudo-Aristeas ascribes the general disinclination to virtue to men's natural want of self-control and their proneness to pleasure, in opposition to which he commends self-restraint, moderation, and temperance.* Among other virtues, he gives a high place to humility,† and declares that the supreme beauty is piety, whose power is God-given love.‡

2. *Aristobulus.*

Aristobulus is known to us as the reputed author of a work, of which only fragments have survived, containing interpretations of the Mosaic law,§ and dedicated to Ptolemy Philometor.|| From his connection with the Ptolemies it is reasonably inferred that he resided at Alexandria. He is described as a Peripatetic,¶ and is often regarded as the founder of the Jewish-Alexandrian school of philosophy. If this view can be made good, the fragments become a valuable relic of a remarkable intellectual movement, and deserve all the erudition that has been bestowed upon them; but if they belong to the same class of literature as the letter of Aristeas, and are of considerably later origin than that which they claim, our interest in them must almost disappear. Hody,

* Ἐγκράτεια, μετριότης, σωφροσύνη, p. XXXI., question 63; XXV. 21; XXVII. 32.

† XXIX. 48.

‡ XXVI. 27.

§ Anatolius, Bishop of Laodicea in the later portion of the third century, describes it as βίβλους ἐξηγητικάς τοῦ Μωϋσέως νόμου, Euseb., Hist. Ec., VII. 32. Eusebius calls it τὴν τῶν ἱερῶν νόμων ἐρμηνείαν, Praep. Ev., VII. 13.

|| 181-145 B.C. Clem. Al., Strom., I. 22, p. 410 Potter; quoted by Euseb., Praep. Ev., IX. 6.

¶ Clem. Al., Strom., I. 15, p. 360, V. 14, p. 705; Euseb., Praep. Ev., VIII. 9; IX. 6; XIII. 12 (in the superscription).

in his essay on *Aristeas*, vigorously asserted their pseudonymous character. *Valekenæer's* dissertation, already referred to, has been widely accepted as a sufficient answer to the attacks of *Hody*; and *Gfrörer*, *Dähne*, and *Zeller* (not to mention other writers) admit the genuineness of the fragments. *Grätz*, however, has renewed the assault,* and it is not possible for us to proceed without taking at least a cursory view of the evidence on each side.

In the absence of early testimonies it seems to be necessary, first of all, to ascertain the literary quality of the work, so as to decide whether we may trust the author's statements or not. The simple fact is that the work bears imposture on its face. It contains a number of verses which are professedly cited from *Orpheus*, *Hesiod*, *Homer*, and *Linus*,† but are so obviously composed or corrupted by a Jew, that *Zeller* is at a loss whether to wonder more at the assurance of the forger or at the credulity of the Jewish and Christian theologians who were so long deceived by them.‡ *Valekenæer*,§ with whom *Zeller*|| fully concurs, does not hesitate to ascribe the fraud to *Aristobulus* himself. *Ewald* exculpates him, and thinks that the real authors of the verses may have become unknown long before the time of *Philometor*.¶ It is impossible to decide this question with certainty. We must observe, however, that we have no evidence that the Jews employed themselves in this kind of composition so early as *Ewald* supposes, and that *Aristobulus* had a motive for the fraud in his desire to prove that the Greeks had borrowed from the wisdom of *Moses*. That he was not incapable of

* See his two articles entitled *Der Angebliche jüdäische Peripatetiker Aristobulos und seine Schriften*, in the *Monatssch. f. Gesch. u. Wiss. des. Jud.*; Febr. u. März, 1878, pp. 49-60 and 97-109.

† *Euseb.*, *Praep. Ev.*, XIII. 12. Instead of *Linus*, *Clem. Al.* has *Callimachus*, who flourished under *Philadelphus*: *Strom.*, V. 14, p. 713.

‡ *III. ii. p. 261 sq.*

§ *P. 10.*

|| *III. ii. p. 261.*

¶ *Gesch. d. V. I., IV. p. 339*, *Ann. Schürer*, who thinks the modern scepticism "almost unintelligible," takes a similar view. See his *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, II. p. 764 sq.

deliberately altering a text is apparent from his having twice changed $\Delta\iota\acute{o}\varsigma$ into $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ in the well-known verses of Aratus.* It is true that he calls attention to this change, pleading that the signification is the same; but we must remember that he could not hope to falsify this poem without immediate detection, and he may have been willing to indulge in more extensive and secret frauds when he thought his readers would be unable to correct him. However this may be, the presence of forged verses casts suspicion over the entire work, and prevents us from placing any confidence in the writer's assumed connection with Ptolemy Philometor. Let us see, then, whether there is any independent evidence in the case.

The first writer who mentions Aristobulus is Clement of Alexandria, some three hundred and fifty years after his alleged date. We may concede that we have no right to expect any allusion to him in earlier writers, for Philo never names any of his own predecessors in allegorical interpretation, though he refers to them in a general way, and Josephus may have had reasons for not mentioning him.† I admit, therefore,

* Praep. Ev., XIII. 12.

† Dr. M. Joël, however, shows that the *argumentum a silentio* has in this instance more than a merely negative force. Josephus, if he had known Aristobulus and his quotations, would probably have mentioned them in his chapter in the work against Apion (I. 22), in which he enumerates the ancient Greek authors who betrayed an acquaintance with the Jews. Still more inexplicable is the silence of Justin Martyr, who in the *Cohortatio ad Gentiles* (c. 15), quotes some of the Orphic poem. A comparison of the verses in Justin with those in Clement (Strom. V. 14, p. 723) and Eusebius shows, as Lobeck had already pointed out in his *Aglaophamus*, that they were subject to successive additions, and that the form in which they are ascribed to Aristobulus (by Eusebius) must be far later than the time of the Ptolemies. (See Joël's *Blicke in die Religionsgeschichte zu Anfang des zweiten christlichen Jahrhunderts*. I. Der Talmud und die Griechische Sprache nebst zwei Excursen a. Aristobul, der sogenannte Peripatetiker, b. Die Gnosis. Breslau, 1880, Pp. 85 sqq.) The reply easily suggests itself that, as Clement was certainly acquainted with a work ascribed to Aristobulus, the additions may have been made in successive copies of that work. Moreover, much caution is necessary in drawing conclusions from omissions in writers who are in the habit of quoting just what suits their immediate purpose.

that the argument from silence cannot be pressed against Aristobulus; but, nevertheless, the silence of more than three centuries entirely deprives him of the advantage of independent historical proof. We have no reason to suppose that Clement and the later writers who refer to him had any information about him except what they derived from his alleged writing. They would naturally regard this as genuine, and implicitly trust its pretensions, and therefore their testimony lends no sanction whatever to the truth of its contents.

Some stress has been laid upon the confusion which is found in the references to the date of Aristobulus. Anatolius reckons him among the seventy translators, and says that he addressed his work to Ptolemy Philadelphus and his father.* Similarly, Clement of Alexandria, in one passage, according to the present reading, places him in the time of Philadelphus.† Yet there can be no doubt that the book itself, agreeably to the earlier statement of Clement, professed to belong to a later period; for in a passage quoted from it by Eusebius, Philadelphus is referred to as the king's ancestor.‡ We must suppose, therefore, that Anatolius consulted it in a very cursory way, and was misled by the ambiguity of the word *ἐρμηνεία*, while the reading "Philadelphus" in Clement must be due to a mere blunder on the part either of that father himself or of a copyist. Nevertheless these errors show that Aristobulus was not a familiar historical personage, and confirm our previous impression that the only authority for the date and origin of the fragments is to be found in the fragments themselves.

Now, we have seen that the fragments immediately lay themselves open to the suspicion of fraud; and, accordingly,

* Euseb. as before.

† Strom., V. 14, p. 705. As there is practically only one MS. of the *Stromata*, the reading may be a mere transcriber's error.

‡ Praep. Ev., XIII. 12.

when we are told* that the king interested himself in inquiries affecting the Mosaic Law, and raised the objection that it ascribed bodily organs to the Divine Power, we are at liberty to doubt the probability of this statement, and to recognize in it a device by which the author sought to secure a factitious value for his own lucubrations. Our suspicions are not allayed when we meet with our old friend Demetrius Phalereus, in company, too, with a statement which we can only regard as a deliberate falsehood. The writer was anxious to prove that Plato had followed the Jewish legislation, and busied himself about its several contents, and that Pythagoras too had transferred much of it into his own system. But the question must have mentally arisen, How could the philosophers have borrowed from it when they did not understand its language? To a writer who did not believe what he was saying, nothing was easier than to dispose of a little difficulty like this. Certain parts of the Pentateuch were translated “before Demetrius Phalereus by others, before the conquest of Alexander and the Persians . . . so that it is obvious that the before-mentioned philosopher† borrowed much”; but the whole translation of everything contained in the Law was made in the time of the king’s ancestor Philadelphus, under the direction of Demetrius Phalereus.‡ Valckenaer contends, that the words “before Demetrius Phalereus by others” are an interpolation.§ His arguments do not seem to me to have much force, but it is unnecessary to discuss them, as he accepts the concluding reference as genuine. How, then, are we to regard this testimony to the work of

* Praep. Ev., VIII. 10.

† Plato.

‡ *Διηρημένεται γὰρ πρὸ Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαληρέως δι' ἑτέρων* (Clem. *ὑφ' ἑτέρων*, or, as quoted by Euseb., *ἑτέρων*. Clem. also omits *Φαληρέως*) *πρὸ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ Περσῶν ἐπικρατήσεως*. And at the end *Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαληρέως πραγματευσαμένου τὰ περὶ τούτων*. Praep. Ev., XIII. 12; Clem. Al., Strom. I. 22, p. 410-11, where the quotation does not include the latter part of the passage; Praep. Ev., IX. 6, where the passage is quoted from Clement, and not directly from Aristobulus.

§ P. 49

Demetrius? Valekenaer receives it as trustworthy. The story is told here in its simplest form. Demetrius is not represented as librarian; and although the statement of Hermippus cannot be set aside, it is not inconsistent with the supposition that Demetrius may have remained in favour with Philadelphus for one or two years before the king heard of the advice which he had tendered to his father.* Valekenaer, accordingly, inclines to the opinion of those who think that the translation was begun, under the care of Demetrius, in the last two years of Ptolemy Lagi, and finished when Philadelphus was the sole occupant of the throne.† This would be plausible reasoning if we had any ground for regarding Aristobulus as an authority. But since he is a writer more distinguished by inventiveness than veracity, it seems to me impossible to attach the least weight to his assertion. Zeller abandons the defence of the story, but thinks that the legend may have been in circulation as early as the time of Aristobulus.‡ This is conceivable, though Grätz thinks that the interval between the death of Philadelphus and the accession of Philometor is too short for the purpose, and that, if the story arose so soon, it must have been true.§ It is difficult to decide how long it takes for popular credulity to do its work; but the strong point in Grätz's position is this, that there is no evidence that such a legend ever existed; for if our previous criticism has been correct, the whole story sprang into an instantaneous maturity from the fertile and blundering brain of Pseudo-Aristeas. The manner of allusion, as to a well-known fact, shows that Aristobulus himself was not the fabricator of the tale; and it certainly seems to be the simplest supposition that he had before him the letter of Aristeas, and that therefore he belonged not to the time of Philometor, but to that of Tiberius or one of his successors, or, at all events, to the Roman period.

Grätz adds one or two other evidences of later origin. He

* P. 52 sqq.

† P. 57.

‡ III. ii. p. 260, Anm. 2 of the previous page.

§ P. 104.

contrasts the boldness of the assertion that the Greek philosophers and poets borrowed from Moses with the caution displayed in the genuine works of Philo. A parallel to Aristobulus can be found only in the *Quaestiones et Solutiones*, preserved in an Armenian translation, which Grätz believes to be spurious, and subsequent to Philo, on the ground that "not even in his youth can Philo have said such absurdities" as there occur, that they contain quite different allegories from Philo's, and they present in the name of "distinguished men" several expositions which Philo gives as his own.* He also calls attention to the fact that Aristobulus added the statement about the earlier translation, of which there is not a hint in *Pseudo-Aristeas*.† He might have strengthened his argument by observing that this addition was associated with that curious growth of opinion which he has noticed in connection with Philo. When the Jews began to study the Greek writers, it was evident that the historians and poets had treated the Mosaic Law with a painful neglect. In the time of *Pseudo-Aristeas* this was still admitted; but instead of explaining it by the political insignificance of the Jews, and the strangeness of their language, he chose to invent some more flattering cause: it was due to the awful and divine sanctity of the Law, owing to which some writers who attempted to make use of it were smitten by God for their temerity.‡ Afterwards the notion arose that the neglect was not so great as was apparent on the surface, and that the philosophers displayed such remarkable wisdom that they must have derived it without acknowledgment from Moses. This notion, so opposed to that of *Pseudo-Aristeas*, would naturally be held at first with some moderation, such as we find in the undisputed works of Philo; but it is found in Aristobulus in its most developed and most fraudulent form. If the poets did not allude to Moses they must be made to do so; if the philosophers could not have read Hebrew, they must be provided with a Greek translation.

* P. 107 sq.

† P. 105.

‡ P. XXXV.

This contrast between the two works, combined with what appears to be the natural course of development, seems to me to afford strong evidence of the later date of Aristobulus.

Further, it may be worth while pointing out some resemblances which I have observed between Aristobulus and Pseudo-Aristeas, which, though far from amounting to a proof, suggest a possible dependence of the former upon the latter. In one passage it is observed by Aristobulus that "it is acknowledged by all the philosophers that one ought to have pious opinions* about God, which especially our school† admirably prescribes."‡ The phrase *διαλήψεις όσίας* is not, so far as I am aware, a common one,§ and all the philosophers have certainly not made their acknowledgment in the terms here employed. But in Pseudo-Aristeas|| we find a possible source for this statement. The king asked the 30th translator, "What is the highest point of glory?" The reply was, "To honour God; that is, not with gifts or sacrifices, but with purity of soul, and of pious opinion¶ that all things are prepared by God, and administered according to his will." The king signified his approval with a loud voice, "those present, but *particularly the philosophers*, joining in the acclamation." If this is a coincidence, it is a curious one; and if there is any relation of dependence, it would seem to be on the side of Aristobulus, for his statement might very well be suggested by the event in the letter, whereas it hardly stands out with sufficient prominence to be itself the source of the alleged event. Aristobulus goes on to say that the whole apparatus of the Jewish Law relates to "piety and righteousness and self-control, and the other things which are really good."** Similarly Eleazar, in Pseudo-Aristeas, gives the first

* *Διαλήψεις όσίας.*

† *Αἵρεσις.*

‡ Praep. Ev., XIII. 12.

§ The word *διάληψις* itself occurs in 2 Mac. iii. 32, but in quite a different connection, and more in the sense of supposition or surmise.

|| P. XXVI., question 30.

¶ *Διαλήψεως όσίας.*

** *Περί εύσεβείας . . καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἐγκρατείας κ.τ.λ.*

place in the Law to “the things of piety and righteousness,”* while “self-control”† and other virtues are treated farther on. Again, Aristobulus, a little earlier in the same passage, cites the poem of Aratus to prove that διὰ πάντων ἐστὶν ἡ δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ. So Eleazar, in the place just referred to, represents it as the fundamental doctrine of the Law that μόνος ὁ θεός ἐστι, καὶ διὰ πάντων ἡ δύναμις τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστι. Lastly, Aristobulus says that in the verses‡ which he has cited he has removed Δία καὶ Ζῆνα, for their purport refers to God, θεός, which has therefore been used instead. This statement will not apply to any of the supposed lines of Orpheus, and must therefore be limited in its reference to the verses of Aratus, which immediately precede it. In these, as we have said, he twice changes Διός into θεοῦ, but there is no Ζῆνα to change. Where, then, has the Ζῆνα come from? Is it not from the letter of Aristeas,§ where this is the word chosen for identification with θεόν,|| and where the authority of a courtier of Ptolemy Philadelphus is found for the substitution?

We have only to show, in conclusion, that if the work with which we are dealing was a forgery, the writer had a reason for ascribing it to Aristobulus. In the first chapter of second Maccabees¶ there is a letter from Judæa addressed to “Aristobulus, the teacher of Ptolemy the king, and sprung from the race of anointed priests, and to the Jews in Egypt.” The date of this letter is given as the 188th year, that is of the Seleucid era, corresponding to 125 B.C. If this reading be correct, the king referred to must be Ptolemy VII. Physcon. Why, then, did our author push Aristobulus back to the reign of Philometor? Grätz replies, because he knew that none of the Ptolemies had been so favourable to the Jews, whereas Physcon was hostile to them.** If Valckenaer is right in his conjecture that the letter is wrongly dated in our copies, and

* P. XVI.

† P. XXXI., question 63.

‡ Ποιημάτων.

§ P. III.

|| Θεὸν . . . ὅν . . . προσονομάζοντες ἑτέρως Ζῆνα.

¶ 10 sqq.

** P. 105 sqq.

was really written in 149 Seleucid, or 164 B.C.,* there was no occasion for our forger to alter the time of the historical Aristobulus. In any case he could find no name more suited to his purpose than that of one who is styled the teacher of Ptolemy, and he could wish no higher sanction for his apology and his frauds than the pretence that the work was written by a distinguished member of the sacerdotal caste in reply to the questions of a king. On the other hand, those who believe in the genuineness of the fragments may derive from the allusion in 2 Maccabees some slight confirmation of their view. It shows that there *was* an Aristobulus who might conceivably have addressed an apology to the king; but I cannot bring myself to recognize the forger of Orphic verses and the inventor of an imaginary translation in the most distinguished of the Egyptian Jews.

In favour of the genuineness of the fragments it is difficult to find any positive arguments. It is not sufficient, in this instance, to repel objections, for the presumption lies against a book which, as we have seen, is fraudulent on the face of it. Reliance may be placed on the consideration that the fragments contain nothing that points even to as late a period as the time of Philo, a circumstance which can only be explained from their higher antiquity, for the fabricator of such writings generally acts with the purpose of supporting the ideas of his own time through older authorities.† This argument does not appear to me to have much force. The principal purpose of the writer seems to have been to frame an apology for the Jewish Law by proving its agreement with the highest teaching of Greek philosophy. This purpose was not obsolete in the time of Philo; for it is conspicuous in the writings of Philo himself, whereas we have no evidence, except the fragments, that it existed as early as the time of Aristobulus. In the prosecution of this purpose the author proposed, as a sub-

* P. 43.

† See Zeller, 2nd ed., III. ii. p. 220, Anm. of the previous page.

sidinary aim, to prove the dependence of the Greek thinkers upon the Jewish Law. This view is, as we have seen, in a more developed form than in Philo ; and the writer might well seek some ancient and respectable authority for his impudent inventions. In regard to his philosophical doctrines, we must remember that we have a very small portion of his work from which to form an opinion. We have not enough to prove that he was not, as Grätz says,* a charlatan instead of a philosopher ; and the few thoughts which have been extracted from him may just as well be the dying echo as the new-born utterance of the Jewish-Alexandrian system.

On the whole, then, though we must be content with something far short of demonstration, the evidence seems to me to incline against the genuineness of the fragments ascribed to Aristobulus, and it is impossible for us to give them that honourable place in the line of philosophical development which has been so generally assigned to them.

With the view which we have formed we need not spend much time in examining the contents of the fragments. Their value depends entirely on their date, and they do not help to elucidate a single important subject. Anthropomorphisms in the Pentateuch are explained as figurative expressions, which must be understood agreeably to the nature of the subject. Thus the hand of God refers to his power, for the strength and energy of man are in the hands, and in common conversation the word is used to denote force. The divine standing relates to the creation of the cosmos ; for all things are subject to God, "and have received a standing, so that men perceive that they are immovable." For instance, heaven never becomes earth, nor earth heaven, nor the sun the moon, nor the moon the sun, nor rivers seas, nor the sea rivers, nor a man a beast, nor a beast a man. Things are not exchangeable, but receive the same alterations and corruption within themselves. Therefore the divine standing must be spoken of

* P. 107.

in accordance with this, all things being subject to God. The divine descent upon the mount was not local, for God is everywhere, but a display of the energy of God.* The divine voice is not a spoken word, but the creation of works, as Moses has called the whole genesis of the cosmos words of God; for he says in relation to each thing, "and God said, and it was done." When it is said that God stopped on the seventh day, it is not meant that he did not make anything more, but that he fixed the order of things for all time; "for he intimates that in six days he made the heaven and the earth and all the things in them, in order that he may indicate the times, and declare the order, what is prior to what. For having put in order, he holds them together so, and does not alter."†

His doctrine of God is chiefly contained in the Orphic verses.‡ God is invisible.§ None of mortal souls beholds him, but he is beheld by the mind.|| This apparently refers to that spiritual vision which is denied to the *ψυχή*, but is open to the higher *νοῦς*. He is the Maker and Ruler of the world, having himself the beginning and middle and end.¶ "He himself does not out of good things put evil upon mortal men; but favour and hatred and war and pestilence and tearful woes accompany him; nor is there any other."** It is possible to find in these obscure words the doctrine that God is the source only of unmixed good, and that even punishments are inflicted not by himself, but by his attendant powers; but, then, what is the meaning of *οὐδέ τις ἐσθ' ἕτερος*? This addition rather suggests that it is God alone who inflicts even great calamities, but that, instead of sending these on his own motion out of his treasure of good, he distributes them in accordance with the favour or hatred which men deserve. Such an explanation accords best with the statement that "There is One Self-complete, and by him all things are

* Praep. Ev., VIII. 10.

† Praep. Ev., XIII. 12, §§ 2 and 14 sq.

‡ Praep. Ev., XIII. 12.

§ Verse 20.

|| 11-12.

¶ 8, 34, 35, 39; Praep. Ev., XIII. 12, § 13.

** 13-16.

completed, and in them he himself moves about.”* If *αὐτός* in the one case means “He himself in distinction from his powers,” it must equally do so in the other; and then the passage last quoted must mean that it is God himself who moves about creation, while his powers remain in their transcendent solitude above it—a position which exactly reverses the Alexandrian doctrine. But I fancy that this writer used *αὐτός* not as a compendious and enigmatical expression of a new philosophy, but simply to make his verses scan. His own conclusion from the verses is simply that “the power of God is through all things,” and there is no evidence that he connected this phrase with any particular philosophy. His statement that wisdom “existed before heaven and earth” is not connected with any philosophical thought, but merely quoted as a clear and beautiful expression of Solomon’s.† I therefore see no reason for ascribing to him Philo’s doctrine of the Divine powers.

Some have found the belief in a pre-existent matter in his description of God as “the moulder of the cosmos,” *κόσμοιο τυπωτήν*.‡ The phrase is not inconsistent with the doctrine of an eternal matter; but neither is it inconsistent with the doctrine that God first created matter, and then fashioned it into a cosmos.

The writer’s general philosophical competence may be judged of not only by the total want of philosophical thought in the fragments, but by his absurd confusion in his apparent adoption of a Stoical doctrine. He describes the Logos, “in which we have a knowledge of human and divine things,” as the seventh thing in us.§ It is no wonder that Homer, Hesiod, and Linus glorified the seventh day, though even they did not get their wisdom from the natural light of the “seventh Logos,” but had to borrow it “from our books.”

* 10 sq.

† Praep. Ev., VII. 14; XIII. 12, § 14.

‡ Verse 8.

§ Praep. Ev., XIII. 12, § 15.

Such, in brief, is the philosophy of this dull apologist of Judaism, whose heavy style is unrelieved by any grace, and whose commonplace wisdom is unilluminated by a gleam of suggestive thought. If he was really the teacher of Ptolemy, and gained the royal admiration for his forgeries, we can only pity the misfortunes of the king. Our time is too valuable to permit us to grope longer among these questionable ruins, and I must refer those who wish to see how philosophical sermons can be extracted from their crumbling stones to the elaborate discussions of Gfrörer and Dähne.

BOOK III.

PHILO.



CHAPTER I.

THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY.

IN an earlier part of this work we have dwelt upon the general principles of Philo's philosophy, and examined the method by which his conclusions are woven into the texture of the Jewish Scriptures. From the dogmatic basis on which the whole superstructure of his thought ultimately rests arises a serious difficulty as soon as we enter on a detailed exposition of his views. Nowhere has he himself attempted to unfold a completed system, but his philosophical conceptions lie scattered up and down his writings, and often strike one as mere embellishments in the interpretation of the great prophet and legislator Moses. The narratives and precepts of the Pentateuch form, for the most part, the thread on which his theories are strung, and thus determine the sequence of his thoughts; and it is not till we find the same ideas recurring again and again that we feel ourselves in the presence of a man who has seriously applied his mind to speculative questions, and given to them a coherent, if not always a complete or absolutely self-consistent, answer. Owing to this peculiarity of method, it is not easy to determine the concatenation of the several portions of his system, or to detect the precise mental conditions in which each originated; and independently of this, the various lines of inquiry, theology, cosmology, anthropology, so interlace and react on one another that they cannot

be fully understood except in their mutual relations, and, when for the sake of distinctness we begin to follow them separately, it is by no means clear to which of them the priority ought to be assigned. We shall not, however, go wrong if we consider first Philo's notion of the sources and objects of philosophy, for we shall thus gain some insight into the genius and drift of his own speculation, and perhaps obtain light upon the order of its genesis.

The source of philosophy, that fountain of all real good, is most frequently found in the contemplation of nature, particularly of the heavens. "The sky rained down philosophy, and the human mind contained it, and vision acted as its guide." Looking up into the ether the eye discerned sun and moon and planets and fixed stars, their rising and setting and determinate periods, the waxing and waning of the moon, the yearly motions of the sun, and innumerable other marvels, while, all around, the things in earth and sea and air attracted the attention, and filled the mind with admiration. Feasted on this glorious spectacle the intellect was driven to inquire what was the substance of these visible things, the same throughout the universe, or different in different objects? Was the world uncreated, or had it a beginning? What was the method of the observed motion? What were the causes by means of which the several bodies were administered, and the reasons on account of which they had arisen? What were the forces* by which they were held together, and were these material or immaterial? And to come to higher questions, was the cosmos one and finite, and was it self-moved with irrational drift, or governed by the providence of a Father and Creator? These are examples of the problems which spring from the observation of the universe; and the investigation of these, and of others similar in character, constitutes philosophy.†

* Or powers, *δυνάμεις*.

† De Mundi Opificio, 17 (I. 12); De Special. Legibus, III. 34 (II. 330-1). See also M. Op., 25 (I. 18); De Abrahamo, 31 (II. 24); Fragments, II. p. 665, answering to Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesin, II. 34.

On other occasions, however, Philo depreciates the study of nature as suggestive of insoluble problems, and turns in preference to the realms of consciousness, as lying nearer to our powers, and being more fruitful in results. The investigation of our bodily and mental constitution presents numerous questions to which philosophy must find an answer. What is the nature, and what the method, of seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, touching, and in general of sensation, and what is the relation of these to their several organs, those apertures of the body which bring us into communication with the external world? And within us we have to examine the ruling and the subject principles, the animate, the inanimate, the rational, the irrational, the immortal, the mortal, the better, the worse. A consideration of these leads to a clear knowledge of God and of his works, because we discern in ourselves a true analogy to the universe, and from the contemplation of our own mind are led by inevitable inference to the universal and sovereign mind which guides the cosmos by law and right. A farther reason is also given, that, when we most know, we most despair of ourselves, and he who has learned the nothingness of everything phenomenal attains to an accurate knowledge of Him who truly is.* These statements suggest inquiries which will demand a fuller investigation hereafter; at present they are mentioned simply as proving Philo's acceptance of consciousness as a source of the highest philosophical truth.

This account of the sources of philosophy has already given us some notion of its objects. These, however, are in several places brought under strict definition. Thus we are told that philosophy concerns itself with "the whole nature of things; † for this cosmos, and all the visible and invisible substance of things, are its material." ‡ Elsewhere to this extended outlook is added also the regulation of conduct: by philosophy men are enabled "both to see the nature of things and to do what

* De Migratione Abrahami, 33 (I. 465); De Somniis, I. 10 (I. 628-30).

† Τῶν ὁρτων.

‡ De Congressu quaerendae eruditionis gratia, 25 (I. 540).

is accordant with the perfecting of the best lives, the contemplative and the practical.”* Philosophy, however, as its name implies, is not the end, but the means: it is “the pursuit of wisdom, while wisdom is the knowledge of divine and human things and their causes,”† or, with some variation, it is the earnest desire and endeavour to see accurately Real Being,‡ and, failing that, to see at least his image, the most sacred Logos, and after this the most perfect work among perceptible things, the cosmos.§

Since philosophy has so wide a range, it is evident that it may be divided into distinct branches, and that the mutual relations of these will be differently determined according to the bias of particular thinkers. Where all branches alike are acknowledged to be legitimate subjects of human inquiry, and, under the control of a purely speculative interest, truth is valued simply as such, they will be arranged side by side in the enjoyment of equal rights. But when any portion appears to lie beyond the grasp of our powers, it will necessarily fall into a subordinate position; and when philosophy is cultivated for any ulterior end, its various divisions will be arranged in an ascending scale, that being placed highest which is nearest to the desired goal. Now, in Philo, notwithstanding the width and freedom of his culture, the practical and religious interest was supreme, and formed his standard of estimate for all the departments of human study. Independently of natural temperament, it could hardly have been otherwise with a Jew who had taken so deeply to heart the grandest lessons of his nation’s sacred literature. We have seen, moreover, that Greek philosophy itself had long been tending in this direction; and in the Stoical exaltation of ethics Philo recognized a congenial embodiment of his own thought. According to him the hope of blessedness|| is the incentive to philosophical

* De Praemiis et Poenis, 2 (II. 410).

† Cong. erud. grat., 14 (I. 530).

§ De Confusione Linguarum, 20 (I. 419).

‡ Τὸ ὄν.

|| Ἑλπὶς εὐδαιμονίας.

investigation;* and blessedness, which consists in the acknowledgment of the universal Ruler as our Lord, and in serving him, is the final gift which philosophy has to bestow, the joyful Isaac whom, according to promise, she gives to the wise and aged Abraham.† This supreme result is also expressed in the words of the Stoical formula, which is declared to be not more an utterance of Zeno than a Pythian oracle, “to live conformably to nature.”‡

These remarks will prepare us for Philo's distribution of human studies. The ethical end is kept constantly in view,§ and each successive application of industry must help to render the invisible soul, that earthly house of the invisible God, as strong and beautiful as possible. The foundation must consist of good natural parts and of instruction. From the former spring cleverness, perseverance, memory; from the latter, facility of learning and attention, roots, as it were, of a tree that will bring forth cultivated fruit, qualities without which the understanding cannot be brought to perfection. On these must be reared the superstructure of virtues, with their appropriate actions, in order to impart strength and stability to the foundation. To these again must be added, like the stucco, pictures, and precious stones which adorn the front of an edifice, contributing beauty but not strength, the encyclical studies—grammar, with its readings in poetry and history; geometry, which brings into rhythm and measure what is disproportioned and inharmonious in us; and rhetoric, which deals with suitable expression, emphasis, and agreeable delivery.|| The order of enumeration, though not of worth, is here affected by the comparison with a house, in which the walls must be built before the ornaments can be placed upon

* Pr. et Poen., 2 (II. 410).

† De Cherubim, 2 (I. 140); 31 (I. 158).

‡ Quod omnis probus liber sit, 22 (II. 470).

§ See the expressive words, *Ἀκοῦσαι δὲ πρῶτον, εἶτα ἐργάσασθαι μανθάνομεν γὰρ οὐ τοῦ μαθεῖν χάριν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πράξει*, *Fragm. in Harris*, p. 38, answering to Qu. et Sol. in Gen., IV. 110.

|| Cherub., 30 (I. 157-8).

them. Elsewhere the encyclical studies are mentioned before the virtues. They are only milk for babes, while the perfect nourishment, suited for men, is found in the guidance which comes through prudence and temperance and every virtue; for these being planted in the understanding will bear the most profitable fruit, noble and praiseworthy actions.* So, in every instance, these studies are treated as merely preparatory, of no intrinsic value, but sharpening the mind, and training it for the investigation of more important subjects.† The imperfect, who have travelled only thus far in the path of self-culture, are alien sojourners, not settled inhabitants of wisdom.‡ They catch but a perfume, while they need nourishment; and as smell is the servant of taste, they must turn their homage from the subjects to the rulers, from the alien to the native sciences, by which they may obtain mastery over the irrational powers of the soul.§ In other words, they must proceed to philosophy. Of this, as we learn from the history of Abraham, the encyclical studies, represented by Hagar, are the servant, and it is necessary to embrace the servant before we can obtain from our genuine wife the promised blessedness in Isaac.|| From this point of view a curious division of men into four classes is made. Right reason,¶ being masculine and perfect, may be called a father, encyclical discipline** a mother; and it is proper to obey each. The injunction of the father is to follow nature, and pursue naked truth; that of the mother to attend to what is ordained as just in cities and nations by the principal men, who have embraced opinion†† instead of truth. He who obeys both will bear away the prize of victory from all competitors; he who submits to the father, but disregards the mother, will receive the second prize; he who attends to the mother alone

* De Agricultura Noe, 2 (I. 301). See also § 4, p. 303.

† See ib., § 3.

‡ Παροικεῖ σοφίᾳ, οὐ κατοικεῖ.

§ De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini, 10 (I. 170).

|| Cong. erud. gr., 14 (I. 529-30), and the treatise generally. See also De Posteritate Caini, 38 (I. 250); Qu. et Sol. in Gen., III. 19 sqq.

¶ Ὁρθὸς λόγος.

** Παιδεία, a feminine.

†† Δόκησις.

will be honoured with the third; but for him who neglects both there is nothing but discomfiture.*

Having now reached the highest stage of human culture, we must notice the different departments of philosophy itself. Philo accepts the division into physics, ethics, and logic, which, though traceable in the writings of Plato, is said to have been first formulated by his disciple Xenocrates.† It was adopted also by the Peripatetics and Stoics, and passed probably from the latter to Philo. At least he avails himself of the Stoical comparison of philosophy to a field, in which the trees and plants correspond with physics; the fruits, for the sake of which the plants exist, with ethics; and the fence with logic.‡ Hence it is apparent that the highest rank is assigned to ethics, and that the other two departments derive all their value from their connection with this. The study of nature must come next, since it contributes directly to the production of ethics, as the tree to the growth of the fruit. Logic must take the lowest place, because it has no organic connection with either ethics or physics, but merely serves as their strongest protection, through its power of exposing sophisms and presenting unquestionable demonstrations.§ Philo accordingly expresses his undisguised contempt for those who pursue speculative philosophy as an end in itself. Like physicians who treat diseases with words instead of medicine, surgery, and diet, they are mere dealers in words, and have no desire to heal life, which is full of infirmities, but from their earliest years to the latest old age they are not ashamed to engage in verbal disputes, as though blessedness consisted in an endless and aimless meddling with names and phrases, and not in the improvement of character, the fountain of what is human.|| It is especially curious to notice Philo's repeated

* De Ebrietate, 9 (I. 362). † Sextus Emp., Adv. Math., VII. 16, p. 373.

‡ See Sextus, *ib.*, § 17; Diog. Laertius, VII. 40.

§ Agr. Noe, 3 (I. 302). See also De Mutatione Nominum, 10 (I. 589); De Sacrificantiis, 14 (II. 262-3).

|| Congr. erud. gr., 10 (I. 526-7). The same doctrine is succinctly stated in

attacks on astronomy, one of the noblest subdivisions of physics; and we cannot but admit that they betray a certain narrowness of view, when we remember that he was living in the city where Eratosthenes, president of the mathematical school, had decided that the earth was spherical and had approximately determined its dimensions, and where Hipparchus had constructed his great catalogue of fixed stars, had ascertained the true length of the year, and had discovered the precession of the equinox. These great pioneers of exact science were, in his view, only wasting their gifts upon barren speculations. For, in the first place, their inquiries contributed nothing to the true end of human life. The founder of the Hebrew race was versed in these studies, when he still dwelt in Chaldæa, and his name was Abram, "High father,"* a title which denoted that he was a meteorologist, one who lifted himself up from the earth, and investigated the problems of astronomy. Owing to the term "father" Philo has to concede that the examination of these subjects is indicative of a soul capable of producing a perfect offspring, and even the meteorologist is not fruitless of wisdom. He must not, however, linger among these subjects, where he is a philomath rather than a philosopher, but become Abraham, the elect father of sound, that is, the wise mind which generates rational speech. For on what account does one inquire into the rhythmical movements and periods of the stars? Is it merely to meddle with these things themselves? And what benefit could result from such meddling? Can it overcome the desires and passions which drive and confuse the soul? If it does not lead to the possession of virtue, it is as worthless as trees that bear no fruit. It is necessary, therefore, to go on

the Vita Mosis, III. 27 (II. 167) — "True philosophising has been woven together out of three things, purposes and words and deeds, into one species of things adapted to the acquisition and enjoyment of blessedness." We may contrast this with Aristotle's *διὰ τὸ εἶδεναι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι*, . . . καὶ οὐ χρήσιώς τινας ἐνεκέν. . . . *μόνη γὰρ αὐτῇ αὐτῆς ἐνεκὴν ἔστιν*: Met., I. ii. 10 sq.

* Πατήρ μετέωρος.

from physical to ethical philosophy, from the theory of the cosmos to the knowledge of its maker.* But, in the second place, the questions with which astronomy deals are beyond the powers of human thought. Why inquire about the sun, whether it is a foot in diameter, or larger than the whole earth, or many times as large? Or why about the moon, whether it shines with its own or with a borrowed light? "Why do you leap above the clouds when you are walking upon the earth? Why do you say that you can touch the things in the ether, when you are rooted to the solid ground? Why do you dare to draw inferences about things that do not admit of inference?" "These things are too great for your thoughts, since they have obtained more blessed and divine destinies." "They moor themselves to conjectures and guesses, not to the firm-set argument of truth, so that one might even confidently swear that no mortal will ever be able to comprehend clearly any of these things." Ceasing to prate about these sublime objects, attend to what is close at hand; learn to know yourself, your own house, the body in which you dwell.† There is here an interesting inversion of our modern ways of thinking, and there is something refreshing in this vigorous outburst of agnosticism in relation to a science which we have learned to regard as superlatively accurate. It illustrates the tendency in men to become agnostics in subjects to which they are not led by their special aptitudes and training.

This classification of the branches of philosophy would not be complete unless we determined the place of theology. In a passage cited above,‡ the transition from the theory of the cosmos to the knowledge of its Maker is represented as equivalent to that from physics to ethics. From this it is evident that Philo confined physics to cosmology, and found room for

* Mut. Nom., 9-10 (I. 588-9). See also Cherub., 2 (I. 139-40); De Gigantibus, 14 (I. 271).

† Migr. Abr., 33 (I. 465); Somn., I. 4 (I. 624); I. 10 (I. 628-9).

‡ Mut. Nom., 10 (I. 589).

his theology under the head of ethics. The reason for this arrangement is plain. With his faith in a supernatural God he could not follow the example of Chrysippus, who, quite in accordance with his pautheistic system, looked upon inquiries relating to the gods as a subdivision of physics.* On the other hand, "piety, the fairest of possessions," being a moral quality, belonged to ethics, and naturally carried with it that knowledge of the Creator from which it sprung.

The foregoing account suggests to us some general order to regulate our farther progress. Since philosophy had its origin in the contemplation of the heavens, and since the studies of nature and of man respectively conduct us to questions which involve a doctrine of cause or of God, it seems as if we should follow the true concatenation of thought if we start with a consideration of those facts which are revealed to observation and consciousness, and pursue the theories founded on these till they bring us into the presence of metaphysical problems. We must then take up the inquiry into the being and nature of God, and his relation to the universe. We shall thus be led to the doctrine of mediating powers, culminating in the doctrine of the Logos, and, returning with altered vision to the subjects from which we set out, be introduced to cosmological and anthropological topics which cannot be discussed till they are seen in the light of a super-sensible world.

* Plut., *De Repug. Sto.*, c. 9, p. 1035 A. B.

CHAPTER II.

THE UNIVERSE AND THE PROBLEMS IT SUGGESTS.

ACCORDING to Philo the visible universe is the portal by which alone we can enter the invisible, and if we would comprehend the ideal we must be content to start with the material.* Independently of this dictum we cannot but remember how seriously in these later centuries the revolution of science has modified at least some of the outlying problems of philosophy and theology, and if we desire to enter sympathetically into Philo's system we must look forth upon the world with the unassisted eyes and the rude instruments of ancient Alexandria. In the first place, our earth, instead of being a mobile atom which takes its little part amid the vast aggregate of stars, becomes unique in kind, a mighty mass of land and water, collected together as the fixed centre of the universe.† That the earth was spherical is not, so far as I can recollect, expressly stated; it is, however, distinctly implied in the description of the terrestrial zones. The two frigid zones, it is said, are equal to one another and situated at the poles, while the two temperate zones come between these and the torrid zone, one in the north, and the other in the south.‡ This form is also best suited to the theory of the heaven, which was conceived as extending in ever-widening spheres around the earth. The outermost ethereal circle

* Somn., I. 32 (I. 648-9).

† De Plantatione Noe, 1 (I. 329); Confus. Ling., 30 (I. 428); Vita Mosis, III. 9 (II. 150).

‡ Quis rerum divinarum heres, 29 (I. 493).

acted as boundary and preservative for everything within it, from which circumstance heaven probably derived its name, *οὐρανός*, from *ὄρος*.* We are not, however, to infer from the existence of this boundary that, even compared with the revelations of our astronomy, Philo's universe was of insignificant dimensions. On the contrary, he declares that the heaven is infinitely large,† for it is not circumscribed either by empty space or by material substance, and is not measured by any measures which come into our calculation, and probably, because it is circular and perfectly elaborated into a sphere, it does not partake of length and breadth.‡ The latter suggestion may be difficult for us to grasp, but the whole passage proves that, in Philo's view, the spacious dome which rose above his head reached into distances which were immeasurable even in thought. Thus he appears to answer his own question whether this outermost sphere was possessed of depth, or was only a surface without depth;§ for on the inner side it hemmed in the cosmos, like a city, and formed a definite circumference.|| When he affirms, in connection with this circumference, that the cosmical objects are not infinite,¶ we need not consider this statement as contradictory of that already made, for the outer sphere might widen into incalculable depths and yet, since it was of an indivisible nature and constituted a unity in itself,** it might nevertheless be the limiting wall of the universal city. We must remember, however, that in Philo's opinion these subjects could only be treated conjecturally, and

* Plant. Noc, 1 (I. 330).

† 'Απειρομεγέθης.

‡ Quis rer. div. her., 47 (I. 505). In this passage he says that God is its boundary, and therefore, like him, it is uncircumscribed. Probably this is one of Philo's grand phrases to which we are not to attach any very distinct meaning; for we have no other reason to suppose that he looked upon God as an infinitely extended substance round about the universe. Elsewhere he says that outside the universe there must be *ἡ κενόν ἢ μηδέν*, and, as a *κενόν* would leave it without support, it is held together by God's eternal law: Plant. Noc, 2 (I. 330 sq.).

§ Somn., I. 4 (I. 623). || Spec. Leg., III. 34 (II. 331). ¶ 'Απειρα, *ibid.*

** De Decem Oraculis, 21 (II. 198); Quis rer. div. her., 48 (I. 505).

he may possibly have wavered in his conception to suit the metaphysical idea or the allegorical fancy which was uppermost in his mind. At all events, this most distant sphere was that of the fixed stars, and was called "unerring"* because, though it was not without motion, its motion was uniform, being simply the diurnal revolution from east to west.†

Immediately within this all-encompassing region of stars came the divided portion of the heaven, second both in power and rank, and presided over by the number seven. This inner sphere, being partitioned six times, contained the seven circles of the planets. Nothing heavenly can really err, but these stars were called the erring ones because they revolve in a direction opposite to that of the undivided sphere, and were hence improperly named by thoughtless men, who attributed their own error to the heavenly bodies, which never leave the order of the divine army.‡ In addition, however, to this motion, which, as being special to themselves, is described as voluntary, they had also an enforced movement by which they participated in the daily revolution of the outer sphere.§ This much might seem to be determined by observation, but the arrangement assigned to the planets is admitted to be only conjectural. Those appear to Philo to give the best guess who have assigned to the sun the middle rank, and placed above it Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars (or, to translate their Greek names, the Illuminator, the Shiner, the Fiery); below it Mercury (the Glistener), Venus (the Light-bearer or Morning-bearer), and the moon, the neighbour of the air. His reasons are, apparently, twofold. The golden candlestick prepared for the tabernacle symbolized the planets, the central stem being the sun, while the three branches on each side represented the subordinate luminaries. Besides this the sun, on account of its size and the benefits which it conferred upon

* Ἀπλανής. As we shall see, the Greek word suggested a moral idea, which I have sought to render in the translation.

† Cherub., 7 (I. 142), and the other passages just referred to.

‡ Dec. Orac., 21 (II. 198).

§ Cherub., I.e.

the earth, was of central dignity and attended by the other planets as by a body-guard. Within this retinue a farther distinction was observed. Mercury and Venus moved with the same speed as the sun, while the periods of the rest were unequal, though not without definite proportions to that of the solar group and to one another.* When we add that the equinoctial circles of the spring and autumn, treated not as identical but as parallel, the summer and winter tropics,† and the zodiac, as the path of the sun and moon,‡ had been traced in the sky, we have completed our picture of the general structure of Philo's universe, and are now able, with imagination less scientific than falls to our lot in these modern times, to gaze up into his glorious Egyptian skies, and see them rising, circle on circle, and sphere on sphere, into immeasurable magnitude, and wonder at the prodigious velocity with which they move on their vast diurnal march.

We must next consider the composition and character of the universe and its principal parts. Philo accepts the current division of matter into four elements—fire, air, earth, water—out of which the cosmos was compounded.§ These elements are described as “foundations,”|| “principles and powers,”¶ and “roots”** of the cosmos. They all alike come under the category of substance or body,†† but are distinguished from one another by the possession of contrasted qualities. First, if we are to trust the Armenian version, they are distinguished by the mathematical forms ascribed to them by Plato, fire

* Quis rer. div. her., 45 (I. 504); Cherub., 7 (I. 142,) where the order is given as the Sun, Venus, Mercury; Vita Mosis, III. 9 (II. 150-1).

† Quis rer. div. her., 29 (I. 493).

‡ Somn., II. 16 (I. 673).

§ Cherub., 35 (I. 162), and other passages too numerous to cite, at least 15.

|| Quis rer. div. her., 27 (I. 492).

¶ Ἀρχαί τε καὶ δυνάμεις, ib., 57 (I. 513); ἀρχαί also Quod deterius potiori insidari soleat, 42 (I. 220); δυνάμεις also Post. Caini, 2 (I. 227); Quis rer. div. her., 30 (I. 494).

** Πίζας, Plant. Noe, 28 (I. 347).

†† Οὐσία, σῶμα, Quis rer. div. her., 57 (I. 513); Somn., I. 3 and 4 (I. 622-3).

being pyramidal, air octahedral, water icosahedral, and earth cubical.* Of their geometrical properties, however, no farther use is made, and Philo dwells rather on their physical characteristics. By these they are at once separated into two groups, air and fire being light and rare, earth and water dense and heavy. Each group, again, forms an antithesis, the light dividing into cold and hot, the heavy into wet and dry.† And, once more, each single element falls into a dual distribution, earth into continents and islands, water into sea and rivers, air into the changes of summer and winter, and, what is more important, fire into the useful, which, though suited for culinary and heating purposes, is insatiable and destructive, and the preservative or salutary,‡ which has been assigned to the composition of the sky and serves for illumination.§ What is farther said about the various divisions and kinds of earth and water possesses little interest, as it relates only to matters of the commonest observation, but the account of air claims more of a scientific character. It, we are told, has a ductile|| nature, yielding to surrounding bodies which stand in its way, being an organ of life, respiration, seeing, hearing, and the other senses, admitting condensation and rarefaction, motion and rest, and by its variety of changes producing the four seasons. Our knowledge of these things, if not easily attained, is guaranteed by our senses, and, therefore, occupies a very

* Qu. et Sol. in Gen., III. 49.

† Quis rer. div. her., 27 (I. 492); § 41, p. 501; § 57, p. 514; Quod det. pot. ins., 42 (I. 220); Qu. et Sol. in Gen., I. 64. In the Armenian version earth and water are represented as feminine, because they are "material" and susceptible, and air as masculine, because it is a moving and active cause: Qu. et Sol. in Gen., III. 3. This is stated in explanation of the heifer, the she-goat, and the ram in Gen. xv. 9, and seems to me open to suspicion, both because it differs totally from the explanation of the same passage in Quis rer. div. her., 22 (I. 487-8), and because Philo's philosophy of matter and of God would hardly have allowed him to accept this distinction among the elements.

‡ Σωτήριον.

§ Quis rer. div. her., 27 (I. 492), and for the last distinction also Vita Mos., III. 17 (II. 157).

|| 'Ολκός, which, I think, we must here understand in a passive sense.

different position from our theory respecting the nature of the sky.* Venturing, however, into this more obscure region, we learn that the air, filling the whole intervening space, extends from the lunar sphere to the earth.† Its colour is black.‡ But we must not hastily conclude from this statement that the contemporaries of Philo were colour-blind and supposed that the earth was for ever enfolded by a sable sky. The sky, we must remember, began with the lunar sphere, which, as we have just learned, lay immediately beyond the air, and Philo believed that it was symbolized by the two emeralds,§ one for each hemisphere, on the shoulders of the high-priest. One of his reasons is furnished by the resemblance in colour, and, though to us it may appear odd to compare the blue sky to a green stone, we must make allowance for the exigencies of allegory, and admit at all events that the brilliant hue of the heaven is thereby broadly distinguished from the blackness of the air which lay beneath.|| Indeed, it was this distinction, resting on an unscientific visual judgment, which supported the astronomy of the time, for the blue seems to form a complete hemisphere at a definite distance from our point of view, and nothing was more natural than the inference that it marked the beginning of a substance different from the atmosphere. If we ask why the air was supposed to be black, and not simply transparent and colourless, we may, I think, find the explanation in the blackness of night. When the solar fire is withdrawn and not even the stars' ethereal light trembles through the gloom, we see the air as it really is, the dun organ of a radiance which it transmits but cannot hold. It is some support of this explanation that Philo regards the "darkness" which, in the hour of creation, lay

* Somn., I. 3, 4 (I. 623).

† Ib., 22 (I. 641); Mund. Op., 9 (I. 7); Vita Mos., III. 12 (II. 153); De Monarchia, II. 5 (II. 225-6).

‡ Cong. erud. gr., 21 (I. 536); Somn., I. 22 (I. 642); and several other passages.

§ Σμάραγδοι.

|| Vita Mos., III. 12 (II. 153).

“upon the face of the deep,” as an allegory for the air.* In connection with this element we have only to remark further that it was not regarded as an unalterable substance. In relating how, after the consecration of Aaron, a flame fell upon the altar, Philo suggests that this may have been a fragment either of the purest ether or “of air resolved into fire in conformity with the natural change of the elements.”† This particular transformation might be deduced from the phenomena of lightning, but from the breadth of the expression we may probably infer that Philo followed here the Stoical physics, and regarded all the elements as mutually interchangeable.‡ At all events, as we shall see, he believed that they were only different forms of the same original matter.

In relation to fire, the principal question which presents itself is whether Philo really confined himself to four elements, or admitted with Aristotle§ the existence of a fifth, which he called ether. The latter position is maintained without misgiving by Soulier on the authority of a single passage in the Armenian version, and of two passages in the Greek, which he refers to, but does not quote or examine.|| A full consideration of the evidence does not seem to me to justify us in ascribing this to Philo, at least as a permanent opinion. According to the Armenian version, the fact that in preparing the sacrifice, of which an account is given in Genesis xv. 9 sqq., Abraham did not divide the birds symbolizes the fifth nature or substance, of which it is said the heaven is made; for the four elements are mixtures rather than elements, the earth, for instance, containing portions of water, air, and fire, while the

* *Mundi Op.*, 7 (I. 6).

† *Vita Mos.*, III. 18 (II. 158).

‡ See also his reference to the “changes of the elements into one another” in the treatise *De Providentia*, II., § 100, preserved in Greek by Euseb., *Præp. Ev.*, VIII. 14, § 36; Mangey, II. 643.

§ *De coelo*, I. iii. 13.

|| *La Doctrine du Logos chez Philon d'Alexandrie*; Rome, Turin, Florence 1876, p. 32.

fifth substance is alone unmixed and pure.* This is a singularly weak and confused statement. The elements are no less elements because they are generally found mixed together; and if the heaven differs from the rest of the universe only in purity, it does not thereby become a fifth essence. The passage, moreover, appears open to suspicion because a completely different explanation of the same event is given in the treatise *Quis rerum divinarum heres*,† according to which the two birds represent the indivisible human mind‡ and its archetype, and with these is compared, not the whole heaven, but only the sphere of the fixed stars in express contrast with that of the planets. Nothing is said about the purity or mixture of the elements, which really has nothing to do with the division of bodies into large and separate parts. Soulier might, however, have appealed to a stronger passage farther on, where it is said that the heaven is made of a fifth (element), and partakes of a wonderful and divine essence, according to which it is unchangeable, while sublunary things, composed of the four elements, are subject to generation and corruption.§ This also has nothing corresponding to it in the parallel passage in the Greek;|| and whereas, in the Armenian, God is the measure only of incorporeal ideas, in the Greek he is declared to be the measure of all things, corporeal and incorporeal. The representation of the accompanying powers also, and of their function as measures of things, is quite different in the two cases. Some may think, too, that the reference to God as appearing “like a trinity in unity” does not help to raise the Armenian above suspicion. However, allowing these passages to stand for what they are worth, let us examine how far the doctrine of a fifth element is sanctioned by the surviving Greek treatises.

In the first place, we have already called attention to Philo’s

* Qu. et Sol. in Gen., III. 6.

† 48 (I. 505).

‡ Νοῦς, λόγος.

§ Qu. et Sol. in Gen., IV. 8.

|| De SS. Abelis et Caini, 15 (I. 173).

repeated references to the four elements, and to his division of fire, as one of these four, into the useful and the salutary, the latter being assigned to the heaven. This division, we saw, is parallel to a corresponding division of the other elements, such as that of water into salt and fresh. Again, Philo not only speaks repeatedly of the four elements of which the cosmos is composed, but in certain passages he emphasizes their application to the entire scene of things, and avails himself of their number as a reason for certain injunctions in the Mosaic Law. They are “the roots of the universe.”* They were the same in number as the seasons; and accordingly the fruit of trees became holy in the fourth year,† and, what is more important for the present inquiry, the heavenly bodies were said to have been created on the fourth day.‡ The four spices of which the incense was compounded are pronounced to be symbols of the elements (which are named) “out of which the whole collective cosmos§ was completed.”|| The four materials used for the curtains of the Tabernacle¶ had the same signification, the linen standing for the earth from which it grew; the hyacinth (rendered “blue” in our version) for the air, which is black; the purple for water, from which comes the shell-fish that produces the dye; and the scarlet for fire, which it resembles. These materials were selected out of the indefinite number available for the purpose, because it was necessary in preparing an edifice for the Father and Sovereign of the whole to take substances similar to those with which he made the universe.** In like manner, “the elements of the universe,†† earth and water and air and fire,” which had been employed for producing the totality of things,‡‡ were used as instruments of punishment in the ten plagues of Egypt.§§ And, once more, we are told that

* Τοῦ παντός.

† Lev. xix. 24.

‡ Plantat. Noe, 28 (I. 347).

§ Σύμπας ὁ κόσμος.

|| Quis rer. div. her., 41 (I. 500-1).

¶ Ex. xxvi. 1.

** Τὸ ὅλον. Cong. erud. gr., 21 (I. 536); Vita Mosis, III. 6 (II. 148-9).

†† Τοῦ παντός.

‡‡ Τῶν ὅλων.

§§ Vita Mos., I. 17 (II. 95-6).

"the entire cosmos* was completed" out of the four elements which are found in the composition of man.† Agreeably to this theory, the ether is declared to be "a sacred fire, an inextinguishable flame." This is indicated by its very name, which comes from *αἶθρην*, the same as *καίειν*, to burn.‡ Evidence of the fact is afforded by one portion of the heavenly pyre, the sun, which, though it is so far distant, warms or consumes with its rays both the earth and the naturally frigid air.§ Soulier strangely refers to this passage without any perception that it contradicts the doctrine of a fifth element, and sanctions Stoical instead of Aristotelian physics. Following this theory Philo occasionally substitutes "heaven" for fire in his enumeration of the elements. Thus he says that, as the servants of Abraham and Isaac dug four wells, so there are "in the cosmos earth and water and air and heaven, these four."|| In the continuation of the passage about the plagues of Egypt, "air and heaven" are opposed to "water and earth,"¶ and farther on, "fire" once more takes the place of "heaven."** In the third book of the Life of Moses "heaven" is made interchangeable with ether, and rains down "fire upon the rebels."†† These passages can leave no doubt as to Philo's prevailing opinion; but a few statements seem to point in a different direction.

Soulier curiously includes among his references a passage on the authority of which he asserts that souls are made of the fifth element.‡‡ Now, the statement which is here made

* "Ὀλος ὁ κόσμος.

† Dec. Orae., 8 (II. 185).

‡ Aristotle, agreeably to his different view, derives it *ἀπὸ τοῦ θείου αἵ.*

§ Confus. Ling., 30 (I. 428). See also Plantat. Noe, 1 (I. 330), where fire, the hot element, is placed upon air, the cold.

|| Somn., I. 3 (I. 622). See also Spec. Leg., III. 20 (II. 318).

¶ Vita Mos., I. 20 (II. 98).

** § 26, p. 103.

†† 38 (II. 178). See also § 31, p. 171, where again heaven is one of the four elements. Similarly ether is substituted for fire in Praem. et Poen., 6 (II. 414), where, however, earth and water and air and ether are not spoken of as the elements.

‡‡ Quod Deus immutabilis sit, 10 (I. 279).

does not relate to souls, but only to one species of soul—the human mind,* and it makes no allusion to a fifth element. It affirms that the mind was not made out of the same elements as the rest of the world,† but of a purer and better substance, out of which the divine natures were fabricated. In other words, it was not material. The elements are not specified, and the passage has no bearing on our question. A passage overlooked by Sonlier is much more to the point. The high-priest's dress represents the cosmos, the long dark robe representing the black extended air, its flowery portions the earth, its pomegranates water,‡ and its bells the harmony of earth and water. These “three elements” are properly symbolized by the single robe, because they, as subject to change, are of one kind, in contrast with the heaven, of which the ephod is the symbol. In this full account we have still the four elements; but in the brief summary farther on we unexpectedly find in addition “fire” represented by the “scarlet.” As the scarlet is one of the colours of the ephod, and as no use is made of the other colours, this new type is quite unsuitable; and one must almost suspect the words *πυρὸς τὸ κόκκινον* of being a corruption, introduced from the not very remote account of the curtains of the Tabernacle by someone who thought that fire ought to be mentioned. If we allow the words to stand, we must simply regard the enumeration as loosely and hastily made; and in the absence of a specified number, and of the term “element,” we cannot permit it to stand in opposition to the express statements cited above.§

In another place, where Philo is speaking of the living beings which inhabited each of the elemental parts of the cosmos, he mentions both fire and heaven. But it is his object to show that life was to be found everywhere throughout the universe; he does not say that fire and heaven were

* Νοῦς.

† Τὰ ἄλλα.

‡ Ποῖσσι from ῥύσις.

§ Vita Mos., III. 11, 12, 14 (II. 151-3 and 155).

different elements ; and on the supposition of their unity, they were still sufficiently distinct in nature, locality, and the kind of creatures by which they were said to be peopled, to call for separate mention, just as in place of water he speaks of "sea and rivers."*

In the only other passage appealed to by Soulier the doctrine of a fifth element is explicitly referred to. "Let there be,"† it is said, "in conformity with the doctrine‡ of the ancients, a certain fifth circular substance, different from the four in superiority, out of which the stars and the whole heaven were thought to have been made,§ of which accordingly it is to be supposed the human soul also is a piece."|| The guarded and hypothetical character of this statement must strike even the reader who pays no attention to the context ; but when we look back to the previous page, and find that the whole exposition is adduced, without a word of approval, as the opinion of "some people,"¶ we can only wonder that it should be seriously cited as an evidence of Philo's belief. One passage remains. The possibility of the heavens being "a fifth circular body, participating in none of the four elements," is suggested as an alternative to its being "the purest fire." But the question thus suggested is declared, with many others, to be beyond our solution, and we might suppose that Philo was at least divided in his opinion. Yet, strange to say, as though he had forgotten this particular suggestion, which occurs near the beginning of a long list, he gives his decision in the very act of declaring that no decision can be made. He says, "All these and such things, belonging as they do to the fourth and best body in the cosmos, heaven, are obscure and incomprehensible"; and again, he describes the whole inquiry as that relating to "heaven, the fourth of the things in the cosmos." He had good reason ; for was

* Gigant., 2 (I. 263). See also Plantat. Noe, 3 (I. 331).

† "ἔστω.

‡ Λόγος.

§ "Ἐδοξε γεγενῆσθαι.

|| Ἀπόσπασμα. Quis. rer. div. her., 57 (I. 514).

¶ Τινίς.

not this sky, which one might swear no one could ever comprehend, the fourth of Abraham's wells—the well of the oath?*

This is rather a tedious discussion of a subordinate point; but it has been needful, in order to conduct us to a sound conclusion, and it has not been without an incidental value in giving us a clearer insight into Philo's method. He was too well educated to embrace doctrines opposed to the established science of his day; but in matters which were scientifically uncertain he allowed his judgment to be determined by the sense of Scripture as ascertained through allegorical interpretation. In the present instance, if we are content with the evidence of his writings which have been preserved in the original language, it is apparent that he held consistently the doctrine of four elements, one of which, fire, was the substance of the heaven.† The purity of heaven, "the holiest part of the substance of things,"‡ is frequently referred to. The earth, considered in itself, is worthy of our regard, but in comparison with ether is as inferior as darkness to light, as night to day, as corruption to incorruption, and as a mortal to a god.§ Of this purest substance the heavenly bodies are portions, being, with one exception, wholly compacted of it. The moon, which adjoins the air, is said to be a mixture of ethereal and ærial substance, and the black portion, which some call a face, is only the intermingled air.||

From this general division of the cosmical substance we pass

* Somn., I. 4 (I. 623-4). The incomprehensibility of heaven as the fourth thing in the cosmos, the other three being air and earth and water, is again dwelt upon in § 6.

† If we consider the Armenian a correct representative of his lost work, we can only say that it expresses his earlier and less settled opinion.

‡ Monarchia, II. 1 (II. 222).

§ Θεοῦ without the article. Philo does not, probably, mean the Supreme. Vita Mos., III. 24 (II. 164). See also Mundi Op., 39 (I. 28); 7 (I. 6); Legum Allegoriarum, III. 56 (I. 119); Decem Orac., 25 (II. 202); 29 (II. 205); De Justitia, 14 (II. 374); De Humanitate, 6 (II. 389), &c.

|| Somn., I. 22 (I. 642).

to another mode of distribution, which is the more interesting because it introduces us to a philosophical view of the universe. According to this the order of nature, owing to the genesis of things from one another, is governed by necessary reason, and, beginning with that which is meanest, ends with that which is best of all. Philo follows here the Mosaic account of the creation of animals, which proceeds from fishes, through birds and beasts, up to man; but it is a curious coincidence with modern science that he compares this process with the growth of an embryo, without, however, drawing a detailed parallel between the two lines of development.* This movement of nature is accomplished by successive acts of differentiation, the results of which are observable in the objects around us. First of all, things are divided into animate and inanimate.† Each of these, again, falls into two main subdivisions. The inanimate are distinguished into those which remain unaltered and those which move, not by change of locality, but by inward growth. The latter class includes only living plants, for Philo reckons logs separated from the parent trees among the former. The strong bond of unchanging substances is a habit‡ or permanent condition, which is defined as “a spirit turning back upon itself.”§ This spirit begins from the middle and stretches itself to the extremities, and, having touched the surface, bends back again until it arrives at the same place from which it started. Its continual double course is imperishable,|| and its greatness and splendour are proved by the imitation of racers at triennial games. Plants are distinguished by the possession of a higher characteristic, namely, “nature” or organism,¶ which comprises the powers of nutrition, change, and growth. That they require nutrition is proved by the results of watering them or neglecting to do so. Their capacity for change is exemplified by the withered and fallen leaves of winter, nature’s breathing-time, and the recovered

* Mundi Op., 21, 22 (I. 14, 15).

§ Πνεῦμα ἀναστρέφον ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ.

† Ἐμψυχα and ἄψυχα.

|| Ἄφθαρτος.

‡ Ἐξίς.

¶ Φύσις.

bloom of spring and summer, when the folded and silent energy awakes as from a deep sleep, to produce at last the perfect fruit of autumn. This reminds us of the division of plants into wild and cultivated, the one class affording food to the lower animals, the other to man. Rising now into the animated realm, we at once observe the distinction of rational and irrational. The latter, however, possess in common with the former certain characteristics which separate them from plants. Soul* differs from nature or mere organism through the presence of three attributes—perception, mental representation, and impulse. To these man and higher beings add reason and free preferential power. It will be more convenient to consider these terms when we come to Philo's anthropology. Meanwhile, continuing our classification, we divide the irrational creatures into wild and tame, and the rational into mortal and immortal. Finally, our mortal race separates itself into men and women. It is not yet time to discuss the full significance of these facts; but we may observe that this process of differentiation, by which the vast variety of nature is formed out of the four elements, is characteristic of reason, whose function it is to discriminate.†

Before leaving this classification, we must notice the scientific conception of the mode in which the successive characteristics with which we have been dealing are produced. If we omit the human reason from our survey, they are in every instance due to the presence of air. The word "spirit," therefore, in connection with inorganic substances must be used in its strictly physical sense. It is the same element which becomes permanent "habit" in motionless bodies, "nature" in plants, and "soul" in animals.‡

In the foregoing account of nature's ascending scale we saw that the summit was occupied by immortal beings. The

* $\Psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$.

† Quis rer. div. her., 27 (I. 492); Quod Deus immutabilis, 7-10 (I. 277-9).

‡ Somn., I. 22 (I. 641).

existence of these, though not open to direct observation, was deemed capable of scientific proof; and while we postpone the speculations regarding their function and destiny, we may notice here that part of Philo's doctrine which challenges the attention of natural philosophy. Air and fire were believed to be "most fruitful of souls."* That the air was the "house of incorporeal souls" was proved by different lines of evidence. First, every other part of the universe open to our observation was tenanted by suitable beings, earth, sea, and rivers by the various land and aquatic tribes, even fire by animals which it generated, said to be found especially in Macedonia, and heaven by the stars, which, as we shall see, were supposed to be alive. The air, therefore, the remaining portion of the universe, must likewise be full of living beings. And what if these are undiscoverable by sense? Air itself is invisible; soul, too, is a thing invisible, and it is necessary that it should be apprehended only by mind, that like may be seen by like. Again, air seems better suited than earth and water for the support of life; for it is air which endows with soul the denizens of these grosser elements. Without air and breath they cannot live, and while they pine in disease when the air is vitiated, they gain health and vigour from the pure breezes of the north. It is not to be imagined, therefore, that this sustaining element is alone a desert; rather, like a populous city, it holds immortal citizens, souls equal in number to the stars.†

The ether, too, was peopled with intelligent natures. In spite of his firm persuasion of the conjectural character of all astronomical speculation, this view was held by Philo without any apparent misgiving, and he rejects with scorn the supposition that the stars were only masses of earth filled with fire—persons who entertained such a notion were themselves worthy of prison and the mill, where red-hot instruments were kept for the punishment of the impious.‡ This confidence is the

* Vita Mosis, I. 17 (II. 96).

† Somn., I. 22 (I. 641); Gigant., 2 (I. 263).

‡ Somn., I. 4 (I. 623)

more strange, as he does not profess to base it even upon plausible evidence. From his allusions, however, we may probably gather the true order of his thought. In the scale of natural objects we did not meet with motion involving change of place till we passed from plants to animals. Now, the ceaseless motion of the heavenly bodies strongly impressed the imagination; and if this motion seemed to be less spontaneous in the case of the fixed stars, which were carried round by the revolution of the entire sky, the planets at least appeared to move of themselves, and so exhibited the most marked characteristic of animated existence.* This suggestion, borrowed from observation, comes to the support of an *a priori* thought. The great cosmical city must have had citizens prior to man, and what could these be but rational, divine natures, some incorporeal, but others, as the stars, not without bodies?† The bodies of these living stars were, as we have seen, believed to be composed of ether or fire, the purest of the elements; and therefore, if the heavenly orbs were animated at all, they must have belonged to the purest and highest order of dependent existence. Accordingly, they are declared to be unmixed and divine souls. Each of them is purest mind, and hence is explained their circular motion, for this movement is most akin to mind.‡ Owing to their purity they escape the taint to which the mingled nature of man is liable. They participate in virtue alone, and are wholly unsusceptible of evil.§ In brief, they are sharers in a “divine and happy and blessed nature,” and as such are incapable of error,|| and thus the sky becomes the “most sacred abode of manifest and perceptible gods.”¶

This poetical science of the stars conducts us to the music of

* See Plantat. Noe, 3 (I. 331).

† Mundi Op., 50 (I. 34).

‡ Gigant., 2 (I. 263).

§ Mundi Op., 24 (I. 17).

|| Decem Orac., 21 (II. 198).

¶ Mundi Op., 7 (I. 6). Here Müller reads ἀφανῶν, instead of Mangey's ἐμφανῶν, and supposes the reference of this first epithet to be to the invisible powers of God (Des Juden Philo Buch von der Weltschöpfung, p. 29 sq.).

the spheres. Two things are capable of celebrating the praises of God—heaven and mind. The heaven always sings, rendering sweetest melody by the movements of the beings in it; and if the sound of this supernal strain could reach our ears, such ungovernable longing would possess us that we should abstain from our necessary food and drink, and, like men who are going to be immortalized, nourish ourselves henceforth on the inspired songs of perfect music. Listening to these, it is said, Moses touched neither bread nor water for forty days and forty nights. Thus heaven is the divine organ, the archetype of music, and following music's perfect laws the planets and fixed stars move on their choral dance.* We cannot better sum up this portion of our subject than in the words of our own great dramatist—

“ Look how the floor of heaven
Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold;
There's not the smallest orb, which thou behold'st,
But in his motion like an angel sings,
Still quiring to the young-eyed cherubims;
Such harmony is in immortal souls;
But, whilst this muddy vesture of decay
Doth grossly close it in, we cannot hear it.”

We have now completed our survey of the material universe external to man, as it appeared to the eyes of Philo. It hardly requires to be remarked that the conception which he entertained of the scene amid which he lived was in no respect original, but had been wrought out by the genius of Greece, and simply appropriated by this eager student of a literature so unlike that of his own people. But a thoughtful mind could not rest in a conception conformed merely to the visible aspect of things, but was driven on to philosophical inquiries to which it was possible for different answers to be returned; and in making a selection among these Philo, although the views which he preferred always appeared to him the most rational,

* Somn., I. 6-7 (I. 625-6), with which compare Quaest. et Sol. in Gen., III. 3; Mundi Op., 23 (I. 16); Vita Mos., III. 9 (II. 151); Human., 3 (II. 387).

was necessarily governed by dogmatic considerations. The grand boundaries of the Mosaic teaching were too plain to be transgressed; but even those conclusions which were inevitable were approached by a philosophical path, and justified before the bar of reason.

The first question which naturally suggests itself in connection with the above scheme of things is this—Is the universe really a whole? Are phenomena so multifarious really bound together in the unity of a single organism, or are they the random and disjointed play of mutually independent objects? To the devout believer in Hebrew monotheism only one answer was possible; but here at least the science even of that time was in complete accord with the anticipations of faith, deviating from it only in its pantheistic conception of that ordered unity which it expressed by the word *cosmos*. It was the study of the heavens, we may well suppose, which first taught the observer to recognize unity in the midst of multiplicity. The vast numbers of the stars, instead of shooting off each upon its separate path, move with harmonious order like a mighty and invincible host;* and who could watch their steadfast march from year to year without feeling that they belonged to one another, and were bound together by some mysterious power or law? A further step would soon be taken, and the earth be brought into the embrace of the great system by which it was surrounded; for the heavenly bodies not only shed down their light upon this lower world, and revolved around it at unvarying distances, but were obviously connected with its periodic changes. Accordingly, Philo assigns to the Chaldæans, who, more than the rest of mankind, were devoted to the study of astronomy, the honour of pointing out the relation of earthly things to those on high, and of heavenly things to those on earth, indicating thus the most musical harmony of the whole, arising from the communion and sympathy of the parts with one another, parts

* See for the expression Dec. Orac., 12 (II. 189).

which, though separated locally, were not divided in kin. While dissenting, as we shall see, from another portion of the Chaldaean doctrine, he frankly accepts this as in apparent agreement with the teaching of Moses.* The heavenly bodies are said, in the first place, to rule over those natures which are contained in the air between the earth and the moon. This thought is not expanded; but it is apparently suggested by the obvious dependence of the seasons, with their varying aërial temperature, on the periodic movements of the sun. The way, too, in which air, naturally so dark, became all aglow with borrowed radiance, betokened a near affinity between it and the luminous orbs above, and when the softer gleam of night followed the fiery day, it might well seem that the moon took up, as "minister and successor of the sun," his care for lower things.† But the very mystery attaching to the stars would cause the ascription to them of a wider, if an occult, sway; and we need not be surprised at the current saying that the nature of all things on earth subsisted through their influence.‡ Without committing himself to so sweeping a statement, Philo declares that earthly things have been made dependent on the heavenly by a kind of natural sympathy,§ and in different places he enumerates the points of connection. The most obvious influence is of course that of light, through which alone the innumerable qualities of bodies, and the various kinds of colours and forms become apparent. But the heavenly bodies also exhibit signs of future events; for by their rising, or setting, or eclipses, or, again, their appearances and occultations, men conjecture what will take place, productiveness and failure of crops, births and deaths of animals, clear and clouded skies, calms and storms, fulness and emptiness of rivers, tranquil and billowy sea, and interchanges of the seasons, such as a wintry summer or a hot winter. Some have even foretold earthquakes from movements in the sky.

* *Migrat. Abr.*, 32 (I. 464).

† *Quis rer. div. her.*, 57 (I. 513).

‡ *Monarchia*, I. 1 (II. 213-14).

§ *Mundi Op.*, 40 (I. 28).

The influence which is thus indicated is attributed chiefly to the planets, which "exhibit most sympathy towards air and earth." They occasion the seasons, and are, though not exclusively, the measures of time, of days, months, and years; and from the lapse of time, day succeeding day, the nature of number was learned. From these real and supposed instances of connection between earth and sky Philo draws the large conclusion, "the signs of all the things on earth have been posted up in heaven."*

It is evident that the line of speculation which is here traced, though it leads to the grand truth of an organic sympathy between the most distant parts of the cosmos, might easily be pushed to a superstitious extreme. Philo himself affirms, without misgiving, that eclipses "are intimations either of the death of kings or the destruction of cities."† It will have been observed, however, that in the above examples he never subordinates human actions to the mysterious control of the stars; and while he accepts what he calls the astronomy of the Chaldæans, he no less emphatically rejects their astrology, or art of casting nativities. This was based on a pantheistic conception, according to which the visible universe was either itself God or contained God within it as its soul, fate and necessity were deified, and good and ill were entirely dependent on the fixed periods of the stars. A view which thus destroyed at a blow both theism and human responsibility could not but appear to Philo a tissue of impiety, and he brushes away its fundamental postulate as wholly absurd and untenable.‡

The principle of mutual dependence which we have learned from the heavens Philo extends to the entire sphere of things. No individual object is perfect, so as to be without need of anything else; and each in its endeavour to obtain what it

* *Monarchia*, II. 5 (II. 226); *Mundi Op.*, 19 (I. 13) and § 38, p. 27-8.

† *Fragment on Providence*, II. 643 end.

‡ *Migrat. Abr.*, I. c.; *Quis rer. div. her.*, 20 (I. 486).

requires is of necessity brought near to that which is able to supply its want. Thus interchanging and commingling, coming into communion and harmony, like a lyre which yields its tune from dissimilar notes, things were destined to sound in unison, all, through all, undergoing a kind of mutual bestowal and requital, with a view to the completion of the entire cosmos. This conception of universal harmony and reciprocal benefit is illustrated by a number of examples which present no special feature on which we need pause; they are summed up in the comprehensive statement that each is in want of each, and all of all.*

Thus an intellectual apprehension of the scene around us introduces an ideal element into our conception, and we now survey, not a mass of unrelated phenomena, but a cosmos with its fixed and orderly ways. Equality, "the mother of justice," "has ordered all things well, things in heaven and things on earth, by immovable laws and ordinances," as witness days and nights, which balance one another in the course of the year, the equal periods of the waxing and the waning moon, and the seasons with their equal number of months.† There is a consecution and proportion of all things, which maintains an indissoluble series;‡ there are powers, an invisible bond of unity, by which the parts, locally separated, are joined in one;§ there is an everlasting law, which stretches from the centre to the circumference, and from the extremities to the centre, constituting a bond of the universe that cannot be broken.||

Various figures are employed to express the organic unity at which we have arrived. The cosmos is the all-bearing plant, of which the elements, with their contrasted properties, are the shoots.¶ It is "the greatest and most perfect

* Cherub., 31 (I. 159).

† Justitia, 14 (II. 373-4).

‡ Mutat. Nom., 23 (I. 598).

§ Migrat. Abr., 39 (I. 471).

|| Plantat. Noe, 2 (I. 330-1). For the idea of laws, see also Mundi Op., 19 (I. 13).

¶ Plantat. Noe, 1 (I. 330).

man,"* man on his side being a microcosm,† and having his soul fashioned after the pattern of the heavenly spheres.‡ Again, it is a vast city, with its well-ordered government and duly subordinated authorities, with one polity and one law.§ Or, lastly, it is the supreme and real temple of God, having for its shrine the holiest part, the heaven, the stars for votive offerings, and for its priests incorporeal souls, the ministering angels of the divine powers.||

Our first question is now fully answered. The scene amid which we live is an organized whole, and Philo accepts without qualification, at least for our cosmos, the dictum that "all things are one."¶

Our next problem relates to the perfection of the universe. This perfection is invariably assumed by Philo; but it is asserted rather as a philosophical axiom than as a theory requiring to be proved. "It was fitting that the greatest of works should be made most perfect by the greatest Creator."** That it might after all be imperfect, framed upon an unwise plan, and full of flaws and clumsiness in the execution, seems never to have dawned upon him. He felt apparently that it was not for him to carp at details which he could not fully understand, and measure things by their bearing on sentient experience instead of by their adaptation to the safety and permanence of the whole; and therefore he abandoned himself contentedly to the pure admiration which is awakened by a larger outlook, and was ravished with the beauty and magnificence of a universe which extended with all-pervading order into such dim reaches of space, and came from the obscurity

* Migrat. Abr., l. c.

† Quis rer. div. her., 31 (I. 494); Mundi Op., 27 (I. 19-20), where man is βασιλεὺς οὐρανός, carrying as images in himself many starlike natures; Plantat. Noe, 7 (I. 334).

‡ Quis rer. div. her., 48 (I. 505).

§ Monarchia, I. 1 (II. 213); § 4, p. 216-17; Cherub., 35 (I. 162); Mundi Op., 4 (I. 4); De Josepho. 6 (II. 46); Abraham., 15 (II. 12).

|| Monarch., II. 1 (II. 222). ¶ De Animalibus Sacrificio idoneis, 6 (II. 242).

** Plantat. Noe, 2 (I. 330).

of ages more remote than the memory of man.* We may, however, remark that by the word perfection he seems to intend something different from that which it means for ourselves. When we speak of the perfection of the universe, we do not confine our attention to the whole, but demand that each minutest part shall reach a standard of ideal excellence, and be conformed to the highest and most efficient purpose. But Philo thinks rather of internal completeness, of a self-sufficing and self-sustaining quality, which has no need to look for foreign resources to supply what is lacking in itself. So far, therefore, is the perfection of the whole from implying the perfection of the parts, that Philo rather regards the imperfection of individual natures as essential, for it is only through the mutual dependence which thence arises that the universal harmony can be produced and maintained.† In two places, indeed, he speaks of the whole as consisting of "perfect parts"; but he here refers only to the elements, the materials out of which the cosmos was made, and not to the innumerable creatures included in its vast aggregate.‡ Perhaps we may express his thought by saying that the parts considered analytically were perfect, considered sectionally were imperfect.§

From the doctrine of the two passages just referred to a very important conclusion is derived. A question was raised

* See especially *Praem. et Poen.*, 5 (II. 413).

† See the passage already referred to, *Cherub.*, § 31.

In a fragment on Exodus xx. 25, he says, "The things of nature are perfect and full, wanting no addition;" but here the contrast is with artificial improvements, and the statement is too general to be set in opposition to the passage referred to in the text: *Fragm.*, II. 677, answering to *Qu. et Sol. in Ex.*, II. 1.

‡ *Quod det. pot. ins.*, 42 (I. 220-1); *Plantat. Noe*, 2 (I. 330).

§ See also, for the perfection of the universe, *Mundi Op.*, 2 (I. 2), 3 (I. 3), (where it is connected with the six days of creation, six being the first perfect number after unity. A perfect number is that which is equal to the sum of its factors: $6 = 1 + 2 + 3$); *Quod Deus immut.*, 23 (I. 288); *Agr. Noe*, 12 (I. 308-9); *Plantat. Noe*, 31 (I. 349); *Confus. Ling.*, 20 (I. 419); *Quis rer. div. her.*, 41 (I. 501); *Abraham.*, 1 (II. 1), 16 (II. 12); *Vita Mosis*, III. 36 (II. 176). In some of these passages the cosmos is only declared to be the most perfect of perceptible or created things.

in ancient philosophy whether there was only one cosmos, or whether there were several, or even an infinite number. Philo decides that there is only one. The universe would not be perfect unless the elements of which it is composed were perfect; and this they could not be unless their whole substance had been used up in the formation of the cosmos. Here, again, the idea of completeness is predominant; for otherwise the argument would obviously have no validity; and accordingly the same thought is elsewhere expressed by saying that the cosmos would not be a whole* unless the parts of which it consisted were whole. A theological plea is also advanced: there can be only one cosmos, for there is only one artificer, and he made his work like himself in loneliness.† Even this last argument is not very convincing; for why may not the same creator make any number of systems absolutely independent of one another, and all equally complete and beautiful? It is evident that Philo's views of the perfection and unity of the cosmos had settled down into established moulds of thought, and required but feeble bands of reason to hold them together.

A question of the gravest moment readily occurs in connection with the foregoing account: was this solitary and perfect cosmos self-existent and eternal? There were men then as now who affirmed that it was.‡ It is needless to say that Philo did not agree with them, but held fast by the Jewish tenet that there was a time when the universe was not.§ This is such an invariable assumption that we may confine our attention to the few passages where he indicates a philosophical ground for his belief. He accepts as an axiom the doctrine that everything perceived by the senses is involved in genesis and in changes, never remaining in the same condition, and concludes that since the cosmos is visible

* "ὅλον, τὸ ὅλον being a common name for the universe.

† Mundi Op., 61 (I. 41).

‡ Ib.

§ Dec. Orac., 12 (II. 190).

and perceptible, it must of necessity have come into being.* If we may venture to complete a line of argument which is not fully traced, we may say that the derivative origin of the universe is connected with its visibility by two links—one of thought, and the other of experience. Philo lays it down as an unquestionable truth that everything which has come into being is necessarily and by nature subject to change; for change is its special characteristic,† as unchangeableness is that of God. Apparently he means that as becoming is in its essence a change, so that which has become must always retain this distinctive mark. We may, therefore, argue back from mutability to genesis. This reasoning is confirmed by our consciousness of alterations in ourselves. These go on independently and even in spite of our wills, and thereby prove that we are subject to a causality not our own.‡ We may add what Philo virtually, though not actually, expresses, that any mutable object to which we cannot ascribe a preferential power of change must necessarily be of a dependent and derivative nature. Thus change and genesis go inseparably together. We now take up our experiential link. The cosmos, notwithstanding the ideal order and constancy which we have already discovered in it, is perpetually changing. This remorseless law of instability affects, so far as our experience can tell us, every visible thing; and therefore, as the universe is visible, it bears in its very nature the proof that it is not eternal, but has been called into being by some cause independent of its mutations.§

Notwithstanding this clearly asserted and intelligible doctrine, Philo is careful to remove the genesis of the world beyond the confines of time. He does this by making the essence of time consist of phenomenal succession. It is not merely measured by, but is, the interval of days and nights,

* Mundi Op., 2 (I. 3).

† Ἰδιον . . . αὐτοῦ.

‡ Leg. All., II. 9 (I. 72); Cherub., 6 (I. 142).

§ See De Profugis, 2 (I. 547).

and these are produced by the movement of the sun over and under the earth, or, in other words, by the revolution of the heaven; and as motion cannot be prior to the thing moved, but must be either subsequent or simultaneous, time must be either of the same age as the cosmos or younger, and it is utterly unphilosophical to declare that it is older. In strictness of speech, therefore, one must say, not that the cosmos was made in time, but that time subsists through the cosmos. It follows that the Mosaic account of creation cannot be received in its literal sense. The six days denote, not a chronological succession, but an order attaching to created things. Now, order is a sequence and series, if not in the actual effects, at least in thought. Number, accordingly, belongs to it, and serves to express it; and in the present instance the number six is chosen on account of its perfection, and because it contains the male and female principles, being the product of three and two, the first of the odd and even, or the male and female numbers. Similarly, "In the beginning he made the heaven" does not refer to the beginning of a time-succession, but means "he made the heaven first," that being first in the order of thought which was simultaneous in fact. If subsequently Philo describes the series of creative acts in the language of time, representing things as coming before and after one another, we must either strain his words into agreement with the foregoing doctrine, or believe (what seems more probable) that he lapsed inadvertently and inevitably into the *a priori* conception of time as the logically prior condition of all successive existence.*

From the denial that the world was made in time it might seem a reasonable inference that, though it was derived, its derivation was eternal, and that it had really no beginning. This inference, is however, explicitly set aside by Philo. We have already referred to the passage† where, in speaking of

* Mundi Op., 3 (I. 3); § 7 sqq. p. 5 sqq.; Leg. All., I. 2 (I. 44); Quod Deus immut., 6 (I. 277); SS. Abelis et Caini, 18 (I. 175). † Dec. Orac., 12 (II. 190).

the several parts of the cosmos which were deified by the heathen, he says "there was once a time when they were not."* He adds that we must not regard as God one who formerly was non-existent, and who "came into being from a certain time." This involves at least a formal contradiction of the previous doctrine, which can be escaped only by assigning two different meanings to the word time. It seems probable that there is real confusion of thought, and that Philo was as unable as other philosophers to smother his native intuitions. He had persuaded himself that time was nothing but the succession of phenomena, and had, therefore, no existence prior to phenomena; but as soon as he ceases to think of his argument, the natural light of reason returns, and he feels that a phenomenon implies a before and after, and therefore, instead of creating time, takes place *in* time. The contradiction thus exhibited in the very form of the words is implied in those passages where it is said that the world formerly did not exist, or was brought into being out of non-existence†; for these virtually ascribe to the cosmos a beginning, and make it possible to speak of the time before its creation.

Some partial alleviation of these difficulties is afforded by the doctrine of eternity. "Nothing," says Philo, "is future with God, who is withdrawn even from the ends of times. For also his life is not time, but the archetype and pattern of time, namely, eternity;§ and in eternity nothing is either past or future, but only present."|| A similar thought is expressed in another passage, where it is said that eternity is the life of the intelligible cosmos, as time is of the perceptible.¶ According to this, eternity is the motionless duration of unalterable being; time is the moving succession of ever-

* Ἦν ποτε χρόνος, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν.

† Ἀπὸ τινὸς χρόνου γεγόμενον.

‡ Migrant. Abr., 32 (I. 464); Somn., I. 13 (I. 632); Vita Mos., III. 36 (II. 176).

§ Αἰών.

|| Quod Deus immut., 6 (I. 277). For time as the imitation of eternity, see also Quis rer. div. her., 34 (I. 496).

¶ Mutat. Nom., 47 I 619.

shifting phenomena. The former is the archetype of the latter; that is, it is the metaphysical reality which is demanded by our experiential knowledge of successive events. We may perhaps express it in this way: the sensible world alone can involve a *time*-succession, for only phenomena, whose characteristic it is to come and go, can be before and after one another; eternal entities, being always there, can have only a *thought*-succession, which may be represented by number. Numbers may be synchronous, and yet they readily lend themselves to the order of successive phenomena; and thus the thought-succession of the eternal realm becomes the time-succession of the phenomenal cosmos. Thus it remains true that the world was not made in time, and yet our intuition is not violated; and if, in opposition to this doctrine, it is said that there was a *time* when the universe was not, we must observe at least that the word is still used in relation to phenomena, and that creation is described from the point of view of our limited faculties. But when we ask how an event can issue from the bosom of eternity without creating there a past and future, we are plunged into problems which Philo does not help us to unravel.*

Another question is necessarily suggested by that which we have just considered. If the universe was created, is it also to be destroyed? The same law of mutability from which its derivative character was inferred might seem likewise to point to its termination; and Philo, accordingly, accepts the philosophic maxim that "genesis is the beginning of corruption."† He avoids, however, the natural inference from this axiom by affirming that a created thing may be immortalized by the providence of its maker,‡ and he is therefore able without inconsistency to range himself on the side of those who maintained that the world was imperishable. If we except the special treatise *De Incorruptibilitate Mundi*, on which grave

* See Plato, *Timaeus*, 37, C. sqq., and Aristotle's remarks, *Phys.* VIII. i. 11 sqq.

† Γένεσις φθορᾶς ἀρχή.

‡ Dec. Orac., 12 (II. 190).

suspicious rest, he dwells little upon this subject, although his opinion is expressed with sufficient clearness. He approves of the poet's statement that nothing in creation dies, but only exhibits an altered form,* and still more expressly declares that the entire cosmos, being mingled in proportion, endures for ever.† Again, the heaven is pronounced to be the most perfect of things incorruptible in the perceptible universe.‡ These statements leave no doubt as to Philo's opinion, even if we share the misgivings as to the genuineness of the treatise above referred to.§

* Θνήσκει ᾗ οὐδὲν
τῶν γινομένων διακρινόμενον
δ' ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο
μορφήν ἑτέραν ἀπέδειξε.

Leg. All., I. 3 (I. 45). The lines are from the Chrysippus of Euripides: see Clem. Al., Strom. VI. 2, p. 750.

† 'Ο κόσμος ἅπας . . . εἰς ἅπαν διαμένει. Quis rer. div. her., 30 (I. 494).

‡ Mund. Op., 27 (I. 19).

§ For the evidence of the spuriousness of this work Zeller refers to Bernays, in the Monatsberichte of the Berlin Academy, 1863, pp. 34 sqq., which I have not been able to see (Phil. der Gr., III. ii. p. 294, in Anm. 2 of previous page, second edition). Zeller himself thinks that the work is composite. The original author he takes to be a Peripatetic, with a leaning towards Plato where the latter does not come into collision with Aristotle. He believes that the original work was written in Alexandria in the second half of the first century before Christ, and that it was revised by a Jew of the Alexandrian school in the first or second century of our era, partly to embellish it with the results of his own reading, and partly to bring it into harmony with his Jewish faith. The reviser, however, has done his work so imperfectly that he has left traces of Hellenic polytheism in the designation of the world and the stars as "visible gods." (See his article, Der pseudophilonische Bericht über Theophrast, in Hermes, Zeitschr. f. class. Philol. Berlin. XV., 1880, pp. 137 sqq.) The arguments of the treatise, of which I subjoin a sketch, will at least illustrate the philosophy of the period.

In the first place, if the cosmos is to perish, this result must be due to the action either of something external or of one of its own internal forces. Neither of these suppositions is admissible. There is, as we have seen, nothing outside the universe which could affect it with age or disease, the whole of the elements having been exhausted in its composition. And it is absurd to suppose that it can be dissolved by an internal cause, firstly, because this would make the part greater and more powerful than the whole; and secondly, because that which is susceptible of the internal is susceptible also of the external source of corruption, as we see in the case of animals (§ 5, II. 491-2). In the second place, all the parts of the cosmos are at present arranged in the

Another problem of the highest interest in the history of philosophy remains. Were the four elements so many independent and heterogeneous substances, or might they be classed together under one comprehensive term? Their intimate union in the composition of the universe, and the fact that they all contributed to form the perceptible world in opposition to unseen and impalpable mind, would suggest the belief in a common substance, of which they were only varieties. This generalization, so clearly formulated in the Greek schools, was accepted by Philo. At the basis of the elements, and therefore of the whole cosmos, lay this undifferentiated substance or matter;* and since the marks of

best order, and occupy the positions whither their nature carries them; consequently, if the present system were dissolved, things would have to be disposed in a manner which violated nature, an hypothesis which it is impossible to entertain. Moreover, the nature of everything tends to preserve and immortalize it; and though in the case of individual objects, such as animals or trees, this tendency is defeated owing to its inability to cope with adverse agencies, in the cosmos it cannot fail, because it is dominant over all other things that might inflict an injury (§ 12, II. 498-9). The argument deemed the most convincing, however, is founded on the perfection of God. If God destroys the universe, it must be either that he may never more produce a cosmos, or that he may create another one. The former supposition is inadmissible, because it belongs to God to bring disorder into order, and not order into disorder, and also because it implies repentance, a mental disease which we cannot ascribe to the Supreme. But if he intends to make a new cosmos, then, when it is made, it must be either worse or better than the present one, or equal to it. If it were worse, the Creator would be worse; but this is not to be imagined, for the works of God are made with the most consummate skill and knowledge. If it were similar, the Creator would waste his labour, and would be like children who often, when playing on the shore, pile up mounds of sand, and then throw them down again. And lastly, if it were better, then the Creator also would become better, so that when he created formerly he was less perfect in skill and understanding. This it would be impious to suppose; for God is always equal and like himself. The works of mortals, who are capable of changing for the better and the worse, are properly perishable, but by parity of reasoning those of the immortal are incorruptible; for it is reasonable that the things made should resemble the nature of the fabricators (§ 13, II. 499-500).

* *ὁὐσία*, Mundi Op., 5 (I. 5); Quis rer. div. her., 27 (I. 492); Somn., II. 6 (I. 665); De Creatione Principum, 7 (II. 367); *ἐλγ* Plantat. Noe, 2 (I. 330) [in § 1 the Stoical *ὁὐσία* also is used]; &c.

intelligence in the universe resided, as we have seen, in the very process of differentiation, and in the subsequent adapting of one thing to another, we reach in the ultimate substratum of material objects the very antithesis of mind and life. Its one function is to be the passive support of forms or ideas, which must be impressed upon it from without, and it is, therefore, described almost exclusively by negative predicates. It is without qualities, unarranged, lifeless,* formless,† shapeless,‡ without figure, unstamped,§ unmarked,|| indefinite,¶ out of tune, uneven, unequal,** a dead thing.†† The most frequently recurring epithet is that which denotes the absence of qualities,‡‡ a word for which we have unfortunately no English equivalent. Ἀποιος is not descriptive of imperfection; for, as we shall see, it is also applied to the supremely perfect. Neither, if I am not mistaken, does it denote the absence of attributes, but only the impossibility of including the subject to which it is applied under a generic term, which would indicate *of what sort* it is. All individual material objects are of a certain sort, because they are matter on which have been impressed certain typical forms, which render them apprehensible by the intellect as members of a class. But abstract matter comes under no class, and therefore can be known to us only as the material substratum from which all class distinctions have been effaced.§§

The conclusion thus deduced from the observation of nature was also reached through what seemed to be an *a priori*

* Ἀποιος, ἄτακτος, ἄψυχος, Mund. Op., 5 (I. 5).

† Ἀμορφος, Quis rer. div. her., 27 (I. 492).

‡ Ἀνείδιος, Mutat. Nom., 23 (I. 598).

§ Ἀσχημάτιστος, ἀτύπωτος, Somn., II. 6 (I. 665).

|| Ἀσημος, Prof., 2 (I. 547). The last five epithets are only different ways of expressing the absence of ideas, or of the various genera and species.

¶ Ἀπειρος, De Sacrificantibus, 13 (II. 261).

** Πλημελής, ἀνώμαλος, ἄνισος, Quis rer. div. her., 32 (I. 495).

†† Νεκρόν, Prof., 36 (I. 575).

‡‡ See several of the passages cited above.

§§ See the meaning of ἄποιος fully discussed in the chapter on God.

necessity of thought. Moses, who was supposed to have gained the very pinnacle of philosophy, was, we are assured, aware that there must be in things both the efficient and the passive cause, and that the former was pure mind, by which the latter, being moved and shaped, was changed into the cosmos.* Here matter is introduced simply as the needful condition for the exercise of causality. If an efficient cause exists, then there must also exist something for it to operate upon. But to this substance it is unnecessary to ascribe any causal power of its own, the requirements of thought being fully answered if it is sensitive to the action of a cause external to itself. Hence arises the same negative predication which we have noticed above, and Philo affirms, with an allusion to Plato,† that matter “has nothing beautiful of itself, but is capable of becoming all things.”‡

A very serious consequence, however, springs directly from this *a priori* conception of matter. If the passive cause be a necessary condition of the first exercise of efficient causality, then it must be itself uncaused and eternal, and we are at once transported from the ancient Hebrew monism, and plunged into dualism. Philo, indeed, in the treatise just cited, boldly ascribes this doctrine to Moses, though he does not furnish us with the evidence on which he relied. Probably he referred to certain expressions in the first chapter of Genesis, especially the statement that “the Spirit of God moved over the water,”§ the water being taken as the representative of unformed matter. The possibility of such an interpretation was suggested even in the Rabbinical schools, and Siegfried infers from Philo’s failure to adduce his proofs that he must have been dealing with Jewish speculations which had been already elaborated.|| Whether these inquiries had

* Mund. Op., 2 (I. 2).

† Timaeus, 29 E. and 49 A.

‡ Mund. Op., 5 (I. 5).

§ Πνεῦμα θεοῦ ἐπεφέρετο ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος, i. 2.

|| Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des Alten Testaments an sich selbst u. nach seinem geschichtlichen Einfluss betrachtet. Nebst Untersuchungen über die Gräcität Philo’s, Jena, 1875, pp. 230-1.

penetrated at so early a period the conservative soil of Palestine I will not undertake to decide; but among the Egyptian Jews we have encountered the doctrine of the Greeks in the Wisdom of Solomon. Philo himself, however, seems to have been half-conscious of an inconsistency between his dualism and the traditional faith, for he treats this subject with marked reserve, and his language is not altogether free from ambiguity. He nowhere explicitly asserts the eternity of matter, and that he believed in it can only be inferred from the doctrine of causality above enunciated, from his failure to speak of matter as created, and from certain modes of expression to which we must now attend.

"For the genesis of anything," he says, "many things must combine, that by which, that out of which, that through which, that on account of which," or, in other words, the cause, the material, the instrument, the purpose. Then, turning to the cosmos, he declares that God, by whom it was produced,* is its cause, while the four elements out of which it was compounded are the material.† Here there is no suggestion that the material might be created out of nothing by the Cause, but it is rather implied that it was already there, waiting for the impress of causal activity to put it into shape. A similar remark will apply to the statements that the Demiurge expended the whole of the four principles on the composition of the cosmos,‡ that he wrought and arranged the whole material,§ that the world-moulder shaped the substance of the cosmos, disorderly and confused of itself, bringing it into order from disorder, and from confusion into separation.|| These passages are not in themselves decisive; but the manner in which they describe the formation of the cosmos, and the terms which are deemed appropriate to God, Demiurge, World-moulder, Artificer,¶ are exactly suited to the notion of pre-

* Γέγονεν.

† Cherub., 35 (I. 161-2).

‡ Quod. det. pot. ins., 42 (I. 220).

§ Plantat. Noe, 2 (I. 330).

|| Ib., § 1, p. 329.

¶ Δημιουργός, κοσμοπλάστης, τεχνίτης.

existent matter, which was never created, but eternally ready for the plastic action of the supreme Power.

Notwithstanding this doctrine, which, as we shall see, penetrates deeply into Philo's philosophy, there are some expressions which are thought to be more in accordance with the ancient Jewish conception. We have noticed in another connection the axiom that everything perceptible is involved in genesis and change, a principle from which the genesis of the cosmos is deduced.* This axiom might certainly seem applicable to matter, for the perceptible and the intelligible are an invariable antithesis, and therefore in regard to any concrete object we must suppose that it is perceptible, not in consequence of the ideal form which is impressed upon it, but owing to the material nature which it shares. Nevertheless, I think it would be truer to say that matter is nothing more than the indispensable condition of perceptible existence, and that therefore perceptibility is not a property of matter, but only of ideal forms in combination with matter. It is this combination which has had a beginning, and is subject to perpetual change. Again, the supposition that matter has been created may seem to be confirmed by the express affirmation that it is corruptible so far as depends on itself;† for corruptible is the correlative of originated. It ought, however, to be observed that it is not matter, but "fabricated matter"‡ which is said to be thus corruptible. It was not this, but his own artistic works, that God praised when he surveyed creation, and saw that it was very good. It was the form, the ideal thought, and not the material, that merited commendation; and matter merely wrought into certain shapes, having no living power of its own, could not retain them, but could only sink back into its pristine formlessness. But if it was not matter in its purely abstract condition that was subject to

* Mund. Op., 2 (I. 3). Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐν γενέσει καὶ μεταβολῇ.

† "Υλὴ . . . φθαρτὴ ἐξ αὐτῆς, Quis rer. div. her., 32 (I. 495).

‡ Τὴν δημιουργηθεῖσαν ὕλην.

dissolution, we cannot legitimately infer that it had a beginning: this can be predicated only of matter as moulded by the Demiurge. A similar remark will apply to another passage where the two ideas of origin and dissolution are combined in the phrase "the begotten and corruptible substance."* This expression is antithetical to "God"; and though, if we had no means of correcting its apparent sense, it might reasonably be regarded as declarative of the characteristics of matter, it may nevertheless refer to the phenomenal cosmos considered in its material aspect. The substance of the world as we know it, being subject to the continual action of a formative and disintegrating process, might be spoken of as begotten and corruptible without any thought of denying the eternity of that which, as the prior condition of all becoming and perishing, alone renders the temporary possible. The language in question, therefore, if a little ambiguous, cannot be justly pressed into a charge of inconsistency.

Another class of phrases seems to teach the doctrine of creation out of nothing; but if we view them in an ascending scale, we shall see that this is not necessarily involved. Philo says that God made things which were non-existent,† and brought things non-existent into being.‡ The Greek expression, however, does not imply absolute, but only relative non-existence, and is quite consistent with the formation of a previously amorphous matter into distinct objects. This is clearly implied in the following passage:—"He called things non-existent into being, having wrought order out of disorder, and qualities out of things without quality, and resemblances out of things without resemblance, and identities out of differences, and out of things without mutual participation and congruity participations and congruities, and out of inequality equality, and out of darkness light. For it is always

* Somn., II. 38 (I. 692), ἡ γεννητὴ καὶ φθαρτὴ οὐσία.

† Τὰ μὴ ὄντα, Mutat. Nom., 5 (I. 585).

‡ Εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραγαγεῖν, Mund. Op., 26 (I. 19).

his care, and that of his beneficent powers, to remodel and readapt to the better the discord of the worse substance."* Here one of the strongest expressions of the doctrine of pre-existent matter is introduced as the very ground for a statement which, taken by itself, might appear inconsistent with it. Similarly we may understand the statement that God "displayed the cosmos into being out of the non-existent."† Matter is that which is relatively non-existent, although the abiding condition of all perceptible existences. That formation rather than creation out of nothing is here referred to is shown not only by the word "displayed," but by the context, in which it is alleged that the construction of the cosmos furnished an exact parallel to the change of the elements in the wilderness, by which the air was made to assume the office of the earth, and produce food (manna) for the Israelites, and so exhibit abundance in a desert.

A passage, however, still remains which asserts in the most explicit way the creation of things which once had absolutely no existence. Philo is speaking of the sun as the visible symbol of God, and in conclusion points out a distinction where the analogy fails. The sun, when it has risen, exhibits what was before concealed; but "God, when he begat all things, not only brought them into manifestation, but he made things which before did not exist, being himself not only a Demiurge, but also a Creator."‡ This language is apparently so unequivocal that Siegfried§ does not hesitate to say that "here, in opposition to all Philo's amplifications elsewhere, even the creation of matter is attributed to God." I think, however, we are justified in seeking for a different explanation

* De Creatione Principum, 7 (II. 367).

† Ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι . . . ἀνέφηνε. Vita Mos., III. 36 (II. 176).

‡ Ἄ πρότερον οὐκ ἦν ἐποίησεν, οὐ δημιουργὸς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κτίστης αὐτὸς ὢν. Somn., I. 13 (I. 632). Compare the statement in Vita Mos., III. 8 (II. 150), ποιητὴς ἐστὶν ἀψευδῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὰ μὴ ὄντα ἤγαγεν εἰς τὸ εἶναι.

§ Philo von Al., p. 232. See also Dähne, I. p. 199 sq.; Heinze, p. 210, Anm.

before we ascribe to Philo so flat a self-contradiction in a subject of fundamental importance to his philosophy. The passage itself says nothing about matter, and by its twice-repeated "not only, but also," indicates two distinct processes, the demiurgic and the strictly creative, in the production of the universe. Now, we must so far anticipate as to say that Philo distinguishes two stages in the genesis of the cosmos. First, the intelligible world was modelled to serve as an archetype, and then the visible was constructed* in conformity with this immaterial design.† That Philo had this distinction in mind when he wrote the passage in question is shown by a reference, made just before, to God as the archetypal light, or rather older and higher than the archetype; and if we are at liberty to suppose that the formation of the ideal cosmos was regarded as properly creative while the moulding of the perceptible out of matter was only demiurgic, the requirements of the language seem to be fully satisfied.

Keferstein‡ appeals to another passage, where it is said that "God is one, and Creator and Maker of the universe."§ These words would admit the same explanation as those which we have just considered; but in so general a statement we are hardly required to draw any sharp distinction between "Creator" and "Maker," and it is unnecessary to remark that the former term does not in itself denote creation out of nothing.

We have still to notice two passages which have been preserved in Armenian. The first of these, as quoted by Grossmann,|| might well be deemed decisive—"Non solum creare et edere materiam proprium est providentiae, verum etiam conservare moderarique." A survey of the context, however, modifies our impression. Philo is endeavouring to prove the

* Δημιουργῆσαι is the word.

† Mund. Op., 4 (I. 4).

‡ Philo's Lehre von den göttlichen Mittelwesen. Zugleich eine kurze Darstellung der Grundzüge des philonischen Systems. Leipzig, 1846, p. 6.

§ 'Ο Θεὸς εἷς ἐστὶ καὶ κτίστης καὶ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων. Monarch., I. 3 (II. 216).

|| Quaestiones Philoneae, Lipsiae, mdcccxxix. I. p. 19, note 70.

existence of providence, and replying to the objections raised by Alexander, with whom he is engaged in a dialogue. Alexander has stated the alternative that the universe did or did not originate. If it did not, it was not made by providence; but if it did, how can something be made out of nothing? Philo replies by adopting as an hypothesis the eternity of matter, and, without expressing his own opinion, shows his leaning by his appeal to the "most celebrated philosophers, Parmenides, Empedocles, Zeno, Cleanthes, and other divine men, and as it were a certain true and strictly sacred assembly." According, then, to this hypothesis God made the universe as a sculptor makes a statue, and must bestow the same care upon it as a father on his offspring or an artist on his work. But we may go farther, and maintain that there is a providence even if we suppose the universe as well as matter to be uncreated, because it is the property of providence not merely to create and produce matter, but also to preserve and govern what has been made, just as amongst the Lacedæmonians the Ephorus maintains every part of the polity which it was not his to constitute. From this course of argument it is clear that Grossmann's inference cannot be justly drawn.*

This review will enable us to understand the following section,† which we happily possess in Greek, Eusebius having extracted it in order to prove Philo's belief in the creation of matter.‡ Here Philo declares that with a view to the genesis of the universe God aimed at providing exactly the right quantity of matter, so that there should be neither a deficiency nor a superfluity. But he is replying to the difficulty that if the universe was made we must give some explanation of its precise quantity, and he is avowedly arguing on the hypothesis that matter has been created, an hypothesis for which he cites not a single distinguished name, and which he seems to reject in his manner of proposing it:—"But concerning

* See Prov., II. §§ 45-49

† § 50-1.

‡ Praep. Ev., VII. 21; Mang. II. 625-6.

the quantity of matter, if indeed it has really come into being, we must speak.”* I think, therefore, that we cannot safely infer from this treatise that Philo rejected the doctrine of an eternal matter.

The remaining passage is in the treatise *De Deo*, where Philo speaks of “nature by which matter is created and formed.”† There is, however, nothing to determine the meaning of “created,” which doubtless represents the Greek *κτίζεται*, and may refer only to the building up of matter, and the changing of its desolation into a habitable world. This signification would be quite agreeable to classical usage, by which the word is applied to the settlement and peopling of a country; and it is favoured by the use of the present tense, which implies a continuous process rather than an event completed once and for ever in the far past. The earlier part of the treatise confirms this view; for there Philo announces his dualism in terms which border closely on Gnostic speculation, and gives not a hint that in the remote eternity there was no essence antithetic to the divine. He says that many supposed that formless substance was the Divinity, not knowing the distinction of agent and patient, nor considering what is masculine and what feminine in each thing; for the feminine, which is passive, is matter; but the masculine is the artificer of the cosmos.‡ Such language,

* Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποσοῦ τῆς οὐσίας, εἰ δὲ γίγονεν ὄντως ἐκείνο, λεκτίον. In this connection we may remark that in the earlier of the two treatises on providence the writer cites, with apparent approval, the opinion of the “wise Plato” respecting the origin of the universe, and then adds, “Plato knew that these things [the several parts of the cosmos] were made by God, and that matter, in itself destitute of order, issued forth in the cosmos together with order; for these were the first causes whence the cosmos arose. For even Moses, the legislator of the Jews, said that water, darkness, and chaos existed before the cosmos” (§§ 20-22). We cannot, however, any longer appeal with confidence to this treatise; for Hermann Diels (*Doxographi Graeci*, Berlin, 1879, pp. 1-4) has shown that it has been tampered with, the list of philosophical opinions having been taken from the *De Placitis Epitome* ascribed to Plutarch, which must be at least a hundred years later than Philo.

† *Natura qua creatur formaturque materia*, 6 (Aucher, II. 616). ‡ 3 (II. 614-15).

exposing its author to obvious and serious misapprehension, could hardly be used by a monist without a careful disclaimer of the doctrine which it naturally suggests.

On a survey, then, of the whole evidence, I think we must conclude that Philo believed in the eternity of matter. His language here and there, in his desire to exalt the divine causality, is apparently, but only apparently, inconsistent with this supposition, and he may have shrunk from plainly calling matter eternal, not only out of deference to inherited piety, but because he would have seemed thereby to clothe with too high a dignity, and even to snatch from the realm of unclassified essence, what was the mere dead substratum and possibility of sensible existence.

Dähne* charges Philo with another inconsistency, which it is necessary to consider. He supposes that Philo regarded the four elements as primitive forms of matter, which were, indeed, mingled in blind confusion prior to the creation, but were for ever there, waiting only for a separating and remodelling agent to build them into a cosmos. But in this case matter was not really formless; it was far more than the mere substratum of superinduced ideas, and brought its own primeval definiteness to complicate, and in part determine, the problem of creation. The passages on which Dähne seems mainly to rely, those in which the cosmos is referred to as a mixture of the four elements,† do not appear to me to affect the question; for they say nothing of the relation between the elements and matter. According to the science of the day all the objects in the universe might be resolved into four elements, which therefore, in scientific language, were the "principles"‡ out of which the world was compounded. But this opinion of the physicists did not contravene the philosophical doctrine that the elements were only allotropic

* I. pp. 189 sqq.

† See *Quod det. pot. ins.*, 3 (I. 193); *Quis rer. div. her.*, 30 (I. 494).

‡ *Ἀρχαί*.

forms of the same pristine matter, due to the first energy of the supreme Cause exercised upon hitherto formless substance. I know of nothing in Philo's language which is really inconsistent with this doctrine; and one remarkable passage, to which we have referred in another connection, expresses it with unmistakable clearness. He says that as the artificer divided our soul and members in the midst, so when he fabricated the cosmos he divided the substance of the universe. For having taken it he began to separate it thus. First he made two sections, the heavy and the light, distinguishing the dense from the rare. Then he divided each again, the rare into air and fire, the dense into water and earth, and he, as a preliminary, laid down* perceptible elements of a perceptible cosmos. But again he cut the heavy and the light according to a different set of ideas, the light into cold and hot, the heavy into wet and dry. The account proceeds with the differentiation of cosmical objects according to the description already given. Now, throughout this passage Philo is dealing with the rational formation of the cosmos; and in regard to the elements themselves the use of the word "ideas" shows that he is not speaking of a mere mechanical separation of different substances which were already there, but of the introduction of ideal distinctions into that which before was indeterminate.† The moment you group elements as light and heavy, rare and dense, you have left your "matter without qualities" behind, and entered the sphere of qualified existence.‡ This view is confirmed by the clear recognition, expressed a little farther on,|| of the exercise of intelligence in the determination of the number and nature of the elements. They were divided, like later portions of the universe, with

* Προκατεβάλετο.

† Compare also his description of the four elements as *δυνάμεις*, in their capacity of dry, wet, cold, and hot, Quis rer. div. her., 30 (I. 494). The elements are also distinguished from τὸ μὴ ὄν in a passage where it is said that the human body at death is resolved into them, Sacrificant., 2 (II. 252).

‡ See Quis rer. div. her., 27 (I. 492).

|| § 29, p. 493.

due regard to equality, the heavy being made equal in number to the light, two against two, and again the dry to the wet, the hot to the cold, one against one. It is evident from this that the elements were not regarded as imposing pre-existent and necessary forms upon the divine activity, but as deriving their forms altogether from God's wisdom and choice. The same conclusion follows from the statement that the opinion which does away with ideas confounds everything, and reduces it "to the substance which was earlier than the elements, namely formlessness."* But what perhaps is most decisive is the fact that in describing the creation of the intelligible cosmos Philo assigns the foremost place to the immaterial and ideal heaven, earth, air and water; for, as we shall see hereafter, he implies, by so doing, that they were archetypal patterns without which the corresponding objects in the visible world would have no existence.†

We must interpret in accordance with this clear representation, expressions which are more ambiguous. Thus, when it is said at the close of the passage just cited‡ that the elements were separated out of the formless substance of the universe,§ the language might denote a mere mechanical sorting, but is not incompatible with the view above explained. So when matter, in its original condition, is spoken of as "mixed"|| or "confused,"¶ nothing more need be intended than the total absence of distinguishing lines or marks.** When we

* Τὴν ἀνωτέραν τῶν στοιχείων οὐσίαν, τὴν ἀμορφίαν. *Sacrificant.*, 13 (II. 261).

† *Mundi Op.*, 7 (I. 6).

‡ *Quis rer. div. her.*, § 27.

§ Ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀποκριθῆντα.

Πεφυρμένη, *Sacrificant.*, 13 (II. 261).

¶ *Συγκεχυμένη*, *Plantat. Noe*, 1 (I. 329).

** The expression is, perhaps, more difficult when it is affirmed that "the elements are lifeless matter, immovable of itself, subject to the artificer for all kinds of shapes and qualities." (*Vita contempl.*, § 1, II. 472.) But even if we could ascribe these words to Philo, we should not be forced to find an inconsistency. As the writer is here alluding to the worship of the elements, he is anxious to speak of them as slightly as possible, and his language is strictly consistent with the view which we have taken. To say that the elements are lifeless matter is not the same as saying that matter originally consisted of the elements.

remember that the elements were the ultimate form of matter which science could discover, and that they were believed to be exhaustive of matter and to be mutually interchangeable, proving thereby their absolute identity of substance, we cannot be surprised if Philo's expressions are not always severely controlled by the demands of his philosophical creed.

One more question connected with matter demands a moment's attention: Had it more than a negative imperfection? On this point Philo is not so explicit as we could desire. In representing it as merely the passive cause of the universe, and destitute of all spontaneous movement, he precludes the notion of its being an active principle of evil; and it is in full consistency with this view that he describes it in the main by negative epithets. When he alludes to it as the "worse substance," that is as inferior to the perfect divine essence, this is no more than is justly applicable to a substance which has no perfection of its own; and when he depicts it as "full of heterogeneity, incongruity, discord,"* these words may express only the absence of those resemblances and correspondences which make the beauty of the finished cosmos. This indeed is apparent from the context, where it is asserted that matter is "capable of becoming all things," and that, notwithstanding its originally confused and inharmonious condition, "it received a change and transformation into the opposite and the best things, order, quality, animation, similarity, identity, the well adapted, the harmonious, everything that belongs to the better idea." Philo could hardly describe its pure passivity with greater distinctness. Nevertheless, Dähne affirms that he regarded it as "an active cause† of the imperfections in the world," "a chaos in which the powers of nature were mixed together without aim and order,"‡ and Dr. Edersheim, in his summary of Philo's doctrine, says that "matter in itself was dead—more than that, it was evil."§ This notion of efficient

* Mundi Op., 5 (I. 5).

† Wirkende Ursache.

‡ I. p. 196.

§ The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah, 1883, p. 51.

causality and of natural powers which worked in opposition to the power of God, seems to me fundamentally inconsistent with Philo's philosophy, and not a single passage is adduced which has even the appearance of supporting it. There are, however, two considerations which may be thought at first sight to impart to matter a very real place in determining the constitution of the world. That which is purely passive must be capable of receiving all that the active cause is intrinsically able to communicate. But it is clear from several indications that Philo attributed to creation a limited capacity, which checked the flow of God's agency, and therefore imposed bounds upon the exercise of his omnipotence. Thus he says that God used towards creation* blended powers, because it was impossible for a mortal nature to contain them unmixed, and that not even the whole heaven and cosmos could receive the divine excellences in their purity.† Again, he says that God does not benefit according to the magnitude of his graces, which are infinite, but according to the powers of those who are benefited; for though it is the nature of God to benefit, it is not similarly the nature of that which has been created‡ to experience benefits;§ and, once more, "to everything generated, even if it be excellent, except that it has come into genesis, sinning is naturally attached."|| It will be observed that the incapacity thus referred to is associated directly, not with matter, but with things that have originated; but it may be argued that the imperfection which always attaches to the genesis of things must be due, not to the mere fact of their being made, but to the intractability of the substance out of which they are formed. It seems quite clear, however, from the passages adduced that this was not Philo's view. The source of imperfection was not in the material as opposed to the spiritual, but in the phenomenal as opposed to the eternal. To have come into existence placed

* *Γένεσιν.*† *Quod Deus immut.*, 17 (I. 284)‡ *Τὸ γινόμενον.* § *Mundi Op.*, 6 (I. 5).|| *Vita Mos.*, III. 17 (II. 157).

an infinite gulf between the Creator and the created ; and even the entire cosmos, being in its essence a phenomenon, could never be a complete and exhaustive expression of him who is Eternal Being. If we come to the subordinate parts of the universe, these were limited not only by their phenomenal nature, but by their original conception. They rose above one another in an ascending scale, but the powers of each had definite limits, which they could not transgress. Limitation belongs to the very notion of a cosmos composed of a variety of parts ; and thus God was restricted in the bestowal of his favours, not by the infirmities of matter, but by the necessities of his own original thought. Again, it may be said that, if matter were absolutely passive, it would remain unaltered in any condition into which it might be brought ; but Philo seems to assume that, if the divine agency were withdrawn from it, it would relapse into its pristine chaos, and thus, from its own evil tendency, undo the work of God. This argument, however, rests upon a false human analogy. If we mould a lump of clay, and then leave it, it will retain the form which we have imparted to it, because it has no inward force which is capable of altering it. But in Philo's philosophy, as we shall see farther on, form and power are identical, and, if you withdraw the power, the form must disappear at the same time ; so that, if matter could retain its ideal shapes after the removal of the divine agency, it would prove, not that it was inert, but that it possessed an active power akin to the divine. It is because it has no such power, but is absolutely passive, that the "fabricated matter" of the world is "dissoluble and, moreover, corruptible of itself."* It is, then, not to matter in its original essence, but to matter in its phenomenal and ever changing aspects, that Philo attributes any power of limiting the agency of God. It is to this "generated and corruptible substance"† that "continual war" belongs, that unresting

* Quis rer. div. her., 32 (I. 495).

† Ἡ γεννητὴ καὶ φθαρτὴ οὐσία, words which can hardly describe matter in the abstract.

movement which is ever going forward, as though the world were in part striving towards a fuller embodiment of the divine idea, and in part struggling back into pristine desolation and emptiness. But this war, so unlike the city of God, Jerusalem, "the vision of peace," was not due to any spontaneous energy in matter, but to an inherent necessity. Matter, indeed, because it had no power of its own, *was* necessity, the submissive substratum of warring phenomena, in opposition to God, who was volition and peace.* Thus Philo preserved for matter its absolutely passive character, while, nevertheless, he ascribed incurable disabilities to all material things.

* Somn., II. 38 (I. 691-2).

CHAPTER III.

ANTHROPOLOGY.

IN a passage in which Philo alludes to the inquisitive nature of the student, who ought, with greater zeal than a trader in quest of petty gains, to travel sea and land in search of wisdom, he describes the kind of questions which arise in regard to man. The several things connected with him must be brought under adjudication—what is the body, and what must it do and suffer to co-operate with the understanding? What is sensation and in what way does it assist the sovereign mind? What is logos, and by interpreting what things does it contribute to excellence? What are pleasure and desire, grief and fear, and what is the remedy for these things? What are folly, licentiousness, injustice, and the crowd of other mental diseases generated by moral evil? And, on the contrary, what are justice, prudence, temperance, manliness, in a word, every virtue and happy disposition, and in what way does each of them generally arise?*

This, though not intended as a philosophical distribution of our inquiry, marks with sufficient clearness the general lines which Philo traverses, and suggests two distinct heads under which the various questions may be classed. We may consider man simply as a natural object, and determine the nature and constitution which belong to him as a portion of the cosmos, or we may regard him as a moral

* Migrat. Abr., 39 (I. 471).

being, standing in ethical relations towards his fellow-men and towards the supreme righteousness. The second of these topics we must necessarily reserve till we have surveyed Philo's theological system ; the first demands our immediate attention.

Man, as the microcosm, and lying nearest to our investigation, forms the link in the order of knowledge between the physical universe, which we have just surveyed, and the invisible cause by which all things are upheld. In him reappear the various powers which we see manifested around us, the habitual, vegetative, vital, rational, intelligent.* Habit or constitution is common also to lifeless things, stones and bits of wood, and in us is shared by the bones, which resemble stones. Growth,† which is habit in motion, extends to plants ; and in us the nails and hair are like plants. Life or soul‡ we possess in common with the irrational animals ; but the power of intelligence is peculiar to mind.§ The mind, however, must have its analogy in the great world. It might be compared to the sun ; for when this has risen, it clearly exhibits the things which night concealed, and so the mind, sending forth its own peculiar light, prepares all bodies and things for our apprehension.|| But if such a comparison exhausted the case, man would not be a microcosm, but would immeasurably transcend the cosmos. The latter, too, has indications of mind, and a supreme Thought looks out from its order and beauty. Each consists of body and rational soul, and it is on this account that they stand to one another simply in the relation of great and small.¶ It is, therefore, only from a study of our own minds and their relation to our bodies that we can proceed to a knowledge of God and his relations to the material universe ; for, as Philo says, though God is not as man, it is impossible for us to step out of ourselves, and it is from the things which happen to ourselves that we receive our apprehension of the Unbegotten.**

* Ἐκτική, φυτική, ψυχική, λογική, διανοητική. † Φύσις. ‡ Ψυχή

§ Leg. All., II. 7 (I. 71).

|| Post. Caini, 16 (I. 236).

¶ Quis rer. div. her., 31 (I. 494).

** Confus. Ling., 21 (I. 419).

How faithfully this principle is carried through, and how closely some of the most characteristic language respecting the divine operations corresponds with that which describes the activity of the human mind, will become apparent in the sequel. Meanwhile we turn to consider the dual constitution of man.

According to Philo "there are two things of which we are composed, soul and body."* Man is therefore a duad,† and forms, as it were, a border-land between two contrasted natures, the mortal and immortal, the earthly and divine.‡ The body, designed to be "a house or sacred temple of rational soul,"§ was fashioned out of earth,|| or, more strictly speaking, out of the same four elements of which the entire cosmos consisted,¶ the four powers, dry, wet, cold, and hot being mingled in us in due proportion.** In his physiological conceptions we cannot expect Philo to deviate from the opinions which were then current, and there is nothing in his views upon this subject which affects his philosophical system. It may be sufficient, therefore, to remark that he did not leave himself unacquainted with the statements which the science of that time put forward respecting the internal organs and their operations, and that he was not wholly unfamiliar with physicians and their ways. As an instance of what we should now regard as superstition we may observe that he not only describes the physiological functions of the liver, but represents it as an organ from which the mind, when withdrawn from its daily cares, and no longer harassed by any of the senses, derives its prophetic dreams.††

* Leg. All., III. 55 (I. 119). The division into soul and body is referred to in passages too numerous for particular citation.

† Vita Mos., III. 39 (II. 179).

‡ Mund. Op., 46 (I. 32); Praem. et Poen., 2 (II. 410).

§ Mund. Op., 47 (I. 33).

|| Έκ γῆς, ib.; Leg. All., III. 55 (I. 119).

¶ Mund. Op., 51 (I. 35).

** Quis rer. div. her., 30 (I. 494).

†† See Animal. Sacrif. idon., 7 (II. 244-5); De Exsecrationibus, 5 (II. 432); Fragment on Providence, II. 637 (from the Armen., Prov., II. § 22). See the prophetic faculty of the liver discussed in Plato, Timaeus, 71 D. sq.

Passing to the higher portion of man, we have already seen that soul is distinguished from nature or mere organism by the possession of three properties which are common to the whole animal creation, namely, perception through the senses, mental representation, and impulse; but we must now notice the manner in which Philo describes these attributes. Perception, *αἴσθησις*, as the very name intimates, being an *εἰσθεσις*, introduces things which have appeared into the mind, where they are kept treasured up as in a vast storehouse. By nothing are living things more clearly distinguished from the lifeless. Sensible perception, however, is not all of one kind, but discharges five different functions, for which reason animals were said to be created on the fifth day. Seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling and touch, have each their proper objects and their own faculty of judgment. They agree in producing mental representation,* which is an impression† in the soul; for whatever each of the senses introduces, leaves its own stamp, like a ring or a seal. The mind receives the impression like wax, and retains it until oblivion, the rival of memory, either renders it indistinct or totally obliterates it. Impulse‡ is the disposition or affection, taking the two forms of desire and aversion, which the soul receives from what has appeared and been stamped upon it, and may be defined as a first movement of the soul. These are the characteristics by which animals are distinguished from plants.§

Man, however, though brought under the category of animals by his possession of soul, is widely different from the brutes. He is the “two-natured animal,”|| or rather he is two beings, animal and man, each distinguished by its appropriate power. The former shares the vital power¶ with the irrational creatures, the latter possesses the rational principle, which brings us into connection with a higher realm of existence.** We might

* *Φαντασία.*

† *τύπωσις.*

‡ *ὁρμή.*

§ Quod Deus immut., 9 (I. 278-9); Mundi Op., 20 (I. 14); Leg. All., I. 11 (I. 49).

|| *Τὸ διφύειν ζῶον*, Quod det. pot. ins., 23 (I. 207).

¶ *ἡ ζωτικὴ*

** *Ib.*, § 22.

expect from this that Philo would clearly announce what his doctrine virtually involves, a tripartite division of man; but instead of doing so he constantly treats the vital and mental portions as constituting one soul. There are, he says, two things of which our soul is composed, rational and irrational,* which spring up like two scions from one root,† and yet are so strongly contrasted in their nature that one is divine, while the other is corruptible.‡ Hence he speaks habitually, not of the irrational soul, but of the irrational part of the soul.§ This view gives rise to an ambiguity in the use of the word, which, as Philo himself remarks, is employed in a twofold signification, denoting sometimes the whole, sometimes the sovereign part of the soul, just as by the word “eye” we refer both to the entire organ and to the principal part by which we see.|| Philo makes no attempt to avoid this ambiguity, but freely uses the word soul both in its wider sense and as interchangeable with “mind” and “understanding.”¶

Philo adheres consistently to this dual division of the soul, whenever he refers strictly to its composition; but he does not hesitate to borrow incidentally other philosophical divisions, and to speak of several parts of the soul, when he has in mind, not its composition, but its functions. Thus, adopting the Platonic view, he says that our soul is tripartite,** and has one part rational, a second high-spirited, a third the seat of desire.†† Some philosophers, he adds, distinguished these parts from one another only by function, but some by place also, assigning the first to the head, the second to the chest, and the third to the abdomen. He

* Animal. Sacr. idon., 5 (II. 241).

† Agr. Noe, 7 (I. 304).

‡ Leg. All., II. 24 (I. 83).

§ Τὸ ἄλογον μέρος, or simply τὸ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς. See, for instance, Leg. All. I. 10 (I. 48); Quod det. pot. ins., 46, (I. 223), and many other passages.

|| Quis rer. div. her., 11 (I. 480).

¶ See, for instance, Congr. erud. gr., 25 (I. 540), where νοῦς, ψυχὴ, and διάνοια are successively used simply for the sake of varying the expression.

** Τριμερής.

†† Τὸ λογικόν or λογιστικόν, τὸ θυμικόν, and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν.

himself, if we may judge from his frequent recurrence to this localization of our faculties, agrees with the latter.* Once he introduces the Aristotelian division, and speaks of the three parts of the soul as the nutritive or vital, the perceptive, and the rational.† Here, however, the two former are expressly classed together as consisting of the same substance, and therefore appear simply as subdivisions of the irrational principle.‡ Much more singular is his distribution, also tripartite, into mind or soul, speech and perception.§ This is distinctly given as a threefold division of the soul,|| and yet the first member is itself treated as constituting the entire soul, and, as such, is divided into rational and irrational.¶ Philo is driven into this strange confusion by the exigencies of an allegory in which the heifer, the ram, and the she-goat in Abraham's offering** are made to do duty for the human faculties.†† It is not easy to reconcile these various modes of distribution. The most that can be said in their defence is that they represent the several functions of the soul regarded under different aspects. The first looks upon it as the seat of various principles of action; the second, as possessed of an ascending scale of endowments; the third, as having three criteria of truth, directed respectively to ideas, to words and propositions, and to material objects.‡‡ They serve to illustrate the character of Philo's eclecticism, which readily appropriates whatever seems adapted to the subject immediately under discussion, without always pausing to consider

* Leg. All., III. 38 (I. 110); I. § 22, p. 57; Confus. Ling., 7 (I. 408); Migrat. Abr., 12 (I. 446); De Praemiis Sacerdotum, 3 (II. 234-5); De Concupiscentia, 2 (II. 350-1); De Fortitudine, 3 (II. 377).

† Τὸ θρεπτικόν or ζωτικόν, τὸ αἰσθητικόν, and τὸ λογικόν.

‡ Fragments, II. 668.

§ Νοῦς or ψυχή, λόγος, and αἴσθησις.

|| Quis rer. div. her., 45 (I. 504).

¶ Ib. § 26, p. 491.

** Gen. xv.

†† L. c. § 22 sqq. p. 487 sqq. See also Cherub., 32 (I. 159); Leg. All., III. 13 (I. 95); Congr. erud. gr., 18 (I. 533); Somn., I. 5 (I. 624); Animal. Sacr. idon., 6 (II. 213).

‡‡ See the passage cited in Congr. erud. gr.

whether it can be woven into the texture of a consistent philosophical system.

Leaving these less important elements of his thought, we may return to his permanent division of the soul into rational and irrational, and consider first the nature and functions of the latter. Moses, says Philo, perceiving that the soul was twofold, believed that its substance also must be twofold. Accordingly, of that portion which we possess in common with the lower animals he declared blood to be the substance, for he expressly says, "the soul of all flesh is blood," or, as it is elsewhere given, "blood is the soul of the flesh."* By mentioning flesh he shows that he does not mean the soul in its higher sense; for flesh, or our body, though it partakes of life, has no share in reason.† Philo bases this view exclusively on the authority of Moses, and he is not satisfied with the complete identification of body and soul which it appears to involve. In one of the Greek fragments he is careful by an ingenious criticism to explain away the doctrine which he has just before accepted. In commenting on Genesis ix. 4, he remarks that the expression "in the blood of the soul" indicates that soul is one thing and blood another,‡ so that the substance of the soul is really "spirit."§ It has, however, no place by itself, but is carried in and mingled with the blood.|| "Spirit" here need not denote anything immaterial,

* *Ψυχὴ πάσης σαρκὸς αἷμά ἐστιν*, and *σαρκὸς μὲν ψυχὴν φησι τὸ αἷμα*. The reference seems to be to Gen. ix. 4, where the LXX reads *κρέας ἐν αἵματι ψυχῆς οὐ φάγεσθε*, and Deut. xii. 23, *αἷμα αὐτοῦ ψυχὴ· οὐ βρωθήσεται ψυχὴ μετὰ τῶν κρεῶν*.

† Quod det. pot. ins., 23 (I. 207); Quis rer. div. her., 11 (I. 480-1); Concup., 10 (II. 356).

‡ Here the Greek reads *σῶμα*, which, on the authority of the Armenian Version, I venture to correct into the more appropriate *αἷμα*. Since I wrote these words, *αἷμα* has been given as the Greek text by Harris, on the authority of Cod. Reg. and Cod. Rup., p. 26.

§ Mangey's conjecture, *ἀψευδῶς ψυχῆς*, for the obviously incorrect *ψεῦδῶς ψυχὴν*, is confirmed by the Armenian, and now by Harris, *ψυχῆς μὲν ἀψευδῶς*, p. 26.

|| Fragments, II. 668.

but simply air, for which it is used elsewhere in an enumeration of the elements;* and that this is the meaning intended, is apparent from the continuation of the passage in the Armenian, where it is explained that the breath is carried through the veins and arteries, which also serve as blood-vessels, air preponderating in the latter, and blood in the former.† We must therefore conceive the irrational portion of the soul as strictly consisting of air, which is inextricably mingled with the blood, and so comes into organic connection with every part of the body.

This lower or perceptive soul‡ is divided in accordance with the Stoical philosophy. What the soul is in man, the heaven is in the cosmos; and as the latter, in addition to the indivisible sphere of the fixed stars, has the sevenfold sphere of the planets, so our inferior soul is divided into seven parts or natures, the five senses, speech, and the faculty of reproduction.§ Among the senses there is a certain subordination. Light, being the best of entities, has been made the organ of vision, which is the best of the senses; for that which mind is in the soul, the eye is in the body. Through this most sovereign of our perceptive faculties|| we are brought near to the sun and moon and the other heavenly luminaries; and thus vision has become to mankind the cause not only of many other blessings, but especially of the greatest, philosophy.¶ Hence the four senses which possess distinctive organs are divided into philosophical and unphilosophical. Seeing and hearing enable us to live well, and minister to the immortal mind; smell and taste contribute only to the maintenance of life, and support

* Ebriet., 27 (I. 373).

† Quaest et Sol. in Gen., II. 59. See also Mundi Op., 22 (I. 15), where the *πνευματική οὐσία* of the *σπέρμα* is said to be made into the nutritive and perceptive powers of the soul.

‡ Ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ψυχή, Concup., 10 (II. 356).

§ Quis rer. div. her., 48 (I. 505); Mundi Op., 40 (I. 28); Leg. All., I. 4 (I. 45); § 13, p. 51; Quod det. pot. ins., 46 (I. 223); Agr. Noé, 7 (I. 304).

|| Διὰ τῆς ἡγεμονικώτατης τῶν αἰσθητικῶν ὀψευς.

¶ Mundi Op., 17 (I. 11-12), § 51, p. 35.

our mortal body.* Even in the lower realm, occupied by the latter, there is a difference of rank. Smell has been made by nature the servant of taste, like the subject whose duty it is to taste the dishes before the Queen.†

We have only to add that this inferior principle in us is "the mortal part of our soul."‡ This we should expect from its nature. Being material in its origin, it must share the fate of all material organism, and sooner or later yield to dissolution.

The name which is habitually applied to the higher part of the soul is mind, νοῦς. This word, however, though it is used to embrace the whole of the rational element in man, is not absolutely distinctive. Brutes also have a sort of mind; and we have seen, in speaking of the general characteristics of soul, by which animals are distinguished from plants, that Philo does not hesitate to employ the term mind to denote that which receives impressions through the senses. This mind, which belonged even to "the earthly man" before God "breathed into his face§ the breath of life,"|| is "really earthly and corruptible,"¶ and it is only through the inspired "power of true life" that it becomes "really intelligent and living."** The higher and lower meaning thus attaching to the word mind may serve to explain "one of the numerous contradictions in the anthropology of Philo," to which Zeller calls attention.†† Philo regards representation and impulse as distinctive marks of the animal soul; and yet, says Zeller, he connects the Stoical definitions of these with his prevailing distinction between the rational and the irrational, and represents them as the action and reaction of reason and sense.

* Qu. et Sol. in Gen., III. 5. The same thought is elaborated in *Sacrificant.*, 15 (II. 263), where, however, it is ascribed to "the champions of the senses." Philo apparently assents to their opinion, and objects only to their exclusive exaltation of merely human faculties.

† SS. Ab. et Caini, 10 (I. 170).

‡ Prof. 13 (I. 556).

§ Τὸ πρόσωπον, LXX. || Gen. ii. 7.

¶ Γεώδης ἐστὶ τῷ ὄντι καὶ φθαρτός.

** Leg. All., I. 12 (I. 49 sq.).

†† III. ii. p. 393.

Appeal is made to a passage immediately preceding that which we have just quoted. Throughout that passage Philo uses the word "mind,"* and, I think, obviously in a sense which he considers applicable to the whole animal creation. He is commenting on the verse preceding that which describes the formation of man,† "a fountain went up from the earth, and watered all the face of the earth." The fountain is the symbol of mind; the face of the senses. As the inspiration of the higher mind in man is reserved for the following section, we naturally interpret mind in this place as the "earthly and corruptible," or at least as including this, the distinction being not yet marked. Accordingly, mind and sensation are treated simply as "the powers of the animal,"‡ and it is said that "the animal excels the non-animal in two things, representation and impulse"; so that if Philo contradicts himself at all in this matter, he interweaves his contradiction through the whole tissue of the same short passage. The correctness of our view is confirmed by the clear distinction which is made a little farther on,|| between the "earth-born and body-loving mind" and the "divine spirit";¶ but as this is a subject to which we must presently recur, we need not now enlarge upon it.

This slight ambiguity in the word "mind" may be one reason, in addition to the natural love of variety in expression, why Philo frequently substitutes other terms. Of these, the most common, so far as I have observed are *διάνοια* and *λογισμός*, of which the latter strictly denotes the exercise of reason rather than the rational faculty itself.** Other names are *λόγος*, *πνεῦμα*,†† and *λογικὸν πνεῦμα*.‡‡

The rational power within us is our sovereign part. By a law of nature the numerous herd of our unreasoning faculties

* Νοῦς.

† Gen. ii. 6.

‡ Αἱ τοῦ ζώου ἐννάμεις.

|| § 13.

¶ Γηγενῆς καὶ φιλοσώματος νοῦς and πνεῦμα θεῖον.

** It is not necessary to give particular references.

†† Quod det. pot. ins., 23 (I. 207).

‡‡ Animal. Sacr. idon., 3 (II. 239).

necessarily requires a leader ; and this leader is of course the mind, though it is not always awake to its duty, but sometimes degenerates from a shepherd into a mere cattle-feeder.* Hence the mind is, in philosophical language, the leading or sovereign principle,† and is characterized as “the most lordly” or “the most excellent thing in us.”‡ But besides these general epithets, several figures are employed to describe its superiority. It is the soul’s faculty of vision,§ being in the soul what the eye is in the body,|| or rather it is a kind of soul of the soul, just as the pupil in the eye is said by physicists to be the eye of the eye.¶ Again, it is the true man in the soul of each,** or man within man,†† who bears as a house the perceptible form.‡‡ It is the masculine portion within us, while the irrational part is feminine. Mind is in its whole genus superior to sensible perception, as man is to woman;§§ for it is known by its activity, but the senses, like woman, are characterized by susceptibility, being altogether dependent upon external objects.|||| Thus, it is the father of our compound being,¶¶ and is older than the entire soul, just as the heart is thought by the best physicians to be formed before the rest of the body, like the foundation of a house or the keel of a ship.*** In the exercise of its sovereign rights it is a ruler and king, a judge and umpire in the contests of life, sometimes a witness and accuser.††† Nay, it is itself the state, the civic power within the animal, issuing laws and customs.‡‡‡ Only one step

* Ποιμήν, κτηνοτρόφος. Agr. Noë, 6, 7 (I. 304-5). For ἡγεμών, of the mind, see also Quod det. pot. ins., 46 (I. 223).

† Τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, Leg. All., II. 3 (I. 67) ; Post. Caini, 31, 32, 36 (I. 245, 246, 249), etc.

‡ Τὸ κενρώτατον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, Vita Mos., III. 22 (II. 163) ; τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ κρατιστεῖον, Quod Deus immut., 10 (I. 279).

§ Quod Deus immut., ibid. || Mundi Op., 17 (I. 12). ¶ Ib. 21 (I. 15).

** Quod det. pot. ins., 8 (I. 195). †† Congr. erud. gr. 18, (I. 533).

‡‡ Quod omn. prob. lib., 17 (II. 462). §§ Animal. Sacr. idon., 5 (II. 241).

|||| Leg. All., II. 11 (I. 73).

¶¶ Gigant., 14 (I. 271).

*** Leg. All., II. 3 (I. 67).

††† Quod det. pot. ins., 8 (I. 196) ; Mutat. Nom., 7 (I. 586).

‡‡‡ Leg. All., III. 14 (I. 95).

higher can we go : as Moses was a god to Pharoah, so mind is a god to the irrational soul,* and is for everyone his peculiar divinity.†

This elevated principle is broadly distinguished by its substance or essence from the inferior portions of human nature. Philo's opinion upon this subject must be carefully examined ; for some able writers ascribe to him a view which does not appear to me to be justified by the evidence. Gfrörer maintains that, while in theory he wavers, and sometimes admits that the soul is not material, practically he is decided, and the doctrine "that the soul consists of an ethereal fire-nature" is the one which he himself accepts. This is proved, among other reasons, by the alleged "preponderating majority of passages" in which the ethereal origin of the mind is favoured.‡ Soulier declares, without discussion, that Philo admits a fifth element, the ether, out of which souls are formed.§ Zeller points out his entanglement in materialistic conceptions, but contends at the same time that it was certainly not his intention to weaken thereby the contrast between spirit and matter.|| Heinze also affirms that he cannot free himself from materialism though it is not always consistently maintained.¶

It cannot surprise us if Philo expresses himself with some degree of vacillation upon this subject, for he believed that it lay beyond the range of our unaided human faculties. "The mind in each," he declares, "is unknown to us. Who has seen the substance of the soul? Its obscurity has generated innumerable disagreements among sophists," who introduce the utmost contrariety of opinion.** Similarly, he says in another passage, "the mind in each of us is able to apprehend other things, but is unable to know itself. For as the eye sees other things, but does not see itself, so also the mind

* Leg. All., I. 13 (I. 51).

† Τὸν ἰδίον αἰμίονα. Fragments, II. 635 ; Provid. II., § 16.

‡ I. p. 379.

§ Pp. 32 and 38.

|| III. ii. p. 396.

¶ Pp. 257-9.

** Mutat. Nom., 2 (I. 579).

perceives other things, but does not apprehend itself. For let it say what, and of what kind it is, spirit or blood or fire or air, or any other body; or at least this much, either that it is body or, on the contrary, incorporeal.”* In a paragraph which is in some respects parallel to the foregoing, after stating that we have a considerable knowledge of the body, sensation, and speech, he declares that the fourth thing in us, the sovereign mind, is, like the fourth of Abraham’s wells, incomprehensible. “For what,” he asks, “do we suppose that it is in substance? Spirit [breath], or blood, or body at all? We must, however, say it is not body, but incorporeal. Is it limit, or form, or number, or actuality, or melody, or any of existing things? † And at the moment of its birth is it introduced from without, or is the fervid nature in us hardened by the surrounding air, as red-hot iron in a blacksmith’s is hardened into a stronger material by cold water, because *ψυχή* appears even to have been named from *ψύξις*? But what? When we die, is it extinguished and destroyed with our bodies, or does it survive for a very long time, or is it altogether incorruptible?”‡ We could hardly have a more complete expression of philosophical agnosticism in regard to the essence of the human mind; and yet, in the very midst of this, Philo takes the opportunity of pronouncing decidedly against materialism: whatever the mind may be, it is not “body,” but “incorporeal.”§ Although, as we shall see, he resorted to another source of knowledge, we may fairly accept this as his deliberate philosophical judgment, because it is his object to make the most of our ignorance, and yet he feels compelled to introduce his rejection of the

* Leg. All., I. 29 (I. 62).

† Meaning, I presume, Can it be classed with anything which we know under a different name?

‡ Somn., I. 6 (I. 625). See also Cherub., 20 and 32 (I. 151 and 159), where it is stated briefly that we do not know the *οὐσία* of the mind or soul.

§ Not *σῶμα*, but *ἀσώματον*. So he speaks elsewhere of *ἀσώματον τοῦδε τοῦ σώματος ψυχὴν*, Quod det. pot. ins., 44 (I. 221).

materialistic doctrine, as though on that point at least knowledge were accessible.

In his perplexity Philo turned to Scripture, and found there a solution which philosophy might indeed adopt, but was inadequate to supply. He appeals to the authority of Moses no less than five times in connection with this subject, and four times besides quotes the statement that God breathed into man's face the breath of life, as constituting the groundwork of his doctrine. The passages will be referred to as we proceed.

Having decided against the materialistic hypothesis Philo is prepared to reject all semblance of materialism in his interpretation of the Mosaic narrative. Moses taught that the substance of the soul was blood; but when he spoke of the creation of man, he said that God "breathed into his face a spirit of life,* and man became a living soul." This shows that Moses recognized the dual division of the soul, and regarded the substance of our rational faculty as "spirit," by which word he meant, "not air in motion, but a certain stamp and character of divine power, which Moses calls by a proper name, 'Image,' intimating that God is the archetype of rational nature, and man an image and copy," man standing here for mind or reason.† Thus the earthly and corruptible mind is filled with the power of true life, and man becomes a living soul through the inbreathing of "divine Spirit."‡ This doctrine leads to a very important result. The appearance of man upon the earth breaks the organic connection which we have hitherto observed in the ascending scale of mundane objects. Regarded as an animal, though he occupies the highest position, he still arises through the progressive changes of matter; but his rational faculty enters from without, being divine and eternal.§ Thus the divine Spirit itself is the substance of the rational soul, and especially according to

* Here *πνεῦμα*, instead of the usual *πνοήν*, *ζωήν*.

† Quod det. pot. ins., 22-3 (I. 206-7).

‡ Leg. All., I. 12, 13 (I. 50).

§ Mundi Op., 22 (I. 15). Here, indeed, he speaks only of "those who affirm"

Moses, "the theologian," who tells how God breathed it into the face of the first man.* The soul, then, in its higher sense, the rational mind, is not from anything at all that is originated, but from the Father and Sovereign of the universe.† For the expression "breathed in" meant nothing else than the divine Spirit coming from that happy and blessed nature to form a settlement here for the benefit of our race, in order that, although man is mortal according to the visible portion, according to the invisible, at least, he may be immortal.‡ If the substance of the soul considered in its entirety is blood, yet that of its most sovereign part is distinguished by its want of connection with everything begotten, being divine Spirit breathed from on high.§

This conception leads directly to a doctrine of emanation. In the very passage in which Philo insists most strongly on the impossibility of comprehending the mind or determining its substance, he declares, with an appeal to Moses, that it is "a divine fragment."|| In the want of adequate language to express this relation between the human and the divine, the figure, which is necessarily borrowed from material objects, is amply varied. Every man is, in his understanding, "an impression, or fragment, or ray of the happy nature."¶ The mind is a copy and imitation of the eternal and blessed idea, the most closely related of all the things on earth to the Father of the cosmos.** The doctrines of emanation and of imitation, however, are not identical, and in one passage Philo seems to correct himself in favour of the latter. He says the rational

that this is the case; but among these he would include Moses, and he apparently assents to the dictum.

* Concup., 11 (II. 356), and Fragments, II. 668.

† 'Α'π' οὐδενὸς γινητοῦ τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ ἡγεμόνος τῶν ἀπάντων.

‡ Mundi Op., 46 (I. 32).

§ Quis rer. div. her., 11 (I. 480-1).

|| 'Απόσπασμα θεῖον, Somn., I. 6 (I. 625). "Fragment" is a misleading word, but there is no English equivalent.

¶ 'Εκμαγῆτον ἢ πόσπασμα ἢ ἀπαύγασμα. Mundi Op., 51 (I. 35).

** Decem Orac., 25 (II. 202).

faculty is "a fragment of the soul of the universe, or, as is more pious for those who follow Moses in their philosophy to say, a similar impression of the divine image."* I doubt, however, whether he did not intend this for a correction in language rather than thought; for Moses does not speak of man's relation to the soul of the universe, but to the divine image. This expression, no doubt, introduces a modification of thought, and suggests the doctrine of the Logos, which we are not yet prepared to consider. But what I mean is, that Philo did not recognize the distinction between a being who is made in the likeness of God and one who emanates from God. The latter would appear to him to resemble God by virtue of his origin, and to reproduce on his tiny scale the attributes of his infinite source.† Be this as it may, the doctrine of emanation is in one passage stated with such clearness and emphasis as to leave no doubt that it represents Philo's settled conviction. The human mind, he says, "is an inseparable fragment of that divine and blessed soul. For nothing in the divine is cut so as to be separated, but is only extended. Wherefore, sharing the perfection in the universe, whenever it contemplates the cosmos, it widens with the limits of the universe, receiving no rupture; for its power is ductile." These words are the conclusion of a passage which gives us some insight into the philosophical grounds of the doctrine which is here enunciated. That Philo was not influenced by the difficulty of associating consciousness with any form of matter is apparent from his conception of the animal soul; but the wonderful powers of reason, which extended itself to embrace the universe, deeply moved him, and he could explain them only by the supposition

* *Εἰκόνας θείας ἐκμαγεῖτον ἐμφερές*. Mutat. Nom., 39 (I. 612).

† The apparent confusion which here occurs is precisely similar in character to that between participation and imitation, which we have met with in Plato; and Aristotle seems to regard the two notions as identical, for he treats the change from the Pythagorean *μίμησις* into the Platonic *μίθεξις* as an alteration in the term alone,—*τοῦτομα μόνον μετέβαλεν*, Metaph., I. vi., 3, 4.

that the Creator had breathed into the soul from on high a portion of his own divinity, which invisibly sealed the invisible soul with its own impressions, in order that not even the region of earth might be without an image of God. As the archetype was unseen, the image too was invisible, and, being stamped like the pattern, received no longer mortal, but immortal thoughts. For how could a mortal nature at the same time remain and travel away, or see things here and things elsewhere, or sail round the whole sea, or journey over the earth as far as its limits, or leaving earthly things apprehend the air and its changes, and the strange or customary effects of the seasons, or fly up through the air to heaven, and examine into the movements and relations of the heavenly bodies? How could it think of arts and sciences, and innumerable other things? For alone of our possessions the mind, as being swiftest of all, anticipates and outstrips time, and without regard to its conditions touches with its invisible powers the universe and its parts and their causes. Nay, it considers the cosmos itself too short a limit for its continuous and ceaseless race, and presses on to comprehend the incomprehensible nature of God. Only if it be of divine origin could the human mind, which is so small, and enclosed in such small masses as the brain or heart, contain this vast magnitude of heaven and the cosmos. Then follow the words already quoted descriptive of its nature.*

These passages are neither few nor unimportant, and they seem to state Philo's views in the most explicit manner. If in other places he ascribes to the mind a material origin, he is guilty of a self-contradiction so gross as to render him almost unworthy of serious study—unless indeed, as is not alleged, these antagonistic doctrines represent different periods in his philosophical belief. We must examine the passages bearing on this subject, that we may see for ourselves what they really mean.

* Quod det. pot. ins., 24 (I. 208-9).

The first is one which we have already noticed when discussing the number of the elements.* It ends with these words :—

“For let there be, as is the doctrine of the ancients, a fifth circular substance, differing from the four in superiority, out of which the stars and the whole heaven were thought to have been made,† of which in consequence one must suppose‡ that the human soul also is a fragment.”

In this passage, as we before observed, Philo is stating the opinion of others; and although from the structure of his sentences he may seem to make this opinion his own, still his use of the expressions “let there be” and “were thought” shows that he is not making a categorical declaration of his real belief. He is explaining the words, “Thou shalt go to thy fathers,” in Gen. xv. 15, and refers, without any expression of approval or disapproval, to three different interpretations. Some said that “fathers” meant the sun, moon, and stars; others the archetypal ideas, to which the understanding of the wise man removes; and some surmised§ that the term stood for the four elements into which our bodily frame was resolved. It is added, surely as part of the last opinion, that the intelligent and heavenly species of the soul will go to the purest ether, as to a father. I am inclined to think that the middle view is the one most likely to have commended itself to Philo; and although he might certainly have expressed himself with greater clearness, yet, considering that in an earlier part of this very treatise he has given such a different account of the mind’s origin, I see no occasion to make him responsible for opinions which grew out of the “surmise” of others, and which, in their most questionable part, are certainly stated in a tentative and hypothetical way.||

* Quis rer. div. her., 57 (I. 514).

† Ἐδοξε γεγενῆσθαι.

‡ Θετίον.

§ Τινὲς . . . ὑπερόπασαν.

|| In the Quaest. et Sol. in Gen., III. 11, he mentions the view, as that “of many,” that “fathers” denoted all the elements, but adds that nevertheless the word seemed to him to signify the incorporeal substances and inhabitants of the divine world whom elsewhere Moses was accustomed to call angels. This statement to some extent confirms the interpretation which I have given.

In the second passage which requires our attention it is said :—

“ This species of soul [that is the mind] was not formed out of the same elements of which other things were made, but obtained a purer and better substance, out of which the divine natures were wrought, in consequence of which also, alone among the things in us, understanding was reasonably thought to be incorruptible.”*

Here, it is alleged, the purer substance must be ether, because the divine natures, which can only mean the stars, were made out of it. It might be well, however, to allow Philo to be his own interpreter. He tells us that before the existence of man there were “ rational divine natures.” Were these all stars ? By no means. Some were incorporeal and intelligible, but others, namely the stars, were not without bodies.† Now, as the only bodies which the stars possessed were made of ether, the divine natures which dwelt in them, and themselves belonged to the world of “ intelligibles,”‡ clearly were not ether. It follows that even if the divine natures which are mentioned in our present passage were intended to refer solely to the stars, and of this there is no evidence, still the allusion would be, not to their ethereal bodies, but to their incorporeal reason ; and the “ purer and better substance ” must be, not the ether, but the divine Spirit, which, as we have seen, is the essence of the rational soul. This passage, therefore, is directly opposed to the doctrine which it is adduced to support.

Elsewhere Philo expressly contrasts the opinion of Moses with that which we are considering, and it is needless to remark that the supposed authority of Moses was for him decisive.

“ The others,” he says, “ affirming that our mind is a portion of the ethereal nature, represented man as related to ether. But the great Moses did not liken the species of the rational soul to anything originated, but affirmed that it was a genuine coin of that divine and invisible Spirit marked and stamped with the seal of God.”§ An appeal to the usual

* Quod Deus immut., 10 (I. 279).

† Mundi Op., 50 (I. 34).

‡ Νοητά.

§ I follow here the reading of Eusebius, which alone is intelligible.

text follows, and the inference is drawn that he who receives the breath of life is necessarily made to resemble him who sends it forth. "Wherefore also it is said that man was made in the image of God, not in the image of anything originated." It followed that, since the soul bore this high resemblance, the body too was raised erect, and stretched its vision up to heaven, the purest part of the universe, in order that by what was manifest that which was obscure might be clearly apprehended. For the eyes of the body, which are able to bend themselves towards the ether, are an image of the invisible eye of the understanding; and if the former, though made out of corruptible matter, are competent to run up from the region of earth to the far distant heaven, and touch its limits, how vast must we suppose is the course of the soul's eyes, which winged with desire of beholding absolute Being stretch themselves not only to the remotest ether, but outrunning the bounds of the entire cosmos press on to the Unbegotten.*

In this passage "the Mosaic type" of doctrine does a good deal more than "glimmer through," which is all that Gfrörer allows to it;† it affirms that the soul was immaterial and divine, in emphatic contrast to the view that it was part of the ether. It furnishes also one more glimpse of the inner ground of Philo's belief. That which was material might reach the limits of the material, but could get no farther; the power in us which apprehends the eternal and the absolute can have its source nowhere but in the eternal and the absolute. The same thought will explain a reference, in another place, to the mind as "extending itself as far as the ether and still farther."‡ This is indeed everywhere its characteristic, that it transcends perceptible things,§ and enters the immaterial world of the intelligible.||

The remaining passages in which a material origin may seem to be attributed to the mind receive their explanation from a very natural figure of speech. As ether was the purest and highest form of matter, "ethereal" came to be used, as it is amongst ourselves, of that which is splendid and refined, without reference to its source in matter or in spirit. Thus wisdom is called "ethereal," the figure being suggested by an allusion

* Plantat. Noe, 5 (I. 332-3).

† P. 378.

‡ Gigant., 14 (I. 271).

§ *Αἰσθητά*.

|| *Νοητά*.

to manna, "the heavenly food" by which wisdom was symbolized.* We may compare with this Philo's use of the word "olympian," which is contrasted with "earthly," and corresponds with our own word heavenly.† This secondary use of the term ethereal is apparent in a passage already cited, where, having stated that the substance of the mind is divine Spirit, and having referred to his favourite text, Philo adds, "that which was breathed in was evidently ethereal spirit, and, if anything, better than ethereal spirit, as being a ray of the happy and thrice happy nature."‡ We may explain in a similar manner the statement that the body has been wrought out of earth, "but the soul is of ether, a divine fragment," in proof of which comes the familiar text. The body accordingly has kindred food produced by the earth, "but the soul, which is a part of ethereal nature, on the contrary has ethereal and divine food; for it is nourished by sciences." This mode of representation is suggested by the context, a contrast being drawn, in connection with the sentence passed upon the serpent, between earthly pleasures, which belong to the body's sustenance, and the heavenly pursuits of the soul. Hence appeal is immediately made to the manna, the bread from heaven, which proves that the soul is nourished, not by earthly and corruptible things, but by the words which God showers from the lofty and pure nature which he has called heaven.§ The figurative character of this passage is so apparent that it cannot for a moment be placed in opposition to Philo's more deliberate statements of opinion, especially as even within its own limits the soul is called a "divine fragment." So again, it is by virtue of its purity, and not of its material origin, that the mind is said to be most closely related to heaven, a statement which is made immediately before one of the strongest

* Prof., 25 (I. 566).

† See Quod det. pot. ins., 23 (I. 207); Quod Deus immut., 29 (I. 293); Plantat. Noe, 15 (I. 339).

‡ Concup., 11 (II. 356).

§ Leg. All., III. 55-6 (I. 119).

assertions of its transcendent nature.* We have only to add that when the mind is described as “an ardent and fiery spirit,”† it is so in obedience to the exigencies of an allegory in which the fire of Abraham’s sacrifice represents the mind, and the wood the subjects of its thought.‡

It seems to me, then, that Philo nowhere deliberately maintains the ethereal origin of the mind, in the strict sense of the words; and the most which can be justly alleged is that he two or three times allows himself, partly in deference to the opinion of others, partly from his figurative style of writing, to use language which might be misleading. On the other hand, his doctrine that the rational soul has for its substance the divine Spirit, which connects it inseparably with the Supreme Being, and removes it entirely from the category of matter, is asserted with a frequency and distinctness which leave nothing to be desired. I cannot doubt, therefore, that the latter view represents his settled judgment. We shall presently see that this alone accords with the further development of his philosophy.

This divine substance is by its nature incapable of division. As the irrational soul, with its seven parts, corresponds with the seven planetary spheres, so the mind answers to the outermost and indivisible sphere of the fixed stars, and, though it introduces unending divisions into the objects of its intelligent apprehension, is itself without parts.§

The human mind, then, belongs to a wholly different order of existence from the body and its animating principle. Its heavenly origin is shown even by that upward look which distinguishes the eyes of man from those of inferior creatures.|| It belongs to the same genus as those incorporeal souls, with which, as we have seen, the air is peopled, and what more likely than that prior to its entrance into the body it formed a

* Dec. Orac., 25 (II. 202).

† Prof., 24 (I. 565).

‡ Plantat. Noe, 4 (I. 332).

§ *Ἐνθερμον καὶ πεπυρωμένον πνεῦμα.*

§ Quis rer. div. her., 48 (I. 505-6).

part of that ærial band? Philo readily embraced the Platonic doctrine of the pre-existence of the mind, interweaving with it his more Jewish conceptions, and we must now make nearer acquaintance with the upper world of souls.

Rational nature is of two kinds, the corruptible and the immortal. The former is that of men; the latter, that of souls which, dwelling in air and heaven, have never been bound in a body, the region of endless calamities. These exalted beings are incapable of moral evil, having obtained from the beginning an unmingled and blessed lot.* The distinction thus indicated must have existed originally in the realm of incorporeal souls, for otherwise none would have ever descended into anything so remote from their nature as the body. Philo accordingly recognizes such an original distinction, though he does not very clearly explain it. The whole company of souls was arranged in two ranks; some making their descent into mortal bodies, and being released from them again in conformity with certain defined periods; the others, who enjoyed a more divine constitution and were endowed with greater and more divine thoughts, neglecting the whole region of earth, and keeping aloft close to the ether itself. The latter, with their incorruptible purity, were known to the Greek philosophers as heroes and demons,† but by Moses were more appropriately called angels or messengers, since they acted as ambassadors, bringing good tidings from the Sovereign to the subjects, and reporting to the King what his subjects required. Therefore Moses introduced them in Jacob's vision ascending and descending the ærial ladder, which has the earth as its basis and the heaven as its head. Not that God who knows all things requires such informants, but we poor mortals are in need of mediators, lest we should be overwhelmed by the majesty of the Supreme Power. The souls of the other class

* Confus. Ling., 35 (I. 432).

† Δαίμονες, of course not in the bad sense which was afterwards attached to the word.

are also "incorruptible and immortal citizens" of the air, so that the corruptibility which was just now assigned to them must refer, not to their intrinsic nature, but only to their connection with our mortal frame, a connection which necessarily gives them an experience of dissolution from which the angels are exempt. No satisfactory explanation is given of their descent into the body. They are merely said to be nearest to the earth and enamoured of corporeal existence; but why pure spirits should be thus enamoured does not appear. In regard to the great mass of mankind the difficulty does not seem to have struck Philo; but he is evidently at a loss to understand why the souls of the wise, and especially of the patriarchs of Israel, should have left the brightness of their native sky, and sunk into the shadows of earth. Abraham, and indeed all the wise men of whom Moses speaks, are introduced as sojourners in this foreign earthly land, while their true country is the heavenly realm. They are not like settlers, to whom the country that receives them becomes as a mother-city; but the state which sent them forth continues to be their home, and to it they desire to return. Nor were they, before their entrance on this lower scene, mingled with the multitude in the air contiguous to the earth, but the soul of the wise man comes from the heavenly ether, and from this pure height we cannot suppose that any sensuous attraction has drawn it down. Such rare spirits can have come only for the sake of seeing and learning; and when they have personally observed all perceptible and mortal things, and thus added to their stock of wisdom, they return to the place whence they came. Or perhaps we may trace the operation of another "necessary law": this experience may be needed to bring to their consciousness the fact that they are akin to created things, and cannot be perpetually and entirely blessed. But from whatever cause their migration takes place, from beginning to end of their earthly career they practise dying to the corporeal life that they may share the incorporeal and

incorruptible; and thus they are able to bear up against the rushing flood into which they are plunged, and at last to wing their way to the place from which they came. But others, when they have stepped into the river of the body, neglecting wisdom, and giving themselves up to unstable and random pursuits, are swept away and swallowed up by the suction of the violent eddy. It would seem from this account as if Philo recognized an original difference in moral quality among souls, and he accordingly admits the existence of good and bad demons or souls or angels. The reality of wicked angels is proved by the Psalmist's allusion to them.* They are the same as the angels of God who were attracted by the beauty of the daughters of men,† and are not worthy of the appellation. They are in reality the wicked, who slip into the name of angels, not knowing the daughters of right reason, the sciences and virtues, but captivated by the mortal offspring of mortal men, even pleasures, the bearers of no genuine beauty, which is seen by the understanding alone, but of a spurious gracefulness, through which the senses are deceived.‡

The foregoing exposition is certainly confused. Philo, starting from the text about the angels of God and the daughters of men, proceeds to unfold his doctrine of souls inhabiting the air, and to divide them into their two classes, ministers of the Creator and those that descend into bodies, and therefore, when he speaks of good and bad angels, we naturally expect both to be incorporeal souls, and yet at the end of his explanation the bad turn out to be wicked men. We cannot now anticipate the doctrine which determines the connection of the body with the problem of human sin; but we may say that Philo must have given this unexpected turn to his interpretation because he shrank from admitting that moral evil

* Psalm lxxvii. 49, LXX, ἐὶ ἀγγέλων πονηρῶν.

† Gen. vi. 2.

‡ See Gigant., 2-4 (I. 263-5); Plantat. Noe, 4 (I. 331-2); Conf. Ling., 17 (I. 416); Somn., I. 22 (I. 641-2); § 31, p. 648; Quaest. et Sol. in Gen., III. 10, 45, IV. 74.

could attach itself to an incorporeal spirit. How, then, came the vast swarm of human spirits, so foolishly and recklessly, as it would seem, to expose themselves to a moral contamination from which they were naturally exempt? Philo either was unconscious of this serious flaw in his system, or was content to pass it over in silence as a mystery which he could not solve.

If the pre-existence of the soul might be inferred from its divine origin, much more might its immortality be deduced from the same source. Accordingly Philo treats it as in its very nature immortal. We must reserve for future consideration the connection of this doctrine with his ethical theory; at present we must simply mark the fact that the rational principle in man has descended from a higher existence into the body, to which it is not naturally allied, and will therefore survive the dissolution of his perishable frame.*

Having considered the general character of the rational soul, we must now survey it in its connection with our lower nature. Within our body two organs have been selected by different thinkers as its place of abode, the brain and the heart. On this point Philo, with an unusual simplicity, makes Moses as uncertain as less inspired men. In the peace-offering the brain and the heart were not presented, because our sovereign principle resides in one or other of these; and as it is only our higher part that is susceptible of moral evil, it would be absurd to include in the sacrifice organs which for this reason would induce, not a forgetfulness, but a recollection of sins.† Philo himself, though not pronouncing a decision, seems to give the preference to the brain, for around it the senses keep watch, like body-guards of a great king, and the head has been regarded as the locality of reason by the most profound philosophers.‡

* See especially *Quod Deus immut.*, 10 (I. 279); *Mund. Op.*, 22 (I. 15); § 46, p. 32, and other passages which I need not particularly refer to.

† *Animal. Sacrif. idon.*, 7 (II. 243-4).

‡ *Somn.*, I. 6 (I. 625); *Concupisc.*, 2 (II. 350-1). For an allusion to its locality, see also *Quod det. pot. ins.*, 24 (I. 208).

The manner in which the rational principle connects itself with our earthly and mortal nature is not described by Philo with the clearness that we could desire, and we must be content to view it as already in possession of its fragile tabernacle. There it communicates its own inspiration to the irrational part of the soul, so that the mind has been animated by God, but the irrational portion by the mind; and it is for this reason that the latter is, as it were, a god of the former.* In order that it may be able to effect this inspiration, and to exercise a just control over the divided nature beneath it, it is diffused in its inseparable unity wholly through all the parts.† This statement apparently contradicts our previous localization of the mind in the head, and in order to escape from our difficulty we must attend to Philo's doctrine of the mental powers.

A physical analogy is found in the sun, which, though it is located in heaven, extends its rays into every part of the cosmos. The sun, says Philo, is used symbolically in Scripture in various ways, but among other things it denotes the mind, as in the passage‡ where it is said that they built strong cities for Pharoah, Peitho, the logos or speech, to which "persuasion" § belongs, Rameses, sensation, and "On, the mind, which they called the city of the sun, since, like a sun, it has had the sovereignty of our entire frame attached to it, and stretches its powers|| as rays into the whole."¶ It is, accordingly, by virtue of its powers that the mind, though occupying its seat in the head, nevertheless pervades our entire system. It stands to the rest of our complex being in the relation of a father, and "sows in each of the parts its own powers, and distributes to them its energies, having attached to it the care and superintendence of all."** Like "generous suckers," the suitable powers pervade our system as far as the legs and hands and the other parts of the body within and without.†† Or again,

* Leg. All., I. 13 (I. 51). † Τὸ ἀτμητον ὅλον ἐν' ὅλῳ, Agr. Noe, 7 (I. 304).

‡ Ex. i. 11. § Πείθειν. || Δυνάμεις. ¶ Somn., I. 14 (I. 632).

** Migrat. Abr., 1. (I. 437). †† Plantat. Noe, 7 (I. 334).

the mind may be compared to a fountain which sends off streams in various directions, for it widens and stretches its powers to the several organs of sense.* The idea of stretching,† though borrowed from physical nature, is quite characteristic of the mental powers, and represents Philo's conception of the mode in which the mind, though itself a spiritual monad, extended its influence in space. This conception is once applied directly to the mind itself;‡ once to sensation,§ which, however, is one of the powers; but generally to the mental faculties under their distinctive name of powers or energies.|| As having a capacity for stretching, the power of the mind is described as ductile.¶ And however far it may extend, it receives no rupture. It not only, therefore, pervades the body, but brings itself into contact with the various objects of creation and makes its way even to God himself. In this manner the mind transcends the conditions of space, and, though lodged in such a diminutive organ, can contain the universe. By virtue of the same "invisible powers" it is freed from the limitations of time, which it anticipates and outstrips.**

From this general description we might infer the nature of the powers. They are not mere properties of the mind, in our modern sense, dependent for their existence upon the mind to which they belong; they are spiritual essences, in which the individual mind has only its appointed share, and are included in the eternal realm. This is expressly asserted, indeed, only in regard to some of the higher faculties; but the reasoning which is applied to them is equally applicable to the entire range of our abilities, and conducts us to a view which is in harmony with Philo's whole philosophy, and throws light on some of its profounder questions. The powers of earnestness, improvement, and perfection, will, it is said, never fail,

* Post. Caini, 36, 37 (I. 249); Prof., 32 (I. 573), &c.

† *Τείνω*.

‡ Leg. All., I. 11 (I. 49).

§ Leg. All., II. 11 (I. 73).

|| Leg. All., III. 65 (I. 124); SS. Abelis et Caini, 20 (I. 177); Post. Caini, 36 (I. 249); Ebriet., 27 (I. 373); Prof., 32 (I. 573); Somn., I. 14 (I. 632).

¶ *Ὀλκός*.

** Quod det. pot. ins., 24 (I. 208-9); see also Ebriet., I. c.

but will associate with different men at different times. They are like seals, which, when they impress the wax, are in no way affected, but, though they communicate an image, remain themselves the same; and if the impressed wax be broken up, another piece may be submitted to the stamp. So that we must not suppose that our powers perish with us when we perish, for they are immortal, and embrace innumerable men besides ourselves.* So far, therefore, from the powers depending on the mind, it would be truer to say that the mind depends upon the powers, "for without the powers the mind by itself is found to be bare, and not even to exist."† If we put these conceptions together, it would seem that, as some modern philosophers regard the material atom as simply a centre of force, a focal localization of a power infinite in extent, so Philo regarded the mind as the centre and unity of spiritual powers, the finite individualization of infinite and eternal essences. Nevertheless the mind, as a whole, may be considered superior to the powers taken one by one; and as a monarch represents the centre and unity of the state, so the mind may be compared to a great king, encompassed by its retinue of powers, which act as its body-guards and messengers.‡

Having obtained a view of their general character, we must now survey the powers more in detail. Unfortunately, Philo, with his usual want of system, makes no attempt to give a scientific enumeration of them, but contents himself with rhetorical lists, and allusions to their immense number. In accordance, however, with his fundamental division of the soul, he classifies them as rational and irrational.§ An

* Agr. Noe, 38 (I. 325-6). Cf. Abr., 11 (II. 9).

† Γυμνός καὶ οὐδὲ ὦν. Leg. All., III. 16 (I. 97).

‡ Δορυφόροι, ἄγγελοι. Migrat. Abr., 31 (I. 462), where *δορυφόροι* is used of the higher powers. In the following passages the figure is used of the senses—Mundi Op., 48 (I. 33); Leg. All., III. 38 (I. 110); Somn., I. 5 (I. 624); Special. leg., III. 20 (II. 318); Concupisc. 2 (II. 351); § 11, p. 356; Quod det. pot. ins., 10 (I. 197) 23 (I. 207).

§ Agr. Noe, 14 (I. 310); Migrat. Abr., 38 (I. 470).

equivalent division is that into rational and perceptive,* because “the irrational powers are derived from sensible perception.”† It would be more correct to say, because the perceptive faculties are, in the view of mental philosophy, the most important of the irrational powers, with which Philo actually enumerates them, no longer as comprehending, but as included in them,‡ an inconsistency of language which exemplifies the looseness with which this subject is treated. This classification, though it would naturally embrace the entire soul, is yet found within the mind itself. The mind, while still bare and unentangled in a body, possesses not only rational faculties, but also the ascending powers which distinguish the lower orders of creation, the habitual, the organic, the vital, and even the perceptive.§ Other powers, the nutritive|| and the animal,¶ we must refer to the irrational soul. Of the higher powers, although Philo alludes to their genera and species, there is not even the semblance of classification. A simple enumeration of them as they are found in several lists, will convey the best impression of his use of the term, which, it will be observed, he applies not only to our original faculties, but to our acquired aptitudes. At the summit we may place the intellectual power,** and then the rational,†† with its twofold division, which will be noticed farther on. Then come reflection,‡‡ comprehension,§§ acumen,|||| carefulness,¶¶ memory,*** recollection,††† manifold kinds of arts, certainty of sciences, retentive adoption of the principles of all virtue, intelligence,‡‡‡ sagacity,§§§ prudence,|||| notions,¶¶¶ intentions,**** designs,†††† forethought,‡‡‡‡ earnestness,§§§§

* *Αἰσθητικαί.*

† *Migrat. Abr.*, l. c.; *SS. Ab. et Caini*, 20 (I. 177). ‡ *Leg. All.*, II. 13 (I. 74).

§ *Ἑκτική, φυτική, ψυχική, αἰσθητική.* *Leg. All.*, II. 7 (I. 71); § 10, p. 73; § 13, p. 74.

|| *Θρεπτική*, *Mund. Op.* 22 (I. 15).

¶ *Ζωτική*, *Quod det. pot. ins.*, 22 (I. 207).

** *Ἡ διανοητικὴ δύναμις.*

†† *Ἡ λογική.*

‡‡ *Νόησις.*

§§ *Κατάληψις.*

|| *Ἐδστοχία.*

¶¶ *Μελέτη.*

*** *Μνήμη.*

††† *Ἀνάμνησις.*

‡‡‡ *Σύνεσις.*

§§§ *Ἀγχίνοια.*

|||| *Φρόνησις.*

¶¶¶ *Ἐννοήματα.*

**** *Διανοήσεις.*

†††† *Βουλαί.*

‡‡‡‡ *Προμήθειαι.*

§§§§ *Σπουδή.*

improvement,* perfection.† The term is also employed of the regal, legislative, sacerdotal, and prophetic functions of Moses.‡

A few of the powers are, however, exempted from this vagueness of treatment, and selected for special consideration. Of these we may attend first to the perceptive.§ Philo says

The perceptive faculty may be regarded in two aspects, the habitual, that is the permanent capacity which we possess whether we exercise it or not, and the operative.|| Of these, the former is one of the intrinsic powers of the mind, and was generated at the same time. But not so the latter; it sprang subsequently into being, as the helper and ally of the mind. This has been taught by Moses through the mythical account of the creation of Eve—a narrative which must be taken allegorically, for no one could believe that a woman was really made out of a man's rib. Clearly rib stands here for power, as when we say that a man has ribs instead of strength, or that an athlete is thick-ribbed.¶ Adam, then, must represent the mind, Eve perception already acting through the senses, and the rib the permanent faculty still dormant in the mind. Now, in order that Eve should be created, it was necessary that Adam should fall asleep; for in reality, when the mind is asleep, perception arises; and when it awakes again, perception is extinguished. This is proved by experience. Whenever we desire to follow a train of exact thought, we retreat to a solitary place, close our eyes and ears, and bid farewell to the senses. Thus, when the mind is wide awake, perception perishes. But when the latter arises and is kindled, when the eye surveys the beautifully executed works of painters or sculptors, or the ear attends to some melodious strain, the mind is unable to apply itself to any of its own intellectual subjects. Still more is this the case when taste rises up and is filled with the pleasures of the table. Therefore the awakening of the senses is the sleep of the mind, and the awakening of the mind is the inactivity of the senses, as, when the sun rises, the light of the stars becomes invisible, and, when it has set, shines forth. In this manner, then, operative perception is produced whenever, during the slumber of the mind, the habitual is excited, and stretched as far as the flesh and the organs of sense. But even operative perception is, like woman, susceptible rather than active. Thus vision is affected by the

* Βελτίωσις.

† Τελείωσις. See Leg. All., II. 7 (I. 71); Plantat. Noe, 7 (I. 334); Congr. erud. gr., 18 (I. 533); 8 (I. 524-5); Post. Caini, 11 (I. 233); Agr. Noe, 38 (I. 325-6); De Sobrietate, 6 (I. 396-7).

‡ Vit. Mos., II. 1 (II. 135).

§ 'Η αἰσθητικὴ or αἰσθησις.

|| 'Η καθ' ἑξίν and ἡ καθ' ἐνέργειαν.

¶ Ἐμπλευρός

visible things that move it, white, black, and the rest ; hearing, again, by sounds ; taste by savours ; smell by odours ; touch by rough and soft ; and all the senses remain still until something comes from without to excite them. Consistently with this explanation Adam said, when Eve was brought to him, " This is now a bone from my bones, and flesh from my flesh." The word " this " distinguishes the operative from the habitual perception, which is not taken out of the mind, but grows up with it. " Bone " symbolizes power ; and " flesh from my flesh " signifies that perception is never independent of the mind, for the latter is its fountain, and the foundation on which it rests. The word " now " is inserted because perception is by nature confined to the present moment, and in this respect is inferior to mind, which not only thinks of the present, but remembers the past, and anticipates the future.*

From this account it follows that, although the mind must lull to sleep its higher energies in order that sensible perception may awaken, still these two are to a certain extent mutually dependent ; and we find that this is actually the case, for the senses cannot perceive without the intervention of mind, nor can the mind discern material objects without the mediation of the senses. In order to effect the necessary union, a third principle is required. This is pleasure which is symbolized by the serpent. The historical order in which these three—mind, perception, and pleasure—succeed one another in the Mosaic narrative represents only the order of priority in thought ; for in time they are of the same age, the soul bringing everything with itself, either actually or potentially. The pleasure which attends the exercise of the senses is compared to a serpent, because its movement is, like that of the serpent, manifold and various. In the first-place it is fivefold, attaching itself to each of the five senses ; and secondly, each sense has a great variety of pleasures, vision, for instance, being delighted not only with the different kinds of artistic creation, but with the graceful forms of animals and plants, and the ear deriving sweetness from musical instruments, the song of birds, and the melodious sounds of the human voice.† This leads us to observe that " the perceptive power," of which

* Leg. All., II. § 7 sqq. (I. 70, sqq.).

† Ib. § 18, p. 79.

we have hitherto spoken, comprehends under it "five perceptive powers."* These are distributed from our sovereign principle, the mind, to the several organs of sense, four of which are appropriately situated in the face, the select and sovereign portion of the body. To the eyes the visual spirit† is stretched, to the ears the auditory, to the nostrils that of smell, that of taste to the mouth, and that of touch to the entire surface.‡ The word spirit is ambiguous, and if this passage stood alone, we might be tempted to refer it to the aerial portion of our being; but we must explain it in accordance with the doctrine of the essential nature of the powers which we have already reached, and understand it, therefore, at least in the case of man, in an immaterial sense.§

We come now to a distinguishing prerogative of man, on which we have not hitherto touched. The senses, with their resulting impressions, belong to the whole animal creation; but the mind or understanding, which raises man above the other denizens of earth, is the sole possessor of will or preferential power. So profound and far-reaching did this distinction between man and all that lay beneath him appear to Philo that it carried him at once to the grandest regions of speculation, and spoke to him of the reality of One whom necessity has never bound. This consequence of what he must have accepted as a truth of experience does not come under our present subject; but we cannot without violence separate it from the principal passage in which he unfolds his views. He there tells us that

The Father who begat the understanding deemed it alone worthy of liberty,|| and let it loose from the bonds of necessity,¶ having gifted it with such a portion as it could receive of volition,** his own most fitting and proper possession. For the irrational animals, in whose souls there is not this free mind, have been placed under yoke and bridle, and handed

* Ebriet., 27 (I. 373).

† Τὸ ὁρατικὸν πνεῦμα.

‡ Prof., 32 (I. 573); Post. Caini, 37 (I. 249).

§ Besides the passages cited above, see Leg. All., III. 67 (I. 124-5 ἀρχὴ ἦν αἰσθησεως ὁ νοῦς); § 65, p. 124.

|| Ἐλευθερία.

¶ Ἀνάγκη.

** Τὸ ἐκούσιον.

over to the service of men, as domestics to masters. But man, having been allotted a volitional and self-determining judgment,* and generally exercising preferential energies,† reasonably incurs blame for the wrong which he does with forethought, and praise for the right which he voluntarily performs. For of other things, plants and animals, neither is the fertility praiseworthy, nor are the misdeeds blamable, for they receive their movements and changes in either direction without preference and volition. But the soul of man alone having received from God voluntary movement, and being in this respect made like him, liberated as far as possible from that stern mistress, necessity, would be properly liable to accusation for not honouring him who made it free. For God endowed him with voluntary and preferential energies in order that, knowing good and evil, he may exercise choice of the better, and avoidance of the contrary.‡ Accordingly it is written in Deuteronomy,§ “Behold, I have set before thy face life and death, good and evil; select life.” By this it is shown both that men have a knowledge of good and the contrary, and that they ought to choose the better in preference to the worse.||

From this passage, on which the briefer allusions elsewhere can serve as a commentary, we may gather the essential

* Ἐθελουργοῦ καὶ αὐτοκελεύστου γνώμης λαχών.

† Προαιρετικαὶ ἐνέργειαι.

‡ Αἵρεσις, φυγή.

§ xxx. 15, 19.

|| Ὅφειλousι πρὸ τῶν χειρόνων αἰρεῖσθαι τὰ κρείττω. Quod Deus immut., 10 (I. 279-80). I think we must rest our exposition of Philo's philosophical view upon this and other passages of his complete works; but a remarkable fragment has been preserved “from the Fourth Book of the Allegory of the Sacred Laws,” which in effect reduces the belief in free-will to a useful delusion of the less educated. He refers to the passage, “Behold! I have set before thy face the conflicting things, life and death, good and evil; select life, that thou mayest live.” He then says that it is a happy thing for the soul to be able to choose the better; but it is happier for it not to choose, but for the Creator to draw it to himself and improve it. For, strictly speaking, the human mind does not choose the good through itself, but in accordance with the thoughtfulness of God, while he bestows the fairest things upon the worthy. It is only because God instructs us as a man that the mind is represented as capable of knowing anything, and willing, and choosing, and avoiding. According to the better principle in the Law, God is not as man; and in this aspect the powers and causes of all things are attached to God. But if selections and rejections are in strictness made by the one Cause, why does the legislator advise us to choose, as though we were autocrats of our choice? The answer is that these things are said to those who have not yet been initiated in the great mysteries about the sovereignty and authority of the Uncreated and the exceeding nothingness of the created. [Harris, *Fragm.*, p. 8.] If this passage has been correctly preserved, it stands alone among Philo's utterances, though not without important points of contact with them; and I must be content to leave it without attempting a reconciliation.

elements of Philo's doctrine. It was founded in the first place on a comparison between man and the lower animals, a comparison which seemed to prove that man had received, not a more elevated animal nature, but something in addition to his animal nature, a principle which imparted to him an absolute difference of kind. Not only did man possess rational faculties which were unknown to the brute, but his mode of action was distinguished by clear characteristics; for while the brute was impelled by blind instinct, man decided between conflicting courses, and gave his preference to one rather than the other. Thus the lower animals were altogether free from moral evil, not being involved in those voluntary acts of wrong which are possible only to rational beings.* This leads us to the connection between free-will and the phenomena of conscience. Philo apparently grounds his belief in the former on the testimony of our experience, for he assumes it as a known fact, just as unquestionable as our possession of reason, its reality being, as we have seen, brought into clear light by the contrast between man and brute. The conscience, however, affords a secondary evidence; for the reasonableness of its phenomena is justified by appealing to the existence of our preferential power. Stress is laid especially on the sense of merit and demerit, and the sense of duty is not overlooked; men deserve praise and blame for their good and evil actions, and they *ought* to follow the better. Elsewhere a further consideration is suggested. The cause of evils is not God, but the voluntary turning of our own mind towards what is worse.†

If we inquire into the character of free-will, it seems to consist in the exercise of choice between a better and a worse which are placed before it. This is clearly stated at the close of the passage above quoted. It is repeated with no less clearness elsewhere. Higher beings than man are exempt from moral evil, because their lot is unmingled—by which we may

* Conf. Ling., 35 (I. 432).

† Quod det. pot. ins., 32 (I. 214).

understand that the temptation to evil is not presented to them, and they are thus lifted above the moral problems in which mankind so often prove faithless. The brutes, as we have seen, are not raised above, but sunk beneath, the possibility of sin. But man, with his divided nature, has two courses open to him, and accordingly "he almost alone of all beings, having a knowledge of good and evil, chooses often the worst things, and avoids things worthy of serious pursuit."* The same capacity for choice is implied when it is said, "The hortatory word of the Father imposes no necessity, in order that with volition and self-determination thou mayest pursue the better."† Something more than a choice among data may seem to be implied in the epithet "self-moved"‡ which is given to the rational nature in connection with Adam's naming of the animals.§ It is true that no choice is here spoken of; but, nevertheless, we may conceive the act as being only a selection of the most appropriate out of all possible names, so that the self-movement is only towards the best out of a multitude of data. That the epithet is not to be pressed too closely is shown by another passage, where the dependence of the soul on a higher power for its prime movements is strongly insisted upon. All the first movements of the soul, it is said, either in order or power, are to be referred to God. The first in order are those which we shared at the first moment of our birth, nutrition, growth, the senses, speech, mind, parts of the soul and body, the energies of these; in a word, our natural movements and conditions. The first in dignity and power are right actions, virtues, virtuous deeds.|| So again it is said of our higher faculties and requirements that no mortal is able to plant any of these, but only the unbegotten Artificer, who not only has made, but makes, them in everyone that is born.¶ We can reconcile

* Conf. Ling., l. c.

† *Ἀυτοκίνητον*.

|| SS. Ab. et Caini, 20 (I. 177).

‡ Quod det. pot. ins., 4 (I. 193).

§ Mundi Op., 52 (I. 36).

¶ Plantat. Noe, 7 (I. 334).

these passages with Philo's doctrine of the will only when we confine the self-movement to an exercise of choice, so that even the highest achievement of the human mind is nothing more than a voluntary acceptance of divine conditions.

We may explain in the same way two statements which at first sight seem opposed to a doctrine of free-will. Having declared that perception is generated from the mind itself, Philo adds a correction:—he is foolish who supposes that, according to true reason, anything at all is generated from the mind or from himself; “the mind is not the cause of anything, but only God, who is before the mind.”* Again, in a passage in which Philo protests against the impiety of making personal claims and forgetting God, he says that doing† is the property of God, and it is not allowable to ascribe this to anything begotten, for susceptibility‡ is the property of the begotten.§ The context in which these statements occur might induce us to make some reduction of their force; but they seem to deny to man, in the most unequivocal way, the power of absolute origination. They are not, however, inconsistent with the doctrine of will which we have unfolded, but leave room for an exercise of choice, which produces nothing new, but only determines which of two contingents shall become the actual.

From the will we proceed to the other faculty which gives man his pre-eminence over the brutes, the logos. In treating of this power Philo follows the lines with which we have become familiar in the Greek philosophy. The logos in man, like the breast-plate or logeion|| of the high-priest,¶ is twofold. The one has its seat in the sovereign mind itself, the other in the organs of speech; and they are accordingly distinguished as the internal and the uttered.** The former,

* Leg. All., II. 13 (I. 74-5).

† Τὸ ποιεῖν.

‡ Τὸ πάσχειν.

§ Cherub., 24 (I. 153).

|| Properly a speaking-place.

¶ See Ex. xxviii. 16.

** Ὁ ἐνδιάθετος and ὁ προφορικός. Vita Mosis, III. 13 (II. 154).

the power by virtue of which we are rational and participate in mind,* is also called *ὁ κατὰ διάνοιαν λογος*† or *ὁ ἐν διανοίᾳ*.‡ The latter, the faculty by which we converse,§ is sometimes called *ὁ κατὰ προφοράν*|| or *λόγος προφορᾶς*¶ or *γεγωνὸς λόγος*.** These are intimately connected with one another, for the mind or understanding, where the internal logos resides, is the fountain from which the receptacles of the uttered logos are filled, and through the latter all our thoughts flow forth, like streams gushing into the open day from their hiding-place in the ground.†† As a lyre or other musical instrument is silent unless it is struck, so the logos remains quiet if it is not struck by the sovereign principle within; and as instruments adapt themselves to the endless minglings of music, so the logos is responsive to circumstances, and receives untold modifications. For all kinds of persons, parents and children, relatives and strangers, citizens and foreigners, old and young, rich and poor, man and woman, it has its appropriate notes; and it adapts itself to the number, dignity, and importance of its subjects, sometimes elevating and sometimes subduing its tones. Therefore Moses called it Jubal,‡‡ which means “one turning another way,”§§ for it wavers like a balance or like a boat on a stormy sea, and like Jubal it is the parent of music.|||| The close union between the two logoi is expressed by Philo, in his peculiar allegorical way, through both the parental and the fraternal relation. Abraham, according to him, signifies the elect father of sound. Sound symbolizes the uttered logos; and father, the sovereign mind. For the

* Leg. All., II. 7 (I. 71).

† Vita Mos., I. c.; Quis rer. div. her., 1 (I. 473); Prof., 17 (I. 559). See also Congr. erud. gr., 6 (I. 524).

‡ Migrat. Abr., 13 (I. 447).

§ Leg. All., I. c.

|| Vita Mosis, I. c.; Migrat. Abr., 1 (I. 436); Post. Caini, 30 (I. 244); Ebriet., 16 (I. 367); Gigant., 11 (I. 270); Praem. Sacerd., 3 (II. 235).

¶ Prof., I. c.

** Vita Mos., I. c.; Leg. All., III. 40 (I. 111); Post. Caini, 31 (I. 245).

†† Quod det. pot. ins., 12 (I. 199); § 25, p. 209.

‡‡ Gen. iv. 21.

§§ Μετακλίνων.

|||| Post. Caini, 30-32 (I. 244-6).

internal logos is by nature the father of the vocal, being older, and secretly planting the words that are to be spoken.* In another sense, however, they are brothers; for they are both sprung from one mother, the rational nature. This relationship is symbolized chiefly through Moses and Aaron, for the latter was appointed to speak for Moses.† It is shown also by the statement that Jubal was the brother of Jobel‡ and by the direction in Numbers§ that “his brother shall minister,” which means that the mind of the virtuous man shall keep the dogmas of wisdom, but its brother the logos shall expound them to those who seek instruction.|| The connection is further expressed through the figure of a house. When Abraham was desired to leave his land and his kindred and his father’s house, this denoted that, when the soul is to be purified, it must quit the body, sensation, and the uttered logos. For the mind is, as we have seen, our father, and the logos [or speech] is the house in which it dwells, for therein it arranges and exhibits itself and all the thoughts which it generates.¶ Again, the uttered logos is repeatedly referred to as the interpreter** of the mind. As Aaron came forth to meet Moses, so the logos comes to meet our thoughts, which it then speaks and interprets, bringing them into clear light out of the invisible region of the understanding; and as Aaron rejoiced when he saw Moses, the logos rejoices whenever we know anything clearly, and is rich in significant and appropriate words.†† Hence it is important to bring each kind of logos to the highest perfection, that there may be a just correspondence between them; for many entertain admirable thoughts, but, not having cultivated the encyclical learning, are betrayed by their interpreter, as Abel, intent on

* Abraham., 18 (II. 13); Cherub., 2 (I. 139-40); Mutat. nom., 10 (I. 588).

† Migrat. Abr., 14 (I. 448); Quod det. pot. ins., 12 (I. 199); § 34, p. 215.

‡ Gen. iv. 21; Post. Cain., 30 (I. 244). § viii. 26.

|| Quod det. pot. ins., 19 (I. 204). ¶ Migrat. Abr., 1 (I. 436-7).

** Ἑρμηνεύς.

†† Quod det. pot. ins., 34-5 (I. 215-16).

immortal things, but undisciplined in eloquence, fell before the art rather than the strength of Cain ; and others on the contrary, like the Sophists, are most powerful in interpretation, but worthless in their thoughts.* When both are in a state of high efficiency, then " words come forth the immortal laws of an immortal soul."† But that which " has the rank of herald or interpreter to the suggesting mind "‡ does not always speak the truth, and for this reason it has been justly observed that ears are less trustworthy than eyes ; for the eyes are conversant with things themselves, but the ears only with words which are the interpreters of things, and not always faithful.§ From this we may readily deduce the highest virtues of the logos. They are symbolized by the urim and thummim, rendered by the LXX *δήλωσις* and *ἀλήθεια*, upon the double breast-plate of the high-priest. Of these, truth belongs to the internal logos, clearness to the uttered ; for the understanding ought not to admit any falsehood, or our faculty of interpretation to put any impediment in the way of the most exact explanation.||

In conclusion, we must notice the more important points affecting the sources of knowledge. It is perhaps superfluous to remark that Philo recognized the unity of human consciousness, and confined knowledge strictly to the mind itself. This he expressly affirms in the only instance in which the question was likely to arise. No sensible man, he declares, would say that the eyes see, but that the mind sees through the eyes, and similarly of the other senses,¶ or, in language less strict, the eyes see, but the mind more clearly through the

* Migrat. Abr., 13 sqq. (I. 447 sqq.)

† Mundi Op., 40 (I. 29).

‡ Somn., I. 5 (I. 625).

§ De Judice, 2 (II. 345). For the logos as interpreter see also Leg. All., I. 24 (I. 58), ὁ ἐρμηνευτικὸς λόγος: Quod det. pot. ins., 12 (I. 199) ; § 19, p. 204 ; Post. Caini, 32 (I. 246) ; Migrat. Ab., 39 (I. 471) ; Congr. erud. gr., 6 (I. 523), ἡ δὲ τῶν φωνητηρίων ὀργάνων ἐρμηνευτικὴ δύναμις; Vita Mos., III. 13 (II. 154).

|| Leg. All., III. 40-1 (I. 111) ; Vita Mos., l. c. ; Jud., 3 (II. 347).

¶ Post. Caini, 36 (I. 249).

eyes, and the ears hear, but the mind better through the ears, and the other senses apprehend their appropriate objects, but the understanding does so with greater purity; for it is, properly speaking, the eye of the eyes, and in general the sense of the senses,* using them like attendants in a court of justice, but itself judging the nature of the matters submitted to it.† The sources and criteria of knowledge are two—sensible perception and reason.‡ To each of these has been assigned its own council-chamber and court of justice, to the latter for the purpose of investigating intelligible things,§ to the former for the investigation of visible things.|| The end of the one is truth, that of the other opinion,¶ which, as attaching itself to probabilities, is characterized by instability and error.** In one passage, indeed, Philo casually says that there are three measures†† in us—perception, logos, and reason: the first, of perceptible things; the second, of names and words and things spoken; the third, of intelligible things.‡‡ This is not inconsistent with the previous statement, if we regard perception and reason as the sources of our primary notions, on the basis of which the logos, or discursive faculty, builds up a system of knowledge expressed in propositions.

Philo renders full justice to our lower organ of apprehension. That knowledge of the perceptible universe to which, as we have seen, he ascribed the origin of philosophy, was in itself a desirable thing, and could be obtained only through the intervention of the senses. The mind, sensible perception, and perceptible objects were connected together like a chain, and the two extremes were powerless without the uniting link, and without the mutual influence which it secured.§§ There was once a time when the mind had no converse with sensation. At that time, being by itself, it had no contact with body, but

* Αἰσθησίων αἰσθησις.

† Αἰσθησις and νοῦς or λογισμός.

‡ Ὁρατά.

** Ebriet., 41 (I. 383); Praem. et poen., 5 (II. 412-13).

†† Congr. erud. gr., 18 (I. 533).

† Congr. erud. gr., 25 (I. 540).

§ Νοητά.

¶ Δόξα.

‡‡ Μέτρα.

§§ Leg. All., I. 11 (I. 49).

was blind and powerless; not blind like one who has merely lost his sight and has compensation in the keenness of the other senses, but bereft of all sensational power, and severed from the material world by the thick darkness that was poured over it. In order that it might have apprehension not only of incorporeal things, but of solid bodies, this feeble half of a perfect soul was brought to its completion by the inweaving of the other portion which Scripture has symbolically named woman or Eve. The latter, the moment it was created, flooded the mind with light, and, dispersing the mist, presented the world clearly to the view; and the mind, as one illumined with solar radiance flashing out of night, or arising from a deep sleep, or as a blind man to whom sight is suddenly restored, encountered in a multitude all created things, and exercised every sense upon its appropriate objects, and inclined to those things that produced pleasures, and turned away from those that created pains.* Thus perception is that which nourishes our mind,† and Scripture has rightly represented its symbol Eve as having been created to help the mind Adam; for how, without the help of vision, can our mind perceive that this is white or black, or, without the help of the ear, that the voice of the singer is sweet or out of tune?‡ Through these windows perception enters, and impresses on the waxen tablet of the mind the representations of material things; and through these the mind peeps forth and surveys the splendour and beauty of the cosmos; and he who beholds with keener eye not only sees a glorious world, but “looks through nature up to nature’s God.”§

But Philo ascribes to the senses even a more extended function. They are the starting-point of all our intellectual apprehension. It is not possible for us to conceive any incor-

* Cherub., 18, 19 (I. 149-50).

† Plantat. Noe, 32 (I. 349).

‡ Leg. All., II. 3 (I. 68).

§ Fragments, II. 665, answering to Qu. et Sol. in Gen., II. 34; Mund. Op., 59 (I. 40).

poral existence except by taking the beginning from bodies ; for from bodies at rest space was apprehended by thought,* and from those in motion time. Similarly, the whole intelligible cosmos, consisting of ideas, can be apprehended in no other way than by ascent from the perceptible.† Philo, however, does not confound the sensible perception with the intellectual intuition. The bodily eyes behold only the surfaces of visible things, but the understanding penetrates the depths of bodies, and surveys the natures of incorporeal things, which sensible perception is unable to view.‡ Henceforth nature supplies to the mind perceptible things through the senses, but, without these, whatever is apprehensible by reason.§

Owing to the analogy between the two orders of apprehension, Philo often speaks of the eye of the soul.|| The mind has its visions which transcend the sphere of the senses ; and if the eye sees sensible things, the mind no less truly sees the intelligible.¶ The latter, such as species, genus, thought, are apprehensible by intelligence alone, and may be viewed by the mind when it has stripped off the whole bodily frame and run away from the mob of the senses.** The eye requires the aid of light before the seer and the seen can communicate with one another, but the soul sees by itself without the co-operation of anything else, for noumena are a light to themselves. In the same way we are taught the sciences ; for the mind, directing its unclosed and sleepless eye upon doctrines and theories, sees them, not by spurious, but by genuine light which has shone from itself.†† Compared with this intelligible and incorporeal light of truth, that which illumines the senses is as night in comparison with day.‡‡ But so far is Philo from applying to intuition the test of universality that he regards it as a

* *Ἐνοηθῆναι*.

† Fort., 3 (II. 377).

|| Post. Caini, 2 (I. 227), &c.

** Somn., I. 8 (I. 627).

†† Vita Mos., III. 37 (II. 177).

† Somn., I. 32 (I. 648-9).

§ Special. leg., III. 20 (II. 318).

¶ Mund. Op., 17 (I. 12).

†† Mutat. Nom., 1 (I. 579).

growing faculty. The impure are, in his view, incapable of having those elevated ideas which are revealed by a genuine philosophy. By the impure he means those that have either not been instructed at all, or have been instructed perversely and forged the beauty of wisdom into the ugliness of sophistry. These being unable to see the intelligible light on account of the weakness of the soul's eye, as though spending their time in the night, disbelieve those that live in the day, and suppose that the sun-lit visions which the latter relate resemble the portents and apparitions of a juggler's tricks. Here, however, as is shown by the examples which follow, Philo is not so much discussing the philosophical nature of intuition as dwelling on two points of view from which all things alike may be regarded. He shows that what to one order of mind is wealth, to another is poverty; what to one is the crowning glory of citizenship, to another is exile. It is that the lower mind, with its dim understanding, is the slave of opinion, and depends upon the senses, while the higher contemplates the ideal and divine, and drinks from the stream of Wisdom, who, being incapable of envy, never closes her hall of meditation, but freely admits everyone that thirsts.*

One general characteristic, affecting both classes of knowledge, is that hardly anything is known from and by itself, but is tested by comparison with its contrary; for instance, the little by comparison with the great, the dry with the wet, the hot with the cold, the light with the heavy, the black with the white, the weak with the strong, the few with the many. Similarly, in regard to moral good and evil, the beneficial is known through the injurious, the noble by contrast with the base, the just and good generally by comparison with the unjust and bad. This is only part of an elaborate impeachment of the certainty of human knowledge; for that which is incompetent to bear witness to itself, and requires the

* Quod omn. prob. lib , 1, 2 (II. 445-7).

advocacy of something else, is insecure. But Philo dwells, in a long passage, upon many other considerations which make this uncertainty apparent.

If we always received the same unaltered impressions from the same things, we might trust our two criteria, but since, in fact, we are differently affected by them, we can make no secure affirmation about anything. There are several causes for this variability in our impressions. See, for instance, the countless differences among animals, which vary from one another in almost every respect. See the changing hue of the chameleon and the sea-polypus, and the neck of the dove flashing innumerable colours in the rays of the sun. It is said, too, that there is among the Scythians a rare animal, called *tarandos*,* as large as an ox and with a face like a stag's, which always changes its fur to suit the country and the trees, so that it escapes notice and is difficult to hunt. Amongst men there is the same instability. Not only do they judge the same things differently at different times, but what one man likes, another dislikes. Philo often saw this exemplified at the theatre, where the music that raised some to enthusiasm was heard with indifference or aversion by others. Even in the same man how numerous the changes. The same things affect us differently according as we are in health or in sickness, awake or asleep, young or old, stationary or in motion, bold or timid, in sorrow or in joy, moved by friendship or by hatred. Our perceptions are influenced also by posture and by the places in which things are. Fishes in the sea, when they expand their fins, appear larger than the natural size; and oars, though perfectly straight, look bent in the water. At a distance lifeless things are sometimes taken for animals, and animated things for lifeless; stationary objects are supposed to be in motion, and those in motion to be stationary; bodies which are approaching appear to recede, and those which are retreating to come nearer; things of great size look very small, and polygons seem circular. [We need not pursue this class of illustration further; but] we must notice the effect of education, and hereditary customs, and ancient laws, which differ not only in nations and cities, but even in every village and household. From this circumstance arises an endless diversity in the estimation of the base and the noble, the becoming and the unbecoming, the just and unjust, lawful and unlawful, praiseworthy and blamable. It is no wonder if the multitude, who are taught from the cradle to be the slaves of custom and law, believe what has been once committed to them, and give and withhold their assent without investigation. But philosophers are no less discordant in their judgments, and hold conflicting opinions on almost every subject of inquiry, not agreeing even in such fundamental subjects

* Perhaps reindeer or elk.

as the being and providence of God, the nature of the good, and the ends for which we ought to live. The conclusion follows that we must not be too positive in our affirmations, but be content to suspend our judgment.*

From the point of view, then, of mere human philosophy, Philo deliberately adopts the formula of the Sceptics; and if instead of being a Sceptic he was an Eclectic, this result was due to his recognition of a supernatural source of knowledge in the Holy Scriptures. That knowledge of the Supreme which the most approved philosophy taught to her votaries came to the Jews through laws and customs in fulfilment of a divine promise.† The faith which he derived from this venerable source was brought by Philo as a test to the great problems of philosophy; and if he believed that it was possible, through a wisely directed culture, to attain to the clear and direct intuition of truth, it was here that he recognized the ultimate ground of certitude. The learning of the Greeks only supplied the mould in which his thought was cast; the material was drawn from the best traditions of Hebrew piety. And while he endeavoured to justify by philosophical reasoning the revelations of faith, it was always as a Jewish believer and disciple of Moses that he addressed his appeal to his countrymen and to mankind.

* Ebriet, 41-9 (I. 383-8).

† Human., 2 (II. 386).



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